Bayview Loan Servicing v. Ahiarah, S. ( 2018 )


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  • J-A17037-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC,            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellants           :
    :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    SOLOCHIDI AHIARAH; THE MAERLIN          :
    COMPANY                                 :       No. 1893 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order November 13, 2017
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
    Civil Division at No(s): GD04-006220
    BEFORE: OTT, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                      FILED OCTOBER 31, 2018
    Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (“Bayview”), appeals from the Order
    directing Bayview to accept payment in the amount of $150,000 as
    satisfaction of the Judgment previously entered against The Maerlin Company
    (“Maerlin”) in this mortgage foreclosure action, with respect to property
    located at 214 Emerson Street, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (“the Property”). We
    reverse.
    On October 24, 1986, Solochidi Ahiarah (“Ahiarah”) executed a Note
    and Mortgage, in favor of United American Savings & Loan Association
    (“United”), in the amount of $58,000, with 10% interest per annum.        The
    Mortgage was recorded on October 27, 1986.
    On March 23, 2004, Interbay Funding, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
    company, as servicer for Wachovia Bank, N.A., as Indenture Trustee
    (“Interbay”), Bayview’s predecessor-in-interest, filed a Complaint in mortgage
    J-A17037-18
    foreclosure. Interbay alleged that the Mortgage was in default because the
    payments due November 1, 2001, and monthly thereafter, had not been paid.
    Interbay subsequently filed three separate Praecipes to reinstate the
    Complaint. Ahiarah’s counsel ultimately accepted service on his behalf.
    After appropriate notice, Interbay filed a Praecipe for Default Judgment
    on February 22, 2005, requesting that the trial court enter judgment in its
    favor, and against Ahiarah, as a result of Ahiarah’s failure to file an answer to
    its Complaint within 20 days of the date of service.        On the same date,
    Interbay also filed a Praecipe for Writ of Execution. The trial court entered a
    default Judgment in favor of Interbay, in the amount of $67,980.94, plus costs
    and interest.1
    Maerlin subsequently filed a Petition to Intervene, asserting that Ahiarah
    had sold the Property to Maerlin on September 21, 1990, and therefore,
    Maerlin should have been joined as an original party to the action. Maerlin
    also filed a Petition for rule to show cause why the Judgment should not be
    opened or stricken. The trial court granted Maerlin’s Petition to Intervene on
    March 15, 2005.2
    ____________________________________________
    1 We note that while the copy of the docket attached to Bayview’s reproduced
    record indicates that a default Judgment was entered on February 22, 2005,
    the certified record does not specify that Judgment was entered, and does not
    contain a copy of the Judgment.
    2The Order granting Maerlin leave to intervene is not contained in the certified
    record.
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    On March 17, 2005, Maerlin filed both an Answer and New Matter, and
    a Motion to Stay the proceedings.
    On April 1, 2005, Interbay filed a Response to Maerlin’s Petition for rule
    to show cause. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court issued an
    Order opening the default Judgment.
    Interbay filed an Amended Complaint on March 9, 2006, naming Maerlin
    as a defendant. Maerlin filed Preliminary Objections, asserting that Interbay
    had failed to obtain either Maerlin’s consent, or leave of court, prior to filing
    the Amended Complaint, as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1033. On July 17, 2006,
    the trial court entered an Order striking Interbay’s Amended Complaint. The
    trial court further directed that Interbay could file a Second Amended
    Complaint, after first obtaining Maerlin’s consent, or leave of court.
    On February 1, 2007, Interbay filed a Second Amended Complaint,
    without first obtaining Maerlin’s consent or leave of court. Maerlin thereafter
    filed a Petition for rule to show cause why the Second Amended Complaint
    should not be stricken. Interbay filed a Response, and a “Motion to Amend
    First Amended Complaint Nunc Pro Tunc to File Second Amended Complaint
    in Mortgage Foreclosure As Of February 1, 2007.” On April 19, 2007, the trial
    court entered an Order, granting Interbay’s Motion, and accepting the Second
    Amended Complaint, nunc pro tunc.3
    ____________________________________________
    3Maerlin filed Preliminary Objections on May 16, 2007, which were ultimately
    withdrawn.
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    On September 5, 2007, Maerlin filed an Answer and New Matter, raising
    claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, violations of Pennsylvania’s
    Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, and breach of contract,
    and seeking punitive damages. Interbay filed a Reply on September 26, 2007.
    Eventually, Interbay filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and a brief
    in support thereof, on November 22, 2013, alleging that Maerlin had failed to
    raise any genuine issues of material fact in its Answer and New Matter.
    Maerlin filed a Response.   With regard to Ahiarah, the trial court granted
    Interbay’s Motion, and entered an in rem Judgment against Ahiarah in the
    amount of $136,602.41. The trial court denied Interbay’s Motion with regard
    to Maerlin.
    On March 7, 2016, Interbay and Maerlin entered into a Consent
    Judgment, under which the parties agreed that (1) an in rem judgment would
    be entered in favor of Interbay, and against Maerlin, in the amount of
    $170,132.53; (2) Interbay would “forbear from execution upon the judgment
    for a period of 120 days to permit [] Maerlin [] time to attempt to obtain
    financing to satisfy the judgment;” (3) Interbay would not attempt to bring a
    deficiency judgment, or otherwise assert personal liability, against Maerlin;
    and (4) “[i]n the event that [] Maerlin [] obtains an offer or commitment for
    financing that is less than the judgment amount of $170,132.53, [Interbay]
    agrees to review such offer or commitment in good faith as satisfaction of the
    judgment, subject to the right of each party to conduct appraisals.”
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    Interbay reissued a Praecipe for Writ of Execution on August 3, 2016.
    After several rescheduled Sheriff’s sales, and the filing of two Motions to Stay
    the foreclosure proceedings and a Motion to Continue, the trial court entered
    an Order on June 2, 2017, staying the proceedings, without prejudice. On
    June 28, 2017, Interbay reissued a Praecipe for Writ of Execution. 4
    On August 16, 2017, Interbay filed a Praecipe to mark the Judgment to
    the use of Bayview, and attaching thereto a copy of the assignment of the
    Mortgage from Interbay to Bayview.
    Maerlin filed a Motion to stay the proceedings and to find Bayview in
    contempt on August 30, 2017. Specifically, Maerlin alleged that it had notified
    Bayview of an offer or commitment for financing in the amount of $150,000,
    but that Bayview had failed to “receive” the offer in good faith as satisfaction
    of the Judgment, as provided for in the Consent Judgment. 5 The trial court
    ____________________________________________
    4Following the entry of the Order staying the proceedings, Interbay filed a
    Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court granted. However, Interbay
    withdrew the Motion for Reconsideration after it had reissued the Writ of
    Execution, and scheduled a Sheriff’s sale.
    5 The record reveals that Maerlin’s counsel sent an email to Bayview’s counsel
    on March 31, 2017, which stated, in relevant part, as follows: “Paragraph 4
    of the Consent [Judgment] contemplates the review of an offer of less than
    the [J]udgment amount. Would your client accept $150,000 in settlement of
    the $170,132.53 [J]udgment?” Motion for Reconsideration, 9/11/17, Exhibit
    P3. Maerlin also attached to its Motion several email exchanges between
    Maerlin’s counsel and Bayview’s counsel, including, inter alia, requests by
    Maerlin’s counsel for an answer to Maerlin’s settlement offer, and responses
    by Bayview’s counsel concerning the status of its review. See Motion to Stay
    and Find Plaintiff in Contempt, 8/10/17, Exhibits C-H.
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    entered an Order on the same date, directing Maerlin to order an appraisal of
    the Property within 10 days of the date of the Order, and to complete the
    appraisal within 30 days.         The trial court further ordered that Bayview’s
    appraisal must be completed within 30 days of the due date of Maerlin’s
    appraisal. The trial court also postponed the Sheriff’s sale and scheduled a
    hearing. Bayview filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 11, 2017,
    which the trial court denied.
    The trial court conducted a hearing on November 13, 2017, at which
    time both parties presented their appraisals.6      On the same date, the trial
    court entered an Order requiring Bayview to accept payment in the amount of
    $150,000 as full and final satisfaction of the Mortgage and Note, and directing
    Maerlin to make the payment within 60 days of the date of the Order. Bayview
    filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of
    matters complained of on appeal.
    On appeal, Bayview raises the following issues for our review:
    I. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion, or error of
    law, by adding language and omitting language to the March 7,
    2016 Consent [Judgment?]
    II. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion, or error of
    law, by enforcing the March 7, 2016 Consent [Judgment,] when
    ____________________________________________
    6 Bayview’s exterior-only appraisal, which was based on an evaluation of
    several comparable properties, valued the Property at $435,000. Bayview
    also introduced the Allegheny County Property Tax Assessment, valuing the
    Property at $235,000. Maerlin’s appraisal, which included both an interior and
    exterior inspection, valued the Property at $165,500.
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    the record shows that the terms of the [Consent Judgment] were
    not met by [Maerlin?]
    III. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion, or error of
    law, by finding that [Bayview] acted in bad faith in rejecting the
    $150,000 settlement offer[?]
    Brief for Appellant at 3 (issues renumbered).
    We will address Bayview’s claims together. In its first claim, Bayview
    avers that the record does not support the trial court’s conclusion that it had
    acted in bad faith by rejecting Maerlin’s offer to settle for $150,000. Id. at
    19.   Bayview asserts that its conduct proves that it acted in good faith in
    reviewing the settlement offer because it (1) provided Maerlin with updates
    concerning the status of its review, (2) provided Maerlin with a payoff quote,
    and (3) independently conducted an appraisal of the Property. Id. at 21, 22,
    27-28, 28-29, 30.     Additionally, Bayview claims that its reliance on an
    exterior-only appraisal does not establish that it failed to review the offer in
    good faith. Id. at 28; see also id. at 29 (arguing that mortgagees “routinely”
    use exterior-only appraisals when considering settlement offers).      Bayview
    also points out that even Maerlin’s appraisal valued the Property in excess of
    the settlement offer. Id. at 28.
    In its second claim, Bayview asserts that the terms of the Consent
    Judgment are unambiguous, and therefore, the trial court erred by imposing
    its own interpretation, to Bayview’s detriment. Id. at 31-34. Bayview claims
    that the trial court essentially added a value of $150,000 to the Consent
    Judgment, and removed the condition that Maerlin obtain an offer or
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    commitment for financing. See id. at 34-40. Additionally, Bayview argues
    that “the record is void of providing a specific time frame for [Maerlin] to
    perform[,] and void of [Bayview] agreeing that it would review, any offer[]
    less than its [J]udgment amount, after 120 days.” Id. at 41; see also id. at
    40-46.
    In its third claim, Bayview contends that Maerlin failed to provide
    evidence that it had obtained an offer or commitment for financing, as
    required by the Consent Judgment. Id. at 46. Bayview claims that Maerlin
    merely provided an unsupported statement that it had obtained a commitment
    for $150,000. Id.
    Bayview’s claims require us to interpret the terms of the Consent
    Judgment. A consent judgment is “a contract binding the parties to the terms
    thereof.” Lower Frederick Twp. v. Clemmer, 
    543 A.2d 502
    , 510 (Pa. 1988)
    (citation omitted).   Because contract interpretation is a matter of law, our
    scope of review is plenary, and this Court is not bound by the conclusions of
    the trial court. Maloney v. Valley Med. Facilities, Inc., 
    946 A.2d 702
    , 706
    (Pa. Super. 2008).
    [A] consent order must be construed as would a contract to
    determine the intent of the parties, and to do so[,] the
    surrounding circumstances must be considered, especially “the
    situation of the parties when the contract was made and the
    objects they apparently had in view and the nature of the subject
    matter.” [Lower Frederick Twp., 543 A.2d at 510].
    Laird v. Clearfield & Mahoning Ry. Co., 
    846 A.2d 118
    , 122 (Pa. Super.
    2004), reversed on other grounds, 
    916 A.2d 1091
     (Pa. 2007). Further,
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    “[w]hen construing agreements involving clear and unambiguous terms, this
    Court need only examine the writing itself to give effect to the parties’
    understanding. This Court must construe the contract only as written and
    may not modify the plain meaning under the guise of interpretation.”
    Humberston v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
    75 A.3d 501
    , 510 (Pa. Super. 2013)
    (citation omitted).
    In its Opinion, the trial court concluded, without explanation, that
    Bayview “acted in bad faith in rejecting [Maerlin’s] $150,000 offer to purchase
    the premises.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/17, at 3. However, the plain and
    unambiguous terms of the Consent Judgment contain no requirement that,
    following a good faith7 review, Bayview must accept such an offer.8
    The Consent Judgment provided that Bayview would forbear from
    execution on the Judgment for a period of 120 days, during which time Maerlin
    could attempt to obtain the financing necessary to satisfy the Judgment.
    Additionally, if Maerlin obtained an “offer or commitment for financing” for an
    ____________________________________________
    7 “The duty of good faith has been defined as honesty in fact in the conduct
    or transaction concerned.” Surveyors & Eng’rs, Inc. v. Nat’l Penn Bank,
    
    801 A.2d 1248
    , 1253 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation and brackets omitted).
    8 We note that the provision of the Consent Judgment requiring Bayview to
    review an offer or agreement for financing less than the Judgment amount in
    good faith does not identify a specific time period in which Maerlin was
    permitted to submit an offer, or in which Bayview was required to review such
    offer. “When the exact period for which the parties intended to contract is
    unable to be determined, an agreement for a ‘reasonable time’ will be
    inferred.” Scullion v. EMECO Indus., Inc., 
    580 A.2d 1356
    , 1359 (Pa. Super.
    1990).
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    amount less than the $170,132.53 Judgment, the clear terms of the Consent
    Judgment require Bayveiw to “review such offer or commitment in good faith
    as satisfaction of the [J]udgment.” Consent Judgment, 3/7/16, at 2 (emphasis
    added).
    Here, despite Maerlin’s significant delay in submitting the settlement
    offer, Bayview reviewed Maerlin’s offer to settle for $150,000.9      Bayview’s
    counsel acknowledged Bayview’s receipt of the offer to settle. See Motion to
    Stay and Find Plaintiff in Contempt, 8/10/17, Exhibit F. After a subsequent
    inquiry by Maerlin’s counsel, Bayview’s counsel advised Maerlin that Bayview
    was in the process of reviewing the settlement offer.       See 
    id.,
     Exhibit G.
    Bayview later provided Maerlin’s counsel with a payoff quote. See 
    id.,
     Exhibit
    H. On August 24, 2017, after several months of review, Bayview’s counsel
    sent a letter notifying Maerlin’s counsel that Bayview had reviewed and
    rejected the settlement offer.         See Motion for Reconsideration, 9/11/17,
    Exhibit P4.
    Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Bayview complied with the
    requirements of the Consent Judgment, and acted in good faith when it
    reviewed, and ultimately rejected, Maerlin’s settlement offer. Thus, the trial
    court erred in determining that Bayview acted in bad faith in failing to accept
    a settlement offer submitted more than a year after the entry of the Consent
    ____________________________________________
    9As Bayview correctly points out in its brief, see Brief for Appellant at 46-47,
    Maerlin merely inquired whether Bayview would accept $150,000, and did not
    present evidence of an offer or commitment for financing.
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    Judgment.   We therefore reverse the November 13, 2017 Order requiring
    Bayview to accept payment of $150,000 as full and final satisfaction of the
    $170,132.53 Judgment entered against Maerlin.
    Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Application to Supplement
    Brief granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/31/2018
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