Batterman, C. v. Santo, S. ( 2022 )

J-S27003-22
J-S27004-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
CHAD BATTERMAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
SILVIA SANTO : No. 967 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered March 16, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No: 2019-06877
CHAD BATTERMAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
SILVIA SANTO : No. 968 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered March 16, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No: 2019-06877
CHAD BATTERMAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
SILVIA SANTO : No. 969 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered March 17, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No: 2019-06877
J-S27003-22
J-S27004-22
CHAD BATTERMAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
SILVIA SANTO : No. 1194 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered March 17, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No: 2019-06877
BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 27, 2022
In these consolidated appeals, Appellant, Chad Batterman (Father), pro
se challenges four orders issued in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery
County denying his petitions to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in this
protracted, tortuous custody battle between Father and Appellee, Silvia Santo
(Mother), involving the couple’s minor children. With respect to all four
orders, Father contends that the trial court committed error of law in denying
his IFP petitions based on its conclusion that Father failed to demonstrate his
inability to obtain funds for transcripts and fees related to his appeals. 1 With
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1 An order denying IFP status is a final, appealable order. See Grant v.
Blaine, 868 A.2d 400, 402 (Pa. 2005).
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regard to two of the orders, he also argues that the trial court’s failure to
conduct a hearing deprived him of due process. Following review, we affirm.
In a July 27, 2022 memorandum disposing of another of Father’s
appeals from an order denying an IFP petition, a panel of this Court provided
the following factual background:
Father and [Mother] were married in November 2014 and
separated in November 2017. Mother and Father are the parents
of C.B. and D.B. (Children), [dates of birth, 10/20/15 and
10/10/17], respectively. On February 12, 2018, the court entered
an order granting the parties shared legal custody of the Children,
granting Mother primary physical custody, and granting Father
partial physical custody (one day a week and every other
weekend). See Order, 2/12/18. On May 3, 2019, the trial court
entered a custody order granting Mother sole legal custody and
primary physical custody of the Children and granting Father
partial physical custody of the Children. See Order, 5/3/19. Since
2017, this custody matter has accumulated over 370 docket
entries, primarily from Father’s efforts to obtain contempt orders
against Mother.4
4 Despite words of caution and criticism by the Honorable Melissa S.
Sterling, Father has continued his litigious pursuit. Judge Sterling
stated:
Dozens of emergency petitions, petitions for contempt,
reconsideration motions, appeals and numerous filings against
third parties including children’s physicians, local police, and
maternal grandparents seeking discovery regarding the children,
have been filed with this court and the Pennsylvania Superior
Court and have been heard before numerous judges. Despite
numerous warnings and threats of sanctions being imposed
against him, Father continues to file and seeks contempt ruling
after contempt ruling, hoping to increase his custody time while
reducing Mother’s. Father’s continued abuse and misuse of the
court system in his attempts to gain the upper hand cannot be
ignored. We do not make our decision today lightly, particularly
given the four-year, non-stop battle over these small children
and the continued abuse of court time and resources. It appears
to us that their spiteful litigation has almost become a full-time
job for these parents. We know Father seeks an equal parenting
role, but we do not believe that would be the correct decision at
this time. These parents must learn to co-parent as peacefully
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as they possibly can. Once they reach that state of mind–that
their children are more important than their battles–we are
hopeful that they will be able to jointly make the right decisions
for the Children. But for now, one parent must have the ability
to make final decisions on critical issues such as health and
education and, having heard 5 days of testimony, reviewed both
parties’ exhibits and considered all the evidence before us, we
believe the order we have issued today is the fairest we can
provide.
Findings of Fact, 7/16/21, at 2-5, 9, 12.
Batterman v. Santo, No. 145 EDA 2022, unpublished memorandum at 1-3
(Pa. Super. filed July 27, 2022) (brackets, ellipses, and some footnotes
omitted).2
As stated, the instant appeals relate to four different orders denying
Father’s petitions for IFP status. At docket No. 967 EDA 2022, Father’s appeal
stems from the March 16, 2022 order denying a March 9, 2022 IFP petition
seeking waiver of fees relating to the transcript of a March 2, 2022 hearing
“address[ing] issues raised in 11 custody and contempt petitions” before the
Honorable Henry S. Hilles, III. Trial Court Opinion, 5/9/22, at 1-2. At docket
No. 968 EDA 2022, Father’s appeal involves the March 16, 2022 order denying
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2The panel explained that the trial court erred by basing its denial of Father’s
December 16, 2021 IFP petition simply on the fact “[Father] has not
persuaded the court that he is without the necessary resources.” See Order,
12/17/21. The panel determined that the failure to conduct an evidentiary
hearing required reversal and remand for a hearing. Batterman, supra, at
8-9. By contrast, the trial court in the instant action did hold a hearing on
March 11, 2022 and based its denials not only on its review of Father’s
petitions but also on testimony and evidence presented at the March 11
hearing.
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a second March 9, 2022 IFP petition seeking waiver of fees for the transcript
of an October 7, 2021 hearing on Father’s “Emergency Motion to Remove the
Parties’ Children from Mother’s Residence until Proper Asbestos and Lead
Testing Is Completed.” Id. at 2. At docket No. 969 EDA 2022, Father
appealed the March 17, 2022 order denying his IPF petition filed that same
day in which he requested waiver of fees for three separate appeals as well
as a March 11, 2022 hearing involving Father’s “two, then-pending IFP
Petitions.” Id.3 At docket No. 1194 EDA 2022, Father appealed the May 2,
2022 order denying his April 29, 2022 IFP petition requesting waiver of fees
for the transcript of an April 27, 2022 hearing. In all four appeals, Father
argues trial court error for denying the petitions. In the appeals docketed at
No. 969 EDA 2022 and No. 1194 EDA 2022, Father also argues that he was
deprived of due process by virtue of the trial court’s failure to conduct a
hearing.
In D.R.M. v. N.K.M., 153 A.3d 348 (Pa. Super. 2016), this Court
reiterated that:
“[I]n reviewing a trial court’s resolution of an application to
proceed in forma pauperis, we reverse only if the court abused its
discretion or committed an error of law.” Amrhein v. Amrhein,
903 A.2d 17, 19 (Pa. Super. 2006). An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error in judgment but requires a finding of bias,
partiality, prejudice, ill will, manifest unreasonableness, or
misapplication of law. Commonwealth v. Tickel, 2 A.3d 1229,
1233 (Pa. Super. 2010). The trial court “has considerable
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3 When appropriate, we shall refer to appeals from the two March 16, 2022
orders and the March 17, 2022 order collectively as “the March appeals.”
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discretion in determining whether a person is indigent for
purposes of an application to proceed in forma pauperis.”
pauperis.” Amrhein, supra at 20.
Id. at 350-51.
In its July 27, 2022 memorandum opinion addressing Father’s appeal
from a December 20, 2021 order denying IFP status, the panel correctly
observed:
In determining IFP status, the trial court must satisfy itself of the
truth of the averment of an inability to pay the costs of litigation,
and if it believes the petitioner’s averments, there is no
requirement that the court conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Commonwealth v. Cannon, 954 A.2d 1222, 1226 (Pa. Super.
2008), citing Amrhein[, 903 A.2d at 19]. However, if the court
disbelieves even some of the petitioner’s averments, an
evidentiary hearing must be held. Amrhein, supra. See also
Crosby Square Apartments v. Hanson, 666 A.2d 737 (Pa.
Super. 1995)[.] Although the trial court has considerable
discretion in determining whether a person is indigent for
purposes of an IFP application, Amrhein, supra, in making that
determination, the trial court must focus on whether the person
can afford to pay and cannot reject allegations contained in an
application without conducting a hearing. Cannon, supra;Crosby Square, supra.Batterman, supra, at 7 (some citations omitted).
Further:
Pa.R.C.P. 240 (“Rule 240”) governs the filing of IFP Petitions
generally and provides that if “the petition is denied, in whole or
in part, the court shall briefly state its reasons.” Pa.R.C.P.
240(c)(3). This Court has instructed, if “the trial court is inclined
to deny . . . IFP applications after conducting the appropriate
evidentiary hearing(s), the trial court must place a brief statement
of its reasons on the record and/or in its order(s).” Goldstein v.
Haband Co., 814 A.2d 1214, 1218 (Pa. Super. 2002).
D.R.M., 153 A.3d at 351.
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Here, the trial court conducted a hearing on March 11, 2022. As the
court explained:
The court presided over a hearing on March 11, 2022 during which
Father testified with respect to his financial situation and
introduced exhibits into the record. The court ultimately
concluded that Father had the financial resources to pay the
various fees and denied the three IFP petitions in orders issued
March 16, 2022 (two) and March 17, 2022.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/9/22, at 2. Not only did the court conduct the required
evidentiary hearing, but also in its two orders issued on March 16, 2022, the
court indicated its reason for denying Father’s petitions, stating, “[Father] has
failed to demonstrate that he is unable to obtain funds to pay for the requested
transcript.” Order, 3/16/22, at 1. In the order issued on March 17, 2022, the
court indicated, “[Father] has failed to demonstrate that he is unable to obtain
funds to pay for (1) the requested transcript and (2) the fees in connection
with any appeal.” Order, 3/17/22, at 1.
We find no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s orders
challenged in the March appeals. Father filed petitions with information
regarding his financial situation and presented testimony at the March 11,
2022 hearing regarding his finances, along with exhibits that were admitted
by the court. The court issued orders that properly included a brief statement
as to why each petition was denied. In its opinion addressing the March
appeals, the court further explained that
contrary to Father’s contention in the IFP affidavits, Father is not
“unable to obtain funds from anyone, including [his] family and
associates, to pay the costs of litigation.” Father clearly has
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access to funds from his father to finance his everyday life
including housing expenses, children’s activities and vacations.
The court found Father to be wholly incredible in his self-serving
testimony that his father is essentially willing to finance Father’s
expenses except for the within filing fees. Father was unable to
demonstrate that he is “unable to pay the fees and costs” as
averred in his IFP affidavits.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/9/22, at 5 (emphasis in original; footnote and some
capitalization omitted).
Regarding the March appeals, the orders were entered after the court
considered Father’s petitions and conducted a hearing on March 11, 2022. We
reject Father’s contention that the trial court denied him due process by not
conducting another hearing before issuing the March 17, 2022 order, one day
after issuing its two March 16, 2022 orders and less than one week after
conducting the March 11 hearing. Father has not even remotely suggested
that his financial status changed between March 11, 2022 and the time the
orders were issued on March 16, 2022, and he has failed to advance any
legitimate argument that his status changed between March 16, 2022 and
March 17, 2022 when it issued the order appealed from at docket 969 EDA
2022. Finding no abuse of discretion or error of law with respect to the March
appeals, we affirm the trial court’s orders entered on March 16, 2022 and the
order entered on March 17, 2022.
In the appeal docketed at No. 1194 EDA 2022, Father again asserts trial
court error for denying an IFP petition, this time with regard to the trial court’s
May 2, 2022 order denying Father’s April 29, 2022 IFP petition. In that
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petition, Father requested waiver of fees for the transcript of an April 27, 2022
hearing. We note that the third page of Father’s April 29, 2022 petition
appears to be a photocopy of his two March 9 petitions as well as the March
17 petition. However, Father’s handwritten notation in the March petitions
claiming “arrears of at least $34,000 per the Philadelphia Family Court” is
altered by writing the number “5” over the “4” so that he now suggests he
has “arrears of at least $35,000 per the Philadelphia Family Court.” See IFP
Petition, 4/29/22, at 3. In all other respects, Father’s representations in the
April 29 petition are unchanged from those made in the March petitions.
In its May 2, 2022 order denying the April 29, 2022 petition, the trial
court explained, “The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is unable to
obtain funds to pay for his transcript. The court presided over an evidentiary
hearing with respect to Petitioner’s ability to pay on March 11, 2022 (in
connection with a previous request to proceed in forma pauperis).” Trial Court
Order, 5/2/22.
We find no abuse of discretion or error of law on the part of the trial
court in denying Father’s April 29, 2022 petition. Further, the court conducted
an evidentiary hearing only seven weeks earlier and Father has not
demonstrated, or even suggested, that yet another hearing would have
produced any information to alter the trial court’s determination that Father
failed to demonstrate an inability to pay for the transcript. As the trial court
observed,
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[Father] did not aver that his financial condition had somehow
changed in the intervening weeks; there was no basis for the court
to schedule another hearing. Certainly, Thompson v.
Thompson, 187 A.3d 259 (Pa. Super. 2018), does not stand for
the proposition that the court must conduct IFP hearing on a
regular basis if a serial filer continues to file IFP petitions.
[Father] was unable to demonstrate that he “is without financial
resources” to pay the fees and costs as contemplated by
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 240.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/26/22, at 5.
Therefore, we reject Father’s assertion that he was denied due process
as a result of the trial court’s failure to conduct an additional evidentiary
hearing absent any evidence that Father’s financial condition changed in the
intervening period. Father is not entitled to relief.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/27/2022
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