Com. v. Adams, H. ( 2018 )

J-S66012-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
HAROLD T. ADAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 4036 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 4, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003268-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 19, 2018
Appellant, Harold T. Adams, appeals from the amended judgment of
sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following
his jury trial convictions for rape of a child, involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse, unlawful contact with a minor, endangering the welfare of a child,
and corruption of a minor.1 We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly set forth most of the
relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no
reason to restate them. We add that, on November 2, 2017, Appellant filed
a request to submit supplemental post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc along
with supplemental post-sentence motions challenging the sexually violent
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3123(a)(1), 6318(a)(1), 4304(a)(1), and
6301(a)(1), respectively.
J-S66012-18
predator (“SVP”) designation. On November 20, 2017, this Court vacated
denial of Appellant’s post-sentence motions and expressly granted an
additional 30 days for the court to rule on the supplemental post-sentence
motions. On December 4, 2017, the court granted the supplemental post-
sentence motion to strike the SVP designation, denied the motion in all other
respects, and entered an amended sentencing order without the SVP
designation. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on December 6, 2017.
On December 8, 2017, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); Appellant timely
complied on December 21, 2017.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PROSECUTION’S MOTION IN LIMINE LIMITING THE
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF OTHER ALLEGATIONS OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT[?] THE COMPLAINANT ACCUSED HER
BROTHER OF SEXUAL ABUSE DURING THE SAME TIME
FRAME AS THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST APPELLANT. THIS
SAME BROTHER TESTIFIED AT TRIAL. THE ACCUSATIONS
AGAINST HER BROTHER WERE RELEVANT TO SHOW BIAS
AND MOTIVE TO FABRICATE. THE ACCUSATIONS WERE
PROPER IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
COMPLAINANT, THE COMPLAINANT’S MOTHER AND THE
COMPLAINANT’S BROTHER.
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
PROSECUTION’S OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFENSE LINE OF
QUESTIONING SEEKING TO ELICIT EVIDENCE THAT THE
VICTIM’S BROTHER WAS BEHAVING POORLY, AND THAT
THIS BEHAVIOR LED TO THE BREAKDOWN IN THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPELLANT AND HIS FAMILY[?]
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
PROSECUTION’S OBJECTION TO THE DEFENSE LINE OF
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J-S66012-18
QUESTIONING SEEKING TO IMPEACH THE TESTIMONY OF
COMPLAINANT’S MOTHER REGARDING HER MOTIVE AND
BIAS IN REGARD TO THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST
COMPLAINANT’S BROTHER[?] THE QUESTIONING WAS
RELEVANT ON ITS OWN AND BOTH FAIR RESPONSE TO AND
COMPLETION OF THE PROSECUTION’S REDIRECT OF THE
WITNESS.
WHETHER APPELLANT SHOULD BE AWARDED AN ARREST
OF JUDGMENT ON THE CHARGES OF RAPE OF A CHILD,
INVOLUNTARY DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITH A
CHILD, UNLAWFUL CONTACT WITH A MINOR,
ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD, CORRUPTION OF
A MINOR, INDECENT ASSAULT OF A PERSON LESS THAN 13
YEARS OF AGE, AS THE GREATER WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE VERDICT[?] THE
GREATER WEIGHT DID NOT SUPPORT ANY PROPOSITION
FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AS A PRINCIPAL, AN
ACCOMPLICE OR A CONSPIRATOR AND THE GREATER
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT ANY
FINDING OF SPECIFIC INTENT, AND, HENCE, A NEW TRIAL
IS REQUIRED. THE VERDICT WAS BASED ON
SPECULATION, CONJECTURE AND SURMISE.
(Appellant’s Brief at 5-6).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Donna M.
Woelpper, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court
opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions
presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed April 27, 2018, at 3-7) (finding:
(1-3) contrary to Appellant’s claims, court permitted Appellant to question
Victim about allegations she had made against her brother and about Victim’s
failure to disclose Appellant’s abuse when she reported her brother; other than
for purposes of this line of questioning, evidence that Victim had accused her
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J-S66012-18
brother of—and that he had admitted—inappropriately touching Victim was
irrelevant to allegations against Appellant; Victim’s allegations against her
brother were unrelated to Appellant’s sex acts on Victim and did not serve in
any way to exculpate Appellant; court permitted Appellant to ask Victim if she
recalled her mother and Appellant arguing about her brother between time
Victim disclosed Appellant’s abuse and time Appellant moved out of family
home; Victim said she did not recall argument; court also allowed Appellant
to question Victim’s mother directly about reason(s) her relationship with
Appellant ended; court further permitted Appellant to ask Victim’s brother
about why Appellant left family home and specifically whether Victim’s mother
and Appellant had argued about Victim’s brother’s behavior; thus, Appellant’s
evidentiary challenges merit no relief; (4) Victim testified about 4 specific
incidents in which Appellant either forced her to perform sex acts on him or
forcibly performed sex acts on her; jury found Victim’s testimony credible;
verdict was hardly shocking and not against weight of evidence). Accordingly,
we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/19/18
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J .,1.. Circulated 11/28/2018 02:21 PM
)
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
·'
:2018 APR 2 7 PH I : 2 8 FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PgNNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
I
:OFFlCE Of JUDICIAL RECOROS
CRIMIMAL DIVISION
FIRST JUOIClt�L DISTRICT
Of PH!IG(jjrvj,M(l)NWEAL TH OF CP-5l-CR-0003268-2015
PENNSYLVANIA
V,
SUPERIOR COURT
HAROLD ADAMS 4036 EDA 2017
OPINION
WOELPPER, J. APRIL 27, 2018
I. PROCEDURAL & FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 10, 2017, a jury found Harold Adams ("defendant") guilty of rape of a child,1
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child.i unlawful contact with a minor.' endangering
the welfare of a child," and corruption of minors.5 On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency and
weight of the evidence and several of this Court's evidentiary rulings. His claims are meritless.
When K.R. was eight years old, she lived on Mercy Street in Philadelphia with her mother,
older brother (Z.B.), and stepfather (defendant). Defendant often watched K.R. while her mother
was at work. On one occasion when defendant was watching K.R., the two were in K.R. 's
mother's room watching television. Defendant told K.R. to get on top of him. K.R. said no, so
defendant pulled her on top of hip and began to rub his penis against her leg. He then told K.R. to
CP·51-CR-0003268-2015 Comm. v. Adams, Harold T.
Opinion
1 18 Pa.C.S. §312l(c).
II Ill I II 111111111111111
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(b).
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 63 I 8(a)( I). II
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(I). 8102405851
5 18 Pa.C.S. § 630J(a)(l)(ii).
"hump" him and assured her that he would not tel1 anyone. K.R. told defendant to let her go: He
did so only after he had finished rubbing himself against her. N.T. 3/8/17, 33-39.
On another occasion, when K.R, was nine years old, she and defendant were in the living
room. Defendant told her to suck his penis. When she said no, defendant got up, grabbed K.R.,
and forced his penis into her mouth. Id. at 40-43.
The sexual abuse soon escalated. When K.R. was still nine years old, defendant took off
her clothes as she lay on the bed and penetrated her vagina with his penis. She told him to stop
and that it hurt. He responded, "Just take it." Id. at 49. This happened on more than one occasion.
Id. at 45-50.
Defendant also assaulted K.R. in the basement of their home. K.R. was downstairs playing
Xbox. Defendant told her to go into the back.room of the basement, where he kept his exercise
equipment. He laid her down on her back on a weight-lifting bench, removed her clothing, and
penetrated her vagina with his penis. Id at 51-52.
K.R. testified that 'on another occasion, when she was approximately ten years old,
defendant told her that he had put his "dick" in her vagina v.:hile she was sleeping. Although she
did not recall the penetration, she did remember waking up and feeling "pressure" in her vagina.
Id. at 55-57.
In February, 2014, when K.R. was almost ten and one-half years old, she told her brother
Z.B. about the abuse. Z.B. told her to tell their mother, which she did. K.R. 's mother did not
immediately report the abuse to the police. Instead, she allowed defendant to continue living at
the house while plotting to take matters into her own hands and kill him. After a few weeks, K.R. 's
mother abandoned that plan. She eventually reported the abuse to the police in January, 2015. Id.
at 57, 65·67, 175-184.
2
After the jury found defendant guilty of the above offenses, this Court deferred sentencing
for a presentence investigation, mental health evaluation, and an evaluation by the Sexual
Offenders Assessment Board. On July 21, 20 I 7, the Court sentenced defendant to eighteen to
thirty-six years of imprisonment. He filed a timely post-sentence motion, which this Court denied
on November 2, 2017. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
On sufficiency review, al1 evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict
winner to determine whether "there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756
(Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014). The Commonwealth may meet its
burden "by means of wholly circumstantial evidence." Id Finally, the reviewing court "may not
weigh the evidence and substitute [its] judgment for the fact-finder." Id.Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining the convictions on the
basis that "[t]he Commonwealth did not prove that the [d]efendant was a principal, an accomplice
or a conspirator to the acts in question." Statement of Errors, 1 I. K.R. testified, however, that
defendant assaulted her on multiple occasions while she was in his care. The jury found K.R.'s
testimony was credible evidence to prove that it was defendant who perpetrated the offenses.
Defendant also. argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he "acted with specific
intent to endanger the welfare of a child or corrupt the morals .of a minor ... " Id · A defendant is
guilty of endangering the welfare of a child if the Commonwealth proves that he is a "parent,
guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age" and that "he
knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating the duty of care, protection or support.''
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(l ). A "person supervising the welfare of a child" is someone "other than a
parent or guardian that provides care, education, training or control of a child." Id. at (a)(3).
Someone is guilty of corrupting the morals of a minor ifhe is over the age of 18 and "by any course
of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses) corrupts or tends to corrupt the
morals of any minor less than 18 years ofage ... " 18 Pa.C.S. § 630J(a)(l)(ii). Here, the evidence
established that defendant (who was over age 18) was responsible for watching K.R. when she was
between eight and ten years old while her mother was at work. The evidence further established
that while supervising K. R., defendant directed her to rub against his groin, perform oral sex on
.
him, and ultimately submit to vaginal sex. When K.R. refused, defendant physically forced
himself upon her by picking her up and sitting her on top of him as he rubbed his genitals against
her, by forcing his penis into her mouth and into her vagina, by dismissing her pleas to stop, and
by ignoring K.R.'s complaints of pain. This purposeful and forceful conduct was sufficient to
sustain the convictions for endangering the welfare of a child and corrupting the morals of a minor.
N.T. 3/8/17, 33-52; 3/9/17, 103.
B. Weight ofthe Evidence
Defendant next claims that this court erred in denying his weight of the evidence claim. A
defendant is not entitled to a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim unless the verdict
"is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice." Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949
A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 2008). Appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge palpably abused
its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for a new trial. Id. As such, a "trial court's denial
of a motion for a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its
rulings." Id. at 879-80.
Defendant argues the "verdict was based on speculation, conjecture and surmise."
Statement of Errors, , 2. It was not. K.R. testified to four specific incidents in which defendant
either forced her to perform sexual acts upon him while she was in his care, or forcibly performed
sexual acts upon her. The guilty verdict based on this testimony- which the jury found credible
- was hardly shocking.
C. Evidentiary Rulings
Defendant challenges three of the Court's evidentiary rulings. "It is well-established that
the admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, and such rulings will not
form the basis for appelJate relief absent an abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Hoover, 107
A.3d 723, 729 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation and citation omitted). An abuse of discretion· is not
found "merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires
a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of
support so as to be clearly erroneous." Id.Defendant claims the following errors:
The Court erred in granting the Prosecution's Motion in Limine
limiting the introduction of evidence of other alJegations of sexual
assault. The complainant accused her brother of sexual abuse during
the same time frame as the accusations against Defendant. This
same brother testified at trial. The accusations against her brother
were relevant to show bias and motive to fabricate. The accusations
were proper impeachment evidence against the complainant, the
complainant's mother and the complainant's brother.
The Court erred in sustaining the Prosecution's objections to the
Defense line of questioning seeking to elicit evidence that the
complainant's brother was behaving poorly, and that this behavior
led to the break down in the relationship between the Defendant and
his family.
The Court erred in sustaining the Prosecution's objections to the
Defense line of questioning seeking to impeach the testimony of
. complainant's mother's testimony regarding her motive and bias in
5
regard to the accusations against complainant's brother. The
questioning was relevant on its own and both fair response to and
completion of the Prosecution's redirect of the witness.
Statement of Errors,,, 3-5 (internal citations to record omitted).
Contrary to defendant's claims of error, this Court did permit defendant to question K.R.
concerning the allegations against K.R. 's brother and her failure to disclose the abuse by defendant
at the time she reported the abuse by her brother. N.T. 3/8/17, 79-84. Other than for purposes of
this line of questioning, evidence that K.R. had accused her brother of-and that he had admitted
to-inappropriately touching her was not relevant to the allegations against defendant. The
allegations neither related to the specific acts of defendant, nor did they in any way serve to
exculpate him. See Commonwealth v. Fink, 791 A.2d 1235, 1243-44 (Pa. Super. 2002) (evidence
of victim's prior sexual abuse inadmissible where it neither establishes victim's bias against
defendant nor serves to exonerate defendant).
The Court also permitted defendant to ask K.R. if she recalled her mother and defendant.
arguing about her brother between the time K.R . disclosed defendant's abuse and the time he
moved out of the family home. N.T. 3/8/17, 111-112. K.R. said she did not. Defendant was also
given significant leeway to question K.R. 'smother directly about the reason(s) that her relationship
with defendant ended. N.T. 3/9/17, 13. Finally, defendant was permitted to ask Z.B. about the
reason defendant left the home, and specifically whether defendant and K.R.'s mother had argued
about Z.B. 's behavior. Id. at 88. Accordingly, the Court's evidentiary rulings were not an abuse
of discretion.
6
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons herein> defendant's judgment of sentence should be affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
7
' � I o,
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIRST JUDlCIAJ, DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
'CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF CP-51-CR-0003268-20 I 5
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
SUPERIOR COURT
HAROLD ADAMS 4036 EDA 2017
PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am thi� �ay of April, 2018, serving the foregoing Opinion on the persons
indicated below, by first class mail:
Joseph Schultz f:Slj,
1518 Walnut s/reet, Suite 808
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Lawrence Goode, Supervisor
Appeals Unit
District Attorney's Office
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia, PA 19107
{¥., 2),, '//.--
Anna Dillon
Secretary to the Honorable Donna M. Woelpper
8