Com. v. Williams, W. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM C. WILLIAMS,
Appellant No. 567 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 8, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0307231-2000
BEFORE: SHOGAN, STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2017
Appellant, William C. Williams, appeals pro se from the denial of his
third petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42
Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
A prior panel of this Court provided the following relevant factual
background:
On February 11, 2000, at approximately 2:30 p.m.
in response to information being broadcasted by
police radio of a stolen 2000 Mercedes that was
being tracked by a Global Tracking System, . . .
Police Officer Thomas Schaffer . . . informed police
radio he was responding to the [Philadelphia] area of
Adams Ave. & Roosevelt Blvd., which was the last
position of the stolen vehicle given by police radio.
Officer Schafer approached the intersection of
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Whitaker Ave. and Wyoming Ave. He observed a
black Mercedes pulling up to the intersection
traveling south on Whitaker Ave. The officer
informed police radio that he had a vehicle fitting the
description and of his location. At this point the black
Mercedes, which was being operated by a black man,
began to back up at a high rate of speed from
Wyoming Ave. to the intersection of Whitaker and
Louden St. (one block). The officer activated his
emergency dome lights while traveling north in the
northbound lanes of Whitaker Ave. at the
intersection of Whitaker and Louden. The Mercedes,
with tires smoking, executed a 180 degree turn. The
officer exited his patrol car and got to within five feet
from the Mercedes before the Mercedes sped off
west on Louden St. The officer informed police radio
of the location and direction of the Mercedes . . . .
The officer observed it disregarding the stop sign at
Louden St. and Bingham St. . . . The officer began
traveling westbound on Louden St. The Mercedes
was no longer in the officer’s view. The officer turned
off his emergency dome lights and continued
westbound on Louden St. As the officer approached
D St. he observed that the Mercedes had been
involved in an auto accident with a Plymouth Neon
..., which was on the southbound corner of the
intersection on the sidewalk. The Mercedes was
stopped on Louden St. west of the intersection facing
east with a black male with orange hair behind the
steering wheel.
Police Officers Purfield and Lynch pulled up to
the scene and approached the Mercedes, taking the
operator into custody. The operator of the Mercedes
was later identified as [Appellant]. The operator of
the Plymouth Neon was pronounced dead at the
scene. The passenger of the Plymouth Neon
sustained a broken pelvis and fractured skull. . . . A
witness observed the Mercedes traveling westbound
on Louden St. at a high rate of speed and
disregarding the stop sign as it entered the
intersection where it contacted the Plymouth.
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Commonwealth v. Williams, 859 A.2d 838, 2484 EDA 2003, (Pa. Super.
filed July 8, 2004) (unpublished memorandum at 2-3) (quoting Trial Court
Opinion, 10/14/03, at 1-3).
The PCRA court set forth the procedural history as follows:
On April 17, 2001, [Appellant] was found guilty after a jury
trial, presided over by the Honorable John Poserina, Jr., of Third
Degree Murder, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c), as a felony of the first
degree; Homicide by Vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, as a felony of
the first degree; Involuntary Manslaughter, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504,
as a felony of the first degree; Aggravated Assault, 18 Pa.C.S. §
2702, as a felony of the first degree; Receiving Stolen Property,
18 Pa.C.S. § 3925, as a felony of the third degree; Causing an
Accident While Not Properly Licensed, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742.1, as a
felony of the third degree; and Fleeing or Attempting to Elude a
Police Officer, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733, as a misdemeanor of the
second degree.
[Appellant] was sentenced to fifteen (15) to thirty (30)
years for the third degree murder of Ralph Morales; four (4) to
eight (8) years for the aggravated assault of Daniel Andre, to
run consecutively; one (1) to two (2) years for the theft
conviction, to run consecutively; one (1) to two (2) years for the
causing an accident while not properly licensed conviction, to run
consecutively; one (1) to two (2) years for the fleeing or
attempting to elude a police officer, to run consecutively; the
homicide by vehicle and involuntary manslaughter convictions
merged for purposes of sentencing. [Appellant] received an
aggregate sentence of twenty-two (22) to forty-four (44) years.
On November 17, 2003, the Superior Court affirmed the
judgment of sentence.
On February 24, 2005, the Supreme Court denied his
petition for allowance of appeal.
On April 27, 2005, [Appellant] filed a Post Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA) petition.
On October 1, 2009, the PCRA Court denied his petition.
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On November 17, 2010, the Superior Court affirmed.
On July 12, 2011, the Supreme Court denied his petition
for allowance of appeal.
On July 19, 2011, [Appellant] filed a second PCRA petition.
On June 20, 2013, the Superior Court affirmed.
On March 2, 2015, [Appellant] filed the instant PCRA
petition, his third.
On December 30, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a motion
to dismiss.
On January 6, 2016, the Court issued a 907 notice.
On January 11, 2016, [Appellant] filed a response to the
907 notice.
On February 8, 2016, the Court formally dismissed
[Appellant’s] third PCRA petition.
On February 16, 2016, [Appellant] filed the instant appeal
to the Superior Court.
PCRA Court Opinion, 4/12/16, at 1-2. Both Appellant and the PCRA court
have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues, which we reproduce
verbatim:
1. Whether the PCRA Court erred in not invoking Jurisdiction and
granting this petitioner a new sentence as to the fleeing or
attempting to allude police conviction/sentence because of its’
illegality of being above the maximum sentence?
2. Whether the PCRA Court erred in not invoking jurisdiction and
granting this petitioner a new trial as to the aggravated assault
conviction due to trial counsel ineffectiveness by failing to object
to The Commonwealth submitting Mr. Daniel Andre medical
records into evidence and for eliciting hearsay inculpatory
testimony/evidence establishing the serious bodily injury
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element without bring in Mr. Danny Andre medical doctor to be
confronted by this petitioner, both violating this petitioner
federal and state constitutional rights under the confrontation
clause,since this was the earliest opportunity to bring this issue
to the court and this issue is a clear violation of watershed
procedural rules effecting the fundamental fairness and accuracy
of the proceedings?
3. Whether The PCRA Court erred in not invoking jurisdiction and
grant this petitioner duplicate time credit of one(1) year, four(4)
months, and sixteen(16) days toward his five related charges,
since this petitioner filed this claim pursuant to the second and
third exception to the Pennsylvania statutory time limitation?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, this
Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports the
conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 2016). The PCRA
court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for them in
the certified record. Commonwealth v. Lippert, 85 A.3d 1095, 1100 (Pa.
Super. 2014).
Initially, we must address whether this appeal is properly before us.
The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. PCRA Court
Opinion, 4/12/16, at 8. “As the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a question of
law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted). Moreover, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a
jurisdictional threshold that may not be disregarded in order to reach the
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merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is untimely.
Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 762 (Pa. Super. 2013).
“Whether [a petitioner] has carried his burden is a threshold inquiry prior to
considering the merits of any claim.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65
A.3d 339, 346 (Pa. 2013).
In order to be considered timely, a first, or any subsequent PCRA
petition, must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment
of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of
sentence “becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including
discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). However, an untimely petition may be
received when the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the
three limited exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met.1 A petition invoking one of
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1
The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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these exceptions must be filed within sixty days of the date the claim could
first have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled
to the exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, “the petitioner must
plead and prove specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised within
the sixty-day time frame” under section 9545(b)(2). Commonwealth v.
Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1167 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Our review of the record reflects that Appellant’s judgment of sentence
became final on May 25, 2005, ninety days after the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal and the time in
which to petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court
expired. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 13. Therefore,
Appellant had until May 25, 2006, in which to file a timely PCRA petition. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Herein, Appellant’s petition was filed on March 2,
2015. Thus, the instant PCRA petition is patently untimely, and Appellant is
constrained to establish that one of the aforementioned exceptions to the
PCRA time bar applies.
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(Footnote Continued)
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
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While inartfully drafted, we can glean from Appellant’s brief that he is
attempting to satisfy the PCRA’s timeliness requirements by claiming as
follows: his sentence was illegal; his trial counsel was ineffective; and the
United Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S.
___, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), applies to his case.2 Appellant’s Brief at 10, 13,
and 22. We conclude that none of these arguments establishes an exception
to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA.
First, Appellant argues that his sentence was illegal. It is well settled
that while the legality of a sentence is cognizable under the PCRA, the claim
must be raised in a timely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30
A.3d 516, 522 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737
A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999) (holding that claims challenging the legality of a
sentence are subject to review within PCRA, but they must first satisfy the
PCRA’s time limits). Because Appellant’s PCRA petition was untimely and no
exception to the time requirements applies, the PCRA court was without
jurisdiction to address this issue. Therefore, no relief is due.
Next, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the admissibility of certain evidence at trial. However, our
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2
In Montgomery, the United States Supreme Court opined that Miller v.
Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), was to be applied
retroactively; the Miller Court held that a mandatory sentence of life in
prison without parole for individuals under the age of eighteen when they
committed their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment.
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Supreme Court has explained that allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the
PCRA. Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005); see
also Commonwealth v. Lark, 560 Pa. 487, 746 A.2d 585, 589 (2000)
(holding that an allegation of ineffectiveness is not sufficient justification to
overcome an otherwise untimely PCRA petition). Accordingly, Appellant’s
claim of prior counsel’s ineffective assistance does not provide him relief
from the fact that his PCRA petition was untimely.
Next, Appellant avers that he was not afforded proper credit for time
served, and he alleges that the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in
Montgomery and Miller provide relief. First, we note that Appellant was
twenty-seven years old at the time of the aforementioned crimes. Thus,
Appellant was over the age of eighteen when he committed the crimes, and
the holding in Miller is inapplicable. Moreover, Appellant was not sentenced
to a term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. We conclude that
this issue is meritless.
Finally, in regard to the argument pertaining to credit for time served,
this claim implicates the legality of Appellant’s sentence. Commonwealth
v. Wyatt, 115 A.3d 876, 879 (Pa. Super. 2015). As discussed above, while
the legality of a sentence is cognizable under the PCRA, the issue must be
raised in a timely PCRA petition. Jackson, 30 A.3d at 522. Again, because
Appellant’s petition is untimely and no exceptions apply, the PCRA court had
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no jurisdiction to address this claim of error. Appellant is entitled to no
relief.
In conclusion, as Appellant’s PCRA petition was untimely and no
exceptions apply, the PCRA court correctly determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to address the claims presented and grant relief. See
Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding
that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to hear untimely petition). Likewise, we
lack the authority to address the merits of any substantive claims raised in
the PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267
(Pa. 2007) (“[J]urisdictional time limits go to a court’s right or competency
to adjudicate a controversy.”).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/13/2017
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