Com. v. N.M.C. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S54027-17
    
    2017 PA Super 335
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    N.M.C.
    Appellant                  No. 225 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 6, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-17-SA-0000035-2016
    BEFORE: OTT, J., MOULTON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
    OPINION BY MOULTON, J.:                               FILED OCTOBER 23, 2017
    N.M.C. appeals from the January 6, 2017 judgment of sentence entered
    in the Clearfield County Court of Common Pleas following his bench trial
    conviction for disorderly conduct – creates a hazardous or physically offensive
    condition.1 Because we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to sustain
    the conviction, we vacate N.M.C.’s judgment of sentence.
    On May 10, 2016, at approximately 1:15 p.m., then-14-year-old N.M.C.
    used his cell phone to video-record a fight between two other male students
    that occurred in the boys’ bathroom at Dubois Area Middle School. The 45-
    second video shows two male students talking, squaring off, shoving each
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(4).
    J-S54027-17
    other, and throwing several punches. In the background of the video, a male
    student exposes his buttocks to the camera and another is standing at a urinal
    behind a divider. That evening after school, N.M.C. sent the video via text
    message to his girlfriend and one other student. On May 11, 2016, a third
    student asked N.M.C. if he could see the video, but N.M.C. refused to show it
    to him.
    On May 11, 2016, the assistant principal, Michael Maholtz, learned of
    the fight. Maholtz confronted the combatants and eyewitnesses to the fight,
    who did not tell Maholtz the truth about the altercation.            After these
    interviews, Maholtz received a copy of the video from N.M.C.’s girlfriend. The
    video helped Maholtz identify the participants as well as other students
    present for the fight,2 and Maholtz subsequently conducted additional
    interviews. When first interviewed, N.M.C. admitted that he witnessed the
    fight but did not reveal that he had taken a video. Shortly thereafter, N.M.C.
    provided a second statement, in which he admitted to recording the fight.
    N.M.C. was cited for disorderly conduct – creates a hazardous or
    physically offensive condition.        On August 15, 2016, a magisterial district
    judge held a summary trial and found N.M.C. guilty. On September 7, 2016,
    N.M.C. appealed to the court of common pleas.
    On January 6, 2017, the trial court held a de novo trial.         At trial,
    Assistant Principal Maholtz testified that he was alarmed because the fight
    ____________________________________________
    2Both participants, N.M.C., and some of the other students present for
    the fight were disciplined by the school.
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    occurred in a restroom where there are “many safety hazards” and that there
    had been a “rash of these incidents prior to this one.” N.T., 1/6/17, at 10.
    Maholtz also testified that this was the first such incident that had been video-
    recorded, that it was not common to see students video-record fights, and
    that the administration was attempting to “prevent these [incidents] from
    happening due to the national trend.” Id. at 16-17.
    N.M.C. testified in his own defense. He stated that went to the restroom
    to watch the fight, that he had not planned in advance to record the fight, that
    he did not publish the video on social media, and that he did not intend to
    cause or promote more fights.       Id. at 20-21.    When asked why he had
    recorded the fight, N.M.C. said he wanted to have evidence that he was not
    fighting. Id. at 23. He further stated that he text-messaged the video only
    to his girlfriend and to one other student, id., and that he did not show the
    video to anyone else. Id. at 24, 26.
    N.M.C. also presented the testimony of one of the participants, who
    stated that he did not know the fight was being recorded, that he did not tell
    anyone he was going to fight the other student, and that N.M.C. entered the
    bathroom right before the other combatant entered. Id. at 29-31.
    In closing, N.M.C.’s counsel argued that the Commonwealth had failed
    to prove the creation of a hazardous or physically offensive condition. Id. at
    32-33. The Commonwealth’s closing argument was as follows:
    This case is very straight[-]forward. I don’t think there
    is much of dispute about what happened in this case. For
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    me personally, I can see why this type of behavior shouldn’t
    be tolerated.
    I can see why it does create a hazardous condition. It
    encourages fighting. It promotes fighting. It encourages
    these videos to be spread around and kids to be
    embarrassed by this type of behavior, like maybe getting
    beat up in the video or something like that and having it
    posted online or in text messages like in this case, I think it
    entices individuals to get in fights. It makes them look
    tough. And that’s why, I guess, overall, I would ask the
    Court to find [N.M.C.] guilty here today.
    Id. at 33.
    At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found N.M.C. guilty:
    Okay. Well, it has been a long time since I have been in
    high school. I suppose back at that time, if there is a fight,
    yeah, I suppose a lot of people wanted to go see the fight.
    Of course, as we get older and wiser, then we realize
    where there is a fight, you want to go the other direction as
    fast as you possibly can.
    All that being said, I think the Commonwealth has proven
    its case. I think he is guilty of the disorderly conduct
    section.
    Id. at 33-34. The trial court sentenced N.M.C. to 90 days’ probation, 35 hours
    of community service, and ordered N.M.C. to pay a $100 fine and court costs. 3
    On February 3, 2017, N.M.C. timely filed a notice of appeal.
    N.M.C.’s sole issue on appeal is:
    Whether the lower court erred in finding [N.M.C.] guilty of
    disorderly conduct and that the Commonwealth presented
    sufficient evidence to prove the same when it[] determined
    that by sharing a video of the fight[, N.M.C.] committed an
    ____________________________________________
    Because N.M.C. was charged with a summary offense, rather than a
    3
    misdemeanor offense, his case did not go to juvenile court. Nevertheless,
    given N.M.C.’s age and our disposition, we refer to him here by his initials.
    -4-
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    act that created a hazardous or physically offensive
    condition; that sending of the video to two other teenagers
    recklessly created a risk of public annoyance or alarm; and
    that the video served no legitimate purpose?
    N.M.C.’s Br. at 5 (full capitalization and trial court answer omitted).
    N.M.C. argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
    disorderly conduct – creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition.
    According to N.M.C., the Commonwealth failed to prove that N.M.C.’s acts of
    recording the fight and sending it to two people created a hazardous or
    physically offensive condition because “he did not do any acts which could be
    construed as ‘public unruliness’ which could or did lead to ‘tumult and
    disorder.’”   N.M.C.’s Br. at 14.   N.M.C. asserts that “the Commonwealth
    presented absolutely no evidence that sending the video of a fight to two (2)
    individuals would incite danger or that this type of behavior tends to
    encourage or promote physical violence.”       Id. at 15.   In addition, N.M.C.
    contends that the Commonwealth presented no evidence that N.M.C. sent
    words in those messages that would “encourage and incite violence,” that the
    combatants in the fight “were motivated by seeing a similar video,” or that
    possible dissemination of the video led the combatants to fight. Id. Finally,
    N.M.C. contends that he did not create a “physically offensive condition”
    because his actions were not “direct assaults on the physical senses of
    members of the public.” Id. at 16. We agree.
    Our standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is as
    follows:
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    We must determine whether the evidence admitted at
    trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when
    viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
    verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable
    doubt. Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier
    of fact to find every element of the crime has been
    established beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of
    the evidence claim must fail.
    The evidence established at trial need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe
    all, part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within
    the province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and
    substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. The
    Commonwealth’s burden may be met by wholly
    circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the
    defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact[-]finder unless
    the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter
    of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the
    combined circumstances.
    Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
    141 A.3d 523
    , 525 (Pa.Super. 2016)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 
    42 A.3d 342
    , 345 (Pa.Super. 2012)).
    Pennsylvania’s disorderly conduct statute provides as follows:
    (a)   Offense defined.--A person is guilty of disorderly
    conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience,
    annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk
    thereof, he:
    (1)   engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent
    or tumultuous behavior;
    (2)   makes unreasonable noise;
    (3)   uses obscene language, or makes an obscene
    gesture; or
    (4)   creates a hazardous or physically offensive
    condition by any act which serves no legitimate
    purpose of the actor.
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    18   Pa.C.S.    §   5503(a).4       We    have   defined   the   relevant   terms   of
    subsection(a)(4) as follows:         “A ‘hazardous condition’ is a condition that
    involves danger or risk[,]” particularly of “injuries resulting from public
    disorders.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    574 A.2d 1161
    , 1164 (Pa.Super.
    1990).     “Although a precise definition of ‘physically offensive condition’ is
    elusive, this term encompasses direct assaults on the physical senses of
    members of the public.” 
    Id.
    The issue in this case is whether N.M.C. created a hazardous condition
    or a physically offensive condition by video recording the incident and
    disseminating the video to two other students.         Based on our review of the
    record and the prosecution’s theory of the case, the basis for the trial court’s
    decision was that N.M.C created a hazardous condition by text messaging the
    video to two students, because the video could have been further
    disseminated to other students and thereby encourage future fighting. There
    are only a handful of cases addressing the “hazardous or physically offensive
    condition” element of subsection 5503(a)(4), and this appears to be a matter
    of first impression in Pennsylvania.
    In Williams, we overturned a conviction for disorderly conduct –
    creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition where the appellant
    drove to an apartment complex parking lot, “removed his trousers, exited his
    ____________________________________________
    4N.M.C. was charged and convicted under subsection (a)(4). We
    express no opinion about whether his conduct fell within any of the other
    subsections.
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    car,” and entered a vehicle that did not belong to him. 
    Id. at 1162
    . We could
    not conclude “that appellant created a significant risk or danger of injury to
    anyone,” reasoning that:
    [a]ppellant walked silently through a residential parking lot
    after midnight and entered a vacant car. His conduct was
    neither boisterous nor confrontational. He did not threaten
    any residents of the apartment house. There is no evidence
    that he distracted passing motorists or obstructed any exit
    or thoroughfare.      The most serious consequence of
    appellant’s odd behavior was that a single vehicle in the lot
    sustained damage to the molding around its windows. Such
    minor act of vandalism cannot be said to constitute a
    hazardous condition.
    
    Id. at 1164
    . We also concluded that the appellant did not create a “physically
    offensive condition”:
    Although a precise definition of “physically offensive
    condition” is elusive, this term encompasses direct assaults
    on the physical senses of members of the public. A
    defendant may create such a condition if she sets off a “stink
    bomb”, strews rotting garbage in public places, or shines
    blinding lights in the eyes of others. See Model Penal Code
    and Commentaries § 250.2 commentary at 347 (Official
    Draft and Revised Comments 1980). . . .
    In the instant case, appellant did not directly assault the
    senses of the residents of the apartment house. Appellant
    did not invade the residents’ physical privacy. All appellant
    did was enter a car belonging to someone else while dressed
    in his underwear. Although appellant was inadvertently
    observed by one of the tenants, we cannot say that she was
    physically offended by his conduct. For some, the idea of
    wearing underwear in public may be morally offensive. Yet,
    the sight of a person in underwear is no more physically
    offensive than the sight of a person dressed in other
    eccentric costumes that from time to time come into
    fashion.    In order to affirm appellant’s conviction for
    disorderly conduct, we would have to stretch the words of
    the statute beyond all reasonable bounds.
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    Id. at 1164-65 (internal footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
    In contrast, in Commonwealth v. Roth, 
    531 A.2d 1133
     (Pa.Super.
    1987), we concluded that a group of activists who sought to place a large
    piece of scrap iron on a church’s altar in protest of the church’s practices,
    despite multiple warnings by the church not to do so, created a “hazardous
    condition” within the meaning of section 5503(a)(4):
    The occurrences of that day were steeped in an
    emotionally charged atmosphere. Some members of the
    congregation who knew of the demonstrators’ plans
    refrained from attending services that day. Those who
    attended were frightened for their safety as well as for the
    welfare of the young and elderly members present. The fear
    was grounded partly on the literature concerning the
    demonstration. A certain amount of apprehension was
    caused by fear of a reoccurrence of a “skunk oil” attack
    which had been visited upon the Church during a prior
    Christmas celebration.
    Accompanying the fear of many was the determination
    of others not to allow their services to be disrupted. Ushers
    were stationed at each entrance of the church building to
    ensure the congregation’s safety. Some of these ushers
    expressed that they would not permit any demonstrators to
    enter the building. Another parishioner stationed himself at
    the top of the steps leading to the Church nursery so that
    no one could disturb the children present there.
    It is apparent from our reading of the record that many
    of the Church members felt that their Church was under
    siege while others were determined not to “let the battle be
    fought” inside their church. When Appellants proceeded to
    disrupt the Church services, albeit peacefully, they in reality
    engendered a “hazardous” condition. Appellant’s conduct of
    moving towards the Church’s property certainly created a
    dangerous situation in which altercations between the
    demonstrators and Church members could have occurred.
    
    Id. at 1137
     (internal citations omitted).
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    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
    we conclude that the evidence failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
    that N.M.C. created a hazardous or physically offensive condition. The record
    shows that N.M.C. recorded a fight between two students and then
    disseminated the video to two other students. Under these circumstances,
    we cannot conclude that he created “a condition that involves danger or risk”
    of “injuries resulting from public disorders,” or a condition that assaulted the
    senses of members of the public. Williams, 
    574 A.2d at 1164
    .
    Here, N.M.C.’s conduct did not create the sort of danger or risk that we
    found sufficient in Roth. At trial, Maholtz testified that although similar fights
    had occurred before, this was the first time that he had seen video evidence
    of a fight, and that the school administration was attempting to prevent this
    behavior “from happening due to the national trend.” N.T., 1/6/17, at 16.
    Having viewed the video and considered its very limited dissemination, we
    conclude that the Commonwealth failed to show that N.M.C.’s dissemination
    of the video to two people created or risked creation of a “hazardous condition”
    within the meaning of subsection (a)(4).
    Similarly, the prosecution failed to prove that N.M.C.’s dissemination of
    the video created or risked creation of a “physically offensive condition.” We
    recognize that the video’s subject matter may be unsettling.          Nor do we
    discount the prosecutor’s comment in closing argument that “I can see why
    - 10 -
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    this type of behavior shouldn’t be tolerated,” at least not by school officials. 5
    Nevertheless,     the   evidence     presented     does   not   show   that   N.M.C.’s
    dissemination of the video or its content directly assaulted the physical senses
    of members of public.6        As in Williams, while some may find the video’s
    content morally offensive, we cannot say that its content is as physically
    offensive as “set[ting] off a ‘stink bomb’, strew[ing] rotten garbage in public
    places, or shin[ing] blinding lights in the eyes of others.” Williams, 
    574 A.2d at 1164-65
    .
    In its opinion, the trial court concluded that the evidence was sufficient
    to convict N.M.C.:
    [t]he real issue here is not so much that [N.M.C.] took the
    violent and graphic video, but that he, thereafter,
    distributed it to two other individuals via text message.
    [N.M.C.] was well aware that by sending the video to other
    individuals, there was a high risk of the video becoming
    subsequently available to the public. Further, had the video
    become public, it certainly could have incited danger, as this
    type of violent video tends to encourage and promote
    physical violence, especially amongst adolescents.[7]
    ____________________________________________
    5We recognize that video recording of fights in schools has become an
    issue for school administrations across the country. See, e.g., Bill would
    make recording and posting fight videos illegal, CBS News, 2/19/16, available
    at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bill-would-make-recording-and-posting-
    fight-videos-illegal (reporting on proposed legislation in Illinois to criminalize
    recording fights with purpose of sharing those videos online).
    6 We leave for another day the question whether wider dissemination of
    such material on social media networks could create a hazardous condition
    within the meaning of subsection 5503(a)(4).
    7 We also recognize that the trial court’s decision rests in part on the
    fact that N.M.C. video recorded this fight in school and sent the video to two
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    Therefore, the Court believes that [N.M.C.]’s distribution of
    the video engendered danger or the risk of additional fights.
    Further, because [N.M.C.] recognized that sharing this
    violent and graphic video could have resulted in its
    availability to the public, the Court believes [N.M.C.]
    recklessly created a risk of public annoyance or alarm.
    Opinion Pursuant to PA. R.A.P. 1925(a), 3/30/17, at 3. We disagree.
    The trial court’s conclusion stretches the disorderly conduct statute too
    far. The trial court posits that because N.M.C. knew the initial two recipients
    could have further disseminated his video, N.M.C. knew that the video could
    have incited other students to fight.              The Commonwealth’s evidence,
    however, only shows that N.M.C. disseminated the video to two other students
    via text message. The Commonwealth did not present the testimony of those
    recipients, let alone any evidence that they were personally offended by the
    video’s contents or that they even considered further dissemination.8
    Accordingly, the evidence does not show that N.M.C.’s dissemination of the
    video created a condition involving danger or risk of injury to others.
    We are reminded that
    [t]he offense of disorderly conduct is not intended as a
    catchall for every act which annoys or disturbs people; it is
    not to be used as a dragnet for all the irritations which breed
    in the ferment of a community. It has a specific purpose; it
    has a definitive objective, it is intended to preserve the
    ____________________________________________
    schoolmates. While we understand the concerns of school administration, see
    supra, note 5, from a sufficiency perspective our analysis would not be
    different if reviewing a similar incident involving adult patrons at a bar. We
    also note that no one suggests that this incident, and N.M.C.’s role in this
    incident, did not warrant school discipline.
    8 As noted above, one of these students showed the video to Assistant
    Principal Maholtz.
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    public peace; it has thus a limited periphery beyond which
    the prosecuting authorities have no right to transgress any
    more than the alleged criminal has the right to operate
    within its clear outlined circumference.
    Commonwealth v. Hock, 
    728 A.2d 943
    , 947 (Pa. 1999) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Greene, 
    189 A.2d 141
    , 145 (Pa. 1963)). While we do
    not condone the behavior of N.M.C. or his classmates, we conclude that the
    evidence before the trial court was insufficient to prove that N.M.C. created a
    hazardous or physically offensive condition.
    Judgment of sentence vacated.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/23/2017
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Document Info

Docket Number: 225 WDA 2017

Filed Date: 10/23/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/23/2017