Com. v. Knecht, M. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MARTIN LOUIS KNECHT
Appellant No. 385 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 1, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000302-1977
CP-15-CR-0000303-1977
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MOULTON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2017
Martin Louis Knecht appeals from the February 1, 2016 order of the
Chester County Court of Common Pleas granting partial relief on his petition
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-
9546. Knecht, who had been sentenced to a mandatory sentence of life
without parole, sought relief pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455
(2012), which held that the imposition of such sentences for juvenile
offenders was unconstitutional. Without conducting a resentencing hearing
or imposing a minimum sentence, the trial court “[c]orrected” Knecht’s
judgment of sentence to reflect that he was sentenced to “life in prison, with
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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the possibility of parole.”1 Order, 2/15/16, at 1. Based on settled precedent
from our Supreme Court, we reverse the order, vacate the judgment of
sentence, and remand for the trial court to conduct a resentencing hearing
pursuant to Miller and Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013).
On July 2, 1977, a jury convicted Knecht of second-degree murder,
robbery, theft by unlawful taking or disposition, and criminal conspiracy.2
On July 21, 1981, the trial court sentenced Knecht, who was 16 years old at
the time of the offense, to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
for the second-degree-murder conviction and concurrent sentences of 10 to
20 years’ imprisonment for the robbery conviction and 5 to 10 years’
imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction. On June 29, 1984, this Court
affirmed the judgment of sentence.
Knecht filed unsuccessful post-conviction petitions in 1985, 1989,
1997, and 2010. On July 20, 2012, Knecht filed a pro se PCRA petition
arguing that his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole was unconstitutional pursuant to Miller. On July 31, 2012, the trial
court issued an order stating its intention to grant the PCRA petition, vacate
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1
The original record contains only documents filed on or after January
27, 2016 – that is, the consolidated motion to vacate stay, to vacate
unconstitutional sentence, and for bail pending litigation, and later
documents. We have gathered additional information and dates from the
docket and a prior opinion from this Court.
2
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(b), 3701, 3921, and 903, respectively.
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the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and
impose a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The
Commonwealth requested a stay or an extension of time to answer the PCRA
petition. On September 17, 2012, the PCRA court entered a stay “pending
the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the cases of
Commonwealth v. Batts[3] and Commonwealth v. Cunningham,[4]
argued on September 12, 2012.”
On October 30, 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its
decision in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10-11 (Pa. 2013),
holding that Miller did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.
Neither Knecht, the Commonwealth, nor the PCRA court took steps to
address the stay following the issuance of the Cunningham decision. On
January 25, 2016, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), which held that Miller
applied retroactively to cases that were final at the time Miller was decided.
On January 27, 2016, Knecht filed a consolidated motion to vacate
stay, to vacate unconstitutional sentence, and for bail pending litigation. On
February 1, 2016, the PCRA court issued an order “correct[ing]” Knecht’s
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3
Commonwealth v. Batts, 981 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 2009) (granting
petition for allowance of appeal).
4
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 51 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2012) (granting
petition for allowance of appeal).
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sentence to reflect that he was now sentenced to “life in prison, with the
possibility of parole.” Order, 2/15/16, at 1. The order, which did not include
a minimum sentence, further stated that Knecht “may file an application for
parole with the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.” Id.
On February 2, 2016, Knecht filed a timely notice of appeal. Knecht
raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the lower court err in acting without a hearing and
without providing an opportunity for argument, allocution
and the presentation of evidence when the court purported
to “clarify” an unconstitutional sentence in a way not
authorized by law?
2. Did the lower court usurp the legislative function and
rewrite sentencing provisions in “clarifying” a sentence in a
way not authorized by law, and in derogation of clear
legislative intent, when it purported to make defendant
eligible for parole?
3. Did the lower court err in concluding that it had judicial
authority to grant the Parole Board discretionary authority
to release on parole an inmate who is serving life
imprisonment, and in purporting to make appellant eligible
for parole, where existing Pennsylvania statutes prohibit
the grant of parole to a person serving a life-sentence?
Knecht’s Br. at 4. Because Knecht’s issues are related, we will address his
arguments together.
Knecht’s arguments, while not lining up neatly with his statement of
issues, are essentially twofold. He first alleges a process error – he was
wrongly denied a resentencing hearing required by controlling authority in
both the United States Supreme Court and our Supreme Court. Second, he
alleges a substantive error – because the statute under which he was
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sentenced for second-decree murder is unconstitutional, and because there
is no other valid statute on which to base this aspect of his sentence, he
should be released forthwith. As set forth more fully below, we agree with
Knecht’s first claim, and thus remand for a resentencing hearing, but
disagree with his second claim.
As to process, Miller and Batts provide that juvenile offenders serving
an unconstitutional sentence of life without parole are entitled to a
resentencing hearing at which the sentencing court must take into account a
list of age-related factors, set forth in Miller, designed to insure that each
offender receives an appropriately individualized sentence. Accordingly,
Knecht correctly argues that the trial court erred by “correcting” his
sentence without such a hearing. Batts, 66 A.3d at 297 (finding appropriate
remedy for a juvenile defendant who was sentenced to life imprisonment
without possibility of parole is remand for resentencing where trial court will
impose minimum sentence after considering appropriate age-related
factors); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 135 A.3d 1097, 1109 (Pa.Super.
2016) (remanding for resentencing where juvenile defendant not sentenced
to mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole, but where trial court
failed to consider the age-related factors before imposing sentence); see
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also Commonwealth’s Br. at 40 (agreeing Knecht entitled to resentencing
hearing).5
In contrast, Knecht’s broader contention that he may not be
resentenced at all, and instead must be released because he has already
completed his valid sentences for the underlying felonies, is without merit.
Knecht’s complaint in this regard has several strands, but reduces to this:
because the statutory scheme under which he was sentenced is
unconstitutional (for imposing mandatory life without parole on juveniles),
and because the legislature has failed to adopt a substitute sentencing
scheme that applies to Knecht,6 there is no valid statutory provision under
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5
As Knecht further argues, and as the trial court acknowledged in its
1925(a) opinion, the court needs to impose a minimum sentence in order to
render Knecht eligible for parole. The Prisons and Parole Code provides that
the Parole Board may exercise its discretion to grant parole “only after[] the
expiration of the minimum term of imprisonment fixed by the court in its
sentence or by the Board of Pardons in a sentence which has been reduced
by commutation.” 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(3). Similarly, the Parole Board may
not release on parole any inmate “condemned to death or serving life
imprisonment.” 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1).
6
On October 25, 2012, the Governor signed into law a new sentencing
scheme applicable to juveniles convicted of murder. See Batts, 66 A.3d at
293. For juveniles convicted of second-degree murder after June 24, 2012,
the statute provides:
(1) A person who at the time of the commission of the
offense was 15 years of age or older shall be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment the minimum of which shall be at
least 30 years to life.
(2) A person who at the time of the commission of the
offense was under 15 years of age shall be sentenced to a
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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which he may be properly resentenced. While this argument may hold
superficial appeal, it is foreclosed by decisions of both our Supreme Court
and this Court.
In Batts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Miller did not
render the entire Pennsylvania sentencing scheme for first-degree murder
unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. 66 A.3d at 295. The Batts Court
reasoned that the statutory provision mandating a sentence of life without
parole for first-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a), is unconstitutional
“only when that mandate becomes a sentence of life-without-parole as
applied to a juvenile offender—which occurs as a result of the interaction
between Section 1102, the Prisons and Parole Code, see 61 Pa.C.S. §
6137(a)(1), and the Juvenile Act, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302.” Batts, 66 A.3d
at 295-96.7 The Court further stated:
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(Footnote Continued)
term of imprisonment the minimum of which shall be at
least 20 years to life.
18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(c).
7
In Commonwealth v. Mitchell, this Court similarly found:
Contrary to Appellant’s argument at sentencing, there did
exist statutory authority to sentence him. Specifically,
under the then-applicable version of 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(b),
Appellant was to be given life imprisonment. However,
that statute’s interplay with 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a), which
mandated no opportunity for parole, was no longer
constitutionally sound.
135 A.3d 1097, 1109 n.8 (Pa.Super. 2016).
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Miller neither barred imposition of a life-without-parole
sentence on a juvenile categorically nor indicated that a
life sentence with the possibility of parole could never be
mandatorily imposed on a juvenile. Rather, Miller
requires only that there be judicial consideration of the
appropriate age-related factors set forth in that decision
prior to the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole on a juvenile.
Id. at 296 (internal citations omitted). The Court concluded that the
appropriate remedy for a juvenile defendant who was sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is a remand for resentencing
where the trial court will impose a minimum sentence 8 after considering
appropriate age-related factors.9
Here, Knecht, who was a juvenile at the time of the offense, was
sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller
and Montgomery, the trial court “clarified” Knecht’s sentence to reflect that
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8
The Prisons and Parole Code provides that the Parole Board “may
parole subject to consideration of guidelines established under 42 Pa.C.S. §
2154.5 (relating to adoption of guidelines for parole) and may release on
parole any inmate to whom the power to parole is granted to the board by
this chapter, except an inmate condemned to death or serving life
imprisonment. . . .” 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1). Further, the Parole Board
may exercise its discretion to grant parole “only after[] the expiration of the
minimum term of imprisonment fixed by the court in its sentence or by the
Board of Pardons in a sentence which has been reduced by commutation.”
61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(3).
9
Although the appellant in Batts was convicted of first-degree
murder, the analysis regarding whether the statutory scheme is
unconstitutional also is applicable to second-degree murder convictions.
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Knecht was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
The trial court, however, did not impose a minimum sentence and it issued
the new sentence without the benefit of a resentencing hearing. 10 Pursuant
to Batts, the trial court was required to hold a hearing and consider the
appropriate age-related factors, prior to resentencing Knecht and imposing a
minimum sentence. See Mitchell, 135 A.3d at 1108-09; Batts, 66 A.3d at
297; see also 63 Pa.C.S. § 6137 (parole board lacks authority to parole
inmate until inmate has served minimum sentence).
Therefore, we must reverse and remand to the trial court to conduct a
resentencing hearing, where the court shall consider the appropriate age-
related factors when resentencing Knecht.
Order reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/13/2017
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10
In its Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) opinion, the
trial court states that it would have amended its order to reflect that Knecht
was sentenced to time served to life imprisonment. However, the trial court
was required to conduct a hearing prior to resentencing Knecht.
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