Rittenhouse Plaza v. Lichtman, J. ( 2023 )

J-A20029-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
RITTENHOUSE PLAZA, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOAN LICHTMAN :
:
Appellant : No. 1807 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered August 4, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No.: 071003964
BEFORE: STABILE, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2023
Appellant Joan Lichtman pro se appeals from the August 4, 2021 order
of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which denied her
petition to strike judgment. Upon review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. Briefly,
this appeal stems from a landlord-tenant action between Appellant and
Appellee Rittenhouse Plaza, Inc. (“Rittenhouse”), the operator of a housing
cooperative under which individual proprietary tenants occupy apartment
units under proprietary leases between the tenants and Rittenhouse. From
1992 to 2007, Appellant resided in Unit 8C of Rittenhouse Plaza, located at
1901 Walnut Street in Philadelphia (the “Property”).
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A20029-22
On September 26, 2007, Rittenhouse filed a landlord-tenant action
against Appellant in Philadelphia Municipal Court, seeking past due rent and
possession of the Property. On October 19, 2007, the court entered judgment
in favor of Rittenhouse for money damages and possession. Appellant
appealed de novo to the trial court, which eventually, on May 9, 2008, also
found in favor of Rittenhouse in the amount of $47,081.19 and awarded
Rittenhouse possession of the Property. Appellant’s appeals to this Court were
unsuccessful and she was evicted from the Property on June 16, 2008.1
On January 28, 2010, Appellant filed an emergency motion to stay the
sheriff’s sale, which was denied the same day. On February 2, 2010,
Appellant’s cooperative interest in the Property was sold following active
bidding. On April 6, 2010, the sheriff’s deed was recorded. On May 28, 2010,
the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to set aside the sale and this Court
affirmed the order on March 11, 2011.
Appellant pro se filed several petitions to strike the May 9, 2008
judgment, all of which were denied.2 On July 18, 2021, Appellant filed yet
____________________________________________
1 This Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal from the May 9, 2008 judgment
because Appellant failed to file post-trial motions.
2 Since 2011, Appellant has filed over twenty-five lawsuits litigating her
grievances against various organizations and public officials in connection with
the underlying landlord-tenant dispute. See, e.g., Rittenhouse Plaza, Inc.
v. Lichtman, No. 745 EDA 2007, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed
Aug. 22, 2007); Rittenhouse Plaza, Inc. v. Lichtman, 26 A.3d 1187 (Pa.
Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 32 A.3d 1278(Pa. 2011); Lichtman v. Chubb Group of Ins. Companies, et al., 107 A.3d
218 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum); Lichtman v. Glazer,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-2-
J-A20029-22
another petition—her fifth—to strike the judgment.3 The trial court denied the
petition on August 4, 2021. Appellant pro se timely appealed. Both Appellant
and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant presents seven issues for our review, reproduced
verbatim below.
[I.] Did the trial judge err or abuse discretion in this Landlord-
Tenant matter, when failing to get the correct set of facts; failing
to inform himself of Philadelphia’s law governing evictions, i.e.,
specifically Philadelphia Code, Chapter 9-1600, entitled
Prohibition against Unlawful Eviction Practices; and failing to read
Defendant’s pleadings and submitted paperwork, thereby,
rendering his premises to be incorrect and his conclusions not
supported by law nor the evidence?
____________________________________________
111 A.3d 1225 (Cmwlth. 2015) rehearing en banc denied, appeal denied,
125 A.3d 779 (Pa. 2015); Lichtman v. Prudential Fox Roach, 107 A.3d 228(Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum); Lichtman v. the Honorable
Arnold New, No. 549 C.D. 2015, unpublished memorandum (Cmwlth. filed
August 27, 2015); Lichtman v. Bomstein, 134 A.3d 496 (Pa. Super. 2015),
appeal denied, 141 A.3d 651 (Pa. 2016); Lichtman v. R. Seth Williams
and Kathleen Martin, No. 1435 C.D. 2017, unpublished memorandum
(Cmwlth. filed May 8, 2018); Lichtman v. Kelley Hodge, John Delaney, R.
Seth Williams, Kathleen Martin, No. 1563 C.D. 2017, unpublished
memorandum (Cmwlth. filed Sept. 13, 2018); Lichtman v. Bradley K. Moss
and Sheila Woods-Skipper, No. 365 EDA 2019, unpublished memorandum
(Pa. Super. filed Nov. 7, 2019); Lichtman v. Krasner, No. 352 C.D. 2018,
unpublished memorandum (Cmwlth. filed April 18, 2019); Lichtman v. Eric
Feder, Deputy Court Administrator, Office of Judicial Records of
Philadelphia County, No. 2551 EDA 2019, unpublished memorandum (Pa.
Super. filed March 2, 2020); Lichtman v. [Nine Judges of the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas], No. 1457 EDA 2019, unpublished memorandum
(Pa. Super. filed March 25, 2020).
3Although Appellant titled the instant petition as a “Motion for Extraordinary
Relief”, in substance she sought to strike the May 9, 2008 judgment for money
damages and possession. Thus, like the trial court, we treat the motion as a
petition to strike judgment.
-3-
J-A20029-22
[II.] Did the trial judge err or abuse discretion, when wrongly
concluding that Defendant’s unopposed motion for extraordinary
relief, which sought enforcement of Philadelphia Code, Ch. 9-
1600, entitled Prohibition against Unlawful Eviction Practices, was,
instead, an untimely petition to open a judgment, and, therefore,
barred by the coordinate jurisdiction rule and doctrine of res
judicata?
[III.] Did the trial court err or abuse discretion when failing to
acknowledge and to give due judicial consideration to the reality
that Defendant’s motion was unopposed?
[IV.] Did the trial judge err or abuse discretion and/or violate the
Canons of Judicial Conduct, nos. 1 and 2, when the Court acted
on bias and prejudice, especially against pro se’s; failed to
carefully read and consider Defendants’ pleadings; failed to
examine supplied and/or available evidence; and/or when the
judge incorrectly applied a convenient legal standard as a
contrived excuse to deny Defendant’s guaranteed, constitutional
rights to due process and a full, fair hearing?
[V.] Did the trial judge err or abuse discretion, while refusing his
mandatory, nondiscretionary duty—under the Court’s own
motion—to strike the May 9, 2008 judgment for possession and
money, due to its being void, as a matter of law?
[VI.] Did the trial judge commit a crime(s), when denying
Defendant’s Motion for Extraordinary Relief, and/or while
improperly refusing to sign the mandatory Order to Strike the void
May 9, 2008 judgment, and thereby, the trial judge erred in
declining to demand the judiciary’s, public servants’, landlords’
and private attorneys’ compliance with, and obedience to,
Philadelphia Code, Ch. 9-1600?
[VII.] Are the trial judge and/or any other person(s), including
public officials or private citizens, subject to prosecution,
discipline, and/or sanctions for failing to comply with the Rules of
Professional Conduct, especially nos. 8.3 and 8.4; failing to
obey/enforce Philadelphia Code, Ch. 9-1600; and/or for conspiring
with fellow members of the Bar in their engineered demand for
Defendant’s permanent Silence, i.e., as in Defendant’s untimely
Death?
-4-
J-A20029-22
Appellant’s Brief at 2-3 (emphasis in original) (sic).4
Here, upon review of the entire record, Appellant’s petition to strike the
May 9, 2008 judgment must be dismissed under the law of the case doctrine.
See Ario v. Reliance Ins. Co., 980 A.2d 588, 597 (Pa. 2009) (explaining
that “a court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter should not
reopen questions decided by another judge of that same court or by a higher
court in the earlier phases of the matter”). This Court previously dismissed
an appeal from the denial of petition to strike the May 9, 2008 judgment that
was based on the same allegations that Appellant makes in the instant—her
fifth—petition: that the 2008 judgment allegedly was secured through perjury
and corruption. Rittenhouse v. Lichtman, No. 2538 EDA 2009 (Pa. Super.
Order filed November 30, 2009). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
dismissing Appellant’s latest petition to strike. See Plasticert, Inc. v.
____________________________________________
4 Even though Appellant’s brief complies with most of the structural appellate
rules of court, it lacks substantive compliance. Her argument section is replete
with irrelevant assertions, accusations, personal opinions and legal
conclusions. Appellant’s legal arguments are wholly undeveloped, contain few
meaningful citations to authorities, and make a tepid attempt to apply any
authority to the facts of the present case. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4), 2119(b).
Essentially, the argument section of Lichtman’s brief consists of a forty-nine-
page diatribe, alleging perjury, official corruption and administrative
ineptness. While this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a
pro se litigant, an appellant is not entitled to any particular advantage because
she lacks legal training. “[A]ny layperson choosing to represent herself in a
legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that her
lack of expertise and legal training will prove her undoing.” Branch Banking
and Trust v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation
omitted).
-5-
J-A20029-22
Westfield Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 489, 492 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“[W]e may affirm
the trial court’s order on any valid basis.”).
Furthermore, as the trial court observed, the coordinate jurisdiction rule
also would prevent Appellant from obtaining relief. As noted, and is apparent
from the face of the record, Appellant’s instant attempt to strike the judgment
entered against her in the 2008 landlord-tenant dispute against Rittenhouse
is indistinguishable from her first four unsuccessful attempts.
In Zane v. Friends Hospital, 836 A.2d 25 (Pa. 2003), our Supreme
Court explained that the “coordinate jurisdiction rule,” provides that judges of
coordinate jurisdiction should not overrule each other’s decisions. Zane, 836
A.2d at 39. The rule is “based on a policy of fostering the finality of pre-trial
applications in an effort to maintain judicial economy and efficiency.” Starr,
664 A.2d at 1331. Consistent with the law of the case doctrine generally, it
“serves to protect the expectations of the parties, to ensure uniformity of
decisions, to maintain consistency in proceedings, to effectuate the
administration of justice, and to bring finality to the litigation.” Id. The
“prohibition against revisiting the prior holding of a judge of coordinate
jurisdiction, however, is not absolute.” Id. We recognize that a departure
from the rule is warranted in “exceptional circumstances” where there has
been a change in controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence,
or where “the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create a
manifest injustice if followed.” Id. (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court
explained the clearly erroneous exception as follows.
-6-
J-A20029-22
To accede to a coordinate judge’s order that is clearly erroneous
would be not only to permit an inequity to work on the party
subject to the order, but would allow an action to proceed in the
face of almost certain reversal on appellate review. Moreover, the
requirement that the prior holding also create a manifest injustice
serves as a significant curb on the exception so that it would apply
to only those situations in which adhering to the prior holding
would be, in essence, plainly intolerable.
DiGregorio v. Keystone Health Plan E., 840 A.2d 361, 368–69 (Pa. Super.
2003) (en banc) (quoting Zane, supra at 29-30)) (emphasis added).
As the trial court aptly reasoned:
Beyond her sensational and unfounded conspiracy allegations,
[Appellant] does not contend that there has been a change in
controlling law or a substantial change in the facts or evidence.
Thus, for [Appellant] to be successful, she had to show that the
orders of the prior judges were clearly erroneous and a manifest
injustice occurred.
It is not enough for the prior orders to simply have been
erroneous. The standard is the prior ruling had to have been so
clearly erroneous that following it would create a manifest
injustice. Adherence to a clearly erroneous order in this context
“would allow an action to proceed in the face of almost certain
reversal on appellate review.” Zane, 836 A.2d at 29-30. A
manifest injustice occurs where adherence to the prior order
would be “plainly intolerable.” Id. As previously noted,
[Appellant] does not raise any credible facts that would case any
doubt whatsoever on the prior orders and rulings of judges of
equal jurisdiction. Thus, this [c]ourt is bound by the prior orders
of judges of equal jurisdiction.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/21, at 6. We agree with the trial court’s reasoning.
Separately, we also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant’s
instant petition “raises identical issues she previously raised on several
occasions. As a result, [Appellant’s] claims are now barred by the doctrine of
-7-
J-A20029-22
res judicata.”5 Id. (citing R/S Financial Corp. v. Kovalchick, 716 A.2d
1228, 1229-30 (Pa. 1998)).
Finally, having disposed of her issues in this appeal, we cannot ignore
Appellant’s repeated abuse of our judicial system. Under the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, we sua sponte may impose upon Appellant counsel fees.
See Feingold v. Hendrzak, 15 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2011) (explaining
this Court sua sponte may “impose an award of reasonable counsel fees”). In
fact, Pa.R.A.P. 2744, relating, inter alia, to counsel fees, provides:
In addition to other costs allowable by general rule or Act of
Assembly, an appellate court may award as further costs damages
as may be just, including
(1) a reasonable counsel fee and
(2) damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum in addition to
legal interest,
if it determines that an appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay
or that the conduct of the participant against whom costs are to
be imposed is dilatory, obdurate or vexatious. The appellate court
may remand the case to the trial court to determine the amount
of damages authorized by this rule.
____________________________________________
5 Res judicata “holds that a final judgment on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction will bar any future action on the same cause of action
between the parties and their privies.” Khalil v. Travelers Indemnity
Company of America, 273 A.3d 1211, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2022). Res judicata
“prohibits parties involved in prior, concluded litigation from subsequently
asserting claims in a later action that were raised, or could have been raised,
in the previous adjudication.” Id. Collateral estoppel “operates to prevent a
question of law or issue of fact which has once been litigated and fully
determined in a court of competent jurisdiction from being re[-]litigated in a
subsequent suit.” Vignola v. Vignola, 39 A.3d 390, 393 (Pa. Super. 2012).
-8-
J-A20029-22
Pa.R.A.P. 2744.
As we detailed above, Appellant’s conduct leading up to this appeal has
been nothing short of obdurate, obstreperous and vexatious. For more than
a decade she has filed a plethora of motions, petitions and appeals, as
evidenced by the extensive docket of this case. Moreover, this appeal is
wholly frivolous, especially considering that Appellant continues to flout a clear
admonition issued by a prior panel of this Court. We stated in no uncertain
terms that “[Appellant] is prohibited from further IFP filings in the trial court
or this Court; she is further precluded from filing future actions that have as
their basis the issue of the alleged “perjured statement” in Rittenhouse’s
landlord-tenant complaint.” Lichtman v. Williams, No. 3074 EDA 2019, 237
A.3d 460, 2020 WL 2537195 at *3 (Pa. Super. filed May 19, 2020)
(unpublished memorandum) (emphasis added). As a result, we now hold that
Appellant’s continued vexatious conduct before this Court (and the trial court)
warrants the awarding of attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we deem it appropriate
to award Rittenhouse counsel fees to deter Appellant from filing frivolous
appeals in the future. We thus remand this matter to the trial court for
calculation of reasonable counsel fees.
Appellant must understand that after almost fifteen years, she should
accept the finality of the judgment entered against her in 2008 and
discontinue her campaign of frivolous challenges.
-9-
J-A20029-22
Order affirmed. Application denied as moot.6 Case remanded.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/28/2023
____________________________________________
6 On August 22, 2022, Appellant filed in this Court an “Application [for]
Reconsideration of Order”, asserting that her request to participate remotely
at oral argument was legitimate and should have been granted. In light of
the disposition of this appeal, and the fact that oral arguments already have
occurred, we deny the application as moot.
- 10 -