HSBC Bank USA v. Carney, P. ( 2016 )


Menu:
  • J-A03034-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOC AS                  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    TRUSTEE FOR THE HOLDERS OF THE                          PENNSYLVANIA
    CERTIFICATES ISSUED BY DEUTCHE
    ALT-A SECURITIES MORTGAGE LOAN
    TRUST SERIES 2007-ARI
    Appellee
    v.
    PATRICK CARNEY
    Appellant                   No. 877 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 5, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Civil Division at No(s): 10-010108
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY, J., and DUBOW, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                            FILED APRIL 05, 2016
    Appellant, Patrick Carney, appeals pro se from the judgment entered
    in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, in favor of Appellee, HSBC
    Bank, in this mortgage foreclosure action. We affirm.
    In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant
    facts and procedural history of this case. We add Appellant timely filed post-
    trial motions pro se on March 6, 2015, which the court denied on March 11,
    2015. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on March 23, 2015.1           The
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Ordinarily, an appeal properly lies from the entry of judgment, not from
    the order denying post-trial motions. See generally Johnston the Florist,
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    J-A03034-16
    court ordered Appellant on March 25, 2015, to file a concise statement of
    errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).        Appellant
    timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement pro se on April 13, 2015. On May 5,
    2015, the court entered judgment in favor of Appellee.         Thereafter, on
    August 3, 2015, this Court quashed Appellant’s separate appeal at docket
    No. 838 EDA 2015 without prejudice to Appellant to raise any issues
    pertaining to the foreclosure action within the context of the current appeal
    at docket No. 877 EDA 2015.
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    DID THE [TRIAL] COURT COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW AND
    ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER
    THE   CUMULATIVE    EFFECT   OF   THE   NUMEROUS
    INTENTIONAL DECEITS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS OF
    [APPELLEE] AND ITS VARIOUS COUNSELS, THEREBY
    DEPRIVING THE [TRIAL] COURT OF JURISDICTION TO
    HEAR THE MATTER WHEN APPELLEE DID NOT HAVE
    STANDING TO INVOKE THE COURT’S JURISDICTION AND
    DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF HIS PROPERTY RIGHTS?
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    Inc. v. TEDCO Constr. Corp., 
    657 A.2d 511
    , 516 (Pa.Super. 1995) (en
    banc). Nevertheless, a final judgment entered during pendency of an appeal
    is sufficient to perfect appellate jurisdiction. Drum v. Shaull Equipment
    and Supply, Co., 
    787 A.2d 1050
     (Pa.Super. 2001), appeal denied, 
    569 Pa. 693
    , 
    803 A.2d 735
     (2002). Here, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal
    prematurely on March 23, 2015, prior to the entry of judgment. The court
    entered final judgment on May 5, 2015. Thus, Appellant’s notice of appeal
    relates forward to May 5, 2015, the date judgment was entered. See
    Pa.R.A.P. 905(a) (stating notice of appeal filed after court’s determination
    but before entry of appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry
    and on day of entry).        Hence, there are no procedural/jurisdictional
    impediments to our review.
    -2-
    J-A03034-16
    DID THE [TRIAL] COURT MAKE AN ERROR IN FACT
    AND AN ERROR OF LAW IN FAILING TO UPHOLD
    PA.R.C.P. 2002 BY IGNORING GOVERNMENT-
    CERTIFIED AND AUTHENTICATED EVIDENCE, THAT
    THE TRIAL COURT ADMITTED, WHICH CLEARLY
    ESTABLISHES APPELLEE LACKED STANDING AND
    WAS THEREFORE NOT A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST?
    DID THE [TRIAL] COURT MAKE AN ERROR IN FACT
    AND AN ERROR IN LAW WHEN [MS. ROMANO]
    ROBO-SIGNED    APPELLANT’S  ASSIGNMENT   OF
    MORTGAGE?
    DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
    AND SHOW BIAS IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE, THEREBY
    DEPRIVING APPELLANT HIS RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS
    TO A FAIR AND EQUITABLE TRIAL?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 3-4).
    As a preliminary matter, we note Appellant proceeds in this appeal pro
    se. While this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se
    litigant, pro se status generally confers no special benefit upon an appellant.
    Strawn v. Strawn, 
    664 A.2d 129
     (Pa.Super. 1995).             See also Cole v.
    Czegan, 
    722 A.2d 686
    , 687 (Pa.Super. 1998) (stating pro se status does
    not entitle appellant to any particular advantage because appellant lacks
    legal training). “[A]ppellant has a duty to file a comprehensible brief and to
    raise and develop properly his appellate issues.” Cole, 
    supra.
     Accordingly,
    a pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the
    Pennsylvania Rules of Court.        Jones v. Rudenstein, 
    585 A.2d 520
    (Pa.Super. 1991), appeal denied, 
    529 Pa. 634
    , 
    600 A.2d 954
     (1991). This
    Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if an appellant fails to conform
    -3-
    J-A03034-16
    substantially to the requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of
    Appellate Procedure.   Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Laird v. Ely & Bernard, 
    528 A.2d 1379
     (Pa.Super. 1987), appeal denied, 
    520 Pa. 576
    , 
    549 A.2d 136
     (1988).
    Instantly, Appellant’s brief complies in form with most of the pertinent
    rules of Pennsylvania’s appellate procedure. Nevertheless, Appellant’s brief
    fails to provide us with an adequate argument section, pursuant to the
    applicable rules, which require the argument section to contain a discussion
    of Appellant’s contentions on appeal plus legal arguments and citations
    supporting those contentions.    See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).     Here, Appellant’s
    fourth issue challenges the trial court’s bias, but contains no citations to
    authority.   See Dalrymple v. Kilishek, 
    920 A.2d 1275
     (Pa.Super. 2007)
    (stating failure to support argument with pertinent authority results in
    waiver on appeal). Instead, this issue consists of a string of contentions and
    references to Appellant’s version of the facts. Thus, Appellant’s fourth issue
    is waived. See 
    id.
    After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
    applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable G. Michael
    Green, we conclude Appellant’s remaining issues merit no relief.     The trial
    court’s opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of these
    questions presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed May 8, 2015, at 9-15)
    (finding: (1)-(3) as security for Note, Appellant executed Mortgage in favor
    of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), acting solely as
    -4-
    J-A03034-16
    nominee for American Brokers Conduit (“ABC”), and its successors and
    assigns; Mortgage specifically lists MERS as mortgagee and nominee for
    Lender, ABC; thus, MERS may execute Mortgage as nominee for Lender,
    ABC; MERS granted signing authority to Ms. Romano, MERS’ certifying
    officer, to execute Assignment of Mortgage (“AOM”); therefore, MERS acted
    within its specific authority to execute AOM to Appellee, and Ms. Romano
    had express authority to execute AOM with Recorder of Deeds; Appellant is
    not third-party beneficiary of AOM, he is not party to AOM, and he did not
    sign AOM; thus, Appellant lacks standing to challenge validity of transfer and
    assignment of Note and Mortgage to Appellee; Appellee is owner and holder
    of Mortgage and Note; Appellant’s failure to make monthly payments
    constituted default under Mortgage and Note; Appellee issued proper pre-
    foreclosure notifications, and Appellant failed to cure default; Note was
    endorsed by Lender, ABC, and made payable in blank; Appellee holds and
    possesses original Note, which it produced at trial). The record supports the
    trial   court’s   decision;   therefore,   we    have   no   reason   to   disturb   it.
    Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
    Judgment affirmed.
    -5-
    J-A03034-16
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/5/2016
    -6-
    Circulated 03/22/2016 10:47 AM
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY,
    PENNSYLVANIA
    CIVIL ACTION-LAW
    HSBC BANK, USA, NATIONAL                                        NO. 2010-010108
    ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR
    THE HOLDERS OF THE
    CERTIFICATES ISSUED BY
    DEUTSCHE ALT-A SECURITIES
    MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST SERIES
    2007-ARl
    v.
    PATRICK T. CARNEY
    Elizabeth Gallard, Esquire
    Patrick T. Carney,pro se
    OPINION
    GREEN, J.                                                                    FILED: M~y s, Jo\5_
    Appellant, Patrick T. Carney, filed the instant appeal following a (Y)C\rv\.\ 1\, 2015
    Order denying a Motion to Vacate Judgment Based on Judicial Bias and Judge's Lack
    of Knowledge and Lack of Understanding of the Securitization Process.1 Appellant's
    Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal was filed on April 13, 2015.2
    Therein, Appellant neglects to specifically enumerate the errors complained of on
    1
    Said Motion was considered as a Motion for Post-Trial Relief pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 227.1.
    2
    The companion case of HSBC Bank, USA, National Association, as Trustee for the Holders of the
    Certificates Issued by Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2007-ARl v. Patrick
    T. Carney, 2010-008543 was tried in conjunction with the instant matter.
    appeal over the course of his sixteen (16) page statement. Nevertheless, Appellant
    raises the following issues for appellate review:
    1.     HSBC Bank, USA, National Association, as Trustee for the Holders of the
    Certificates Issued by Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust Series
    2007-ARl (hereinafter "HSBC" or Appellee) is not a real party in interest as "it
    did not have standing to bring this wrongful foreclosure action" and "that no
    securitization has been proven to have ever taken place";
    2.    Both the Mortgage and the Note are void ab initio;
    3.   The Trial Court failed to find that American Brokers Conduit was a legal
    corporation or that it was properly licensed to operate as a licensed lender;
    4.    The blank indorsement found in the Note is ineffective;
    5.    Plaintiff failed to produce evidence that it is the owner of the Note or that it
    is a holder in due course;
    6.    "The manufactured assignment of mortgage ... is a fabricated document
    that had no authority to assign ownership interest of said mortgage because
    Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (:MERS-as nominee for ABC-
    assignor) was not the owner of the subject mortgage and was only the nominee for
    ABC, an alleged New York Corporation, which was a non-existent Corporation.
    IvIERS, never has written instruction, nor written authorization to transfer the
    Mortgage or the Note.";
    7.    The assignment of the Mortgage is void ab initio;
    8.   The assignment of the Mortgage is a "fabricated document" and MERs
    lacked the authorization to transfer either the Mortgage or the Note;
    9.    Appellee should not have been permitted to file non-party verifications;
    10. The Trial Court "showed bias in protecting and shielding witnesses from
    Defendant's examination in violation of his federal civil right to due process";
    2
    11. The Trial Court "showed bias when [the Trial Court] refused Defendant
    access to the notary witness's logbook";
    12. The Trial Court "showed bias and a lack of adherence to the rules of
    evidence in allowing hearsay documents of a generic nature .... "
    13. The Trial Court erred by "failing to find that fraud was established in a clear
    and convincing manner."
    On November 16, 2006, Appeliant, Patrick T. Carney, executed a thirty-year
    adjustable rate promissory          note (hereinafter "Note") in the principal sum of
    $74,175.00 in favor of lender, American Brokers Conduit (hereinafter "ABC"). (P-1;
    P-133;    ,r,r 3-4, N.T.   10/27/14, p. 41). The last page of the Note contains an undated
    indorsement signed by Ryan Criscione, as Assistant Secretary of American Brokers
    Conduit, which states: "PAY TO THE ORDER OF __                    WITHOUT RECOURSE".
    (P-1). ABC indorsed the Note and made it payable in blank, without recourse. (P-1).
    Appellant, HSBC Bank, USA, National Association, as Trustee for the Holders of
    the Certificates Issued by Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust Series
    2007-ARl (hereinafter "HSBC" or Appellee) is currently in possession of the Note.
    (P-1).
    3
    HSBC served discovery, including Requests for Admission and Defendant failed and/or refused to
    respond. (P-13). Given Defendant's failure to respond to the Requests for Admission, said Requests
    were deemed admitted pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4014. (June 23, 2014 Order).
    3
    On November 16, 2006, Appellant executed a mortgage ("Mortgage") in favor
    of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., ("MERS"), as mortgagee, as
    nominee for ABC, the Lender, and Lender's successors and assigns, which secured
    the indebtedness of the Note. l\1ERS is the identified mortgagee in the Mortgage.
    (P-2; P-13;    ,r,r 1-2, N.T. 10/27/14, p.38).    The Property subject to the Mortgage is real
    property located at 3921 Gideon Road, Brookhaven, Pennsylvania 19015
    ("Property"). The Mortgage was recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds of
    Delaware County on December 14, 2006 in Mortgage Book No. 003981, Page 1879.
    (P-2).
    At the time of the execution of the Note and Mortgage, Appellant was the
    owner and President of Golden Mortgage Services, Inc., which did business as
    Golden Mortgage Services. (P-39, N.T. 10/27/14, p. 9). Appellant through Golden
    Mortgage Services selected American Brokers Conduit to serve as the Lender in the
    underlying transaction. (N.T. 08/04/14, p. 25). Appellant through Golden Mortgage
    Services had used American Brokers Conduit as Lender in prior real estate
    transactions.4 Appellant was also the owner5 and President of Golden Abstract
    Services, Inc., which did business as Golden Abstract Services. (P-39, N.T. 1027/14,
    4   At trial, Mr. Camey testified that he worked with ABC "often." (N.T. 10/27/14, p. 14).
    5
    Based upon Mr. Camey's testimony, this Court assumes he was the sole shareholder of Golden
    Abstract Services, Inc., at all times relevant to this civil action.
    4
    p. 10). Golden Abstract Services acted as the settlement agent for American Brokers
    Conduit at the closing of the loan. (P-20, N.T. 10/27/14, pp.10-11).
    Appellant's mortgage loan was fully funded. (N.T. 08/04/14, p. 25). Appellee,
    HSBC, purchased the Note in January 2007.             On September 1, 2009, the last
    mortgage payment was tendered by Appellant. (P-13; ~ 7). Appellant did not apply
    for a loan modification. (P-13; 18).
    The Note provides that failure to pay the full amount of each monthly payment
    on the date it is due is a default. (P-1, 1 7(B)). The Note and Mortgage provide that
    upon default of such monthly payments for a period of one (1) month and upon
    written notice of default which is left uncured, then the entire debt is collectible,
    immediately. (P-1, 17(C); P-2,   ,r 22; P-3, 1 10).
    On or about June 21, 2010, counsel for HSBC sent Appellant, via certified
    mail and regular mail, at both the Property's address and his last known address,
    Notice of Intention to Foreclosure, and Notice of Intent to accelerate the debt, as set
    forth in Act 6 of 1974, 41 P.S. §403(a) and a Notice of Homeowners' Emergency
    Mortgage Assistance, pursuant to Act 91 of 1983, as amended in 1998, 35 P.S.§1680,
    401(c) ("Act 6/91 Notice") due to the failure to make monthly mortgage payments.
    (P-4). The Act 6/91 Notice explained to Appellant that his Mortgage was in default,
    the nature of the foreclosure proceedings and how to take action to avoid foreclosure.
    Appellant did not seek Act 6/91 assistance within the applicable time periods
    5
    provided under the Homeowners'               Emergency Assistance Act with respect to the
    Mortgage at issue. (P-13; 1 11).             Appellant received the Act 6/91 Notice at least
    thirty (30) days prior to the commencement of this foreclosure proceeding.                        See
    Exhibit C to P-13. (P-13; 113). Despite this written notice, Appellant failed to make
    any payments that were due and owing. (P-13, 118).
    On or about July 30, 2010, HSBC commenced the instant mortgage
    foreclosure action against the Appellant. Appellant is the mortgagor and real owner
    of the Property.        Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. is the current servicer of the
    mortgage loan. The total amount alleged and owing in the Complaint totaled
    $93,819.62. (P-13, 116).
    The Mortgage provides that the borrower pay taxes and property insurance
    premiums on the Property. (P-2,            ,r,r 3, 4,   5). The Mortgage also provides that the
    Lender may obtain insurance coverage at Lender's option and at the borrower's
    expense. (P-2,     ,r,r 5, 9). Appellant    did not pay taxes or homeowners insurance owed.
    on the Property.' The loan servicer(s) on behalf of Plaintiff paid the taxes and
    property insurance         premiums        on the Property       totaling $13,562.42         ("escrow
    advance") which are set forth in detail at Exhibit P-36. (P-36; P-2,          ,r 9).6
    6   The total disbursements in exhibit P-36 are shown as "escrow advance" on exhibit P-35.
    6
    At trial, Appellee produced the original Note, made it available for inspection,
    and Appellant inspected the original Note and confirmed that he signed the original
    Note. (N.T. 10/15/14, pp.224, 230-233, N.T. 10 /27/14, p.41.) Appellee's attorney
    currently has possession of the original Note.
    Judith Romano, Assistant Secretary and Vice President of MERS testified at
    trial. Ms. Romano had authority to execute an assignment of mortgage on behalf of
    MERS. (P-16). The Assignment of Mortgage dated June 15, was recorded on July 7,
    2010, in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Delaware County in Record Book
    4766, Page 2370. (P-3).
    As of October 15, 2014, HSBC alleged the total amount due under the terms of
    the Mortgage and Note were as follows:
    Principal Balance                                    $ 74,175.00
    Interest from 8/1/2009 through 10/15/2014            $ 16,686.44
    Cumulative Late Charges                              $   251.16
    Recoverable Balance                                  $ 1,093.70
    Escrow Advance                                       $ 13,562.42
    TOTAL                                                $105,769.14
    Pursuant to the terms of the Mortgage and Note, the total amount due is accruing
    interest at the rate of $5.33 per day. (P-35).
    7
    At trial, Appellant was granted leave to pursue and prove a theory of fraud as a
    counterclaim.7      Following trial, a review of post-trial submissions and closing
    arguments, an in rem judgment was entered in favor of HSBC, and against Patrick T.
    Carney, in the amount of $105,769.14 together with interest and other costs and
    charges collectible under the mortgage, for foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged
    property. On the counterclaim, judgment was entered in favor of HSBC, and against
    Patrick T. Carney. Appellant did not through competent evidence prove concise facts
    supporting a theory of a fraud and failed to prove any harm, injury, or damages he
    sustained.
    REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
    Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2002(a) provides that "[e]xcept as
    otherwise provided . . . all actions shall be prosecuted by and in the name of the real
    party in interest.... " Pa.R.C.P. 2002(a). A 'real party in interest,' as required to have
    standing to maintain an action, is the person who has the power to discharge the
    claim upon which suit is brought and to control the prosecution of the action brought
    to enforce rights arising under the claims. See Spires v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 
    70 A.2d 828
    , 831 (Pa. 1950), overruled in part on other grounds by Guy v. Liederbach,
    7
    The decision to permit Appellant to present evidence in support of this counterclaim for fraud
    occurred in a pre-trial conference that was placed on the record. (N.T., 10/15/14, pp.148-153, 2010-
    008543, 2010-010108).
    8
    
    459 A.2d 744
     (Pa. 1983); Collins v. Allstate Indemn. Co., 
    626 A.2d 1162
    , 1166 (Pa.
    Super. 1993). Where an assignment is effective, however, the assignee stands in the
    shoes of the assignor and assumes all of his rights. See Smith v. Cumberland, Ltd.,
    687 A.2d 1167m 1172 (Pa. Super. 1997).
    Although Appellant contends that l\t1ERS did not have the authority to assign
    the Mortgage to HSBC, he provided no support for this claim. As security for the
    Note and contemporaneously with the execution of the Note on November 16, 2006,
    Appellant executed a mortgage ("Mortgage") in favor of Mortgage Electronic
    Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), acting solely as a nominee for American
    Brokers Conduit and its successors and assigns. The Mortgage lists MERS as the
    mortgagee under the security instrument and as nominee for the lender, American
    Brokers Conduit, the mortgage further provides that:
    This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the repayment of the
    Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of the Note; and
    (ii) the performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under
    this Security Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, Borrower
    does hereby mortgage, grant and convey to l\t1ERS (solely as nominee
    for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) and to the successors
    and assigns ofl\.1ERS, the following described property....
    (P-2, page 3 of 16).
    The Mortgage executed by the Appellant, specifically provides, inter alia, that
    MERS was the mortgagee, as a nominee for the Lender, and Lender's successors and
    assigns. (P-2 at p.1 ). As such, MERS acted within its specific authority by executing
    9
    the Assignment of Mortgage.      rvIBRS may execute mortgage assignments as the
    nominee for a lender. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Ralich, 
    982 A.2d 77
     (Pa. Super. 2009).
    Further, rvIBRS granted signing authority to the individual who executed the
    Assignment of Mortgage, Judith Romano, pursuant to an Agreement for Signing and
    Corporate Resolution. (P-16). The Agreement for Signing Authority and Corporate
    Resolution expressly identified Ms. Romano as a Certifying Officer and gave her
    permission to execute ". . . any and all documents necessary to foreclose upon the
    property securing any mortgage loan registered on the MERS System that is shown
    to be registered to the Member .... " (P-16). rvIBRS had authority to execute the
    Assignment of Mortgage to HSBC and Ms. Romano, as a Certifying Officer of
    MERS, had express authority to execute the Assignment of Mortgage recorded with
    the Recorder of Deeds. (P-2, P-16).
    TIDRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
    MERS, as nominee for Lender and its assigns, assigned Defendant's Mortgage
    to HSBC and the Assignment of Mortgage was duly recorded with the Delaware
    County Recorder of Deeds on      0u l y 7J     2010. (P-2). The recording of an
    assignment of mortgage has no legal import between the parties to the assignment as
    it is "not a prerequisite to [a bank] having standing to seek enforcement of the
    mortgage via a mortgage foreclosure action." U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Mallory, 
    982 A.2d 10
    986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2009). A mortgage is a written instrument that both conveys
    and creates a security interest in real estate. "A mortgage is in essence a defeasible
    deed, requiring the grantee to re-convey the property held as a security to the grantor
    upon satisfaction of the underlying debt or the fulfillment of established conditions."
    Hahnemann Medical College & Hospital v. Com., 
    416 A.2d 604
     (Pa. Commw.
    1980).
    A mortgage is generally accompanied by a promissory note. The note is
    evidence of the debt obligation for which the mortgage is given. The mortgage and
    the note, while separate instruments, secure the same debt. However, the note is a
    personal obligation of the obligor (mortgagor). Judgment on the mortgage is on the
    encumbered real estate, only. In Pennsylvania, the mortgage follows the note. 13
    Pa.C.S. §9203(g). One who is not a party to a contract lacks standing to argue that
    the contract is invalid. Shuster v. Pa. Turnpike Commonwealth. 
    395 Pa. 441
    , 
    149 A.2d 447
    , 452 (\'I 59J;'.Ira G. Steffy & Son. Inc., 
    7 A.3d 278
    , 287-88 (Pa. Super.
    2010). Appellant is not a party to the Assignment of Mortgage and did not sign the
    Assignment of Mortgage.
    A party becomes a third party beneficiary only where both parties to the
    contract express an intention to benefit the third party in the contract itself. Melley v.
    Pioneer Bank, N.A., 
    834 A.2d 1191
    , 1202 (Pa. Super. 2003). Appellant is not a third
    party beneficiary of the Assignment of Mortgage. Accordingly, Appellant lacks
    11
    standing to challenge the validity of the transfer and assignment of the Note and the
    Mortgage to Plaintiff. A defendant lacks standing to challenge a transfer of the Note
    unless the defendant demonstrates potential injury from the enforcement of the Note
    and the Mortgage by a party acting under an alleged defective assignment. J.P.
    Morgan Chase Bank v. Murray. 
    63 A.3d 1
    ~1.iv, 1a1,1o (Pa: Super. 2013). Appellant has no
    interest in the Assignment of Mortgage. He is also not at risk for a "potential injury"
    as he is not at risk of paying the same claim twice; there is only one party, HSBC,
    who is seeking enforcement of the Note and Mortgage.
    Mortgage Foreclosure
    HSBC, is the owner and holder of the Mortgage and Note. Appellant is the
    owner of the property 3921 Gideon Road, Brookhaven, Pennsylvania 19015-1220
    secured by the Mortgage. Appellant's failure to make monthly payments is a default
    under the Mortgage and Note. This Court also found that HSBC issued the proper
    pre-foreclosure notifications and Appellant failed to cure the default.
    The Note at issue is a negotiable instrument governed by Pennsylvania's
    Uniform Commercial Code. Section 3104 of the PUCC offers, in relevant part, the
    following definition of a negotiable instrument:
    Except as provided in subsections ( c) and (d), "negotiable instrument"
    means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of
    money, with or without interest or other charges described in the
    promise or order, if it:
    12
    (1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first
    comes into possession of a holder;
    (2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
    (3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person
    promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the
    payment of money, but the promise or order may contain:
    (i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain or protect
    collateral to secure payment;
    (ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess
    judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral; or
    (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the
    advantage or protection of an obligor.
    13 Pa.C.S. § · 3\ ot..{ (o..')
    The Note at issue meets all of these qualifications. A holder in due course of a
    negotiable instrument is defined as the holder of an instrument if "the instrument
    when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear such apparent evidence of
    forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to call into
    question its authenticity;" and the holder took the instrument for value and in good
    faith. Id. § 3302. The PUCC defines a blank indorsement as follows: "If an
    indorsement is made by the holder of an instrument and it is not a special
    indorsement, it is a 'blank indorsement.' When indorsed in blank, an instrument
    becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone
    13
    until specially indorsed." Id.§ 3205(b). A note is payable to bearer if it (1) states that
    it is payable to bearer or to the order of bearer or otherwise indicates that the person
    in possession of the promise or order is entitled to payment; (2) does not state a
    payee; or (3) states that it is payable to or to the order of cash or otherwise indicates
    that it is not payable to an identified person. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray,
    
    63 A.3d 1258
    , 1265-66 (Pa. Super. 2013).
    When a negotiable instrument, such as the subject Note, is transferred from one
    party to another, the transfer of the instrument "vests in the transferee such rights as
    the transferor has therein." 13 Pa. C.S. § 3~0!J(b). When indorsed in blank, "an
    instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of
    possession alone until specially indorsed." 13 Pa.C.S. § 3205(b). "A note indorsed in
    blank is a 'bearer note', payable to anyone on demand regardless of who previously
    held the note" pursuant to 13 Pa.C.S. §3109(a), 3301. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Gibson,
    
    102 A.3d 462
    , 466 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    The Note was indorsed by the lender, American Brokers Conduit and made
    payable in blank, without recourse making it bearer paper. 13 Pa.C.S. §3109(a).
    HSBC holds and possesses the original Note and produced the original Note at trial.
    In light of Appellant's default for failure to make monthly payments and the failure
    to cure the default, an in rem judgment was entered in favor of HSBC, and against
    Appellant in the amount of $105,769.14, together with interest and other costs and
    14
    charges collectible under the mortgage, for foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged
    property.
    Fraud
    A prima facie case of fraud requires a party to establish: (1) a representation;
    (2) that is material; (3) that is made with knowledge or reckless indifference of its
    falsity; (4) with intent to mislead another; (5) justifiable reliance; and (6) injury.
    Blumenstock v. Gibson, 
    811 A.2d 1029
    , 1034 (Pa. Super. 2002). The elements of
    fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Pittsburgh Live, Inc. v.
    Servov, 
    615 A.2d 438
    , 441 (Pa. Super. 1992). Appellant did not through competent
    evidence prove concise facts supporting a theory of a fraud perpetrated upon him,
    and failed to prove any harm, injury, or damages he purportedly sustained.
    For the aforementioned reasons, the trial court respectfully requests that its
    decision be AFFIRMED.
    BY THE COURT:
    I',:)
    ``
    =
    ~-r
    ;-D           :::If   J. "'T"!
    >Ge            >         ,-
    :~--·,        -<
    )>>-~:
    ::ur--        co   '     '
    rri
    f11U>"'r:-1              0
    c,C:o         ~
    .0 -o..,,
    -u         ::g
    L
    -oa
    ;p.;:o
    ~
    ..
    Q)
    0
    ......_~!$'
    .. ~(
    U)
    15