Com. v. Cephas, B. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
BRANDON CEPHAS :
:
Appellant : No. 2060 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 12, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0007274-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 05, 2018
Appellant, Brandon Cephas, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after a jury
convicted him of Possession of a Controlled Substance with the Intent to
Deliver (“PWID”), 35 P.S. 780-113(a)(30). Sentenced to one to three years’
incarceration, to be followed by a period of probation, he asserts that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. We affirm.
On July 2, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a written complaint charging
Appellant with narcotics-related offenses. On November 12, 2015, at a trial-
scheduling hearing, the Commonwealth requested a trial before a jury, and
the Honorable Carolyn H. Nichols scheduled trial for September 28, 2016.
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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On the scheduled date for trial, both the Commonwealth and Appellant
were ready to proceed, but the trial court granted Appellant’s co-defendant’s
request for a continuance and rescheduled trial for April 12, 2017.
Appellant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 on
November 2, 2016. On January 12, 2017, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s
motion after conducting a hearing on the matter, ruling that court backlog
caused the delay in trial. As noted above, Appellant was eventually tried and
convicted on one count of PWID. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant presents the following question for our review:
DID THE LOWER COURT COMMIT AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION BY DENYING APPELLANT’S RULE 600
MOTION?
Appellant’s brief, at 4.
We review Appellant's Rule 600 claim according to the following
principles:
In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of review of a trial
court's decision is whether the trial court abused its
discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with
law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after
hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the
law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion
is abused.
The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the record
of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the
[trial] court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party.
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Additionally, when considering the trial court's ruling, this Court is
not permitted to ignore the dual purpose
behind Rule [600]. Rule [600] serves two equally important
functions: (1) the protection of the accused's speedy trial rights,
and (2) the protection of society. In determining whether an
accused's right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration
must be given to society's right to effective prosecution of criminal
cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those
contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate
of Rule [600] was not designed to insulate the criminally accused
from good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the
Commonwealth.
So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the
Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental
speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be
construed in a manner consistent with society's right to
punish and deter crime. In considering [these] matters ...,
courts must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not only the
prerogatives of the individual accused, but the collective right of
the community to vigorous law enforcement as well.
Commonwealth v. Bethea, 185 A.3d 364, 370 (Pa.Super. 2018) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wendel, 165 A.3d 952, 955–56 (Pa. Super. 2017)) (case
citation omitted) (emphases added).
In pertinent part, Rule 600 provides:
(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial
(1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to commence
on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial, or the defendant
tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.
(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint
is filed against the defendant shall commence
within 365 days from the date on which the
complaint is filed.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
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To summarize, the courts of this
Commonwealth employ three steps ... in determining
whether Rule 600 requires dismissal of charges
against a defendant. First, Rule 600(A) provides
the mechanical run date. Second, we determine
whether any excludable time exists pursuant
to Rule 600(C). We add the amount of excludable
time, if any, to the mechanical run date to arrive at
an adjusted run date.
***
Rule 600[ ] encompasses a wide variety of
circumstances under which a period of delay was
outside the control of the Commonwealth and not the
result of the Commonwealth's lack of diligence. Any
such period of delay results in an extension of
the run date. Addition of any Rule 600[ ] extensions
to the adjusted run date produces
the final Rule 600 run date. If the Commonwealth
does not bring the defendant to trial on or before the
final run date, the trial court must dismiss the
charges.
Wendel, supra at 956 (citation omitted) (emphases added).
It is long-established that judicial delay may serve as
a basis for extending the period of time within which
the Commonwealth may commence trial where the
Commonwealth is prepared to commence trial prior to
the expiration of the mandatory period but the
court[,] because of scheduling difficulties or the like[,]
is unavailable.
Commonwealth v. Malgieri, 889 A.2d 604, 607–08 (Pa. Super.
2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Commonwealth v. Wroten, 305 Pa.Super. 340, 451 A.2d
678, 681 (1982) (“A judicial delay is a justifiable basis for an
extension of time if the Commonwealth is ready to proceed.”)
(citation omitted).
Bethea, 185 A.3d 364, 370–71 (Pa.Super. 2018).
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Here, the criminal complaint was filed on July 2, 2015. Therefore, the
Rule 600 mechanical run date was July 2, 2016. Trial did not commence by
that date, however, and Appellant filed his Rule 600 motion to dismiss on
November 2, 2016.
At the Rule 600 hearing, Appellant argued that the 321-day delay
occurring between the November 12, 2015, status hearing, where the
Commonwealth requested a jury trial, and the September 28, 2016, trial date
set by the court was attributable to the Commonwealth because the
Commonwealth failed to ask for an earlier trial date and never indicated its
readiness for trial prior to the mechanical run date. The trial court, however,
identified the court's congested docket as the sole cause of the 321-day delay
pushing the trial date beyond the mechanical run date, rather than the
Commonwealth's lack of due diligence.
The record confirms that the delay was attributable to the schedule
limitations of the trial court. In such cases, judicial delay is excludable and
not chargeable to the Commonwealth. See Bethea, 185 A.3d at 372.
Finally, we briefly discuss Commonwealth v. Mills, 162 A.3d 323, 325
(Pa. 2017), upon which Appellant relies. In Mills, the Court addressed
whether the ordinary passage of 174 days from the filing of the complaint to
the trial-scheduling conference should be considered excludable delay, since
it was not attributable to the Commonwealth's lack of due diligence. Id. at
324 (citing Rule 600(C)(1) (Periods of delay at any stage caused by the
Commonwealth shall be counted in the 365-day tally. Any other periods of
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delay shall be excluded from the computation) and Rule 600(D)(1) (Failure to
meet the rule's prompt-trial requirement constitutes grounds for dismissal.
600(D)(1)). The outcome of defendant Mills' Rule 600 dismissal motion
turned on the question, as the 174 days, if deemed includable time, would
combine with other time attributable to the Commonwealth to bring the
calculation over 365 days.
Differentiating between "time necessary to ordinary trial preparation
and judicial delay arising out of the court's own scheduling concerns[,]" id.
at 325, the Court rejected the notion that the former, which it fairly
characterized as "time during which no one is prepared for trial—or even
possibly could be ready[,]" is "delay" under either the letter or spirit of Rule
600:
where a trial-ready prosecutor must wait several months due to
a court calendar, the time should be treated as “delay” for which
the Commonwealth is not accountable. Here, however, the
Commonwealth does not argue that it was prepared for trial
during the 174 days in issue.
Id.
Therefore, the Court held the 174 days from the date of the complaint's
filing to the date of the trial-scheduling hearing was not "delay" but, rather,
time attributable to the normal progression of the case and, therefore,
includable time in the Rule 600 calculation. As such time combined with other
Commonwealth-attributable time to put the trial date beyond 365 days, the
Court concluded the trial court had properly granted defendant Mills' Rule 600
dismissal motion.
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Following the reasoning of Mills, we include the 130 days running from
the filing of Appellant's complaint to the date of his trial-scheduling hearing,
as such normal progression of time did not represent "delay" for the reasons
explained by our Supreme Court. Nevertheless, because no other time was
attributable to the Commonwealth, Rule 600 dismissal does not apply in the
present case as it did in Mills. Here, the court's congested docket, alone,
caused the 321-day delay resulting in the setting of a trial date beyond 365
days. On the trial date, moreover, the Commonwealth stood ready, but
Appellant's co-defendant filed a motion to continue trial, which the court
granted. Accordingly, even when assessed in light of Mills, Appellant's Rule
600 motion was properly denied.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/5/18
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