Com. v. Samuels, G. ( 2018 )


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  • J. S70009/18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :           PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                    :
    :
    GREGORY SAMUELS,                          :         No. 4088 EDA 2017
    :
    Appellant      :
    Appeal from the PCRA Order, December 5, 2017,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0609081-2000
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:              FILED DECEMBER 20, 2018
    Gregory Samuels appeals pro se from the December 5, 2017 order
    denying his third petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (“PCRA”)1 as untimely. After careful review, we affirm.
    The PCRA court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history
    of this case as follows:
    On September 6, 1999, [appellant] fatally shot his
    girlfriend, Bathsheba Woodall, in Philadelphia.
    U.S. Marshalls apprehended [appellant] several
    months later in Jamaica.        On March 23, 2001,
    following a jury trial presided over by the Honorable
    James A. Lineberger, [appellant] was convicted of
    first-degree murder and possession of an instrument
    of crime (“PIC”).[2] On the same date, the trial court
    sentenced [appellant] to life imprisonment for the
    1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
    2   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a) and 907(a), respectively.
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    murder conviction and a lesser, consecutive term of
    incarceration for the     PIC conviction.       On
    November 14, 2002, following a direct appeal, the
    Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence.
    [See Commonwealth v. Samuels, 
    816 A.2d 334
    (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 
    863 A.2d 1145
    (Pa. 2004).]    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    denied allocatur on November 12, 2004. [Id.]
    While his petition for allowance of appeal was still
    pending before our Supreme Court, [appellant] filed
    his first pro se PCRA petition on November 7,
    2003.[Footnote 4]      Counsel was appointed who
    subsequently filed a Turner/Finley “no-merit”
    letter.[Footnote 5] After conducting an independent
    review,    the   PCRA    court   denied   relief on
    November 23, 2004 and granted counsel leave to
    withdraw.    On May 3, 2006, the Superior Court
    affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of post-conviction
    relief. [See Commonwealth v. Samuels, 
    903 A.2d 51
     (Pa.Super. 2006).]      [Appellant] did not seek
    allocatur in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
    [Footnote 4] Although [appellant’s] PCRA
    petition was premature, the PCRA court
    did not finally rule on his petition until
    after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    denied his petition for allowance of
    appeal. Accordingly, the PCRA court
    deemed [appellant’s] petition timely filed
    on November 13, 2004, the day after our
    Supreme Court denied allowance of
    appeal.
    [Footnote   5]   Commonwealth     v.
    Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988), and
    Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
    [Appellant] was subsequently unsuccessful in
    obtaining post-conviction relief through a serial PCRA
    petition filed in 2012. [See Commonwealth v.
    Samuels, 
    122 A.3d 1141
     (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal
    denied, 
    126 A.3d 1284
     (Pa. 2015).]
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    On January 24, 2017, [appellant] filed the instant
    pro se PCRA petition, his third. [Appellant] filed an
    amended petition [on May 2, 2017] which was
    reviewed jointly with his initial petition. Pursuant to
    Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907,
    Petitioner was served notice of the PCRA court’s
    intention to dismiss his petition on November 16,
    2017. [Appellant] did not submit a response to the
    Rule 907 notice. On December 5, 2017, the PCRA
    court dismissed his PCRA petition as untimely. On
    December 12, 2017, the instant notice of appeal was
    timely filed to the Superior Court.
    PCRA court opinion, 4/16/18 at 1-2 (additional footnotes omitted).3
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    1.    Is the after discovered fact is [sic] readily
    available in public domain, and should be
    considered previously known facts?
    2.    Does pro se prisoner have readily available
    access to public information?
    Appellant’s brief at 8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).4
    Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition
    is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is
    supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller,
    
    102 A.3d 988
    , 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s
    findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in
    3The PCRA court did not order appellant to file a concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On April 16,
    2018, the PCRA court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
    4 Appellant’s pro se brief does not contain pagination; for the ease of our
    discussion, we have assigned each page a corresponding number.
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    the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 
    90 A.3d 1
    , 4 (Pa.Super.
    2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings
    of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the
    record could support a contrary holding.”       Commonwealth v. Hickman,
    
    799 A.2d 136
    , 140 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted).          Additionally, we
    note that, “[a]lthough this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed
    by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the
    appellant[.]”    Commonwealth v. Adams, 
    882 A.2d 496
    , 498 (Pa.Super.
    2005) (citation omitted).
    All PCRA petitions, including second and subsequent petitions, must be
    filed within one year of when a defendant’s judgment of sentence becomes
    final.    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).      “A judgment becomes final at the
    conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
    Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
    expiration of the time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
    If a PCRA petition is untimely, a court lacks jurisdiction over the petition.
    Commonwealth v. Callahan, 
    101 A.3d 118
    , 120-121 (Pa.Super. 2014).
    Here, appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on February 10,
    2005, 90 days after our supreme court denied allowance of appeal and the
    deadline for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of
    the United States expired.      See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).       Accordingly,
    appellant had until February 10, 2006, to file a timely PCRA petition. See
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    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant’s instant petition, filed nearly 11 years
    later on January 24, 2017, is patently untimely. As a result, the PCRA court
    lacked jurisdiction to review appellant’s petition, unless appellant alleged
    and proved one of the statutory exceptions to the time-bar, as set forth in
    Section 9545(b)(1).
    To invoke an exception under Section 9545(b)(1), a petitioner must
    allege and prove:
    (i)       the failure to raise the claim previously was the
    result of interference by government officials
    with the presentation of the claim in violation
    of   the     Constitution    or  laws    of  this
    Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
    the United States;
    (ii)      the facts upon which the claim is predicated
    were unknown to the petitioner and could not
    have been ascertained by the exercise of due
    diligence; or
    (iii)     the right asserted is a constitutional right that
    was recognized by the Supreme Court of the
    United States or the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
    this section and has been held by that court to
    apply retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
    The crux of appellant’s argument is that his recent discovery of
    allegations of police misconduct on the part of Detective Thomas Augustine,
    the detective who took his statement in this case approximately 18 years
    ago, satisfies the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA time-bar.
    (Appellant’s          brief   at   1-2.)      Appellant    alleges   he      discovered
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    Detective Augustine’s misconduct from a Philadelphia Daily News article
    that circulated during his “lifer’s association meeting” at SCI-Dallas on
    January 8, 2017, which in turn led him to discover the United States District
    Court’s decision in Hill v. Wetzel, 
    279 F.Supp.3d 550
     (E.D. Pa. 2016).
    (Id.; see also amended PCRA petition, 5/2/17 at unnumbered page 6, ¶ 23
    and Exhibit B.)        In Hill, the United States District Court set forth
    Detective Augustine’s     misconduct    in   taking    two     defendants’         sworn
    statements “in the infamous 1995 ‘center city jogger’ case.”                See Hill,
    279 F.Supp.3d at 558 n.9. This claim is meritless.
    Contrary     to    appellant’s   contention,     we     find   the     fact    that
    Detective Augustine was involved in misconduct in unrelated cases does not
    constitute a newly discovered fact that would invoke the protections afforded
    by Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Rather, the alleged newly discovered fact simply
    supports a previously known “fact,” and therefore does not satisfy the
    exception to the time-bar.       “[T]he focus of [the newly discovered fact]
    exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or
    newly willing source for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v.
    Fennell, 
    180 A.3d 778
    , 782 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted), appeal
    denied, 
    192 A.3d 1111
     (Pa. 2018).            Moreover, appellant has failed to
    present a scintilla of verifiable evidence to support his contention that
    Detective Augustine coerced or engaged in any misconduct whatsoever in
    the taking of appellant’s statement in the case sub judice.               Additionally,
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    even    if   appellant’s   claim   met       the   underlying     requirements    of
    Section 9545(b)(1), he still would not be entitled to any relief. Appellant has
    failed to demonstrate that he brought this exception to the PCRA time-bar
    within 60 days of the date it could have been presented, as required by
    Section 9545(b)(2).        Hill was decided on November 10, 2016; the
    Philadelphia     Daily     News    article    in   question     was   published   on
    November 17, 2016; and appellant did not file the instant pro se PCRA
    petition until January 24, 2017.
    Based on the foregoing, we discern no error on the part of the PCRA
    court in dismissing appellant’s third PCRA petition as untimely.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/20/18
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