Com. v. Goggins, K. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KHALIL M. GOGGINS
Appellant No. 1339 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered April 1, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0010865-2013
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MARCH 21, 2017
Appellant, Khalil M. Goggins, appeals pro se from the April 1, 2016
order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying
his petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm.
The PCRA court adequately summarized the underlying facts and the
procedural history of the case. See PCRA Court Opinion, 8/31/16, 1-3.
Briefly, on September 5, 2014, Appellant was found guilty of terroristic
threats and receiving stolen property. On November 14, 2014, the trial
court imposed an aggregate sentence of seven years’ probation. Appellant
did not file a post-sentence motion or an appeal.
On December 24, 2014, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.
The PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant throughout the
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PCRA proceedings. Subsequently, counsel petitioned the PCRA court to
withdraw as counsel. After reviewing the record, the PCRA court sent
Appellant a notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant did not respond
to the notice. Accordingly, the PCRA court granted counsel’s petition to
withdraw and denied Appellant’s PCRA petition. This appeal followed.
This Court recently reiterated the standard of review from the denial of
PCRA relief as follows:
“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and
scope of review is limited to determining whether the PCRA
court’s findings are supported by the record and without legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa.
2013) (citation omitted). “[Our] scope of review is limited to the
findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA court
level.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 614 Pa. 159, 36 A.3d 121,
131 (2012) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s credibility
determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on
this Court.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 Pa. 17, 18 A.3d
244, 259 (2011) (citation omitted). “However, this Court applies
a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal
conclusions.” Id.
Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214-15 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
banc).
On appeal, Appellant raises several claims. First, Appellant argues all
prior counsel were ineffective for: (i) ignoring available and admissible
evidence tending to establish a viable defense, (ii) failing to recognize he
was prejudiced by “personal animosity by counsel toward [him],” and (iii)
failing to represent him zealously. Appellant’s Brief at 2-3, 5. Second,
Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an
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excessive sentence. Id. at 3. Third, Appellant argues the Commonwealth
engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by vouching for “credibility of
government witnesses.” Id. at 4. Fourth, Appellant argues some
unidentified witnesses testified falsely. Id. at 5.
The first claim, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, is waived for
failure to develop it. Nowhere did Appellant explain what evidence counsel
failed to pursue and/or how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure, how he
was prejudiced from counsel’s animosity toward him (Appellant does not
even identify the “hostile” counsel), or what a zealous counsel should have
done in the instant matter or how was he prejudiced from counsel not being
zealous.
It is well-established that counsel is presumed effective, and that
petitioner has to allege and prove otherwise by a preponderance of
evidence.1 Here, as noted above, he failed to do so. Accordingly, no further
review is warranted. See Commonwealth v. Steele, 961 A.2d 786, 797
(Pa. 2008) (stating that when an appellant fails “to set forth all three prongs
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1
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244 (Pa. 2011):
To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, the petitioner must plead
and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following
three elements: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2)
counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction;
and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s
action or inaction.
Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
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of the ineffectiveness test and [to] meaningfully discuss them, he is not
entitled to relief, and we are constrained to find such claims waived for lack
of development”).
The second, third, and fourth claims are not cognizable under the
PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2) (enumerating claims cognizable
under the PCRA). Even if cognizable, Appellant waived all of them for not
having raised them with the trial court or on direct appeal. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Wharton, 811 A.2d 978, 984-85 (Pa. 2002); 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9544 (“For purposes of [the PCRA], an issue is waived if the
petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during
unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.”).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/21/2017
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