Com. v. Gonzalez, J. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S50032-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JAVIER GONZALEZ
    Appellant                     No. 2544 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the PCRA Order July 21, 2014
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004027-2007
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.:                               FILED OCTOBER 15, 2015
    Javier Gonzalez (“Appellant”), appeals from the order dismissing his
    petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.
    §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.
    The pertinent facts and procedural posture of this matter are as
    follows. On May 5, 2009, a jury convicted Appellant of robbery, threat of
    immediate      serious       bodily   injury1   and   criminal   conspiracy2   for   his
    participation in a gunpoint robbery committed on October 23, 2006.                   The
    trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate period of 14 years 9 months
    to 37 years of imprisonment. After the trial court denied Appellant’s motion
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).
    2
    18 Pa.C.S. § 903.
    J-S50032-15
    for reconsideration of sentence, Appellant filed a direct appeal. This Court
    dismissed the appeal on September 9, 2009, after Appellant’s counsel failed
    to file a docketing statement.
    On July 25, 2011, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition alleging
    ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to keep him apprised of
    the status of his direct appeal. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed
    an amended PCRA petition and memorandum of law in support of the
    amended PCRA petition on November 14, 2012.3             On April 22, 2014,
    Appellant, proceeding pro se, filed another amended PCRA petition. On June
    20, 2014, the PCRA court filed its Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to
    dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing.        On July 7, 2014, again
    proceeding pro se, Appellant filed a response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907
    notice. On July 21, 2014, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing the
    PCRA petition.
    Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal on August 19, 2014.4
    On September 16, 2014, appointed PCRA counsel filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    ____________________________________________
    3
    The certified record contains only the memorandum of law in support of
    the amended PCRA petition, not the amended petition itself.
    4
    Strictly speaking, Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal was a nullity because
    Appellant filed it when he was represented by counsel.                     See
    Commonwealth v. Ellis, 
    626 A.2d 1137
    , 1139 (Pa.1993) (“[T]here is no
    constitutional right to hybrid representation.”); see also Commonwealth
    v. Nischan, 
    928 A.2d 349
    , 355 (Pa.Super.2007) (describing counseled
    defendant’s pro se post-sentence motion as “a nullity, having no legal
    effect”). In the interest of judicial economy, and in consideration of our
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    J-S50032-15
    statement.5 The PCRA court filed its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on October
    21, 2014.
    On March 19, 2015, despite having filed an amended PCRA petition in
    the    lower   court,     Appellant’s    court-appointed   PCRA   counsel   filed   a
    Turner6/Finley7 “no-merit” letter (“no-merit letter”) with this Court in lieu
    of an advocate’s brief, together with an application to withdraw as counsel.
    The no-merit letter provides a factual summary and procedural history of the
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    disposition of this matter as discussed infra, we will overlook this technical
    deficiency.
    5
    Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, filed by court-appointed counsel,
    states as follows:
    [Appellant] filed a pro se Notice of Appeal on August 21,
    2014 and counsel is obligated to represent him on appeal.
    These are the issues [Appellant] wishes that counsel raise:
    1. The court was in error in denying [Appellant’s] PCRA
    [petition] without an evidentiary hearing.
    2. The court was in error in denying the amended PCRA
    [petition] filed by counsel on November 14, 2012. The issues to
    be raised before the Superior Court in this appeal are fully set
    forth in the amended PCRA filed by Appellant’s counsel on
    November 14, 2012.
    [3.] The PCRA [petition] was not untimely filed as set
    forth in the amended PCRA [petition] filed by counsel as an
    exception applies to untimeliness.
    1925(b) Statement.
    6
    Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa.1988).
    7
    Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa.Super.1988) (en banc).
    -3-
    J-S50032-15
    matter, and discusses the general requirements of PCRA relief, including the
    PCRA’s timeliness requirements.          See No Merit Letter, pp. 1-10.     The no-
    merit letter then discusses the timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition, and
    concludes (1) that the petition was untimely, and (2) that none of the
    PCRA’s time bar exceptions applied.            See id. at 10.   Accordingly, the no-
    merit letter asserts that Appellant’s appeal is wholly frivolous because the
    underlying PCRA petition was untimely. See id. at 11.8
    Our Supreme Court has explained the procedure required for court-
    appointed counsel to withdraw from PCRA representation:
    [Turner and Finley] establish the procedure for
    withdrawal of court-appointed counsel in collateral attacks on
    criminal convictions.  Independent review of the record by
    competent counsel is required before withdrawal is permitted.
    Such independent review requires proof of:
    1) A “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel detailing the nature and
    extent of his [or her] review;
    2) A “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel listing each issue the
    petitioner wished to have reviewed;
    3) The PCRA counsel’s “explanation”, in the “no-merit” letter, of
    why the petitioner’s issues were meritless;
    4) The PCRA court conducting its own independent review of the
    record; and
    ____________________________________________
    8
    Both the no-merit letter and the Petition to Withdraw explain that counsel
    sent Appellant copies of these documents, and each advises Appellant he
    has 30 days to respond to the no-merit letter either pro se or through
    privately retained counsel. See No Merit Letter, p. 11; Motion to Withdraw,
    p. 2 (unnumbered).
    -4-
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    5) The PCRA court agreeing with counsel that the petition was
    meritless.
    Commonwealth v. Pitts, 
    981 A.2d 875
    , 876 n.1 (Pa.2009) (citations
    omitted). In addition, this Court has required that PCRA counsel who seeks
    to withdraw must:
    contemporaneously serve a copy on the petitioner of counsel’s
    application to withdraw as counsel, and must supply the
    petitioner both a copy of the “no-merit” letter and a statement
    advising the petitioner that, in the event the court grants the
    application of counsel to withdraw, he or she has the right to
    proceed pro se or with the assistance of privately retained
    counsel.
    Commonwealth v. Friend, 
    896 A.2d 607
    , 614 (Pa.Super.2006) (emphasis
    deleted).
    If counsel fails to satisfy the foregoing technical prerequisites of
    Turner/Finley, the court will not reach the merits of the
    underlying claims but, rather, will merely deny counsel’s request
    to withdraw. Upon doing so, the court will then take appropriate
    steps, such as directing counsel to file a proper Turner/Finley
    request or an advocate’s brief.
    However, where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter
    that do satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the
    court—trial court or this Court—must then conduct its own
    review of the merits of the case. If the court agrees with
    counsel that the claims are without merit, the court will permit
    counsel to withdraw and deny relief. By contrast, if the claims
    appear to have merit, the court will deny counsel’s request and
    grant relief, or at least instruct counsel to file an advocate’s
    brief.
    Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 
    931 A.2d 717
    , 721 (Pa.Super.2007) (citations
    omitted).
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    The instant procedural posture differs from normal practice in that
    appointed PCRA counsel filed an amended PCRA petition in the PCRA court,
    but then filed a no-merit letter with this Court on appeal. This procedural
    posture presents a problem in that, because the no-merit letter was filed
    with this Court after the lower court had already dismissed his petition,
    Appellant was divested of the opportunity to respond to the no-merit letter,
    either proceeding pro se or with privately retained counsel, before the PCRA
    court dismissed his petition.        Additionally, the no-merit letter suffers from
    numerous drafting deficiencies.9         In another case, these shortcomings and
    errors might occasion remand of the matter to the PCRA court with direction
    that counsel file an adequate no-merit letter in the proper forum. However,
    because Appellant’s PCRA petition is untimely without excuse for the reasons
    discussed infra, Appellant suffered no actual prejudice by counsel’s
    missteps.10     Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy, we will not
    remand and instead proceed to decide this appeal.11
    ____________________________________________
    9
    The no-merit letter only summarily details the nature and extent of
    counsel’s review. See No-Merit Letter, p. 11 (“. . . current counsel engaged
    in a careful and exhaustive review of the Appellant’s claims and the available
    record.”). Further, the no-merit letter fails to list or discuss Appellant’s
    underlying ineffective assistance of trial counsel issue, and discusses only
    the timeliness of Appellant’s petition, not whether counsel believes the
    underlying issue lacks merit. See id. at 3-11.
    10
    Because Appellant’s PCRA petition is untimely without excuse, as
    discussed infra, no amount of argument, whether pro se or counseled,
    would have provided the PCRA court with jurisdiction to determine the
    merits of Appellant’s PCRA petition. Accordingly, Appellant has suffered no
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -6-
    J-S50032-15
    In reviewing an order denying PCRA relief, our well-settled standard of
    review is “to determine whether the determination of the PCRA court is
    supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA
    court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
    findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 
    74 A.3d 185
    ,
    191-192 (Pa.Super.2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
    Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must first
    consider the timeliness of his PCRA petition because it implicates the
    jurisdiction of both this Court and the PCRA court.           Commonwealth v.
    Williams, 
    35 A.3d 44
    , 52 (Pa.Super.2011) (citation omitted), appeal
    denied, 
    50 A.3d 121
     (Pa.2012).              “Pennsylvania law makes clear that no
    court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.”        
    Id.
     To “accord
    finality to the collateral review process[,]” the PCRA “confers no authority
    upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-
    bar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 
    23 A.3d 980
    , 983 (Pa.2011).
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    prejudice by being divested of the opportunity to respond to the no-merit
    letter.
    11
    We note that we cannot remand for counsel to file an advocate’s brief that
    would require counsel to argue a position contrary to established law, to wit,
    require argument that a timeliness exception applies to Appellant’s petition.
    Further, a remand to the PCRA court to allow counsel to adequately re-draft
    and then file the no-merit letter and application to withdraw in the
    procedurally proper forum, thereby affording Appellant the opportunity to
    respond, would not change the result of this matter. Therefore, such a
    remand would only serve to waste judicial resources.
    -7-
    J-S50032-15
    “It is undisputed that a PCRA petition must be filed within one year of
    the date that the judgment of sentence becomes final.” Commonwealth v.
    Hernandez, 
    79 A.3d 649
    , 651 (Pa.Super.2013); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
    “This time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the
    court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of a petition.”
    Hernandez, 
    79 A.3d at
    651 (citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 
    753 A.2d 201
    , 203 (Pa.2000)). “Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal
    authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Seskey,
    
    86 A.3d 237
    , 241 (Pa.Super.2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Albrecht,
    
    994 A.2d 1091
    , 1093 (Pa.2010)).
    A judgment of sentence “becomes final at the conclusion of direct
    review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United
    States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time
    for seeking the review.”   42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).     However, a facially
    untimely petition may be received where any of the PCRA’s three limited
    exceptions to the PCRA time bar are met.        Hernandez, 
    79 A.3d at 651
    (footnote omitted). These exceptions include:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
    interference by government officials with the presentation of the
    claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
    Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
    to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
    exercise of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
    recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
    -8-
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    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
    this section and has been held by that court to apply
    retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).    As our Supreme Court has repeatedly
    stated, the petitioner maintains the burden of pleading and proving that one
    of these exceptions applies.      Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 
    941 A.2d 1263
    , 1268 (Pa.2008), cert. denied, 
    555 U.S. 916
     (2008); see also
    Commonwealth v. Leggett, 
    16 A.3d 1144
    , 1146 (Pa.Super.2011) (“The
    petitioner bears the burden to allege and prove [that] one of the timeliness
    exceptions applies.”). Further,
    [a] petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within
    sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).        In order to be entitled to the
    exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, the petitioner
    must plead and prove specific facts that demonstrate his claim
    was raised within the sixty-day time frame under section
    9545(b)(2).
    Hernandez, 
    79 A.3d at 651-652
     (internal quotations omitted).
    Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on October 9,
    2009, thirty days after this Court dismissed his direct appeal. Appellant filed
    the instant petition over one and a half years later, on July 25, 2011.
    Accordingly, the instant petition is facially untimely. Thus, Appellant must
    plead and prove that his petition falls under one of the Section 9545
    exceptions set forth in the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
    -9-
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    Initially, neither Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition, nor the counseled
    amended PCRA petition,12 nor Appellant’s pro se amended PCRA petition, nor
    Appellant’s pro se response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice of intent to
    dismiss without a hearing expressly claim entitlement to any of the PCRA’s
    enumerated PCRA time-bar exceptions. See Pro Se PCRA Petition; Amended
    PCRA Petition; Pro Se Amended PCRA Petition; Rule 907 Response. To the
    extent this Court can discern a pleaded timeliness exception, the PCRA
    petition claims Appellant is entitled to the Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) newly
    discovered facts exception because his direct appeal counsel did not inform
    him of the outcome of his direct appeal.           See PCRA Petition, p. 3.   He is
    incorrect.
    The PCRA petition fails to explain how his counsel’s failure to inform
    him of the status of his appeal rendered the date he discovered the dismissal
    of his direct appeal a “new fact”. The disposition of Appellant’s direct appeal
    was and is a fact of public record. Our Supreme Court has explained that
    information that is part of the public record does not constitute a newly
    discovered      fact   for    PCRA      time-bar   exception   purposes.       See
    ____________________________________________
    12
    As previously explained, the certified record contains only the
    Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended Petition for Relief Pursuant to
    Post Conviction Relief Act. See Footnote 3, supra. We can deduce from
    this memorandum, however, that appointed PCRA counsel did not raise a
    time-bar exception in the amended PCRA petition. See Memorandum of Law
    in Support of Amended Petition for Relief Pursuant to Post Conviction Relief
    Act, p. 7 (“On July 26, 2011 [sic], Petitioner filed a timely, pro se petition
    pursuant to procedures under the Post Conviction Relief Act.”).
    - 10 -
    J-S50032-15
    Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 
    65 A.3d 339
    , 352, (Pa.2013), cert. denied,
    
    134 S. Ct. 639
     (U.S. 2013) (“to constitute facts which were unknown to a
    petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
    diligence, the information must not be of public record and must not be facts
    that were previously known but are now presented through a newly
    discovered source.”).       Further, the PCRA petitions fail to specify the date
    when Appellant learned of his direct appeal’s disposition.                   Accordingly,
    Appellant has insufficiently pleaded the exception. See Commonwealth v.
    Breakiron, 
    781 A.2d 94
    , 98 (Pa.2001) (holding time bar exception not
    properly pleaded where Appellant failed to provide the date on which he
    learned    information     allegedly    entitling   him   to   exception);    see also
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    35 A.3d 44
    , 53 (Pa.Super.2011) (“A
    petitioner must explain when he first learned of the facts underlying his
    PCRA claims and show that he brought his claim within sixty (60) days
    thereafter.”). Accordingly, the petition remains time-barred.
    Because the PCRA petition is patently untimely and Appellant did not
    avail himself of any of the PCRA’s time bar exceptions, the PCRA court did
    not err in denying this petition as untimely.13
    ____________________________________________
    13
    While we appreciate the dissent’s concerns regarding the deficiencies in
    PCRA counsel’s performance, we note that the PCRA court did not appoint
    counsel until after Appellant filed his pro se PCRA petition. While PCRA
    counsel may have provided inadequate representation, the fact remains that
    no amount of adequate representation could or would have transformed
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    - 11 -
    J-S50032-15
    Order affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted.14
    Judge Mundy concurs in the result.
    Judge Panella files a dissenting statement.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/15/2015
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    Appellant’s initial, untimely-filed pro se PRCA petition into a timely-filed
    PCRA petition. See Note 10, supra.
    14
    We acknowledge the dissent’s suggestion that the remedies set forth in
    Commonwealth v. Williamson, 
    21 A.3d 236
     (Pa.Super.2011), are
    appropriate for the instant matter. However, we note that Williamson,
    which concerned counsel’s failure to timely file a petition for allowance of
    appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, is inapposite to the instant
    matter, which involves an untimely PCRA.
    - 12 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2544 EDA 2014

Filed Date: 10/15/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024