Com. v. Reber, B. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S79030-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    BRYAN RAY REBER                            :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 994 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 24, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-54-CR-0001716-2017
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED FEBRUARY 15, 2019
    Appellant, Bryan Ray Reber, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered on May 24, 2018. We affirm.
    Following a stipulated bench trial on May 24, 2018, the trial court found
    Appellant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and a drug or
    combination of drugs (hereinafter “DUI”) and possessing drug paraphernalia.1
    N.T. Trial, 5/24/18, at 7. The convictions arose out of Appellant’s actions on
    May 6, 2017, when the police found Appellant asleep behind the wheel of a
    stationary vehicle that had its engine running and its transmission in the drive
    position. The arresting officer saw that Appellant had heroin on his lap and
    subsequent testing revealed that Appellant had alcohol, methamphetamine,
    and morphine in his blood. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 7/11/7, at 1.
    ____________________________________________
    1   75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(3) and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), respectively.
    J-S79030-18
    After the stipulated trial, the parties immediately proceeded to
    sentencing. At sentencing, the parties stipulated that Appellant had a prior
    DUI offense.    Moreover, the parties stipulated that Appellant’s prior DUI
    occurred on May 21, 2006 and that Appellant was convicted of the DUI on May
    23, 2007. See Appellant’s Sentencing Brief, 4/16/18, at 2; Commonwealth’s
    Sentencing Brief, 5/18/18, at 1-2.
    Notwithstanding this prior DUI conviction, Appellant claimed that he
    should not be subject to the more severe grading and sentencing provisions
    levied upon second-time DUI offenders, as his prior offense did not occur
    “within 10 years prior to the date of the offense for which [Appellant was]
    being sentenced.”     See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3806(b)(1)(i) (“[f]or purposes of
    sections . . . 3803 (relating to grading) [and] 3804 (relating to penalties) . . .
    the prior offense must have occurred . . . within 10 years prior to the date of
    the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced”); see also 75
    Pa.C.S.A. § 3803(b)(4) (mandates a higher grading for individuals who violate
    Section 3802(d), where the individual “has more than one prior offense”); 75
    Pa.C.S.A. § 3804(b) (mandates increased penalties for individuals who violate
    Section 3802(d) when it is “a second offense”).
    Appellant argued that, to interpret Section 3806(b)(1)(i) properly and
    determine whether he has a “prior offense” for purposes of that section, the
    trial court must look to the dates that he actually committed his DUIs – which
    were May 21, 2006 and May 6, 2017.          Appellant claimed that, since more
    than 10 years elapsed between these dates, he was not subject to Section
    -2-
    J-S79030-18
    3806(b)(1)(i)’s ten-year look-back provision and, thus, he did not have a
    “prior offense” for purposes of Section 3806(b)(1)(i). Appellant’s Sentencing
    Brief, 4/16/18, at 2.
    Nevertheless, during sentencing, Appellant acknowledged this Court’s
    recent opinion in Commonwealth v. Mock, 
    186 A.3d 434
     (Pa. Super. 2018),
    appeal granted, ___ A.3d ___, 
    2018 WL 6420180
     (Pa. 2018).             See N.T.
    Sentencing, 5/24/18, at 3-4. In Mock, this Court held that “the phrase ‘prior
    offense,’ as used in [75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3806(b)(1)(i)], refers to . . . the date of
    conviction or other disposition” – not the date the individual actually
    committed the prior DUI. Mock, 186 A.3d at 437-438. Therefore, Appellant
    acknowledged that, under Mock, his “prior offense” occurred on the date he
    was sentenced for his first DUI – which was May 23, 2007.             See N.T.
    Sentencing, 5/24/18, at 3-4. Appellant thus acknowledged that, since May
    23, 2007 was “within 10 years prior to the date of the offense for which
    [Appellant was] being sentenced” – which was May 6, 2017 – Mock required
    the trial court to sentence him as a second-time DUI offender. Id. However,
    during sentencing, Appellant informed the trial court that, even though the
    trial court was bound by Mock, he was raising the claim for issue-preservation
    purposes and so that a higher court could overrule Mock and grant him relief.
    See id.
    The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a term of 90 days to five
    years in jail, with a concurrent term of one year of probation, for his
    -3-
    J-S79030-18
    convictions. Id. at 8-9. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and now
    raises one claim to this Court:
    Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
    held that [Appellant’s] DUI conviction was a second offense
    based on the provisions of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806?
    Appellant’s Brief at 5.
    We need not engage in an extended discussion of Appellant’s claim on
    appeal as Appellant acknowledges that Mock was binding on the trial court
    and that Mock compelled the trial court’s sentencing decision.            See
    Appellant’s Brief at 19. While we understand that Appellant seeks to have
    Mock overruled, we cannot do so.       We, like the trial court, are bound by
    Mock. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Karash, 
    175 A.3d 306
    , (Pa. Super.
    2017) (“a panel of this Court cannot overrule the decision by another panel”);
    Commonwealth v. Taggert, 
    997 A.2d 1189
    , 1201 n.16 (Pa. Super. 2010)
    (recognizing that “one three-judge panel of [the Superior] Court cannot
    overrule another” three-judge panel).        This is true even though the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal in Mock.
    See Marks v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 
    762 A.2d 1098
    , 1101 (Pa. Super. 2000)
    (explaining that the Superior Court has “long held that as long as the
    [precedential] decision has not been overturned by the Supreme Court, a
    decision by our Court remains binding precedent”).          Therefore, we must
    conclude that Appellant’s claim fails as a matter of law.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    -4-
    J-S79030-18
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 02/15/2019
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 994 MDA 2018

Filed Date: 2/15/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024