Com. v. Craig, R. ( 2017 )

J-S95012-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RAYMOND CRAIG
Appellant No. 407 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 15, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0011797-2007
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2017
Appellant Raymond Craig appeals from the January 15, 2016 order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which denied his request
for collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (the “Act”), 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history underlying this appeal are
undisputed. As a prior panel of this Court recounted on Appellant’s direct
appeal:
On July 29-30, 2009, this court conducted a jury trial. The
victim Modibo Ballo (“Ballo”) testified first for the
Commonwealth. Ballo testified that on September 23, 2007, in
the early morning hours, he was inside his home at 1017 South
55th Street in the city of Philadelphia. Ballo stated that he had
lived in this house since June 2007. He stated that he was
making repairs and was in the process of purchasing the home.
Ballo stated that he had a sofa, entertainment center, and six
speakers in his living room. On the morning of September 23,
2007, he went downstairs and found his front door open and
discovered that two speakers and one amp were missing from
his living room. He called 911 and then looked out the front
J-S95012-16
door and saw that the basement window was broken. He
immediately went into the basement to check on his newly
installed heating system. When he came back upstairs, he saw
Appellant inside his home in the living room. Ballo stated that
Appellant ran out the front door and that he ran after Appellant
and chased him several blocks. Ballo stated that Appellant
grabbed a stick from the ground and began swinging it at him
and then dropped the stick and started walking away. Ballo
chased him again. He then grabbed Appellant, pulled him to the
ground, and sat on top of him. As an onlooker called 911, Ballo
testified that Appellant stated ‘Let me go and I’ll get you back
your stuff.’ Ballo then let Appellant stand up and the two men
talked until the police arrived.
Police Officer Charles Vallette (“Vallette”) testified next for
the Commonwealth. He stated that he had worked for the
Philadelphia Police Department for seven years and had been
assigned to the 18th District for the entirety of those seven
years. He testified that on September 23, 2007 he was assigned
to the burglary detail unit and worked the 8 am to 4 pm shift.
Immediately after starting work, Vallette stated that he received
a radio call that two males were fighting on the highway at 52nd
and Baltimore. Vallette arrived at the scene approximately one
minute later and saw two males with their hands on each other.
When he approached the two men, he stated that Appellant tried
to walk away but Vallette requested that he ‘sit tight’ and
Appellant complied. After Vallette talked to Ballo, he placed
Appellant in the back of his patrol car. Vallette then began to
take down information to prepare a police report. Vallette
testified that Appellant stated that he thought the place was
abandoned at least three times.
Police Office Michael Nuassner (“Naussner”) testified next
for the Commonwealth. He stated that he had worked for the
Philadelphia Police Department for three years and had worked
in the 18th District for two years. Naussner testified that he
responded to a radio call for backup on September 23, 2007
around 8 am. When he arrived at 52nd and Baltimore, he stated
that Appellant and Ballo were arguing and that Appellant was
shirtless, sweating, and yelling. Ballo told police that Appellant
had broken into his home, while Appellant screamed that he
thought the house was abandoned. After Appellant was frisked
and placed in the patrol car, Naussner stayed with him.
Naussner testified that Appellant told him, ‘There was a piece of
wood on the basement window and I went into it, and I thought
the house was abandoned.’ Naussner then went to Ballo’s home
with Ballo to examine the property. He stated that the front
door was wide open but he thought the place looked inhabited
and was in decent condition.
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Commonwealth v. Craig, No. 3626 EDA 2009, unpublished memorandum,
at 1-3 (Pa. Super. filed July 26, 2011) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). Appellant subsequently was charged and convicted by a jury of
burglary under Section 3502 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502, and
sentenced to 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment. Appellant timely appealed to
this Court. We affirmed his judgment of sentence, concluding, inter alia,
that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Appellant entered Ballo’s
house with the intention of committing theft. Appellant did not file a petition
for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.
On July 18, 2012, Appellant pro se filed a PCRA petition. The PCRA
court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition, raising two
ineffectiveness claims. Specifically, Appellant argued that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to (1) challenge the weight of the evidence before
the trial court and (2) request a lesser included charge of criminal trespass.
On January 15, 2016, following a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice, the PCRA court
denied Appellant relief for want of merit. Appellant timely appealed to this
Court.
On appeal,1 Appellant repeats the same two ineffectiveness claims that
he raised before the PCRA court. After careful review of the record and the
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1
“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review requires
us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the
record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816,
819 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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relevant case law, we conclude that the PCRA court accurately and
thoroughly addressed the merits of Appellant’s claims. See PCRA Court Rule
1925(a) Opinion, 2/10/16, at 4-10. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s
January 15, 2016 order. We further direct that a copy of the PCRA court’s
February 10, 2016 Rule 1925(a) opinion be attached to any future filings in
this case.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/28/2017
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Circulated 01/31/2017 04:41 PM
F~lED
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FEB 1·0 2016
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CriminalAppeals Unit
CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION FirstJudicialDistrictof PA
COMMONWEALTH CP-51-CR-0011797-2007
vs.
SUPERIOR COURT
RAYMOND CRAIG 254 EDA 2016
BRINKLEY, J. FEBRUARY 10, 2016
OPINION
Defendant Raymond Craig filed a petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. (eff. Jan. 16, 1996), raising a claim based upon
ineffective assistance of counsel. After independent review of Defendant's prose petition, PCRA
Counsel's amended petition, and the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss, this Court dismissed
Defendant's petition based upon a lack of merit. Defendant appealed the dismissal of his petition
to the Superior Court. The sole issue in this opinion is whether this Court properly dismissed
Defendant's petition without a hearing as being without merit. This Court's decision should be
affirmed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
On September 23, 2007, Defendant was arrested and charged with burglary and simple
assault. From July 29 to 30, 2009, a jury trial was held in the presence of this Court. Defendant
was represented at trial by John Konchak, Esquire. The Commonwealth called the complainant,
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Modibo Balla ("Balla") as its first witness. Balla testified that, on the morning of September 23,
2007, he was at his home on l O 17 South 55111 Street when he went downstairs and noticed that his
front door was open and two speakers and an amplifier were missing from his living room. Ballo
further testified that he had lived at that house since June 2007 and was in process of making
repairs to the house. Ballo stated that he looked out the front door and saw that the window to his
basement was broken, so he went to the basement to check on his newly installed heating system.
Ballo further stated that, when he came back upstairs, he saw Defendant in his living room and
Defendant subsequently fled the house. Ballo testified that he chased Defendant down the street,
and was eventually able to grab Defendant, pull him to the ground and sit on top of him. Ballo
further testified that, as an onlooker called 911, Defendant stated to him, "Let me go and I' 11 get
you back your stuff." (N.T. 7/29/2009 p. 46-79).
The Commonwealth called Officer Charles Vallette ("Vallette") as its next witness.
Vallette testified that he had worked as a Philadelphia Police Officer in the 18111 District for 7
years. Vallette further testified that, shortly after starting his shift on September 23, 2007, he
received a radio call that two males were fighting on the highway at 5211d and Baltimore. Vallette
stated that he arrived at the scene approximately a minute later and, when he approached the two
men, Defendant tried to walk away but Vallette told him to stay. Vallette further stated that he
spoke to Ballo and then arrested Defendant. Vallette testified that Defendant stated at least three
times that he thought the house was abandoned while in his presence. (N.T. 7/30/2009 p. 4-25).
The Commonwealth called Officer Michael Naussner ("Naussner") as its next witness.
Naussner testified that he had been a Philadelphia Police Officer for 3 years and had been
assigned to the 18111 District for 2 years. Naussner further testified that, at approximately 8 a.m.
on September 23, 2007, he responded to a radio call for backup and, when he arrived at 5211d and
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Baltimore, he observed Defendant and Ballo arguing. Naussner stated that Ballo told police that
Defendant had broken into his home while Defendant stated that he thought the house was
abandoned. Naussner further stated that he accompanied Ballo back to his residence and that
Ballo's house looked inhabited and in decent condition. Naussner testified that, after Defendant
had been frisked and placed in the patrol car, Defendant told him that he had entered Ballo's
house through the basement window. Id. at 47-55. After Naussner testified, the Commonwealth
and the defense rested.
On July 31, 2009, the jury found Defendant guilty of burglary but deadlocked on the
simple assault charge, which was subsequently nolle prossed by the Commonwealth. At that
time, the Commonwealth stated its intention to seek application of the mandatory second strike
provisions at sentencing. On November 24, 2009, this Court sentenced Defendant to a mandatory
minimum sentence of l Oto 20 years state incarceration. On December 16, 2009, Defendant filed
a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court. On May 7, 2010, upon receipt of the complete notes of
testimony, this Court ordered appellate counsel to file a Concise Statement of Errors pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. l 925(b ). On June 1, 2010, appellate counsel filed the Concise Statement of Errors and
raised two claims on appeal: (l) Whether the evidence was sufficient to find Defendant guilty of
burglary, and (2) Whether this Cami erred by imposing a second strike sentence. On July 30,
2010, this Court filed its opinion in the matter. On July 26, 2011, the Superior Cami affirmed the
judgment of sentence. Defendant subsequently did not file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal
with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
On July 18, 2012, Defendant filed a pro se petition for relief pursuant to the PCRA. On
June 18, 2013, Peter A. Levin, Esquire, was appointed as PCRA counsel. On February 8, 2015,
Mr. Levin filed an amended petition, raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based
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upon trial counsel's failure to file a post-sentence motion that the verdict was against the weight
of the evidence and failure to request a lesser included offense jury instruction on criminal
trespass. On July 3, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss. On December 14, 2015,
this Court sent Defendant a notice pursuant to Rule 907, indicating that his petition would be
dismissed based upon a lack of merit. Defendant did not file a response to the 907 notice. On
January 15, 2016, after independent review of Defendant's prose petition, PCRA Counsel's
amended petition, and the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss, this Court dismissed Defendant's
petition based upon a lack of merit. On January 27, 2016, PCRA counsel filed a Notice of
Appeal to the Superior Court.
ISSUES
I. WHETHER THIS COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFENDANT'S
PETITION WITHOUT A HEARING AS BEING WITHOUT MERIT.
DISCUSSION
I. THIS COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFENDANT'S PETITION
WITHOUT A HEARING AS BEING WITHOUT MERIT.
This Court properly dismissed Defendant's petition without a hearing as being without
merit. When reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, the appellate court's review is limited to
determining whether the PCRA court's findings are supported by the record and without legal
error. Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 619 Pa. 549, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (2013) (citing
Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 781 A.2d 94, 97 n. 4 (2001)). The court's scope of
review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the PCRA
court's hearing, viewed in light most favorable to the prevailing party. Commonwealth v. Fahy,
598 Pa. 584, 959 A.2d 312, 316 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Duffey, 585 Pa. 493, 889 A.2d
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56, 61 (2005)). The burden is on the petitioner in the PCRA petition to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she is eligible for PCRA relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A § 9543.
To establish trial counsel's ineffectiveness, a petitioner must demonstrate: (I) the
underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for the course of action
or inaction chosen; and (3) counsel's action or inaction prejudiced the petitioner. Commonwealth
v. Freeland, 2014 Pa. Super. 274, 106 A.3d 768, 775 (2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515
Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987)). A PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from the ineffective
assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.
Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii)). Counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective
once the court determines that the defendant has not established any one of the prongs of the
ineffectiveness test. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 A.2d 398, 406 (Pa.Super.2008)).
To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel's action or inaction.
Commonwealth v. Davida, 106 A.3d 611, 621 (Pa. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams,
587 Pa. 304, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (2006)).
1. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion that
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion that the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence. If counsel fails to raise an issue in post-verdict motions
or on appeal, he is deemed to be ineffective only if the issue is of arguable merit. Commonwealth
v. Franklin, 2003 Pa. Super. 165, 823 A.2d 906, 908 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Wilkerson,
490 Pa. 296, 416 A.2d 4 77 (1980)). This is so because an accused has no absolute right to raise
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baseless claims and counsel cannot be faulted for not advancing issues which will not at least
arguably obtain some relief for the accused. Id. In Commonwealth v. Luster, the Superior Court
held that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a post-sentence challenge to the
weight of the evidence when trial counsel indicated that he believed the issue at trial involved a
misapplication of the law by the jury rather than a misapprehension of the facts and therefore
filed a post-sentence motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence rather than the weight of
the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Luster, 2013 Pa. Super. 204, 71 A.3d 1029, 1049.
Moreover, the PCRA court determined that even if the claim had been raised, it would have
found that "the jury's verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of
justice" and that it "would not have granted a new trial on a weight of the evidence argument."
Under Pennsylvania law, a weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the verdict. Commonwealth v. Lyons, 622 Pa. 91, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067
(2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (2000)). The
weight of the evidence is "exclusively for the finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or
none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." Luster, 71 A.3d at 1049
(quoting Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (2003)). A verdict is not
contrary to the weight of the evidence because of a conflict in testimony or because the
reviewing court on the same facts might have arrived at a different conclusion than the fact-
finder. Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d 80, 91 (Pa. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Tharp,
574 Pa. 202, 830 A.2d 519, 528 (2003)). Rather, a new trial is warranted only when the jury's
verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one's sense of justice and the award of a new
trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail. Id.
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In the case at bar, Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
post-sentence motion to preserve a weight of the evidence claim on appeal. However, as the
underlying claim is without merit, Defendant's ineffectiveness claim is likewise without merit.
Specifically, there was an overwhelming amount of credible evidence presented at trial which
implicated Defendant in the burglary of Ballo's residence. Balla testified that he awoke on the
morning of September 23, 2007 to find his front door open and his stereo and amplifier missing.
Balla further testified that he went to his basement to check on his newly installed heating
system after seeing that the basement window was broken and, when he came back upstairs, he
saw Defendant in his living room. Balla stated that Defendant subsequently fled from the living
room and he chased him down the street. Balla further stated that, after he caught Defendant and
an onlooker phoned 911, Defendant stated to him, "let me go and I' 11 get you back your stuff."
Vallette testified that Defendant repeatedly claimed that he thought the property was abandoned.
However, Naussner testified that he accompanied Balla back to his residence and thought the
place looked inhabited and in decent condition. Naussner further testified that Defendant told
him he had entered the property through the basement window. Thus, the jury heard substantial
credible evidence that Defendant entered Ballo's property while Balla was present with the
intention of committing a theft therein. Moreover, the jury heard evidence which rendered
Defendant's claims that he thought the property was abandoned incredible. Consequently, it
cannot be said that the verdict was so contrary to the evidence presented at trial so as to shock
one's sense of justice. Therefore, as the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, trial
counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion challenging the
weight of the evidence.
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2. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a lesser-included
offense jury instruction on criminal trespass.
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a lesser included offense jury
instruction on criminal trespass. A lesser-included offense is a crime having elements of which
are a necessary subcomponent of elements of another crime, the greater offense. The elements in
the lesser-included offense are all contained in the greater offense; however, the greater offense
contains one or more elements not contained in the lesser-included offense. Commonwealth v.
Kelly, 2014 Pa. Super. 243, 102 A.3d 1025, 1032 (2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Reese, 725
A.2d 190, 191 (Pa.Super.1999)). If two crimes each require proof of at least one element that the
other does not, then the crimes are not greater and lesser included offenses. Commonwealth v.
Evans, 2006 Pa. Super. 132, 901 A.2d 528, 536-37 (2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879
A.2d 246, 263 (Pa.Super.2005. Criminal trespass contains an element of knowledge-a person
committing that offense must know he is not privileged to enter the premises. Burglary has no
such knowledge requirement. Commonwealth v. Ouintua, 2012 Pa. Super. 219, 56 A.3d 399, 402
(2012). Burglary does, however, require intent to commit a crime within the premises, an
element that criminal trespass lacks. Id. Trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to request
a lesser included charge instruction of criminal trespass because criminal trespass is not a lesser
included offense of burglary. Commonwealth v. Harrison, 444 Pa.Super. 103, 663 A.2d 238,
238-39 (1995).
In the case at bar, Defendant claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
request an instruction for a lesser included charge of criminal trespass. As the Superior Court
reiterated in Quintua, criminal trespass is not a lesser included offense of burglary, as each
offense requires proof of an element the other does not. Consequently, Defendant's claim that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a lesser included offense instruction for
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criminal trespass was without merit as criminal trespass is not a lesser included offense of
burglary.
Even if trespass was a lesser included offense of burglary, Defendant was not prejudiced
by trial counsel's failure to request a lesser included offense instruction as the evidence was
more than sufficient to find Defendant guilty of burglary. As previously discussed, Balla awoke
on the morning of September 23, 2007 to find his front door open and his stereo and amplifier
missing. After seeing that his basement window was broken, Ballo went to his basement to check
on his newly installed heating system and, when he came back upstairs, he saw Defendant in his
living room. Balla then chased Defendant down the street and, after he caught him, Defendant
stated to him, "let me go and I'll get you back your stuff." Moreover, after he was placed in the
patrol car, Defendant told Naussner that he had entered Ballos property through the basement
window. Thus, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence at trial to show that Defendant
entered an occupied structure where an individual was present with the intent to commit theft
therein. Therefore, Defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to request a lesser
included offense instruction as the evidence was more than sufficient to find Defendant guilty of
burglary.
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)
CONCLUSION
After review of the applicable case law, testimony and statutes, this Court committed no
error. Defendant's PCRA petition was properly dismissed without a hearing as being without
merit. Accordingly, this Court's decision should be affirmed.
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