Com. v. Davis, B. ( 2016 )


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  • J. A29005/15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :           PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                    :
    :
    BARBARA JEAN DAVIS,                        :         No. 1878 WDA 2014
    :
    Appellant        :
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, October 23, 2014,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0012544-2013
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES AND MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                 FILED JANUARY 07, 2016
    Barbara Jean Davis appeals from the judgment of sentence following
    her conviction in the Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, Allegheny
    County, of theft by unlawful taking1 and access device fraud.2
    The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
    Appellant was employed from 2007 until 2013
    as the caregiver of Geno Bussler and Lois Bussler.
    The Busslers hired their first caretaker after
    Geno Bussler broke his hip in a serious vehicle
    accident in September 2004.     Geno Bussler was
    confined to a motorchair and required assistance
    with showering and dressing. Lois Bussler required
    assistance due to blindness, tremors, and bipolar
    disorder.   Appellant also prepared meals for the
    Busslers.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).
    2
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4106(a)(1).
    J. A29005/15
    As part of her caregiving duties with the
    Busslers, Appellant had authority to use the
    Bussler[s’] bank card to purchase groceries and do
    other shopping for the Busslers. On occasion the
    Busslers lent money to Appellant and she was
    expected to repay the borrowed amount into their
    bank account. Appellant did not have authorization
    to withdraw funds from the Bussler[s’] account
    without their prior approval.
    Appellant took Lois Bussler to the Rivers
    Casino twice.       While there Appellant called
    Geno Bussler for permission to withdraw $500 for
    Lois to use for gambling. Geno authorized Appellant
    to withdraw $500 on both of those occasions for
    Lois’s use. Appellant called Geno Bussler on a third
    occasion requesting to borrow $500 for her personal
    gambling use at a casino, which Geno authorized.
    On a fourth occasion, Geno Bussler called Appellant
    while she was at a casino, and she told Geno that
    she had already withdrawn $500 from his account
    without first asking permission. The Busslers never
    gave Appellant unlimited permission to withdraw
    money from their bank accounts; they only
    authorized withdrawals for gambling at a casino on
    those three occasions, and did not challenge her
    withdrawal on the fourth occasion.
    In January 2013, the Busslers contacted
    Detective Alan Ballo of the Allegheny County District
    Attorney’s Office when they noticed that their bank
    accounts were significantly lower than they should
    have been, noting that they suspected Appellant of
    withdrawing money from their accounts for
    gambling. Investigators examined the Bussler[s’]
    bank accounts from December 2009-January 2013,
    and found dozens of withdrawals from five different
    casinos totaling $34,591.[Footnote 11] [Footnote 12]
    Detective Ballo cross-referenced the withdrawal
    dates with dates when Appellant used her player’s
    card at each casino.       From January 1, 2009-
    January 31, 2013, Appellant had losses of $56,000
    at Rivers Casino and $26,000 at Meadows Casino.
    -2-
    J. A29005/15
    [Footnote 11] Appellant withdrew money
    from the Bussler[s’] account at Rivers
    Casino,     Mountaineer   Casino,  The
    Meadows, Wheeling Island, and Atlantic
    City, New Jersey.        Commonwealth
    Exhibits 5, 6.
    [Footnote 12] The amount of possible
    cash deposit withdrawals and authorized
    casino withdrawals was deducted from
    this amount in determining restitution.
    See also Commonwealth Post-Sentence
    Motion Exhibit 1.
    Trial court opinion, 4/16/15 at 4-6 (internal citations omitted).
    Appellant was arrested and charged with one count of theft by
    unlawful taking, two counts of forgery, two counts of access device fraud,
    two counts of insurance fraud, two counts of theft by deception, two counts
    of tampering with records, two counts of securing execution of documents
    by deception, and one count of theft by failure to make required disposition
    of funds received.
    Appellant proceeded to a non-jury trial on March 3, 2014, and May 5,
    2014, at the conclusion of which appellant was found guilty of one count of
    theft by unlawful taking and one count of access device fraud.      She was
    found not guilty of the remaining counts.
    Appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment on August 1, 2014. On
    August 6, 2014, appellant was sentenced to two consecutive four-year
    periods of probation. She was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of
    $25,738. On August 18, 2014, appellant filed a motion to reduce restitution.
    -3-
    J. A29005/15
    A hearing was held on October 20, 2014. The motion was partially granted
    on October 23, 2014, and the amount of restitution owed was reduced to
    $20,621.   On this same date, the trial court denied appellant’s motion in
    arrest of judgment. On appeal, she raises the following issues:
    I.     Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a
    conviction for Theft by Unlawful Taking?
    II.    Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a
    conviction for Access Device Fraud?
    Appellant’s brief at 4.
    The standard we apply in reviewing the
    sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the
    evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable
    to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to
    enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the
    above test, we may not weigh the evidence and
    substitute our judgment for the fact-finder.         In
    addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
    established by the Commonwealth need not preclude
    every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding
    a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-
    finder unless the evidence is so weak and
    inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
    fact    may     be    drawn    from    the    combined
    circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its
    burden of proving every element of the crime beyond
    a    reasonable    doubt    by    means     of   wholly
    circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
    above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
    all evidence actually received must be considered.
    Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
    credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
    evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
    of the evidence.
    -4-
    J. A29005/15
    Commonwealth v. Nypaver, 
    69 A.2d 708
    , 714 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations
    omitted). Further, since the trial judge was sitting as fact-finder, this court
    defers to the trial judge’s credibility determinations as the trial judge
    observes the witnesses’ demeanor firsthand.     Commonwealth v. Holton,
    
    906 A.2d 1246
    , 1250 (Pa.Super. 2006).
    The trial judge, the Honorable Edward J. Borkowski, has provided a
    well-reasoned discussion in support of the verdict. (See trial court opinion,
    7/10/15 at 8-12 (explaining the elements of the crimes; the legal standard
    for sufficiency of the evidence; finding the evidence sufficient to establish
    the offenses of theft by unlawful deception and access device fraud and a
    course of conduct where credible testimony showed appellant obtained
    $20,621 by using the victim’s bank cards to make unauthorized withdrawals
    from their bank accounts, without permission, on dozens of occasions to
    support appellant’s out-of-control gambling habit).) Accordingly, we adopt
    the decision of the trial court as dispositive of the issues raised in this
    appeal.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/7/2016
    -5-
    Circulated 12/16/2015 02:22 PM
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY,
    PENNSYLVANIA
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                               CRIMINAL DIVISION
    APPELLEE                                          CC NO.: 201312544
    V.
    BARBARA JEAN DA VIS,
    APPELLANT.
    OPINION
    BORKOWSKI, J.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Appellant was charged by criminal information (CC 201312544)                     with one
    count of theft by unlawful taking, 1 two counts of forgery,' two counts of access
    device fraud," two counts of insurance fraud,4 two counts of theft by deception,'
    two counts of insurance fraud,6 two counts of tampering with records;' two counts
    1
    18 Pa. C.S. § 3921(a).
    2
    18 Pa. C.S. § 410l(a)(3).
    3
    18 Pa. C.S. § 4106(a)(l).
    4
    18 Pa. C.S. § 4117(a)(2). These charges were withdrawn prior to trial.
    5
    18 Pa. C.S. § 3922(a)(l).
    6
    18 Pa. C.S. § 4117(b)(4).
    7
    18 Pa. C.S. 6 4104(a).
    2
    Circulated 12/16/2015 02:22 PM
    of securing execution of documents by deception,8 and one count of theft by failure
    to make required disposition of funds received.9
    Appellant proceeded to a nonjury trial on March 3, 2014, and May 5, 2014,
    at the conclusion    of which Appellant was found guilty of one count of theft by
    unlawful taking and one count of access device fraud; she was found not guilty of
    the remaining counts.
    Appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment on August 1, 2014, which was
    denied by the Trial Court on August 6, 2014.
    On August 6, 2014, Appellant was sentenced by the Trial Court to the
    following:
    Count one: theft by unlawful taking - four years probation;
    Count four:      access device     fraud - four years probation       to be served
    consecutive to the period of probation imposed at count one.
    Appellant was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $25,738.
    On August 18, 2014, Appellant filed a motion to reduce restitution,         a hearing
    was held on October 20, 2014, and the motion was partially granted on October 23,
    2014, reducing the amount of restitution           owed to $20,621. Appellant filed a timely
    notice of appeal.
    8
    18 Pa. C.S. § 4114. These charges were withdrawn prior to trial.
    918
    Pa. C.S. § 3927(a). This charge was not held for court.
    3
    Circulated 12/16/2015 02:22 PM
    In Appellant's    Concise Statement of Matters Complained             of on Appeal,
    Appellant claimed that:
    l. The evidence is insufficient to support her conviction of Theft by
    Unlawful Taking (18 Pa. C.S. § 3921(a)).
    2. The evidence is insufficient to support her conviction of Access
    Device Fraud (18 Pa. C.S. § 4106).
    In its 1925(a) Opinion, the Trial Court found that given the lack of specificity
    engendered by Appellant's claims, the Trial Court could not address thern.l" Trial
    Court Opinion, April 13, 2015, p.6.
    On May 22, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion to Remand for Filing of
    Amended Rule 1925(b) Statement.             On June 9, 2015, the Superior Court granted
    Appellant's motion and remanded the record to the Trial Court for a period not to
    exceed forty days. On June 16, 2015, Appellant timely filed her Amended 1925(b)
    Statement. This opinion follows.
    STATEMENT OF ERRORS ON APPEAL
    Appellant's   claims are set forth below exactly as Appellant presented them
    in her Amended Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal:
    1. The evidence is insufficient to support her conviction of
    Theft by Unlawful Takfog (18 Pa. C.S. § 3921(a)) in the
    following particulars:
    a. No witness could establish any instance where
    money or property was stolen;
    10
    See Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    959 A.2d 1252
    , 1258 (Pa. Super. 2008).
    4 .
    Circulated 12/16/2015 02:22 PM
    b. No witness testified that Defendant took money
    or property of another with the intent to deprive
    them thereof;
    c. Lois       Bussler    specifically   testified  that
    Defendant did not take anything from her or
    take anything that was hers (March 3, 2014
    Transcript, p. 31);
    d. Geno Bussler testified that he did not know
    whether there was any time that Defendant took
    money from his account and did not pay him
    back (March 3, 20J 4 Transcript, p. 81) and did
    not know of any specific time that Ms. Davis
    did not give back the money (id, p. 83);
    e. Detective Alan Ballo testified that he did not
    know of any occasion where the Defendant
    took money from the Busslers and did not pay
    them back. (March 3, 2014 Transcript, p. 121).
    f. With regard to the wedding rings which were
    alleged to have been purchased by Ms. Davis
    with the Busslers' funds, it is noted that no
    witness actually testified that Ms. Davis
    purchased wedding rings for herself with the
    Busslers' funds, Geno Bussler did testify that
    she purchased wedding rings for "two thousand
    five some dollars." (March 3, 2014 Transcript
    43). Later, he testified it was a little over
    $2,600. (id., p. 63). However, the Busslers
    account records indicate that the only purchase
    of wedding rings was in 2010. (see Exhibit C to
    Defendant's Motion in Arrest of Judgment).
    Mr. Bussler admitted           that he purchased
    wedding bands for himself and his wife in
    2010, and that Ms. Davis' marriage was in
    2011. (id., 61-2). Detective Ballo testified that
    there was only one wedding ring transaction
    and that was in August of 2010 for $1,800.00.
    (id., p. 110, 121). Detective Ballo also agreed
    that the transaction could very well have been
    to purchase the Bussler's rings. (id., p. 121).
    5
    Circulated 12/16/2015 02:22 PM
    2. The evidence is insufficient to support her conviction of
    Access Device Fraud (18 Pa. C.S. § 4106) in the following
    particulars:
    a. No witness testified as to any specific instance
    where Ms. Davis used the Buss le rs' A TM card
    without authorization;
    b. The fact that the Busslers testified that they did
    not give Ms. Davis blanket authorization to use
    their cards in any way she please does not
    support a conclusion that she used the cards
    without authorization.
    c. The only specific references in the record to the
    times that Ms. Davis used the Busslers' ATM
    cards are to times when she specifically did
    have authority to use the cards,
    d. Although logically it may be inferred that from
    Geno Bussler 's testimony that he authorized
    withdrawals only four times, his testimony in
    fact was that Ms. Davis would call him "once in
    a while" and ask if she could borrow money,
    and that it was "probably" more than three or
    four times, and that when she did so, he would
    check his bank account, and sometimes say yes,
    she could borrow the money, and that he
    "probably" authorized the use of the ATM card
    more than three or four times. (March 3, 2014
    Transcript, pp. 71-72).
    FINDINGS OF FACT
    Appellant was employed from 2007 until 2013 as the caregiver of Geno
    Bussler and Lois Bussler. (T.T. 16, 24, 37; T.T.(II) 24).11 The Busslers required
    significant assistance after Geno Bussler broke his hip in a serious vehicle accident
    in September 2004. Geno Bussler was confined to a rnotorchair and required
    11
    The designation "T.T." followed by numerals refers to Trial Transcript, March 3, 2014. The
    designation "T.T.(Il)" followed by numerals refers to Trial Transcript (cont.), May 5, 2014.
    6
    Circulated 12/16/2015 02:22 PM
    assistance    with showering and dressing. Lois Bussler required assistance due to
    blindness,    tremors, and bipolar disorder. As their primary caregiver, Appellant
    assisted the Busslers with everyday activities. (T.T. 15, 38, 54).
    As part of her caregiving duties with the Busslers, Appellant had authority to
    use the Busslcr 's bank card to purchase groceries and do other shopping for the
    Busslers.    (T.T. 25, 34, 39). On occasion the Busslers lent money to Appellant and
    she was expected to repay the borrowed amount into their bank account. Appellant
    did not have authorization to withdraw funds from the Bussler's account without
    their prior approval. (T.T. 17-18, 33, 40-42, 71-72; T.T.(II) 26).
    Appellant took Lois Bussler to the Rivers         Casino twice. While there
    Appellant called Geno Bussler for permission to withdraw $500 for Lois to use for
    gambling. Geno authorized Appellant to withdraw $500 on both of those occasions
    for Lois's use. Appellant called Geno Bussler on a third occasion requesting to
    borrow $500 for her personal gambling use at a casino, which Geno authorized. On
    a fourth occasion, Geno Bussler called Appellant while she was at a casino, and
    she told Geno that she had already withdrawn $500 from his account without first
    asking permission.     The Busslers never gave Appellant unlimited          permission to
    withdraw money from their bank accounts; they only authorized withdrawals                  for
    gambling      at a casino on those three occasions,      and did      not   challenge     her
    withdrawal on the fourth occasion. (T.T. 19, 23, 44-45, 67, 85).
    7
    Circulated 12/16/2015 02:22 PM
    In January   2013, the Busslers     contacted     Detective     Alan     Balla of the
    Allegheny County District Attorney's        Office when they noticed that their bank
    accounts were significantly      lower than they should have been, noting that they
    suspected Appellant      of withdrawing money from their accounts for gambling.
    (T.T.     100-102).    Investigators   examined   the     Bussler's     bank     accounts    from
    December 2009-January         2013, and found dozens of withdrawals             at five different
    casinos totaling $34,591.12     (T.T. 104-107).13 Detective Balla cross-referenced the
    withdrawal dates with dates when Appellant used her player's card at each casino.
    (T.T. 106). From January 1, 2009-January 31, 2013, Appellant had losses of
    $56,000 at Rivers Casino and $26,000 at Meadows Casino. (T.T. 92-93). Appellant
    was arrested and charged as noted hereinabove.
    DISCUSSION
    Appellant alleges that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions
    of theft by unlawful taking and access device fraud. These claims are without
    merit.
    The standard of review for sufficiency         of the evidence        claims has been
    stated thusly:
    12
    Appellant withdrew money from the Bussler's bank account at Rivers Casino, Mountaineer
    Casino, The Meadows, Wheeling Island, and Atlantic City, New Jersey. Commonwealth
    Exhibits 5, 6.
    13
    The amount of possible cash deposit withdrawals and authorized casino withdrawals was
    deducted from this amount in determining restitution. (T.T. 104-107); Commonwealth Post-
    Sentence Motion Exhibit 1.
    8
    Circulated 12/16/2015 02:22 PM
    The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted al trial in
    the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
    evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
    may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the
    fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
    established by the Commonwealth          need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's
    guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is
    so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of Jaw no probability
    of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
    Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of
    wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
    above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence
    actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact
    while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight
    of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none of
    the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Gray, 
    867 A.2d 560
    , 567 (Pa. Super. 2005).
    A.
    A person commits theft by unlawful taking if she "unlawfully takes, or
    exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another with intent to deprive
    him   thereof." 18 Pa. C.S. § 3921(a). Appellant specifically alleges that the
    evidence was insufficient to support her conviction         of theft by unlawful taking
    based on the argument that no witness could specify an instance when the
    Appellant took money from them. Appellant's argument relies on isolated out-of-
    context     statements   by Lois Bussler, Geno Bussler, and Detective           Ballo that
    Appellant tortures into      perceived uncertainty, while the entirety of the record
    9
    Circulated 12/16/2015 02:22 PM
    clearly     indicates   otherwise.    The direct and circumstantial           evidence      clearly
    establishes Geno Bussler's explicit or tacit approval for four withdrawals from the
    account, totaling $2000. However, the Busslers'              testimony,      as well as that of
    Detective Ballo, establish         dozens of other unauthorized         withdrawals      from the
    Bussler's    account that coincide with Appellant's          visits    to, and losses at, local
    casinos. It is well-established           that any crime, including       theft by unlawful taking,
    may be proven by wholly circumstantial evidence. See Gray, 
    867 A.2d at 567
    ;
    Commonwealth v. Haines, 
    442 A.2d 757
    , 759-760 (Pa. Super. 1982). The various
    statements/testimony          which Appellant isolates and now argues in this sufficiency
    claim were taken into account in evaluating credibility; the totality of the evidence
    found to be credible by the fact-finder established a series of thefts totaling over
    $20,000 by Appellant to support an out of control gambling habit. (T.T. 17-19, 23,
    33, 40-42, 44-45, 67, 71- 72, 85, 92-93, 104-107; T.T.(II) 26). This evidence was
    sufficient to establish         that Appellant committed        the crime of theft by unlawful
    taking.        See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
    684 A.2d 1085
    , 1086-1088                       (Pa. Super.
    1996) (evidence sufficient to support conviction              for theft by unlawful taking where
    defendant was permitted             to withdraw      money from account for certain business
    expenditures,          but    instead     withdrew    money     for    personal     expenditures)."
    Appellant's claim is without merit.
    14
    In her claim at l(t), Appellant devotes a long paragraph detailing a claim of error on a charge
    10
    Circulated 12/16/2015 02:22 PM
    B.
    A person commits access device fraud if she "uses an access device to obtain
    [ ... ] property or services with knowledge that: the access device was issued to
    another     person who has not authorized its use." 18 Pa. C.S. § 4106(a)(l)(ii).
    Appellant's      argument     again    challenges      the   conviction     by    attacking      the
    circumstantial     evidence in this case. The Busslers inability to cite a specific
    instance when they witnessed Appellant use their bank card without authorization
    does not mean that Appellant cannot be convicted of access device fraud. The
    entirety of the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was
    permitted to use the Bussler's bank card for caregiving expenditures, but was not
    authorized to use the bank card for personal expenses without prior approval. In
    spite of that restriction, Appellant withdrew              money from the Bussler's            bank
    accounts using their bank card on dozens of occasions, without their knowledge
    and permission,     for the purpose of personal gambling at several casinos. (T.T. 17-
    19, 23, 33, 40-42, 44-45, 67, 71-72, 85, 92-93, 104-107; T.T.(II) 26). This evidence
    was sufficient to establish that Appellant committed the crime of access device
    fraud.
    Further, Appellant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish
    access device fraud because Geno Bussler stated that he occasionaJJy permitted
    of which she was acquitted, consequently, the Trial Court will not address it.
    11
    Circulated 12/16/2015 02:22 PM
    Appellant to borrow money is without merit. The amounts here were not loans, but
    rather unauthorized withdrawals        to fuel Appellant's gambling        habit. The Trial
    Court      found   that    Appellant     accessed   the Bussler's     bank     account      without
    permission or knowledge when she withdrew money from the casino ATMs for her
    personal     gambling.15        That Appellant had permission        to withdraw       money      on
    occasion does not negate the evidence of record that Appellant withdrew money
    from the Bussler 's account for personal gambling at area casinos on dozens of
    occasions without the Bussler 's knowledge or permission. See, supra, pp. 9-11.
    Appellant's claim is without merit.
    CONCLUSION
    Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of sentence imposed by this Court
    should be affirmed.
    By the Court,
    DATE:~1.,(                 ,o,   i.01t;
    Edward J. Borkowski
    15
    In determining Appellant's amount of restitution owed, the Trial Court deducted the four
    casino withdrawals that were authorized/unchallenged, and also gave Appellant the benefit of the
    doubt in deducting the amount of possible cash withdrawals that Appellant may have been
    authorized to make. (T.T. 104-107); Commonwealth Post-Sentence Motion Exhibit 1.
    l2