Villas at Packer Condo Assn. v. JPG Group, Inc. ( 2019 )

J-A01034-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
VILLAS AT PACKER PARK : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 827 EDA 2018
JPC GROUP, INC., JPG GENERAL :
CONTRACTORS, LENICK :
CONSTRUCTION, INC. D/B/A :
LENICK CARPENTERS III, INC., DEL :
SERVICES, MID ATLANTIC :
MECHANICAL, CIMORELLI :
CONSTRUCTION A/K/A CIMORELLI :
CONSTRUCTION & FENCE. CO., DALE :
CORPORATION, DJM CONSTRUCTION :
A/K/A DJM CONSTRUCTION CO., :
INC., CRINITI CONSTRUCTION, INC., :
G.L. WOLFGANG CONSTRUCTION :
COMPANY, HANCOCK BUILDING :
ASSOCIATES, INC., UNION :
ROOFING, INC., VOEGELE :
MECHANICAL, INC., LPI :
MECHANICAL, LLC, AND PROBUILD :
EAST, LLC,
Appeal from the Order Entered April 7, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 03103 February Term, 2013
BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MAY 14, 2019
In this appeal, Villas at Packer Park Condominium Association (“Villas”)
maintains that the trial court improperly applied the gist of the action doctrine
and erroneously concluded that the statute of limitations barred its contract
and warranty claims. We affirm.
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The trial court aptly summarized the facts and procedural history of this
case as follows:
Villas is a condominium development consisting of 23 multifamily
building with four units in each building. Lenick Construction, Inc.
(“Lenick”) was hired by the general contractor, Westrum Urban
Construction, LLC (“Westrum”), to install windows and French
doors at the Villas in or about May 1, 2006. In 2006, Villas unit
owners began to complain of water infiltrating their individual
units. Specifically, on November 21, 2006, homeowners wrote to
Westrum representatives, including the superintendent, project
manager, and vice president of operations and complained as
follows:
It has been two weeks since the consultant looked at
our French doors, and nearly a week since we e-
mailed you to let you know that the door continued to
leak after the new strip was installed.
I was just going through my files and this will be the
ninth e-mail I have sent you about the French doors
since October 28. We first made you aware of the
problem last summer.
Westrum investigated the complaints and informed the unit
owners that upgraded doors were to be provided to eight
homeowners. In September 2009, Westrum once again began
receiving complaints of leaking roofs and sliding glass doors from
homeowners. On September 15, 2009, counsel on behalf of two
homeowners forwarded a letter to Westrum concerning the leaks,
Westrum’s responsibility for defects concerning the construction
and suggesting that Westrum investigate the construction and
design defects.
On February 28, 2013, Villas filed a complaint against Westrum
Park Place L.P., Westrum Urban G.P., LLC, Westrum Construction
LLC, John Westrum and John O. Mershon (“Westrum”) alleging
deficiencies in the construction of the Villas’ development. On
September 16, 2013, Westrum filed a writ to join Lenick and other
subcontractors as additional defendants. The joinder complaint
was filed on October 7, 2013 and amended on November 25,
2013, December 9, 2013 and January 14, 2014. Westrum’s
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joinder complaints alleged that Lenick and the other
subcontractors breached their contracts with Westrum, breached
the express and implied warranties within the contract and owed
Westrum contractual and common law indemnity and
contribution.
From June 24, 2014 to August 30, 2014, the action was stayed by
joint request of all the parties. During this period, Villas entered
into a settlement agreement with the Westrum defendants
wherein Westrum assigned its claims against Lenick to the Villas.
On December 4, 2015, Villas amended the complaint as an
assignee of Westrum and alleged claims for breach of contract,
breach of implied warranty of workmanship, negligence and
contribution and indemnity against Lenick.
In September 2016, Lenick filed a partial motion for judgment on
the pleadings and a partial motion for summary judgment. On
February 7, 2017, the court granted the partial motion for
judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the claim for negligence.
Additionally, the court denied Lenick’s motion for summary
judgment finding that Villas’ claims for breach of contract and
breach of implied duty of workmanship as an assignee of Westrum
were timely filed. Lenick filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order denying the motion for summary judgment. Upon review of
the motion for reconsideration, the court vacated its February 7,
2017 order in part denying the partial motion for summary
judgment based on the issue of statute of limitations and ordered
oral argument. . . After oral argument and a review of the papers
and record, the court on April 7, 2017, granted Lenick’s motion
for partial summary judgment and dismissed the claims for breach
of contract and breach of the implied warranty of workmanship as
barred by the statute of limitations.
Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion (“TCO”), filed June 29, 2018, at 1-3
(footnotes omitted). This timely appeal followed.
Villas presents the following issues for our review:
I. Did the trial court commit an error of law in granting
Lenick[’s] Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings where
neither the gist of the action doctrine nor the economic loss
doctrine barred [Villas] negligence claims?
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II. Did the trial court commit an error of law when it ruled that
the statute of limitations on the first party defendants’
joinder claims began to run before plaintiff initiated its
original action and, therefore, before the first party
defendant suffered a harm?
III. Did the trial court commit an error of law or abuse its
discretion in ruling that there were no material facts in
dispute and that evidence was clear and free from doubt as
to when the statute of limitations on the third party joinder
claims began to run?
IV. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on a
deficient evidentiary record based on unauthenticated
emails, letters, and inadmissible hearsay evidence?
Villas’ Br. at 8-9 (suggested answered omitted).
First, Villas maintains that the trial court erred in granting Lenick’s
motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and challenges the trial court’s
application of the gist of the action doctrine.
Entry of judgment on the pleadings is permitted under
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1034, which provides that
“after pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to
unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for judgment on
the pleadings.” Pa.R.C.P. 1034(a). A motion for judgment on the
pleadings is similar to a demurrer. It may be entered when there
are no disputed issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Appellate review of an order granting a motion for judgment on
the pleadings is plenary. The appellate court will apply the same
standard employed by the trial court. A trial court must confine its
consideration to the pleadings and relevant documents. The court
must accept as true all well pleaded statements of fact,
admissions, and any documents properly attached to the
pleadings presented by the party against whom the motion is filed,
considering only those facts which were specifically admitted.
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We will affirm the grant of such a motion only when the moving
party’s right to succeed is certain and the case is so free from
doubt that the trial would clearly be a fruitless exercise.
Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Forest Res., LLC, 83 A.3d 177, 185 (Pa.Super.
2013) (quoting Coleman v. Duane Morris, LLP, 58 A.3d 833, 836 (Pa.Super.
2012)).
Villas maintains that the trial court erred in finding its contract and
negligence claims were barred by the gist of the action doctrine because: (1)
there is no contract between Villas and Lenick; (2) “a claim in negligence can
lie in the negligent performance of a construction contract”; and (3) “there is
an issue of public policy.” Villas’ Br. at 24.
The gist of the action doctrine provides that:
[A]n alleged tort claim against a party to a contract, based on the
party’s actions undertaken in the course of carrying out a
contractual agreement, is barred when the gist or gravamen of
the cause of action stated in the complaint although sounding in
tort, is, in actuality, a claim against the party for breach of its
contractual obligations.
Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48, 53 (Pa. 2014).
“[T]he nature of the duty breached, as alleged in the plaintiff’s
pleadings, is determinative of the gist of the action.” Id. at 63 (emphasis in
original). If the allegations of the complaint “substantially constitute
assertions of a defendant’s complete failure to perform duties originating from
a contract – a nonfeasance – the plaintiff’s action will be deemed to be breach
of contract.” Id. However, an action sounds in tort “if the allegations
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substantially concern the defendant’s negligent breach of a duty which exists
independently and regardless of the contract – a misfeasance.” Id.
Here, the trial court concluded that the gist of Villas’ claim against Lenick
was for breach of contract. Specifically, it opined:
Here, Villas’ claim for negligence as an assignee of Westrum
against Lenick arises from the contract between Westrum and
Lenick. The duties allegedly breached, “performing their work on
the Project and in furnishing, supplying, and installing materials
to the Project,” are duties grounded in the contract between
Westrum and Lenick and the success of the claim squarely
depended on the contract. As such, Villas’ claim for negligence
based on the gist of the action doctrine. Additionally, in the Third
Amended complaint, Villas also alleged a negligence claim on its
own behalf against Lenick. The trial court also properly dismissed
this claim since the duty owed by Lenick was a contractual duty
owed to Westrum. Contrary to Villas[’] argument, the duty was
not societal but contractual. Since no contract existed between
Villas, on its own behalf, and Lenick[,] the claim for negligence
was also barred by the gist of the action doctrine.
TCO at 7 (quoting Villas’ Third Amended Complaint, ¶ 97).
We agree with the trial court’s analysis. Villas claimed Lenick was
negligent based on Lenick’s performance of duties Lenick assumed in contract.
The fact that there was no contract between Villas and Lenick does not change
the analysis, because Villas is the assignee of Westrum. Villas’ public policy
argument likewise carries no weight, as it runs counter to our Supreme Court’s
decision in Bruno, which set forth the “basis of the duty” test that we apply
here.
Villas’ argument that it is entitled to assert its negligence claim against
Lenick is based on a substantial overreading of Bruno. There, the Supreme
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Court considered whether insureds could maintain a negligence action against
their homeowner’s insurer for the alleged actions of the insurer’s agents, an
engineer and an adjuster, in allegedly giving bad advice about mold exposure.
Bruno, 106 A.3d at 70-71. The Court concluded that such a claim was
permissible. It explained that the insurer’s duties under the contract did not
include giving proper advice, such that the negligence claim was proper. Id.
at 71.
Thus, under Bruno, a defendant’s having assumed duties in a contract
does not necessarily require dismissal of every negligence claim that a party
having rights under that contract asserts against that defendant. However, it
does where, as here, the negligence claim is based on the defendant’s duties
under the contract. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the
gist of the action doctrine to grant the motion for partial judgment on the
pleadings.
In its second issue, Villas argues that the trial court erred in concluding
that the statute of limitations “began to run for these claims when Westrum,
not the Villas, knew or should have known that it was injured since Lenick
was in contractual privity with Westrum not with Villas.” Villas’ Br. at 26-27
(emphasis in original) (citing to TCO at 5). It maintains that because of this
incorrect determination, the court erred in concluding that the claim was
barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 26.
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The statute of limitations for a claim of breach of contract and implied
duty of workmanship is four years. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(a). The statute
of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the breach. See Romeo & Sons, Inc. v. P.C. Yezbak & Son, Inc,. 652 A.2d
830, 832 (Pa. 1995).
Here, the trial court concluded that “[t]he clock for statute of limitations
purposes began to run for these claims when Westrum, not Villas, knew or
should have known that it was injured since Lenick was in contractual privity
with Westrum and not with Villas.” TCO at 5. It concluded that it became
aware that Westrum was injured on September 11, 2009. Id. at 6. It based
its conclusion on the following:
The record shows that Westrum became aware of the water
infiltration issues on September 11, 2009, the date the Villas
community manager informed Westrum representatives that the
homeowners were experiencing leaks from roofs and sliding glass
doors. The Westrum defendants acknowledged receipt of the
notice by responding to the email and asking Villas to provide a
more detailed investigation. The email placed Westrum on inquiry
notice that leaks existed. Thereafter on September 15, 2009,
Villas sent a letter to Westrum following up the initial notice of
leaks. On September 11, 2009, Westrum had within its possession
sufficient information to put it on notice that it was harmed and to
investigate the cause of this harm.
TCO at 5-6.
We agree with the trial court that the statute of limitations began to run
when Westrum, not Villas, became aware of the defect, since Levick had a
contractual obligation to Westrum, not Villas. The four-year period to file suit
ended on September 11, 2013. Therefore, “[s]ince Westrum filed its to join
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Lenick on September 16, 2013”, Villas claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. TCO at 6. No relief is due.
For its last issue, related to the above claim, Villas argues that the trial
court’s determination of when the statute of limitations started to run is flawed
because it was based on inadmissible hearsay in the form of the letters and
emails. See Villas’ Br. at 34. It maintains that “a motion for summary
judgment cannot be supported or defeated by statements that include
inadmissible hearsay evidence.” Id. at 34 n.4 (quoting Botkin v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 907 A.2d 641, 649 (Pa.Super. 2006)). We agree
with the trial court that the emails and letters are admissible as business
records. See TCO at 5 n.15; see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Gibson, 102
A.3d 462, 467 (Pa. Super. 2014) (concluding affidavit that referenced loan
history documents was not hearsay and court did not err in considering it
when granting a motion for summary judgment); Pa.R.E. 803(6). The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the emails and letters.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/14/19
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