Com. v. Roebuck, R. ( 2022 )

J-S05026-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RYAN E. ROEBUCK
Appellant No. 1089 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 9, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-22-CR-0003307-2018
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: MAY 24, 2022
Appellant Ryan E. Roebuck appeals from the June 9, 2021 judgment of
sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County (“trial
court”), following his jury convictions for intimidation of victim/witness, and
terroristic threats.1 Upon review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. As
recounted by the trial court:
The victim in the instant case is Appellant’s uncle. For about a
year, Appellant worked as a driver for the victim’s newspaper
distribution business before a disagreement prompted Appellant
to leave this position. On February 23, 2018, in a case
(hereinafter “the previous case”) initiated prior to [this case],
Appellant was charged with burglary, defiant trespass, and
harassment. The victim in the previous case was the same uncle
that is the victim in the instant matter.
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4952(a)(1), and 2706(a)(1), respectively.
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At trial in the instant matter, the victim, the sole witness for the
Commonwealth, testified as to the circumstances surrounding
the previous case. On March 29, 2018, the victim appeared
before Magisterial District Judge (“MDJ”) James Lenker at a
preliminary hearing in the previous case and testified against
Appellant. According to the victim, Appellant appeared angry
throughout the proceedings and angrily stormed out of the MDJ’s
office after he (Appellant) left the witness stand. At some point
while the victim was still in the MDJ’s office, the victim received
approximately five phone calls from a number he recognized as
Appellant’s. The victim did not answer the first few calls, but he
eventually decided to answer the phone and heard a voice that
he recognized as Appellant’s. [The victim testified that he was
“one hundred percent sure” that the person speaking to him on
the phone was Appellant and that prior to this incident, he had
spoken with Appellant on the phone many times when he was
employed as a driver for the victim’s newspaper distributi[on]
business.] Appellant speaking in an angry tone of voice, told the
victim: “You’re dead tonight. You’re gonna die tonight. You’re
gonna die when I see you.” [On cross-examination, the victim
recounted Appellant’s words as “N**, I’ma kill you tonight. I’ma
get you. You gonna die tonight.”] After speaking with Appellant
for about ten to fifteen seconds, the victim hung up the phone,
and Appellant immediately called back. The victim answered the
second phone call, and Appellant again made threatening
statements.
The victim continued to receive calls from Appellant throughout
the day and in the days to follow, at one point sending the victim
a picture of himself at a mall parking lot and telling the victim
that he wanted to fight him at the mall parking lot. Immediately
after leaving the MDJ Lenker’s office on the day of the
preliminary hearing in the previous case, the victim went to the
Susquehanna Township Police Department and filed charges
against Appellant in connection with this incident.
Following the testimony of the victim on behalf of the
Commonwealth, Appellant chose to testify on his own behalf.
Appellant conceded that he attended a preliminary hearing on
March 29, 2019, and he conceded that the victim testified
against him at the hearing. Appellant, however, denied he called
the victim after the preliminary hearing, and he denied
threatening him in any way. Appellant also denied sending the
victim a picture of a mall parking lot and asking him there to
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fight him. Appellant further testified that he did not have the
victim’s phone number at the time of the alleged offenses.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/21, at 2-3 (record citations and footnotes omitted).
A jury eventually convicted Appellant of intimidation of victim/witness, and
terroristic threats. On June 9, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to
an aggregate term of 30 months’ probation. On June 14, 2021, Appellant
filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied on July 30, 2021.
Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant argues only that the trial court “erred in
accepting the jury’s verdict which was contrary to the evidence presented at
trial, specifically the victim’s inconsistent statements.” Appellant’s Brief at 4
(unnecessary capitalizations omitted).
Our standard of review relating to claims implicating weight of the
evidence is as follows:
On this issue, our role is not to consider the underlying question
of whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Rather, we are to decide if the trial court palpably abused its
discretion when ruling on the weight claim. When doing so, we
keep in mind that the initial determination regarding the weight
of the evidence was for the factfinder. The factfinder was free to
believe all, some or none of the evidence. Additionally, a court
must not reverse a verdict based on a weight claim unless that
verdict was so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense
of justice.
Commonwealth v. Habay, 934 A.2d 732, 736-37 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(internal citations omitted), appeal denied, 954 A.2d 575 (Pa. 2008). “[A]
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trial court’s denial of a post-sentence motion ‘based on a weight of the
evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings.’” Commonwealth v.
Sanders, 42 A.3d 325, 331 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 880 (Pa. 2008)).
Here, distilled to its essence, Appellant attacks the jury’s weight and
credibility determination and invites us to accept his version of events. We,
however, decline the invitation. It is settled that we may not substitute our
judgment for that of the factfinder—whether a jury or the trial court—
because it is the province of the factfinder to assess the credibility of the
witnesses and evidence. See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 860 A.2d 102,
107 (Pa. 2004); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 668 A.2d 97, 101 (Pa. 1995)
(“an appellate court is barred from substituting its judgment for that of the
finder of fact.”); Commonwealth v. Forbes, 867 A.2d 1268, 1273 (Pa.
Super. 2005) (stating that “[t]he weight of the evidence is exclusively for
the finder of fact[,] who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
and to determine the credibility of witnesses. An appellate court cannot
substitute its judgment for that for the finder of fact.”).
Moreover, as the trial court pointedly explained:
The only two witnesses to testify at the trial were the victim and
Appellant, and the testimony of each was diametrically opposed.
The victim testified in detail about the multitude of threatening
phone calls and messages he received from Appellant after the
victim’s testimony against Appellant at a preliminary hearing,
and the victim recounted the specific timeframe and
circumstances under which the calls occurred. Appellant, on the
other hand, categorically denied that he had ever threatened the
victim in any way and stated that he did not have access to the
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victim’s telephone number at the time of the alleged incidents.
As is usual, the jury was required to make a credibility
determination, and they evidently found the victim’s detailed
testimony to be more credible than the blanket denials of
Appellant. We do not believe the jury’s credibility determination
was unreasonable or contrary to the evidence. To the extent
there were any discrepancies in the victim’s testimony regarding
the events that occurred more than two years prior to trial, we
cannot agree with Appellant’s contention that these
discrepancies were of such moment that they would impact the
jury’s ability to rely upon the victim’s testimony to return a true
verdict. In short, there was nothing about the verdict in this
case that was shocking or which, even momentarily, took our
breath away. To the contrary, had we been the thirteenth jury,
we would have agreed with the other twelve. Consequently, we
denied Appellant’s post sentence motion for a new trial.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/21, at 4-5 (sic). Accordingly, because we conclude
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the verdict was
not against the weight of the evidence, we conclude that Appellant is not
entitled to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 05/24/2022
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