Com. v. Feitl, N. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S58013-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    NICHOLAS C. FEITL                          :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 152 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 5, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-10-CR-0002389-2016
    BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED DECEMBER 19, 2018
    Appellant, Nicholas C. Feitl, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered on January 5, 2018, following his guilty plea for statutory sexual
    assault and indecent assault.1           Upon review, we vacate the portion of
    Appellant’s sentence for statutory sexual assault that required him to register
    pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42
    Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10–9799.41. We affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence
    in all other respects.
    We briefly summarize the relevant facts and procedural history of this
    case as follows.      In August 2016, Appellant, who was 29 years old at the
    time, engaged in sexual misconduct with a fourteen-year-old female. On
    October 20, 2017, Appellant pled guilty to the aforementioned charges. On
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3122.1(a)(1) and 3126(a)(3), respectively.
    J-S58013-18
    December 28, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 18 to 42 months
    of incarceration followed by a year of probation for statutory sexual assault
    with a consecutive term of 12 months of probation for indecent assault. On
    January 5, 2018, the trial court sua sponte entered an order correcting the
    original sentencing order to reflect the proper statutory section for statutory
    sexual assault as pled by Appellant.           On January 5, 2018, the trial court
    notified Appellant that he was required to register pursuant to Tier II 2 of
    SORNA for both of his sex offenses. This timely appeal resulted.3
    ____________________________________________
    2 For purposes of sex offender registration, SORNA classifies sexual offenders
    into the following three tiers:
    Those convicted of Tier I offenses are subject to registration for a
    period of fifteen years and are required to verify their registration
    information and be photographed, in person at an approved
    registration site, annually. 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9799.15(a)(1), (e)(1).
    Those convicted of Tier II offenses are subject to registration for
    a period of twenty-five years and are required to verify their
    registration information and be photographed, in person at an
    approved registration site, semi-annually. 42 Pa.C.S.[A.]
    § 9799.15(a)(2), (e)(2).
    Those convicted of Tier III offenses are subject to lifetime
    registration and are required to verify their registration
    information and be photographed, in person at an approved
    registration site, quarterly. 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9799.15(a)(3),
    (e)(3).
    Commonwealth v. Muniz, 
    164 A.3d 1189
    , 1206-1207 (Pa. 2017).
    3 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on January 23, 2018. On February 12,
    2018, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied
    timely on February 13, 2018. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to
    -2-
    J-S58013-18
    On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
    I.     Whether the trial court erred, as a matter of law, by
    sentencing Appellant to a SORNA registration period in
    excess of the statutory maximum for the qualifying offense?
    II.    Whether the trial court erred, as a matter of law, by
    indicating on the record that [Appellant] would be subject
    to SORNA registration for an offense not included therein?
    Appellant’s Brief at 18.
    For ease of disposition, we will examine Appellant’s second issue first.
    In his second issue presented, Appellant contends that the trial court erred as
    a matter of law by ordering him to register as a Tier II offender under SORNA
    for statutory sexual assault, because there is no statutory authority for
    registration for that offense. Appellant’s Brief at 45-46. The Commonwealth
    concedes this point. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 12. Upon our review, 18
    Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1(a)(1), the crime to which Appellant pled guilty, is not one
    of the enumerated crimes constituting a Tier II offense. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9799.14 (sexual offenses and tier system). As such, we vacate the portion
    of Appellant’s sentence requiring him to register as a Tier II offender for
    statutory sexual assault. “If this Court determines that a sentence must be
    corrected, we are empowered to either amend the sentence directly or to
    remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.”     Commonwealth v.
    Benchoff, 
    700 A.2d 1289
    , 1294 (Pa. Super. 1997).          Because there is no
    ____________________________________________
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on March 2, 2018, requesting “that the judgment of
    sentence be vacated and that the case be remanded for reconsideration of the
    convictions in light of the holding[] in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 
    164 A.3d 1189
     (Pa. 2017).” Trial Court Opinion, 3/2/2018, at *1 (unpaginated).
    -3-
    J-S58013-18
    additional action necessary by the trial court, we amend Appellant’s sentence
    for statutory sexual assault directly and conclude resentencing is unwarranted
    on this issue.
    In his first issue presented, relying principally upon our Supreme Court’s
    decision in Muniz, Appellant argues:
    [R]egistration pursuant to SORNA should be declared
    unconstitutional as the statutorily prescribed periods of
    registration therein exceed the maximum sentences annexed to
    the corresponding crimes.          More specifically, as applied to
    Appellant, 25 years registration under SORNA constitutes an
    illegal sentence as it inflicts punishment in excess of his maximum
    sentence under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(3)[(indecent assault)].[4]
    As such, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
    25[-]year registration portion of his sentence.
    Appellant’s Brief at 45. As previously mentioned, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion,
    the trial court requests that we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and
    remand for reconsideration in light of Muniz. Trial Court Opinion, 3/2/2018,
    at *1 (unpaginated).         However, this Court recently rejected the precise
    argument Appellant currently advances. See Commonwealth v. Strafford,
    
    194 A.3d 168
    , 173 (Pa. Super. 2018) (SORNA’s registration requirements are
    authorized punitive measures separate and apart from a defendant’s term of
    incarceration, the legislature did not limit the authority of the court to impose
    registration requirements only within the maximum allowable term of
    ____________________________________________
    4 Our amendment of Appellant’s sentence striking his registration requirement
    for statutory sexual assault does not render this issue moot. Even after
    amendment, Appellant retains a 25-year, Tier II registration requirement for
    his indecent assault conviction.
    -4-
    J-S58013-18
    incarceration, and, in fact, the legislature requires courts to impose
    registration requirements in excess of the maximum allowable term of
    incarceration). Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first issue
    presented.
    Judgment of sentence vacated and amended in part and affirmed in all
    other respects. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/19/2018
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 152 WDA 2018

Filed Date: 12/19/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024