Com. v. Valdez, R. ( 2015 )

J-S16012-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ROGER E. VALDEZ
Appellant No. 1339 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 30, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0001053-2013
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JUNE 01, 2015
Appellant, Roger E. Valdez, appeals from the judgment of sentence
following his conviction of rape of a child and related charges, entered on
July 30, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County. No relief is
due.
We write primarily for the parties’ benefit and recite only the facts and
procedural history essential to our disposition. Valdez was charged with one
count of rape of a child, three counts of involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse with a child, one count of unlawful contact with a minor, one
count of aggravated indecent assault, one count of indecent assault, and one
J-S16012-15
count of corruption of minors.1 The charges stem from an incident in which
Valdez, who at the time of the offenses was 37 years old, posed as a 17-
year-old in an online chat forum and lured a 12-year-old victim into
engaging in sexual intercourse. The matter was scheduled for trial on March
4 and 5, 2014. Immediately prior to trial, on March 3, 2014, Valdez entered
an open guilty plea to all charges. Valdez then filled out and signed a
written guilty plea colloquy, after which the trial court engaged in a lengthy
oral colloquy. See N.T., Guilty Plea Hearing, 3/3/15.
Prior to sentencing, Valdez filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea,2
which the trial court denied. At sentencing on July 30, 2014, Valdez again
reiterated his request to withdraw his plea. Valdez did not assert his
innocence, but rather repeatedly maintained that the 12-year-old-victim
“went after me and preyed on me,” and that “what she has done is wrong …
and that the fact [is] that she has been doing this to several other men….”
N.T., Sentencing, 7/30/14 at 24 (emphasis added). The trial court denied
Valdez’s request and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 10 to 30 years’
incarceration. This timely appeal followed.
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
6318(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(7); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7); and 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i).
2
Valdez did not state in his motion a specific reason to support his request
to withdraw his plea.
-2-
J-S16012-15
On appeal, Valdez claims that the lower court abused its discretion by
denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He maintains
that the court insufficiently established the nature of the offenses charged
and the factual basis to establish such charges during the guilty plea
colloquy in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 590.3 See
Appellant’s Brief at 11.
The standard of review that we employ in challenges to a
trial court’s decision regarding a presentence motion to withdraw
a guilty plea is well-settled. “A trial court’s decision regarding
whether to permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn should not be
upset absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion
exists when a defendant shows any ‘fair and just’ reasons for
withdrawing his plea absent ‘substantial prejudice’ to the
Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Pardo, 35 A.3d 1222,
1227 (Pa. Super.2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Prysock,
972 A.2d 539, 541 (Pa. Super.2009); citing Commonwealth v.
Anthony, 504 Pa. 551, 475 A.2d 1303, 1308 (1984)). In its
discretion, a trial court may grant a motion for the withdrawal of
a guilty plea at any time before the imposition of sentence.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A). “Although there is no absolute right to
withdraw a guilty plea, properly received by the trial court, it is
clear that a request made before sentencing ... should be
liberally allowed.” Commonwealth v. Forbes, 450 Pa. 185,
299 A.2d 268, 271 (1973). The policy underlying this liberal
____________________________________________
3
The Commonwealth maintains that Valdez has not preserved this issue for
our review. In his Rule 1925(b) Concise Statement of Errors Complained of
on Appeal, Valdez alleged only that his “plea was not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered.” Statement of Errors Complained of on
Appeal, 8/27/14. The Commonwealth argues that this general statement did
not adequately preserve the more specific issue now raised on appeal, that
the trial court insufficiently established the factual predicate for the offenses
charged. However, as we find that this issue does implicate the
voluntariness of Valdez’s guilty plea, we decline to find this claim to be
waived.
-3-
J-S16012-15
exercise of discretion is well-established: “The trial courts in
exercising their discretion must recognize that ‘before judgment,
the courts should show solicitude for a defendant who wishes to
undo a waiver of all constitutional rights that surround the right
to trial—perhaps the most devastating waiver possible under our
constitution.’ ” Commonwealth v. Santos, 450 Pa. 492, 301
A.2d 829, 830 (1973) (quoting Commonwealth v. Neely, 449
Pa. 3, 295 A.2d 75, 76 (1972)). In Forbes, our Supreme Court
instructed that, “in determining whether to grant a presentence
motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea, ‘the test to be applied by
the trial courts is fairness and justice.’ ” Forbes, 299 A.2d at
271 (quoting United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 561 (3d
Cir.1969)).
Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.2d 254, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 94 A.3d 1007 (Pa. 2014).
“It is well-settled that an assertion of innocence may constitute a fair
and just reason for the pre-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea.” Id. at 263
(citations omitted). Herein, as previously noted, Valdez did not assert his
innocence at the plea withdrawal hearing. To the contrary, Valdez instead
repeatedly placed the blame for his crimes on the 12-year-old victim. He
now argues that his plea was involuntary because “the [c]ourt failed to
properly explain the nature of the charges….” Appellant’s Brief at 11.
In assessing the voluntariness of a plea, we note that “[t]he law does
not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to
enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that [appellant’s] decision to
plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.”
Commonwealth v. Yager, 685 A.2d 1000, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en
banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
-4-
J-S16012-15
Once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is presumed
that he was aware of what he was doing, and the burden of
proving involuntariness is upon him. Therefore, where the
record clearly demonstrates that a guilty plea colloquy was
conducted, during which it became evident that the defendant
understood the nature of the charges against him, the
voluntariness of the plea is established. … Determining whether
a defendant understood the connotations of his plea and its
consequences requires an examination of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the plea.
[I]n order to determine the voluntariness of the plea and
whether the defendant acted knowingly and intelligently, the
trial court must, at a minimum, inquire into the following six
areas:
(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to
which he is pleading guilty?
(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
(3) Does the defendant understand that he has a right to trial by
jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that he is presumed innocent
until he is found guilty?
(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible ranges of
sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged?
(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the
terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts
such agreement?
Commonwealth v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(citation omitted). This examination may be conducted by defense counsel
or the attorney for the Commonwealth, as permitted by the judge. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment.
The record belies Valdez’s assertion that the trial court failed to explain
the nature of the charges or establish the factual basis for the plea. At the
-5-
J-S16012-15
outset of the guilty plea hearing, the trial court explained the charges to
which Valdez was pleading guilty as follows.
On or about April 23 through April 28, 2013, at 500 East
Main Street in the Borough of Palmyra, Lebanon County, Count
I, Rape of a Child, in that you did engage in sexual intercourse
with the victim … when the child was less than 13 years of age;
Count II, Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse, in that you did
engage in anal intercourse with this young lady; Count III,
Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse of the Child, in that you
did perform oral intercourse on [the victim]; Count IV,
Involuntary Sexual Intercourse with a Child, in that you did
cause [the victim] to perform oral sexual intercourse upon you;
Count V, Unlawful Contact or Communication with a Minor, in
that you did communicate with [the victim] for the purpose of
engaging in sexual relations with [the victim], or did engage in
sexual intercourse with [the victim]; Count VI, Aggravated
Indecent Assault, in that you did digitally penetrate the vagina of
[the victim]; Count VII, Indecent Assault, in that you did touch
[the victim’s] vagina, buttocks, breast and/or kissed her; and
Count VIII, Corruption of a Minor, in that you, being 20 years of
age or older, did engage in sexual contact with – and her being
less than 18 years of age, rather, and you being I believe you
said 26 [sic] at the time these matters occurred, did engage in
sexual contact and/or communication with [the victim].
N.T., Plea Hearing, 3/3/14 at 3-4. When the trial court later specifically
asked whether Valdez had vaginal sexual intercourse with the victim, he
admitted, “[y]es, sir.” Id. at 6-7. Valdez additionally acknowledged that he
“accept[ed] all of those charges, sir.” Id. at 7.
Considering the trial court’s detailed explanation of the factual
surrounding the charges, as well as Valdez’s own admission and acceptance
of the charges as stated, we are more than satisfied that Valdez was
adequately apprised of the nature of the charges and the factual basis for
the plea. Our decision is further reinforced by the fact that in response to
-6-
J-S16012-15
question 11 on the written guilty plea colloquy form, which asked “Do you
admit to committing the crime or crimes to which you are pleading guilty
and did your criminal conduct fit the legal elements explained to you which
make up the crime or crimes,” Valdez answered in the affirmative.
“Appellant is bound by these statements, which he made in open court while
under oath, and he may not now asserts grounds for withdrawing the plea
which contradict the statements.” Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997,
1009 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876
(Pa. Super. 2007)).
In light of the foregoing, we find no evidence to suggest that Valdez’s
plea was involuntarily entered. It therefore follows that Valdez has failed to
establish a “fair and just reason” for the presentence withdrawal of his plea.
Accordingly, we find no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Valdez’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/1/2015
-7-