Com. v. Williams, A. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ADRIENE WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 220 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 26, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0009769-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 28, 2018
Adriene Williams appeals from the August 26, 2016 judgment of
sentence of twenty to forty years imprisonment in the aggregate, following
her conviction of third-degree murder, abuse of a corpse, and tampering with
physical evidence. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the events of June 14, 2015, as developed
at trial.
Between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., [Appellant] dropped off her
three-year-old daughter, Adrionna, at [Appellant]’s mother’s
house. [Appellant]’s mother, Lucille Williams, routinely watched
Adrionna while [Appellant] was at work. [Appellant was a security
guard. She had arrived at her mother’s house wearing casual
clothing and she changed into her security guard uniform at her
mother’s house. While at Lucille Williams’ house, Adrionna asked
to eat some watermelon. [Appellant] went to the kitchen to get
some watermelon for her daughter. After a few minutes, Lucille
Williams went to the restroom. Family members noticed Adrionna
run from one room toward the front door of the residence to give
[Appellant] a kiss before she left for work. When Lucille Williams
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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came out of the bathroom, [Appellant] was gone. Lucille Williams
believed that [Appellant] had left for work. Adrionna was also
missing from the residence. The last anyone saw of Adrionna was
when she left one room of the residence and ran toward the front
door to give her mother a kiss. Lucille Williams and two other
occupants of the residence began looking around the residence for
Adrionna without success. The family members frantically
attempted to call and send text messages to [Appellant] to inquire
if she knew anything about Adrionna’s location. [Appellant] did
not answer her phone or respond to any text messages for
approximately ten to fifteen minutes. When [Appellant] finally
responded to the efforts to reach her, [Appellant] claimed that
Adrionna was not with her and she did not know Adrionna’s
location. Additional calls and text messages to [Appellant] went
unreturned for approximately 30 minutes. [Appellant] then
returned to Lucille Williams’[s] residence. [Appellant] changed
clothes and began to look for her daughter.
At approximately 7:50 p.m., about an hour after Adrionna went
missing, Adrionna’s body was discovered by someone walking her
dog about three miles from Lucille Williams’[s] residence.
Adrionna’s body was found lying on the side of a dirt pile strewn
with rocks, road debris and downed trees. Bright, multi-colored
paper clips were found near Adrionna’s body. Emergency
personnel were summoned to the scene and Adrionna was
confirmed dead. Trial testimony indicated that Adrionna had died
from asphyxiation. She had redness and abrasions above her
right eye and forehead area.
A police investigation ensued. Upon being questioned about her
whereabouts at the time Adrionna went missing, [Appellant]
advised detectives that she was at work. She acknowledged that
she responded via a text message that Adrionna was not with her.
She explained that by the time she had made contact with her
family, she was driving in her car, on her way to her mother’s
residence to help find Adrionna. When she returned to her
mother’s house, [Appellant]’s shoes were mud-covered.
[Appellant]’s car was searched and bright, multi-colored paper
clips were found in the car. The paper clips were of the same type
(size and color) that were found at the location where Adrianna’s
body was found. Also found was a notebook in which the
defendant complained of the difficulties of single-parenting.
[Appellant]’s work shirt was recovered from her vehicle and there
was a stain on the shoulder area of the shirt. That shirt was sent
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to the Allegheny County Crime Lab for analysis. Results of testing
revealed that the stain on the work shirt was from watermelon.
Cell phone tower data was admitted at trial. The evidence showed
that at the time [Appellant] claimed she was at work, her cell
phone ‘pinged’ a cell phone tower located in an area near where
Adrionna’s body was found. Furthermore, surveillance videos of
the area where Adrionna’s body was found disclosed that a vehicle
fitting the description of [Appellant]’s vehicle traveled near, and
generally in the direction of, the area where Adrionna’s body was
found.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/17, at 2-4.
On the third day of trial, there was an in-chambers meeting with all
counsel and Detective Steven Hitchings of the Allegheny County Police
Homicide Unit. Detective Hitchings reported that he was approached in the
hall by a woman who identified herself as Angel Jackson, a friend of the
Williams family. She told the detective that she spoke that morning to
Shaneequa Romaine of Buffalo, New York, and that Ms. Romaine told her that
a child died while in foster care provided by Lucille Williams. Ms. Romaine
also represented that Lucille and an adult female named Sonya used to
routinely beat these foster children, one of whom was Appellant. 1
Defense counsel initially sought a recess to discuss the matter with his
supervisor. The court encouraged defense counsel to investigate these
allegations over the lunch hour, and to report back. Defense counsel later
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1 Ms. Jackson also offered information that Adrionna’s father was due to be
released from prison four days prior to her death, and that he intended to
seek custody. Further investigation revealed that the victim’s father was still
incarcerated when she was killed.
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advised the court and the Commonwealth that Ms. Romaine answered his
phone call, and that she advised him that her mother is Lucille’s sister.
The Commonwealth expressed its belief that the defense should be able
to explore this further. The court asked defense counsel whether there was a
need to stop the trial. N.T. Jury Trial, 8/15-26/16, at 358. Defense counsel
argued that trial should be halted to permit an investigation as the
Commonwealth’s evidence did not rule out the possibility that someone else
in the home harmed the child, and that Appellant, or someone operating her
vehicle, transported the body to the location where it was found. Id. at 358.
The defense moved for a mistrial in order to send its investigator to Buffalo.
The Commonwealth urged the court to hold the jury and see what the defense
could ascertain by the next day. The court sent the jury home but held the
motion for mistrial in abeyance. Id. at 364.
When trial recommenced on Friday morning, defense counsel reported
that although Ms. Romaine had some personal knowledge of the death of a
child in Lucille’s care in the mid-90s, maybe 1997, she was young when Lucille
fostered children. The Commonwealth had contacted agencies in Buffalo and
confirmed that Lucille was a foster mother there from 1990-98. In 1996,
Lucille had custody of an infant infected with hepatitis C, who lived one year,
and died while in her care. The discussion focused on the relevance of this
line of inquiry as there were no charges filed.
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In response to the defense’s argument that it was relevant whether
Lucille was abusive to Ms. Romaine and Appellant, the court noted that
defense counsel should have known, with due diligence, of any such abuse
after meeting with his client. The court denied the motion for mistrial, without
prejudice. The court specifically told the defense it could renew the motion
on Monday if, after further investigation, it had additional pertinent
information. Id. at 388. The defense did not renew the motion for mistrial
on Monday morning. However, several days later, at the close of the
Commonwealth’s case, a discussion was held at sidebar. The court inquired
whether the defense intended to pursue any other remedies with regard to
Ms. Romaine. The defense represented that “[r]elative to her, I think we are
pretty much done here.” Id. at 571. The witness had informed their
investigator that she was not willing to discuss anything further.
Nevertheless, defense counsel renewed the motion for nonsuit, arguing that
if they had the opportunity to investigate this matter without the pressure of
an ongoing trial, it was possible that Ms. Romaine would have come in.
Counsel described it a “catch-22” situation, where he needed Ms. Romaine to
make the required factual averment that would enable the court to rule upon
the mistrial motion, but surrounding circumstances made it impossible. Id.
at 573. After the defense formally placed its renewed motion for mistrial on
the record, the trial court asked whether the defense was indicating that it did
not have sufficient factual basis to present anything from this witness that
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might affect Appellant’s defense. Defense counsel answered that question in
the affirmative, confirming that they “just don’t have enough to even know
what she would say at this point.” Id. at 580. The trial court ruled that there
was no compelling basis for a mistrial, and denied the motion. Id. at 597.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Appellant of the
aforementioned charges. Appellant was sentenced on January 17, 2017, and
her post-sentence motions were denied on January 30, 2017. Appellant timely
appealed, and complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
concise statement of issues complained of on appeal. The trial court penned
its Rule 1925(a) opinion, and the matter is ripe for our review.
Appellant presents two issues on appeal:
1. Did the trial court improperly deny [Appellant’s] motion for
mistrial when presented with information that could lead a jury
to believe that a credible alternative suspect exists, but which,
due to the last minute nature of the disclosure counsel was not
able to properly investigate?
2. Did the trial court err in permitting the Commonwealth to offer
the testimony of Ms. Pamela Woods of the Allegheny County
Medical Examiner’s Office when Ms. Woods lacked the training
and experience necessary to qualify as an expert and could not
offer her opinion within the degree of scientific certainty
required by law?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in declining
to grant a mistrial after a friend of Appellant’s family approached Detective
Hitchings and told him that she had information from Ms. Romaine that a child
had died while in foster care provided by Appellant’s mother, and that
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Appellant’s mother would routinely beat children, including Appellant.
Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Tharp, 830 A.2d 519 (Pa. 2012), in
support of her contention that the failure to declare a mistrial was so
prejudicial as to deprive her of a fair trial.
The Commonwealth counters that, after the witness refused to
cooperate, Appellant abandoned the request for a mistrial as she did not renew
her motion. Thus, the Commonwealth argues, the request for a mistrial
should be deemed waived or, in the alternative, the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in denying the motion initially, and later, in not
granting a mistrial sua sponte. The Commonwealth relies upon Pa.R.Crim.P.
605, which provides that the defense must move for a mistrial when the
prejudicial event is disclosed, and that otherwise, a trial court can only declare
a mistrial “for reasons of manifest necessity.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 605(B). A mistrial
was granted on the latter basis in Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983
(Pa.Super. 2014), where the court determined that the defense’s admission
of forged documents perpetrated a fraud upon the court that so undermined
the jury’s function that only a mistrial could cure the harm. The
Commonwealth argues that there was no manifest necessity that compelled
similar action in this case.
In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial, our review is
limited to determining whether the court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 30 A.3d 381, 422 (Pa. 2011). “An abuse
of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion
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the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will . . .
discretion is abused.” Id. Such a motion should be granted “only where the
incident . . . is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a
true verdict.” Id.
The trial court concluded that the report that a child died while in the
care of Lucille Williams thirty years before was never substantiated.
Additionally, “there was no credible, admissible evidence presented . . . that
Lucille Williams [Appellant’s mother] was abusive toward foster children.”
Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/17, at 19. Thus, there was no impeachment or
exculpatory evidence that was excluded due to the denial of the motion for
mistrial. Id.
Preliminarily, we note that Appellant renewed her motion for a mistrial
at the close of the Commonwealth’s case.2 Hence, the Commonwealth’s
waiver argument lacks traction. Nonetheless, the defense conceded at that
time that it had failed to establish the factual predicate for a mistrial. Id. at
579. Although the trial court had approved the retention of a private
investigator to assist the defense in exploring the allegations against Lucille
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2 Appellant’s statement in her brief that she did not renew the motion for
mistrial after Ms. Romaine refused to cooperate with the defense investigator
is refuted by the record. Appellant’s brief at 12. See N.T. Jury Trial, 8/15-
26/16, at 578-79.
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Williams, the defense conceded that it did not have anything from Ms.
Romaine with regard to matters that might affect Appellant’s defense, and
that they did not know what she would say at this point. Id. On these facts,
we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to grant
the mistrial.3
Appellant’s second issue fares no better. Appellant claims that the trial
court abused its discretion when it permitted Ms. Pamela Woods of the
Allegheny County Medical Examiner’s Officer to testify outside the scope of
her expertise. Specifically, Appellant alleges that under Yacoub v. Lehigh
Valley Medical Associates, P.C., 805 A.2d 579 (Pa.Super. 2002), Ms.
Woods lacked “any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge” of plant
matter that would qualify her to testify regarding the comparison of the
victim’s stomach contents and the sample from the stain on Appellant’s shirt.
According to Appellant, this was botany, not forensic chemistry, and the
expert was not a botanist. The trial court ruled that Ms. Woods’s education
and decades of experience, including expertise in Fourier Transform Infrared
Spectrometry (“FTIR”), qualified her to render her opinion that the substance
taken from Adrionna’s stomach may have shared a common source of origin
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3 As distinguished from the typical case where a mistrial is granted, this is not
a situation where the jury was apprised of information that was so prejudicial
that it prevented it from rendering a true verdict. Herein, the jury was
unaware of the unsubstantiated accusations of decades-old misconduct
leveled against Lucille Williams.
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with the stain on Appellant’s shirt. We find no abuse of discretion for the
reasons that follow.
The admission of expert testimony is a matter of discretion for the trial
court, and we will not reverse the trial court’s ruling absent an abuse of that
discretion. Commonwealth v. Yale, 150 A.3d 979, 985 n.11 (Pa.Super.
2016). The question whether a witness qualifies as an expert also rests with
the sound discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Serge, 837 A.2d
1255, 1260 (Pa.Super. 2003). The standard for qualification of an expert
witness is a liberal one: whether the witness has any reasonable pretension
to specialized knowledge on the subject under investigation. Yale, supra at
985 n.11 (citing Commonwealth v. Wallace, 817 A.2d 485 (Pa.Super.
2002)). Training and experience may suffice even where a witness lacks
formal education on the subject matter. Id.; see also Commonwealth v.
Toritto, 67 A.3d 29, 37 (Pa.Super. 2013).
The record reveals that Ms. Woods holds both a Bachelor of Science
degree in chemistry and a Master’s degree in forensic chemistry from
Duquesne University. She had completed many courses offered by the FBI
and private institutions, and additional college classes. At the time of trial,
she had worked for twenty-one years in the Allegheny County Medical
Examiner’s Office in the Trace Evidence Department. N.T. Jury Trial, 8/15-
26/16, at 486. She described trace evidence as “hair, fiber, explosives, fire
debris, tape residues, any adhesives, polymers.” Id. at 486-87. She had
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been qualified to offer expert testimony in the field of trace evidence
approximately forty-five to fifty-five times. Id. at 488.
Appellant’s sole objection to Ms. Woods’s qualifications was that she was
not a botanist. Counsel argued that Ms. Woods lacked the training and
expertise to opine that watermelon was present in the child’s stomach by
comparing that substance with a known sample of watermelon. Id. Counsel
examined the witness further regarding her experience in microscopic
techniques, and specifically, FTIR, which uses light to compare an unknown
substance “visually, and microscopically, and instrumentally,” with a known
substance. Id. at 490. A scientist can conclude from this comparison either
that the two substances are consistent, meaning they contain the same
properties; inconsistent, meaning they do not contain the same properties; or
inconclusive, meaning unable to see sufficient similarities or differences to
generate a finding. Id. at 491. Ms. Woods had previously compared items
that were vegetable or plant matter, specifically marijuana samples, using a
similar approach with more sophisticated microscopes.4 Id.
On the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion in permitting Ms.
Woods to testify. She had “a reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge”
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4 Appellant also objected to the admissibility of Ms. Woods’s opinion that
lycopene was consistent between the two samples on the ground that it was
not probative of whether lycopene was the source of the pigment in the
samples with any degree of certainty, let alone reasonable scientific certainty.
Appellant abandoned that contention on appeal.
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of the use of FTIR to compare the chemical composition of biological stains.
Yale, supra at 985 n.11. Not only did she have an extensive academic
background in chemistry, she had been trained in the scientific technique
used. We have no basis to disturb the trial court’s conclusion that Ms. Woods
was qualified to testify as an expert regarding her comparison of the samples
using FTIR.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Nichols joins the memorandum.
Judge Strassburger files a concurring memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/28/2018
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