Com. v. Jackson, C. ( 2017 )

J-S13034-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
CHARLES JACKSON
Appellant No. 530 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 6, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-51-CR-0330781-1992
BEFORE: BENDER, LAZARUS, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MARCH 07, 2017
Appellant, Charles Jackson, appeals pro se from the order entered in
the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his first Post
Conviction Relief Act1 (“PCRA”) petition as untimely. We affirm.
On May 28, 1992, the trial court convicted Appellant of possession
with intent to deliver. Appellant failed to appear at sentencing, but was
ultimately apprehended and sentenced to two to four years’ imprisonment
on April 12, 1999. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
Appellant filed his first PCRA petition pro se on March 19, 2013. The
PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a Turner/Finley2 “no merit” letter
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2
See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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and a motion to withdraw. On November 3, 2014, the PCRA court issued
notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing pursuant
to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, to which Appellant responded pro se. On January 6,
2015, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely and granted
counsel’s motion to withdraw. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of
appeal on February 2, 2015. A review of the record and docket reveals the
PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
In his petition, Appellant alleges exculpatory evidence would have
changed the outcome of his trial. We conclude Appellant is not entitled to
relief.3
“Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition
is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported
by the evidence of record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v.
Wilson, 824 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (citation omitted).
As our Supreme Court has explained:
3
This Court granted the Commonwealth an extension of time to file a brief
on or before December 19, 2016. However, the Commonwealth has failed to
file a brief. In response, Appellant filed a pro se “motion to expedite [the]
Superior Court[’]s decision through default judgment” based on the
Commonwealth’s failure to file a brief in a timely manner. Nevertheless,
Appellant’s motion is denied. Cf. Pa.R.A.P. 2188 (“If an appellee fails to file
[its] brief within the time prescribed by these rules, or within the time as
extended, [an appellee] will not be heard at oral argument except by
permission of the court.”).
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[T]he PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in
nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court is precluded from
considering untimely PCRA petitions. We have also held
that even where the PCRA court does not address the
applicability of the PCRA timing mandate, th[e] Court will
consider the issue sua sponte, as it is a threshold question
implicating our subject matter jurisdiction and ability to
grant the requested relief.
Commonwealth v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473, 477-78 (Pa. 2003) (citations
omitted).
A PCRA petition “must normally be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final . . . unless one of the exceptions in § 9545(b)(1)(i)-
(iii) applies and the petition is filed within 60 days of the date the claim
could have been presented.” Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 941 A.2d
646, 648 (Pa. 2007) (some citations and footnote omitted). Pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3), “[a] judgment becomes final at the conclusion of
direct review by this Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the
expiration of the time seeking such review.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 54
A.3d 14, 17 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).
When a petition is filed outside the one-year time limit, the petitioner
must plead and prove the applicability of one of the three exceptions to the
PCRA timeliness requirements. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 42 A.3d
1120, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“If the petition is determined to be untimely,
and no exception has been pled and proven, the petition must be dismissed
without a hearing because Pennsylvania courts are without jurisdiction to
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consider the merits of the petition.” (citation omitted)). The three
exceptions to the general one-year time limitation are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or
laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on May 12,
1999, as he did not file a direct appeal. Therefore, his current petition,
which was filed almost fourteen years later on March 19, 2013, is facially
untimely. Moreover, Appellant has not asserted that any of the timeliness
exceptions in Section 9545(b)(i)-(iii) apply in this case. Indeed, his brief is
devoted to the collateral consequences of the underlying conviction on a
subsequent federal conviction. Accordingly, the PCRA court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s claim, and we affirm the
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dismissal of Appellant’s untimely PCRA petition.4 See Johnston, 42 A.3d at
1126.
Order affirmed. Appellant’s pro se “motion to expedite [the] Superior
Court[’]s decision through default judgment” denied.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/7/2017
4
A review of the record indicates Appellant is currently incarcerated.
Although we are unable to determine whether Appellant is still serving his
sentence at this docket, we decline to remand for a determination on this
matter, as Appellant’s untimely petition remains jurisdictionally barred.
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