Com. v. Minaya, J. ( 2016 )

J-S50038-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JUSTIN WILLIAMS MINAYA
Appellant No. 2066 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 15, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0000094-2015
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2016
Appellant, Justin Williams Minaya, appeals from the July 15, 2015
aggregate judgment of sentence of 42 to 96 months’ imprisonment, imposed
after he was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault and one count of
disorderly conduct.1 After careful review, we affirm.2
We summarize the relevant procedural history of this case as follows.
On February 6, 2015, the Commonwealth filed an information, charging
Appellant with the above-mentioned offenses. “The charges resulted from
an incident between [Appellant] and Jean Dorilus (“Dorilus”) on October 29,
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2702(a)(4), and 5503(a)(1), respectively.
2
We note the Commonwealth elected not to file a brief in this matter.
J-S50038-16
2014, in the Borough of Chambersburg in which [Appellant] was alleged to
have attacked the victim with a hatchet.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/14/16, at 1.
Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on June 25, 2015. Relevant to this
appeal, the Commonwealth presented three eyewitnesses, Dorilus,
Richardson Dormeus, and Joseph Berdy, none of whom had met Appellant
prior to the incident on October 29, 2014. Appellant testified in his own
defense. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of all
charges. On July 15, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 42 to 96
months’ imprisonment on the first count of aggravated assault, a concurrent
18 to 36 month sentence for the second aggravated assault count, and a
consecutive 1 to 12 month sentence for disorderly conduct. On July 27,
2015, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion.3 On September 1,
2015, the trial court entered an order granting part of Appellant’s post-
sentence motion insofar that it modified the sentence to reflect that all three
sentences were to run concurrent to each other, resulting in a new
aggregate sentence of 42 to 96 months’ imprisonment. On October 30,
2015, the trial court entered an order denying the balance of Appellant’s
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3
We observe that the tenth day fell on Saturday, July 25, 2015. When
computing a filing period, “[if] the last day of any such period shall fall on
Saturday or Sunday … such day shall be omitted from the computation.” 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. Therefore, the tenth day for Appellant to file a timely
post-sentence motion was on Monday, July 27, 2015. As a result, we deem
his post-sentence motion timely filed.
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post-sentence motion. On November 25, 2015, Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal.4
On appeal, Appellant raises two issues for our review.
[1.] Whether the trial court erred in denying
[Appellant]’s post-sentence motion for
judgment of acquittal by finding that the
Commonwealth had established beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the elements of
aggravated assault and disorderly conduct
when the numerous and significant
discrepancies in the testimony of the
Commonwealth’s witnesses made their
testimony so unreliable and inconclusive that
the jury could not reasonably have concluded
that the Commonwealth had proven all of the
elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable
doubt[?]
[II.] Whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying [Appellant]’s post-sentence motion for
a new trial by finding that the conviction was
not against the weight of the evidence when
that evidence – primarily eyewitness testimony
– was so inconsistent that the jury could not
reasonably have concluded that the
Commonwealth had proven his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 10.
In his first issue, Appellant purports to challenge the sufficiency of the
Commonwealth’s evidence due to various highlighted inconsistencies in the
eyewitnesses’ testimony. Appellant’s Brief at 22-26. However, any
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4
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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challenge to discrepancies in witnesses’ testimony goes to the weight of the
evidence, not its sufficiency. Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 860 A.2d 102,
107 (Pa. 2004); Commonwealth v. Boxley, 838 A.2d 608, 612 (Pa. 2003).
As Appellant does not raise any argument that the Commonwealth’s case
was insufficient as a matter of law, his first argument on appeal does not
entitle him to relief.
In his second issue, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence,
on the same ground as he purportedly challenges its sufficiency. Appellant’s
Brief at 26-27. We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review. “A
claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Landis,
89 A.3d 694, 699 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). An argument that
the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence concedes that the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions. Commonwealth v.
Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, Lyons v.
Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 1792 (2014). Our Supreme Court has
admonished that “[a] new trial should not be granted because of a mere
conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have
arrived at a different conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049,
1055 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). Instead, “the trial judge is to determine
that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater
weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is
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to deny justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A]
new trial should be awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the
evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice ….” Id.
As an appellate court, it “is not [our role] to consider the underlying
question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d 80, 91 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, Morales v. Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015). An
argument that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence
remains “[o]ne of the least assailable reasons for granting … a new trial ….”
Id. (citation omitted). “Thus, only where the facts and inferences disclose a
palpable abuse of discretion will the denial of a motion for a new trial based
on the weight of the evidence be upset on appeal.” Id. (citation omitted;
emphasis in original).
In this case, Appellant avers the jury’s verdict was against the weight
of the evidence based on the following discrepancies.
(a) Dorilus – in testifying about the first
incident before the alleged hatchet attack – said it
was started by [Appellant] demanding money from
Dorilus. He also said that the incident was started
by [Appellant]’s girlfriend demanding a cigarette
from Dorilus. After listening to Dorilus’s testimony,
nobody – not even the jury – could figure out why
this alleged assault occurred.
(b) Dorilus also testified that [Appellant] left
the area after the first incident. He said that six or
seven minutes later [Appellant]’s girlfriend came
back without [Appellant]. He also said that three or
four minutes after [Appellant] left the first time he
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was back with the hatchet. That is not even
possible. [Appellant] was taken to the police station
after the initial incident where he was charged with a
summary offense and released to his mother. They
then went to her house for about half an hour before
she dropped him off near his apartment.
(c) Dorilus testified that when [Appellant]
came back after the first incident that he was scared
because [Appellant] “looked crazy.” But Dorilus also
testified that he did not think [Appellant] would do
anything. If Dorilus was scared, why did he not run
away? He had plenty of time to get into his
apartment. If Dorilus did not think [Appellant] was
going to do anything, why was he scared? The
answer to those questions is that Dorilus was not
scared of [Appellant]. He was just trying to sell his
story to the jury.
(d) Dorilus testified that [Appellant] had the
hatchet in his left hand. Berdy then testified that
[Appellant] had the hatchet in his right hand. Which
one was it? Nobody seems to know the answer to
such an important question.
(e) Dorilus testified that there were six or
seven guys around when [Appellant] came back.
Dormeus did not remember how many people were
around when [Appellant] came back. And Berdy
testified that it was just the three of them (Berdy,
Dormeus, and Dorilus).
(f) Dorilus and Berdy testified that the
hatchet the prosecutor showed during trial was the
one [Appellant] had on the night in question;
however, Dormeus testified that the hatchet was not
the same one [Appellant] possessed.
(g) Dormeus was not able to identify
[Appellant] as the attacker in court. He said he
identified [Appellant] on the night in question based
on the clothing [Appellant] was wearing – a white t-
shirt. However, the night in question was October
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29, 2015; a cold night when nobody would be
running around wearing only a t-shirt.
(h) Dorilus testified that he, Berdy, and
Dormeus watched as [Appellant] walked up the block
toward them with something in his left hand, which
was concealed behind his back. Dormeus testified
that all three of them watched [Appellant] approach
from around a back hallway of the building. And
finally Berdy, who had just come back from Sheetz,
testified that [Appellant] was already on the scene
arguing with Dorilus.
Appellant’s Brief at 23-25.
The trial court supplied the following rationale in support of its
conclusion that Appellant was not entitled to a new trial based on his weight
of the evidence claim.
By virtue of the jury’s verdict, it appears that
[it] did not view these minor inconsistencies to
negatively impact the credibility of the witnesses.
The [trial c]ourt agrees. Dorilus’ testimony
regarding the cause of the altercation, rather than
being inconsistent, simply appears to detail two
separate incidents occurring on the same day which
may have both contributed to the attack. The jury
was free to reconcile the testimony that [Appellant]
and Dorilus had a disagreement over money and the
testimony about the incident between Dorilus and
[Appellant]’s girlfriend and conclude that both
contributed to [Appellant]’s actions. Further, Dorilus
was cross-examined as to inconsistenc[ies] in his
trial testimony as compared to his preliminary
hearing testimony.
The [trial c]ourt does not view the discrepancy
in Dorilus’ testimony regarding the time between the
incidents to be unusual. In the heat of the moment,
a difference of 3 to 7 minutes or whether Berdy
arrived prior to or immediately following
[Appellant]’s arrival is understandable, especially
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when recalling the events that occurred months prior
to the testimony at trial. Likewise, the witnesses’
memory of whether the hatchet was in [Appellant]’s
right or left hand may easily be confused, yet does
not prevent the jury was concluding that [Appellant]
threatened the victim with a deadly weapon.
Finally, [Appellant]’s arguments that if Dorilus
was actually threatened, he should have run or that
[Appellant] was misidentified because he would not
have been wearing a t-shirt in late October do not
contradict or cast doubt upon any evidence actually
presented.
The [trial c]ourt finds no reason to doubt the
weight given to the evidence by the jury. While
minor inconsistencies exist, the basic facts remained
constant between Dorilus, Dormeus, and Berdy and
the investigating officers. Simply stated, the verdict
was not so contrary to the evidence presented as to
shock [the trial c]ourt’s sense of justice. To the
contrary, the verdict rendered was entirely
consistent with the evidence.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/14/16, at 11-12.
It is axiomatic that the jury is the ultimate finder of fact at trial.
[T]he veracity of a particular witness is a
question which must be answered in reliance on the
ordinary experiences of life, common knowledge of
the natural tendencies of human nature, and
observations of the character and demeanor of the
witness. As the phenomenon of lying is within the
ordinary capacity of jurors to assess, the question of
a witness’s credibility is reserved exclusively for the
jury.
Commonwealth v. Alicia, 92 A.3d 753, 761 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
Likewise, “[t]he trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
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of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Feese, 79 A.3d 1101, 1122 (Pa.
Super. 2013), appeal denied, 94 A.3d 1007 (Pa. 2014).
In this case, as the trial court pointed out, the jury was free to find
Dorilus, Dormeus, and Berdy’s trial testimony credible, find Appellant’s
testimony not credible, and resolve any inconsistencies in the
Commonwealth’s favor. See generally Commonwealth v. Horne, 89
A.3d 277, 286 (Pa. Super. 2014) (concluding the weight of the evidence
claim could not prevail as “the jury resolved the inconsistencies among the
testimonies as it saw fit and reached a verdict[]”), appeal denied, 102 A.3d
984 (Pa. 2014). The jury was presented with Dorilus, Dormeus, and Berdy’s
testimony and Appellant’s. They weighed both and ultimately concluded that
Dorilus, Dormeus, and Berdy’s testimony was credible and Appellant’s was
not credible. As an appellate court, we will not reweigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v.
Serrano, 61 A.3d 279, 289 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Based on
these considerations, we conclude the trial court did not commit a palpable
abuse of discretion in deciding the jury’s verdict was not against the weight
of the evidence. See Morales, supra.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellant’s issues on appeal are
devoid of merit. Accordingly, the trial court’s July 15, 2015 judgment of
sentence is affirmed.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/6/2016
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