Com. v. Espinosa, R. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RALPH A. ESPINOSA :
:
Appellant : No. 1433 EDA 2017
:
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 4, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009956-2014
BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MAY 15, 2018
Ralph A. Espinosa appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
January 4, 2017, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. The trial
court sentenced Espinosa to an aggregate term of 21 to 42 years’
imprisonment following his plea of nolo contendere to charges of rape of a
child, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”) with a child, unlawful
contact with a minor, and sexual abuse of children (videotaping sexual acts),1
after he videotaped himself sexually abusing his four-year old niece. On
appeal, he challenges only the discretionary aspects of his sentence. For the
reasons below, we affirm.
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 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(c), 3123(b), 6318(a)(1), and 6312(b)(1),
respectively.
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The facts underlying Espinosa’s nolo contendere plea were summarized
by the trial court as follows:
[Espinosa’s] sexual assault on his four year old niece, M.G.,
was recorded on his cell phone video. At the time of the incident
[] eighteen year old [Espinosa] was living with M.G. and her
family. The eight (8) minutes, forty-four (44) second video
showing the vaginal and anal rape of M.G. was discovered by her
stepfather when he borrowed [Espinosa’s] phone. M.G.’s mother
was immediately notified and police were called. M.G. told her
mother that “her coo-coo (vagina) hurt and her Uncle Ralph
([Espinosa]) put something inside of it.” According to M.G.
[Espinosa] was “the monster [that] left me last Saturday night.”
The child gave further details about the sexual assault when
interviewed at Philadelphia Children’s Alliance. D.N.A. swabs were
taken from M.G. and [Espinosa] resulting in a vaginal D.N.A.
match, but inconclusive as to the anal swab. [Espinosa] made a
statement that he was high at the time of the incident and didn’t
remember anything. When confronted with the video showing the
sexual assault [Espinosa] identified his body parts as those of the
male assaulting M.G., including his penis.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/2017, at unnumbered 2 (record citations omitted).
Espinosa was arrested and charged with 15 offenses. On July 11, 2016,
he entered an open plea of nolo contendere to the aforementioned four
charges in exchange for which the Commonwealth nol prossed the remaining
counts. On January 4, 2017, the trial court sentenced Espinosa to a term of
10 to 20 years’ imprisonment for rape of a child, 10 to 20 years’ for IDSI, six
to 12 years’ for unlawful contact with a minor, and five to 10 years’ for sexual
abuse of children.2 The court directed that all of the sentences run
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2Before the hearing, Espinosa was found not to be a sexually violent predator
under the Sexual Offenders Notification and Registration Act (“SORNA”). See
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consecutively. On January 10, 2017, Espinosa filed a motion seeking
reconsideration of his sentence, which the court denied following a hearing on
April 13, 2017. This timely appeal followed.3
Espinosa’s sole issue on appeal is a challenge to the discretionary
aspects of his sentence. When considering such a claim, we must bear in
mind:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 731 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(quotation omitted), appeal denied, 125 A.3d 1198 (Pa. 2015). Furthermore,
it is well-settled that:
[a] challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not
automatically reviewable as a matter of right. Prior to reaching
the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue:
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42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41. Therefore, we need not remand in light of
the recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Commonwealth v.
Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 925 (2018), and
this Court in Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017).
See Muniz, supra (holding that SORNA’s registration provisions constitute
punishment, and, therefore, the retroactive application of those provisions
violates the ex post facto clauses of the federal and Pennsylvania
constitutions); Butler, supra, 173 A.3d at 1218 (after Muniz, “trial courts
cannot designate convicted defendants SVPs[,] nor may they hold SVP
hearings[,] until our General Assembly enacts a constitutional designation
mechanism.”).
3 On September 27, 2017, the trial court directed Espinosa to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Espinosa complied with the court’s directive, and filed a concise statement on
October 16, 2017.
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We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see [Pa.R.Crim.P. 720]; (3) whether
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that
the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d 793, 815–816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some
citations omitted), appeal denied, 178 A.3d 106 (Pa. 2018).
In the present case, Espinosa complied with the procedural
requirements for this appeal by filing a timely post-sentence motion for
modification of sentence and subsequent notice of appeal, and by including in
his appellate brief a statement of reasons relied upon for appeal pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 522 A.2d 17 (Pa. 1987), and Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f). Therefore, we must determine whether he has raised a substantial
question justifying our review.
A substantial question exists when an appellant sets forth “a colorable
argument that the sentence imposed is either inconsistent with a specific
provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms
underlying the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d
1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 161 (Pa. 2009)
(citation omitted). Here, Espinosa argues the sentence imposed by the trial
court, although within the sentencing guidelines range, was “manifestly
excessive and unreasonable because the sentencing court only considered the
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seriousness of the crime,” and failed to take into consideration mitigating
factors including his young age, lack of a criminal record, and expression of
remorse.4 Espinosa’s Brief at 11-12. Further, he insists the court failed to
consider the relevant sentencing criteria outlined 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721. See id.
at 12. Moreover, Espinosa maintains the trial court’s comments during the
sentencing hearing evidenced a bias and prejudice against him. See id. at
15.
“[A]n averment that the court sentenced based solely on the
seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises a
substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 875 (2012),
quoting Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, although a claim the court failed to consider mitigating factors does
not generally present a substantial question,5 an “excessive sentence claim[ ]
in conjunction with an assertion that the court did not consider mitigating
factors[,]” does present a substantial question for our review.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 731 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal
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4 To the extent Espinosa contends the trial court failed to adequately consider
the sentencing factors listed in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), and in particular, his
rehabilitative needs, we note that he did not raise this claim during the
sentencing hearing, in his written post-sentence motion, or during argument
on his post-sentence motion. See N.T., 1/4/2017; Post Sentence Motion,
1/10/2017; N.T., 4/13/2017. Accordingly, it is waived on appeal. See Grays,
supra.
5 Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 297 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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denied, 125 A.3d 1198 (Pa. 2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77
A.3d 1263, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 91 A.3d 161(Pa. 2014). Similarly, this Court has held that “an allegation of bias in
sentencing implicates the fundamental norms underlying sentencing and
hence, … raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d
293, 297 (Pa. Super. 2011). Accordingly, we may proceed to an examination
of Espinosa’s argument on appeal.
Espinosa concedes the sentence imposed by the trial court fell within
the standard range of the sentencing guidelines. See Espinosa’s Brief at 11
n.1. Therefore, we may only vacate the sentence if we find “the case involves
circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly
unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2).
In the present case, the trial court had the opportunity to review both a
pre-sentence investigation report, and a SORNA evaluation, which concluded
Espinosa did not meet the criteria for classification as a sexually violent
predator. See N.T., 1/4/2017, at 4, 56. Furthermore, the court heard
testimony from the mother, grandmother, and aunt of the victim, 6 two
additional character witnesses for the defense, and Espinosa himself.
Thereafter, the trial court offered the following explanation for the sentence
imposed:
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6 The grandmother and aunt of the victim were called as character witnesses
for Espinosa. See N.T., 1/4/2017, at 26, 33.
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All of these cases are just so sad, what it does to the
families. And what amazed me each time is the duality of the
defendant. On the one hand we have the family talking about this
loving individual who was raised to love people and animals and
who was the favorite student in school, beloved brother, son, and
he couldn’t possible have done this. But then there’s the monster
that visits a four-year-old child and turns her world and her
childhood upsidedown, the monster who sexually assaults her.
But the audacity in this case is taken to a different, another level.
He’s actually videotaping it, further taking away that child’s
dignity. You videotape it for a prolonged period of time.
And that’s one of the saving graces in this case, that you did
not put that child through a trial, where other people had to see
that video, jurors, the Court. So that is one of the saving graces
we have, that the victimization stopped with those in law
enforcement who had to endure that, the child’s mother who had
to endure seeing her beloved child raped by her brother.
But by the same token, you hide behind the cloak of PCP
induced high or marijuana cigarette induced high where you claim
you can’t remember. But, again, the videotaping kind of takes
away from that. Because that’s calculated. Who does that? Who
does that? And the lubricant. So this was in your heart and mind.
And that sweet little child that came in here this morning, the
innocence, the vulnerability, the trust that she must have had in
you.
And what makes it even worse is what it’s done to this
family. There’s no reason for there to be sides. They can come
visit you and be supportive, but they can also be supportive of
that child and her mother. It’s a disgrace, a disgrace, that this
family has allowed this to happen to this child and that child’s
mother, who is part of you. And I would hope and pray that from
here on out you do something to mend that. Again, as I said
earlier, it’s by stopping with the denial. Because he did this. And
you need to accept that, and you need to move on from that and
try to heal and be supportive of that child who is six years old.
Now I don’t know what’s going on in terms of what her
memory of it is or how it’s impacted her, although her mother has
indicated that there’s some behavior issues at this point. But she
has to live with this for the rest of her life. So you need to be
there for her, period. Acknowledge that this has happened and
help her heal.
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It also amazes me that the mother in this situation can be
forgiving. I don’t know if I could do that. I see her there, she’s
torn apart, because she’s a part of you, this family. She loves her
brother, the monster who visited her child, and is forgiving of him.
So this is just truly such a sad situation, that for nine minutes,
almost, that we cannot replay or take away or heal, that your
actions caused all of this.
So the sentence of the Court—and I’m taking into account
all of the reports, the presentence, the psychiatric, the Megan’s
[Law] report, the testimony of both sides, the fact that you did
spare the child a trial in this matter, things that went on in your
background, your issues.
N.T., 1/4/2017, at 53-56.
As noted above, Espinosa contends the court imposed an excessive
sentence based solely on the gravity of the offense, and absent sufficient
consideration of mitigating factors, such as his age and lack of criminal history.
He insists a court must impose a sentence “based on the minimum amount
of confinement” consistent with the sentencing criteria set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9721(b), namely “the gravity of the offense, the need of the public for
protection and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Espinosa’s Brief at
18 (emphasis supplied). Espinosa emphasizes the trial court failed to account
for the fact that he has family support, was “barely an adult” at the time of
the crime, and was “under the influence of PCP.” Id. at 20. Relying on
Commonwealth v. Simpson, 510 A.2d 760 (Pa. Super. 1986), appeal
denied, 522 A.2d 49 (a, 1987), and 522 A.2d 1105 (Pa. 1987), he maintains
his cumulative minimum sentence was objectionable because it “robs him of
most of his young adulthood.” Id. at 24. Further, he states that although he
was not a juvenile when he committed the crime, “the same concerns
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expressed about lengthy incarceration of juvenile offenders [in Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012),] apply” herein. Id. at 25. Moreover,
Espinosa insists the trial court displayed bias and ill-will toward him when it
referred to him as a “monster.” See id. at 29-30.
Preliminarily, we note Espinosa’s insistence that the court must impose
the “minimum” term of confinement consistent with the Section 9721(b)
factors is simply incorrect. While a prior version of the Sentencing Code did
include the language Espinosa proposes, our Supreme Court has made clear
that “under the current Sentencing Code there is no requirement that a
sentencing court’s imposition of sentence must be the minimum possible
confinement[.]” Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 965 (Pa. 2007).
Nor do we agree with Espinosa’s assertion that the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Miller mandates a shorter sentence. The Miller
Court held “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18
at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2460 (emphasis
supplied). Here, Espinosa was 18 years old at the time he sexually assaulted
his niece; he was not convicted of murder, and not sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Accordingly, the Miller case
is simply inapplicable to the facts of this case. Although Espinosa refers to
the language in Miller which states that juveniles have underdeveloped
brains, he fails to acknowledge the Miller Court did not foreclose a trial court’s
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ability to impose a life sentence upon a juvenile convicted of murder; rather,
it imposed a requirement upon the trial court to “take into account how
children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. at 2469.
Our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant statutory
and case law reveals no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Here,
the court had the benefit of both a presentence investigation report, and a
SORNA evaluation. “Where the sentencing court had the benefit of a
presentence investigation report [], we can assume the sentencing court ‘was
aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and
weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.’”
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotation
omitted). Although Espinosa claimed he was under the influence of drugs at
the time of the crime, the court doubted the credibility of his account based
upon the fact he had the wherewithal to apply a lubricant to the victim7 before
videotaping the assault. Moreover, while the trial court declined to view the
video of the incident, so as not to “further victimize” the child,8 it considered
the testimony of the investigating officer who described the incident as
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7See N.T., 1/4/2017, at 16-17 (Commonwealth attorney describing that video
showed Espinosa “rub[bing] some kind of lotion or lubricant on this little girl
before he penetrates her”).
8 Id. at 21.
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“probably the worst thing I’ve ever seen in my career.” N.T., 1/4/2017, at
10. The officer explained the video “shows a cute four-year-old crying in the
background as the defendant continues [raping her], and he’s hushing her,
and he’s telling her, I’m almost there.” Id. Under these circumstances, we
cannot conclude the court’s imposition of consecutive standard range
sentences constituted an abuse of discretion.
We also find Espinosa’s reliance on this Court’s decision in Simpson,
supra, misplaced. In that case, the defendant was convicted of participating
in six robberies of two appliance stores over a five-month period. See
Simpson, supra, 510 A.2d at 761. The trial court sentenced him to an
aggregate term of 30 to 60 years’ imprisonment, despite the fact that the
defendant had a “virtually nonviolent, unremarkable background,” was a high
school graduate and was honorably discharged after serving six years in the
military. See id. at 762. On appeal, a panel of this Court found the
cumulative sentence imposed was excessive. Indeed, after referencing case
law which called for the “minimum amount of confinement” consistent with
the Section 9721(b) factors,9 the panel stated:
This case is one where the benefits of a good prior history and the
effects of aging on criminal involvement make the appellant a
reasonable candidate for a sentence which will punish him, serve
the needs of society for protection and make note of the serious
nature of the acts, but also permit the appellant, in a reasonable
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9 Simpson, supra, 510 A.2d at 762.
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period of time, to return to society and, if need be, under long-
term parole supervision, pick up a meaningful and productive life.
To impose a minimum sentence of thirty years discounts the
possibility of rehabilatation and effectively removes appellant from
society for his potential working life, precluding the possibility of
his ever becoming a contributing member of society.
Id. at 764.
Espinosa argues his case “presents the same concerns that were
addressed by the Simpson Court” because his lengthy term of incarceration
“forecloses any possibility he could have an ordinary life[.]” Espinosa’s Brief
at 23-24. We reject his claim for several reasons. First, as noted above, the
Simpson Court relied, at least in part, on the now-irrelevant language calling
for imposition of the minimum sentence necessary to serve the objective of
the Sentencing Code. Second, Espinosa’s history does not include the
“productive lifestyle” which Simpson led prior to his “rather late in [] life” crime
spree.” Simpson, supra, 510 A.2d at 763. Lastly, while the crimes of which
Simpson was convicted were serious, they are not as troubling as Espinosa’s
videotaped anal and vaginal rape of his four-year-old niece. Therefore, we
find Simpson is not controlling.
Lastly, with respect to Espinosa’s claim that the trial court demonstrated
bias against him, the court maintains its comment was taken out of context.
The court opined:
The Court’s use of the term “monster” referred to the descriptive
term used by the four (4) year old victim as she described the
sexual assault inflicted on her by her uncle. In that context it was
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a[n] appropriate depiction of what, through the child’s eyes, [the
victim] endured.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/2017, at unnumbered 4. Indeed, the prosecutor
stated during the sentencing hearing that, during a forensic interview, the
victim referred to her uncle as “a monster who came into her bedroom at
night.” See N.T., 1/4/2017, at 15. Accordingly, the trial court’s use of the
term was simply a reference to the victim’s description. The court used the
term to juxtapose the victim’s description of Espinosa with the gentle, loving,
young man described by the defense witnesses. We find no evidence of bias.
Compare Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 A.3d 735, 745-749 (Pa. Super.
2013) (vacating sentence imposed by trial judge upon revocation of probation
based on “overwhelming appearance of bias” when judge repeatedly (a)
implied original judge imposed too lenient a sentence, (b) insinuated burglary
defendant “held a particular animus towards the Catholic Church” because she
targeted those congregations more frequently than other organizations; (c)
described defendant as a “pathological liar;” and (d) subjectively compared
defendant to other female defendants he had sentenced, describing her as
“the most violent, thuggish female who has appeared before me”), appeal
denied, 83 A.3d 415 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 496 A.2d 1156(Pa. Super. 1985) (vacating sentence when trial court demonstrated bias
against 16-year-old defendant by stating it had been “waiting” for the day it
could sentence the defendant, describing him as an “animal,” and calling him
“Punk” and “Chief”).
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Accordingly, because we detect no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court, and do not find application of the sentencing guidelines was “clearly
unreasonable” under the facts of this case,10 we affirm the judgment of
sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/15/18
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10 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2).
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