Weible, R. v. Wells, W. ( 2017 )

J-A33011-16
2017 Pa. Super. 49
RODGER WEIBLE ¦ IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
¦ PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee ¦
¦
v. ¦
¦
WILLIAM P. WELLS AND ELIZABETH ¦
LOUISE WELLS ¦
¦
Appellants ¦ No. 46 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order December 8, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
Civil Division at No(s): 923-2009 CD
BEFORE: LAZARUS, SOLANO, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
DISSENTING OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.:FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2017
“Adverse possession is an extraordinary doctrine which permits one to
achieve ownership of another’s property by operation of law.”
Pennsylvania Servs. Corp. v. Texas E. Transmission, LP, 98 A.3d 624,
634 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Flannery v. Stump, 786 A.2d 255, 258
(Pa. Super. 2001)). “It is a serious matter indeed to take away another’s
property. That is why the law imposes such strict requirements of proof on
one who claims title by adverse possession.” Edmondson v. Dolinich, 453
A.2d 611, 614 (Pa. Super. 1982).
There is no Pennsylvania authority directly on point. However, I
believe this Court’s decision in Showalter v. Pantaleo, 9 A.3d 233 (Pa.
Super. 2010), is instructive. In that case, a vacant lot was owned by LTV
Steel. LTV filed for bankruptcy in 1986, and the lot remained in the
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A33011-16
bankruptcy estate until it was sold to ALA in 1993. Shortly thereafter, ALA
sold it to another company which then sold it to Pantaleo in 2008. Id. at
234.
In the meantime, in 1979, the Showalters had purchased a home
adjacent to the lot. The Showalters immediately cleared the lot, and then
continuously for almost 30 years thereafter treated the property as their
own, planting and removing trees, removing part of a fence, placing a swing
set and pool, and allowing their children and pets to play in the lot. They
sued Pantaleo in 2008, claiming that they had acquired ownership of the lot
by adverse possession. Id.
The trial court ruled in favor of Pantaleo, finding that the Showalters
filed to establish 21 years of continuous possession because the inclusion of
the property in LTV’s bankruptcy estate interrupted the Showalters’
“continuity of possession.” Id. at 235. This Court agreed, holding that for
the period between 1986 and 1993 when LTV was in bankruptcy, the lot was
held in custodia legis (in the custody of the law). Id. at 236.
As such, [the Showalters’] possession of the subject property
was interrupted. [The Showalters] cannot establish that they
have met the requirements for adverse possession for a
continuous period of 21 years, because the subject property was
part of the estate in bankruptcy for seven of those years.
Therefore, the trial court committed no error of law or abuse of
discretion in entering judgment in favor of [Pantaleo].4
______
4
[The Showalters] argue that, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5535(b) (concerning stays in civil proceedings), LTV’s
filing for bankruptcy tolled their claim for adverse
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possession. At the time that LTV filed for bankruptcy, [the
Showalters] had no claim that could be tolled. The earliest
time at which [the Showalters] arguably had a claim for
adverse possession was July 31, 2000, 21 years after
[they] purchased the property adjacent to the subject
[lot].
Id. at 237.
Thus, the Showalters actually used the lot in question continuously for
30 years for all the world to see; however, for purposes of the legal
requirements of adverse possession, the bankruptcy was an interruption that
thwarted the legal requirement of 21 years of continuous use. Nor were the
Showalters permitted to tack the 7 years of possession before LTV’s
bankruptcy to the 15 years afterwards to achieve the necessary 21 years.
I see no reason why, for purposes of determining the continuity of
hostile possession, the Commonwealth’s ownership of property for a public
use should be treated any differently than the law’s custody of property in a
bankruptcy estate. The Wellses’ claim should fail for the same reason the
Showalters’ claim failed.
Considering the extraordinary nature of the privilege of acquiring
ownership of another’s land through adverse possession in light of the
guidance offered by Showalter, I cannot join the Majority’s holding.
Rather, I would adopt the approach of those jurisdictions that have held that
the statutory period for adverse possession begins to run anew after the
land is owned by the state. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Morrill, 81 U.S. 120
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(1871) (holding ownership by state “destroys the efficacy of all prior
possession, so that to gain a title under the statute, a new adverse
possession for the time limited must be taken” (emphasis in original));
Home Land Co. v. Bryant, 6 La. App. 130, 132 (1927) (same). See also
Greene v. Esquibel, 272 P.2d 330, 333 (N.M. 1954) (holding that adverse
possession for necessary ten-year period was not established, where “ten
years had not elapsed since the state parted with title”); Winstead v.
Winstead, 38 So. 2d 118, 119 (Miss. 1948) (holding ownership by State
constituted a “breach of the continuity of adverse possession” such that only
possession following state’s ownership was available to possessor “to build
up his prescriptive title”); Fordham Operating Corp. v. Westchester
Cty., 370 N.Y.S.2d 977, 984 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), aff’d sub nom., Fordham
Operating Corp. v. Cty. of Westchester, 382 N.Y.S.2d 292 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1976) (“[A] new adverse possession for the period of the statute of
limitations must be commenced and continued for the statutory period after
the City surrendered title.”).
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
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