Com. v. Jacobs, W. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM GAGE JACOBS
Appellant No. 3 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of December 2, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-46-CR-0002917-2013
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., SHOGAN, J., and WECHT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 15, 2015
William Jacobs appeals his December 2, 2014 judgment of sentence,
which was imposed after Jacobs was convicted in a non-jury trial of driving
under the influence (“DUI”), careless driving, and reckless driving.1 For the
reasons contained herein, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
On October 19, 2012, following a severe traffic accident, Jacobs was
arrested and charged with the above offenses, as well as damage to
unattended vehicle or property and driving at a safe speed.2 The trial court
summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:
On October 19, 2012, [Jacobs], Kristopher Lilick and Julie Radliff
left “The Rib House” restaurant in [Jacobs’] 2004 Jeep Wrangler,
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1
See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(c), 3714, and 3736, respectively.
2
See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3745 and 3361, respectively.
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after imbibing several alcoholic beverages. [Jacobs] drove to
Radliff’s house, where she exited the vehicle. After dropping
Radliff off, [Jacobs’] driving became increasingly hazardous as
he exceeded the speed limit on wet roads. While driving
southwest on Church Road, [Jacobs] accelerated to
approximately sixty-five miles per hour, lost control of the
vehicle, and struck the guardrail. Upon hitting the guardrail, Mr.
Lilick was ejected from his passenger seat in the vehicle.
Because [Jacobs] was wearing a seat belt, he remained in the
vehicle until it eventually came to a stop.
Immediately prior to the accident, driver Jeffrey Rawles made a
left turn onto Church Road. Rawles heard [Jacobs’] vehicle
strike the guardrail and he turned his car around to see what
happened. Approaching the accident, Rawles briefly talked with
Mr. Lilick. Mr. Lilick then left the accident scene and walked to a
friend’s house for transportation to a hospital. Later, Mr. Lilick
arrived at Mercy Suburban Hospital where he was treated for
lacerations to the back of his head, road rash and other
abrasions. Subsequently, Mr. Lilick was transferred to the
Temple University Hospital Emergency Room for further care.
After speaking with Mr. Lilick, Rawles contacted the Upper
Merion Police Department. At approximately 2:28 a.m., Upper
Merion Township Patrol Officer Joseph Davies received a report
regarding a vehicle accident on Church Road. Upon arrival,
Officer Davies found a heavily-damaged gray Jeep Wrangler, half
of which sat off the road. An initial search of the immediate area
surrounding the accident for anyone involved was unsuccessful.
As police were leaving the scene, another Upper Merion Police
Officer, Officer Reiner, discovered [Jacobs] between two tractor
trailers in a nearby parking lot.
Officers Davies and Reiner approached [Jacobs]. Officer Davies
immediately noticed [that Jacobs] had an odor of alcohol, red-
bloodshot glassy eyes, slurred speech and was unsteady on his
feet. [Jacobs] admitted drinking that evening and that he
operated the vehicle in the accident. At that point, Officer
Davies requested Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) to treat
[Jacobs’] injuries. While waiting for EMS, [Jacobs] was unable to
identify other passengers in the vehicle or describe what
happened. Officer Davies concluded that [Jacobs] was driving
while impaired and informed [Jacobs] that he was under arrest
for [DUI].
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Officers Davies and Reiner waited with [Jacobs] until EMS
arrived. EMS took [Jacobs] to Paoli Hospital where he was
treated for various cuts and abrasions. At the hospital, Officer
Davies read the DL-26 form to [Jacobs] and a blood sample was
taken. The blood sample revealed that [Jacobs’] blood alcohol
concentration (BAC) was 0.195%.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 3/4/15, at 1-2.
Prior to trial, Jacobs filed a motion seeking to suppress his admission
to the police that he was the driver of the Jeep. Therein, Jacobs maintained
that he was in custody, and, therefore, should have been provided with his
Miranda3 warnings before being interrogated. Following a hearing, the trial
court denied Jacobs’ motion.
On October 16, 2014, following a two-day bench trial, Jacobs was
convicted of DUI, careless driving, and reckless driving. On December 2,
2014, the trial court sentenced Jacobs to eight days to six months’
incarceration on the DUI conviction. The trial court imposed no further
penalty on the reckless driving conviction. The Commonwealth agreed to
nolle prosse the careless driving charge, even though the trial court had
found Jacobs guilty of that offense. On December 12, 2014, Jacobs filed
post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied on December 18, 2014.
On December 26, 2014, Jacobs filed a notice of appeal. On the same
date, Jacobs filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), even though the trial court did not yet order
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3
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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him to do so. On March 6, 2015, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Jacobs raises the following four questions for our review:
1. Did the lower court err in failing to suppress [Jacobs’]
statement to police when it was taken without first giving
[Jacobs] his Miranda warnings?
2. Did the lower court err in disregarding all of the testimony of
[Jacobs’] expert witness, a qualified medical doctor and
pathologist, even though his testimony raised a reasonable
doubt as to whether it was [Jacobs] or actually the
prosecution’s own witness who was driving under the
influence at the time of the accident?
3. Was there sufficient evidence to convict [Jacobs] for Reckless
Driving?
4. Did the trial court properly exclude from evidence [Jacobs’]
medical records (even though the Commonwealth had
stipulated to their authenticity and which showed that
[Jacobs] had suffered a concussion and a thoracic fracture)
when [Jacobs] argued that the records were relevant to show
his physical condition at the time he spoke to the arresting
officer?
Brief for Jacobs at 5.
In his first issue, Jacobs challenges the trial court’s denial of his
motion to suppress his admissions that he was the driver of the vehicle and
that he had been drinking alcohol prior to driving. Specifically, Jacobs
contends that the statements were obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s seminal
pronouncement in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Our standard
of review over such a claim is well-settled.
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Our standard of review of an order denying a motion to suppress
evidence is limited to determining whether the findings of fact
are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are in error. Commonwealth v.
Crompton, 682 A.2d 286 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v.
Chambers, 598 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1991). In making this
determination, this [C]ourt may only consider the evidence of
the Commonwealth’s witnesses, and so much of the witnesses
for the defendant, as fairly read in the context of the record as a
whole, which remains uncontradicted. Id. If the evidence
supports the findings of the trial court, we are bound by such
findings and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn
therefrom are erroneous. Id.Commonwealth v. Ellis, 700 A.2d 948, 954 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citations
modified); see Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 783-84 (Pa.
Super. 2012), allowance of appeal denied, 65 A.3d 413 (Pa. 2013);
Commonwealth v. Hoppert, 39 A.3d 358, 361-62 (Pa. Super. 2012). “The
Commonwealth need only show by a preponderance of the evidence that a
voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right was
made.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 526 A.2d 1205, 1209
(Pa. Super. 1987); see Commonwealth v. Smith, 784 A.2d 182, 185-86
(Pa. Super. 2001) (same in context of challenge to probable cause in
support of warrant).
It is a fundamental precept of constitutional law that a suspect subject
to a custodial interrogation by police must be warned that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him in court, and
that he is entitled to the presence of an attorney. Miranda, 348 U.S. at
469. If an individual is not advised of his Miranda rights prior to a custodial
interrogation by law enforcement officials, evidence obtained through the
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interrogation cannot be used against him. In re K.Q.M., 873 A.2d 752, 755
(Pa. Super. 2005). “[I]n order to trigger the safeguards of Miranda, there
must be both custody and interrogation. Statements not made in response
to custodial interrogation are classified as gratuitous and are not subject to
suppression for lack of Miranda warnings.” Commonwealth v. Heggins,
809 A.2d 908, 914 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Jacobs focuses his argument upon his contention that he was in
custody for Miranda purposes. Jacobs highlights the facts that he was
injured, that two police officers questioned him, that the officers arrived in
separate vehicles, and that the officers did not seek medical assistance until
after speaking with him about the accident. See Brief for Jacobs at 18-25.
None of these assertions compels us to conclude that Jacobs was in custody
for Miranda purposes.
In deeming an interaction to be a custodial interrogation, “the police
officer’s subjective intent does not govern the determination but rather the
reasonable belief of the individual being interrogated.” Commonwealth v.
Zogby, 689 A.2d 280, 282 (Pa. Super. 1997). An individual is deemed to be
in custody for Miranda purposes when he “is physically denied . . . his
freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which
he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted
by the interrogation.” K.Q.M., 873 A.2d at 755 (citing Commonwealth v.
Williams, 650 A.2d 420, 427 (Pa. Super. 1994)). The court must consider
the totality of circumstances, including factors such as “the basis for the
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detention; the duration; the location; whether the suspect was transferred
against his will, how far, and why; whether restraints were used; the show,
threat or use of force; and the methods of investigation used to confirm or
dispel suspicions.” Commonwealth v. Busch, 713 A.2d 97, 101
(Pa. Super. 1998).
Viewing the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that Jacobs was
not in custody. When the police arrived at the scene, they were unable to
locate anyone involved in the crash. However, during a search of the
surrounding area, they found Jacobs hiding between two tractor trailers. In
an attempt to investigate the accident, and not for the purposes of detaining
or confining Jacobs, the police approached the hiding Jacobs and asked him
if he was involved in the crash. The officers did not relocate him, nor did
they show force or detain him for an unreasonable period of time. The
purpose of the brief detention was to investigate the accident, not to
coercively interrogate Jacobs. Jacobs readily admitted to driving the Jeep
and to drinking seven or eight beers. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, as well as the factors delineated in Busch, Jacobs was not in
custody. The officers merely asked him some questions for the purpose of
investigating the accident.
Jacobs’ assertions to the contrary are unpersuasive. The facts that
two officers approached him, and that they arrived in two separate vehicles,
do not create a coercive environment such that Miranda would be triggered.
Nor do they create a situation where a reasonable person would feel
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involuntarily detained, as would be the case if, for example, Jacobs was
surrounded by a team of officers with their weapons drawn. We also are not
persuaded by the fact that Jacobs was injured. That he was injured and was
unable to leave the scene does not, ipso facto, mean that the police created
an environment where he could not leave. The officers simply approached
Jacobs and asked him some questions for the purposes of investigating a
traffic accident. They did not place him in custody for Miranda purposes.
Jacobs is not entitled to relief.
In his second issue, Jacobs argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by disregarding the testimony of Jacobs’ expert, Dr. Jonathan
Briskin. Dr. Briskin testified as an expert at trial that, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, Jacobs was a restrained passenger in the Jeep,
and not the driver. The trial court elected not to credit Dr. Briskin’s
testimony. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court provided the following
explanation of Dr. Briskin’s testimony and the court’s reasoning for
disregarding that testimony:
Dr. Briskin opined that [Jacobs’] injuries to his lower left
abdomen and right shoulder could be consistent with [Jacobs]
being restrained in the passenger seat. In reaching this
conclusion, Dr. Briskin reviewed medical records of both [Jacobs]
and Mr. Lillick, as well as photographs of [Jacobs’] injuries and
the damaged vehicle. Dr. Briskin did not personally view
[Jacobs’] injuries nor did he inspect [Jacobs’] vehicle. Dr.
Briskin’s analysis was based on his review of a limited amount of
evidence and Dr. Briskin was unable to conclude what actually
happened. Dr. Briskin did, however, note that the injuries
sustained by [Jacobs] could occur if [Jacobs] was a restrained
passenger in a head[-]on collision.
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Accordingly, [the trial court] chose to disregard much of Dr.
Briskin’s testimony because it was inconclusive and based on
conjecture. Furthermore, whatever significance [the court]
allotted to Dr. Briskin’s testimony was weighed against [Jacobs’]
stipulation to his BAC and his admission to driving, in addition to
the other evidence [in the case.]
T.C.O. at 13 (emphasis in original).
Jacobs maintains that the trial court abused its discretion by not
accepting wholesale Dr. Briskin’s testimony. This amounts to a challenge to
the weight of the evidence. When reviewing a weight of the evidence claim,
we consider the following:
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion
of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745,
751-52 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d 1177,
1189 (Pa. 1994) A new trial should not be granted because of a
mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Widmer,
744 A.2d at 752. Rather, “the role of the trial judge is to
determine that ‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so
clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them
equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.’” Id. (citation
omitted). It has often been stated that “a new trial should be
awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as
to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is
imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to
prevail.” Brown, 648 A.2d at 1189.
An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a
weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of
review applied by the trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of
whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Brown, 648 A.2d at 1189. Because the trial judge has
had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence
presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
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consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the
trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 354 A.2d 545 (Pa.
1976). One of the least assailable reasons for granting or
denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the
verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence
and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of
justice.
Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (Pa. 2013) (citations
modified).
Our task in evaluating a weight challenge is as follows:
To determine whether a trial court’s decision constituted a
palpable abuse of discretion, an appellate court must examine
the record and assess the weight of the evidence; not however,
as the trial judge, to determine whether the preponderance of
the evidence opposes the verdict, but rather to determine
whether the court below in so finding plainly exceeded the limits
of judicial discretion and invaded the exclusive domain of the
jury. Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the
trial court has acted within the limits of its judicial discretion.
Brown, 648 A.2d at 1190 (citation omitted).
We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The court
carefully considered the testimony of Dr. Briskin, and weighed the contents,
both favorable and unfavorable to Jacobs, against the other evidence
presented in the case and reached a verdict. That Dr. Briskin was an expert
in no way binds the trial court to credit any, all, or even some of his
testimony. The trial court astutely considered the evidence, and weighed
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the value of that evidence against the remaining evidence. The court did not
abuse its discretion, and this claim fails.
In his third issue, Jacobs argues that the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless driving. Our standard
of review governing sufficiency challenges is well-settled. We must
determine:
whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the [Commonwealth as the] verdict winner,
there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying
[the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the
facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need
not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts
regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089, 1092 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations
omitted).
Pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a), “[a]ny person who drives any
vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is
guilty of reckless driving.” As a preliminary matter, we note that the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
demonstrates that Jacobs was the driver of the vehicle and that he was
substantially intoxicated when driving. However, “evidence of intoxication
alone is insufficient to support a reckless driving conviction.”
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Commonwealth v. Jeter, 937 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007). The
Commonwealth must present additional “indicia of unsafe driving” in order to
prove that the defendant exhibited a “willful or wanton disregard for the
safety of persons or property.” Id.; 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a). The
Commonwealth clearly has met that burden here.
In addition to driving while intoxicated, the testimony at trial
demonstrated Jacobs’ recklessness. The witnesses testified that Jacobs was
speeding on wet roads at 2:30 in the morning. Additionally, in his
intoxicated state and with these dangerous conditions, Jacobs decided to “do
donuts” in the center of a public intersection. He then drove into a quarry,
where he drove the Jeep into piles of gravel and stone, and then did more
donuts in the gravel. One of the passengers in the car pleaded with Jacobs
to take her home. Jacobs then sped away, and drove into a guardrail. This
evidence undoubtedly was sufficient to demonstrate that Jacobs was guilty
of reckless driving.
In his final issue, Jacobs contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by ruling that his medical records were inadmissible at trial. The
records at issue were produced following a visit to the doctor approximately
one week after the accident. According to Jacobs, the records would show
that he suffered from a concussion and a fracture of one of his vertebra.
Jacobs maintains that the records, and the injuries described therein, were
relevant to the question of whether his admissions to the police after the
accident were credible.
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Our standard of review of challenges to the admissibility of evidence is
well settled:
Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial
court clearly abused its discretion. Admissibility depends on
relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically
tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a
fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable
inference or presumption regarding a material fact.
Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon
facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing
and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an
error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill
will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is
abused.
Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted). “In determining the admissibility of evidence, the trial
court must decide whether the evidence is relevant and, if so, whether its
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Commonwealth v.
Hawk, 709 A.2d 373, 376 (Pa. 1998) (citing Commonwealth v. Crews,
640 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Dollman, 541 A.2d 319 (Pa.
1988)). “Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact
in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, or supports
a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material
fact.” Commonwealth v. Spiewak, 617 A.2d 696, 699 (Pa. 1992).
The Commonwealth stipulated to the authenticity of the records, but
not the admissibility of them. Despite their authenticity not being in
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question, the trial court ruled them inadmissible primarily because Jacobs
did not intend to call his diagnosing physician to explain the injuries and how
injuries that were diagnosed one week after the accident would have
impacted Jacobs at the time of the accident. Hence, the court ruled that the
evidence was irrelevant. We agree with the trial court.
The primary issue at trial was whether Jacobs, or someone else, was
driving the Jeep at the time of the accident. Eyewitness testimony
overwhelmingly placed Jacobs in the driver’s seat. Jacobs also admitted to
the police that he was the driver. However, with the medical records, Jacobs
wanted to show that his admission should not have been believed. The
records simply were not relevant for that purpose. As noted, evidence is
relevant if it tends to make one fact more or less likely. By this definition,
the records would have had to show that he suffered substantially from an
illness or injury at the time of the accident. The records only would have
proven Jacobs’ mental and physical condition one week after the accident.
Without supporting testimony to explain to the trial court that his injuries
derived from the accident, that he suffered them in the accident, and that
the effects of those injuries would have impaired his ability to accurately
recall and relay to the officers the events that led to the crash, the records
simply were not legally relevant. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in ruling that the records were inadmissible.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/15/2015
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