Com. v. Truver, B. ( 2022 )


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  • J-A22030-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    BLAKE T. TRUVER                            :
    :
    Appellant               :     No. 871 WDA 2021
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 16, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-33-CR-0000092-2021
    BEFORE:      OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                           FILED: SEPTEMBER 27, 2022
    Appellant, Blake T. Truver, challenges the Judgment of Sentence
    entered by the Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas following his open
    guilty plea to Recklessly Endangering Another Person (five counts), Burglary,
    Conspiracy, Robbery, Simple Assault, Theft by Unlawful Taking (six counts),
    Aggravated Assault by Vehicle, Fleeing or Attempting to Elude Officer,
    Possession of a Controlled Substance (two counts), and Use or Possession of
    Drug Paraphernalia.1 He challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
    After careful review, we affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2705, 3502(a)(1)(i), 903, 3701(a)(1)(i), 2701(a)(3), and
    3921(a); 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3732.1 and 3733(a); 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16) and
    (a)(32), respectively.
    J-A22030-22
    On January 25, 2021, Appellant and another individual pushed their way
    into a home, beat the resident who was present at the time, and stole
    firearms, guitars, and amplifiers. The second resident arrived home during
    the incident and recognized Appellant as a childhood friend. Appellant and
    the other assailant, brandishing knives, chased the second resident from the
    home before jumping in Appellant’s car and driving away.         A high-speed,
    seventeen-mile chase with police officers ensued.      The chase ended when
    Appellant lost control of the vehicle which caused it to rollover several times.
    Appellant and his co-conspirator were airlifted to a hospital. Police officers
    observed stolen property, drugs and drug paraphernalia, and cash strewn
    inside and outside the crashed vehicle.
    The Commonwealth charged Appellant with the above offenses in
    addition to thirty-four traffic violations. On June 2, 2021, the court accepted
    Appellant’s an open guilty plea to twenty criminal offenses and ordered a pre-
    sentence investigation (“PSI”).
    On June 16, 2021, the court held a sentencing hearing after which it
    imposed an aggregate sentence of nineteen to fifty-eight years’ incarceration.
    The individual sentences for each conviction fell within the mitigated and
    standard ranges of the sentencing guidelines.2 Appellant filed a post-sentence
    motion, which the court denied.
    ____________________________________________
    2The court concluded that the six convictions for Theft by Unlawful Taking
    merged with Burglary for sentencing purposes. The individual sentences
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -2-
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    Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied
    with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises the following questions for our review:
    1. Whether the trial court’s failure to adequately consider
    the rehabilitation needs of Appellant, after finding him to
    be youthful, drug addicted and, impliedly, directly and
    negatively influenced by his much older and much more
    criminally-experienced co-actor, resulted in a manifestly
    excessive sentence?
    2. Whether the trial court’s consideration of outstanding,
    unresolved felony charges from other jurisdictions was
    improper and resulted in a manifestly excessive 19-58
    year aggregate sentence?
    Appellant’s Br. at 10.3
    In his first issue, Appellant contends that the sentencing court did not
    properly consider mitigating factors. In so doing, Appellant challenges the
    discretionary aspects of his sentence. An appellant raising such a challenge
    to the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not entitled to review as of right;
    rather, a challenge in this regard is properly viewed as a petition for allowance
    of appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b); Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 
    522 A.2d ____________________________________________
    imposed for the Burglary, Conspiracy, and Robbery convictions fell within the
    mitigated range; the sentences for the assault, fleeing, REAP, and possession
    convictions fell within the standard ranges of the sentencing guidelines.
    3 Appellant has not appended his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement to his brief, as
    required by Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(11). The Commonwealth argues that
    Appellant’s second issue is waived as it was not raised in his Rule 1925(b)
    Statement. Appellee’s Br. at 5. Our review of the certified record, which
    includes Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, confirms that Appellant did not
    include his second issue in his Rule 1925(b) Statement. This issue is, thus,
    waived. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).
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    17, 18 (Pa. 1987); Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 
    91 A.3d 1247
    , 1265
    (Pa. Super. 2014).
    In order to obtain this Court’s review, an appellant challenging the
    discretionary aspects of his sentence must comply with the following
    requirements: (1) preserve the issue at sentencing or in a motion to
    reconsider and modify sentence; (2) file a timely notice of appeal; (3) include
    within his appellate brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
    allowance of appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) raise a substantial
    question that the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.
    Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 
    64 A.3d 722
    , 725 (Pa. Super. 2013).
    Appellant preserved his challenge by filing a timely post-sentence
    motion and notice of appeal, and by including a Rule 2119(f) statement in his
    appellate brief. We, thus, proceed to consider whether Appellant has raised a
    substantial question for our review.
    Whether an appellant has raised a substantial question regarding a
    discretionary aspect of the sentence is determined on a case-by-case basis.
    Commonwealth v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    , 170 (Pa. Super. 2010).                 “A
    substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable
    argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
    with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the
    fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” 
    Id.
     (citation and
    quotation marks omitted).
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    J-A22030-22
    Here, Appellant argues that the court erred in ordering some of his
    sentences to run consecutively without due consideration of his youth and
    rehabilitative needs. Appellant’s Br. at 24-25.
    “[A] sentencing court generally has discretion to impose multiple
    sentences concurrently or consecutively, and a challenge to the exercise of
    that   discretion   does   not   ordinarily   raise   a   substantial   question.”
    Commonwealth v. Raven, 
    97 A.3d 1244
    , 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014). However,
    an appellant may raise a substantial question when a sentencing court
    imposes consecutive sentences if the aggregate sentence of incarceration is
    manifestly excessive, and the sentencing court failed to consider mitigating
    factors. Commonwealth v. Horning, 
    193 A.3d 411
    , 418 (Pa. Super. 2018).
    See also Commonwealth v. Riggs, 
    63 A.3d 780
    , 786 (Pa. Super. 2012)
    (finding that the appellant raised a substantial question in claiming that the
    sentencing court failed to consider rehabilitative needs before imposing
    consecutive sentences that resulted in an excessive aggregate sentence).
    Appellant argues that the aggregate sentence of nineteen to fifty-eight
    years’ incarceration is manifestly excessive and the court abused its discretion
    in entering consecutive sentences without considering, inter alia, his
    rehabilitative needs, mental health, and substance abuse issues as required
    under the sentencing code. Appellant’s Br. at 19. Appellant has raised a
    substantial question and we, thus, address the merits of his claim.
    Generally, “[s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of
    the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent
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    J-A22030-22
    a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 
    167 A.3d 110
    ,
    122 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc) (citation omitted). “A sentencing court
    has broad discretion in choosing the range of permissible confinements that
    best suits a particular defendant and the circumstances surrounding his
    crime.” Commonwealth v. Celestin, 
    825 A.2d 670
    , 676 (Pa. Super. 2003)
    (citation omitted).
    When reviewing a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence,
    we will not disturb a sentence absent a manifest abuse of discretion.
    Commonwealth v. Ali, 
    197 A.3d 742
    , 761 (Pa. Super. 2018). A sentencing
    court abuses its discretion not through a mere error in judgment. Id. “Rather,
    the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing
    court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of
    impartiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable
    decision.” Id. (citation omitted). “The rationale behind such broad discretion
    and the concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the
    sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a
    particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances
    before it.” Moury, 
    992 A.2d at 170
     (citation omitted).
    The sentencing code requires the court to consider certain factors,
    including a defendant’s rehabilitative needs, when determining a sentence.
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    42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).4 The court must also “make as a part of the record,
    and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason
    or reasons for the sentence imposed.” Id. The weighing of these factors,
    however, is “exclusively for the sentencing court,” and an appellate court
    cannot substitute its own judgment for the sentencing court’s on appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Bowen, 
    975 A.2d 1120
    , 1123–24 (Pa. Super. 2009).
    “Long standing precedent [] recognizes that the Sentencing Code
    affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or
    consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same time or to
    sentences already imposed.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    249 A.3d 1206
    ,
    1212 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). This Court has frequently held that
    a court satisfies its obligations under the Sentencing Code when it sets forth
    its general reasoning and consideration of the Section 9721(b) sentencing
    factors before imposing several consecutive sentences. See, e.g., id. at 1217
    (affirming sentence where “trial court fashioned an individualized sentence
    [by] taking into account all of the statutory factors” before announcing series
    of consecutive sentences), Horning, 193 A.3d at 419 (affirming sentence
    where “sentencing transcript reflects the trial court’s consideration of the
    [statutory] sentencing standards” before announcing series of consecutive
    sentences).
    ____________________________________________
    4 This statute also requires the sentencing court to consider the protection of
    the public, the gravity of the offense in relation to its impact on the victim and
    the community, and the sentencing guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).
    -7-
    J-A22030-22
    Significantly, where a PSI report exists, an appellate court presumes
    that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information regarding the
    defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating
    statutory factors. Commonwealth v. Devers, 
    546 A.2d 12
    , 18 (Pa. 1988).
    “Having been fully informed by the [PSI] report, the sentencing court’s
    discretion should not be disturbed.” Id.
    Moreover, “where a sentence is within the standard range of the
    guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the
    Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d at 171
    . See also
    Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 
    668 A.2d 536
    , 545-46 (Pa. Super. 1995)
    (stating that the combination of a PSI report and a standard range sentence,
    absent more, cannot be considered excessive or unreasonable).
    In its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, the sentencing court noted that it
    considered the PSI report, the sentencing guidelines, and the Section 9721
    sentencing factors prior to imposing Appellant’s aggregate sentence.
    The sentencing transcript shows unequivocally that the [c]ourt did
    in fact consider the defendant’s youth, criminal history, and his
    co-defendant’s negative influence when it sentenced him. (See
    Sentencing Transcript, 06/16/2021, [at] 7-11). More specifically,
    it classified each as a positive or mitigating factor. (See id.).
    Weighing against them, however, were, inter alia, the additional
    felony charges he was facing, that he was the one who selected
    Jefferson County as the target for his and the co-defendant’s
    criminal activities, and that he was the one driving at speeds that
    were nothing less than reckless in a patently futile attempt to
    avoid apprehension (Id. at 8-11).
    Tr. Ct. Op., filed 12/23/21, at 1.
    -8-
    J-A22030-22
    Our review of the sentencing transcript reveals that the court properly
    considered the sentencing factors prior to imposing consecutive sentences. In
    addition to acknowledging its review of the PSI report, the court explicitly
    noted its consideration of Appellant’s youth and his addiction to drugs. N.T.
    Sentencing, 6/16/21, at 5, 8-10. The court further noted that Appellant would
    be forty-seven years old when he is eligible for parole and, with respect to his
    rehabilitative needs, the court acknowledged that Appellant would be able to
    participate in programs while in prison to enable him to lead a “good and
    productive” life upon his release. Id. at 16. The court also noted the violent
    nature of the assault and robbery and the extreme recklessness Appellant
    exhibited in fleeing from apprehension, all of which implicated the need to
    protect the public. Id. at 8-11.
    We conclude that Appellant’s sentence is not manifestly excessive in
    light of the nature and number of crimes to which he pleaded guilty, and the
    court did not abuse its discretion in imposing some of the mitigated or
    standard range sentences to be served consecutively. We, thus, affirm the
    judgment of sentence.
    Affirmed.
    -9-
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 09/27/2022
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