In the Interest of: D.W. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S12002-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: D.W.                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: D.W.
    No. 1544 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order Entered August 25, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2015-1966
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.                          FILED MARCH 08, 2017
    Appellant, D.W., appeals from the trial court order denying his petition
    for review of the mental health review officer’s certification committing him
    to involuntary psychiatric treatment for a period of ninety-days pursuant to
    the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”). See 50 P.S. § 7304. We affirm.
    We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history as follows.
    Appellant is an inmate at Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution (“SCI”)
    Rockview. The psychiatric staff at the prison has followed Appellant
    beginning, at the latest, in the summer of 2015. Dr. Kevin Burke, an SCI
    Rockview psychiatrist, diagnosed Appellant as suffering from unspecified
    psychosis and prescribed medication for his condition. Appellant has
    consistently refused to take the prescribed medication and has participated
    very minimally in therapy.
    J-S12002-17
    In early August 2016, Dr. Burke testified that Appellant received bad
    news about his court proceedings and began to tell prison staff members
    that he wanted to take his own life. Dr. Burke opined that Appellant’s
    suicidal threats were credible and believed that, without treatment,
    Appellant would act on the threat within thirty days. Additionally, Dr. Burke
    opined that Appellant was a threat to others because he suffered from a
    certain type of paranoid delusions. Specifically, Dr. Burke testified that
    Appellant believed that certain people within the prison had been surveilling
    him and taking his possessions. Due to his incorporation of specific
    individuals into his delusions, Dr. Burke noted that the prison had to
    sequester Appellant to prevent him from lashing out at these people based
    upon his delusional beliefs.
    On August 17, 2016, SCI Rockview filed a petition seeking involuntary
    psychiatric treatment for Appellant under § 7304 of the MHPA. Finding the
    prison established a “serious mental disability” pursuant to the MHPA, the
    mental health officer granted the petition following a hearing on August 18,
    2016. Appellant filed a petition for review of the mental health officer’s
    determination. Following review of the record, the trial court denied
    Appellant’s petition, see 50 P.S. § 7109(b), on August 25, 2016. This timely
    appeal follows.
    On appeal, Appellant’s sole contention is that the trial court erred by
    allowing the prison to involuntarily treat him without sufficient evidence to
    establish a reasonable probability of death, serious physical debilitation, or
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    serious bodily injury in the imminent future, as required for involuntary
    treatment under § 7301(b)(2)(i) of the MHPA. See Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
    We review a trial court’s order for involuntary treatment “not to find
    the facts but to determine whether there is evidence in the record to justify
    the hearing court’s findings.” Com. ex rel Gibson v. DiGiacinto, 
    439 A.2d 105
    , 107 (Pa. 1981). Accordingly, we must accept the factual findings of the
    trial court that are supported by the record, but we are not bound by the
    legal conclusions a trial court draws from those facts. See 
    id. A trial
    court derives its authority to order involuntary psychiatric
    treatment from the MHPA. Pursuant to § 7304(a), a trial court may order
    involuntary treatment, for a period not exceeding ninety days, if the court
    finds that a person is “severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment.”
    A person is considered to be severely mentally disabled under the MHPA
    when,
    as a result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control,
    judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social
    relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened
    that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to
    himself.
    50 P.S. § 7301(a).
    To establish that a person is a “clear and present danger” to himself,
    evidence must be presented that, within the past thirty days, that
    the person has acted in such manner as to evidence that he
    would be unable, without care, supervision and the continued
    assistance of others, to satisfy his need for nourishment,
    personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety,
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    J-S12002-17
    and that there is a reasonable probability that death, serious
    bodily injury or serious physical debilitation would ensue within
    30 days unless adequate treatment were afforded under this act;
    50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(i).
    “Recognizing the substantial curtailment of liberty inherent to an
    involuntary commitment, our Supreme Court has cautioned that the courts
    must strictly interpret and adhere to the statutory requirements for
    commitment.” In re T.T., 
    875 A.2d 1123
    , 1124 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing
    Commonwealth v. Hubert, 
    430 A.2d 1160
    , 1162-63 (Pa. 1981)). This high
    standard is not relaxed when applying the MHPA standards to incarcerated
    individuals. See 
    Hubert, 430 A.2d at 1162-63
    . Significantly,
    [i]n Gibson . . . our Supreme Court reversed an order for
    involuntary commitment of a prisoner, finding insufficient
    evidence that he posed a clear and present danger to himself or
    others. A psychiatrist had testified that the inmate was
    schizophrenic with paranoid delusions and opined that he posed
    a clear and present danger to himself and others. Testimony was
    also heard that the inmate had been found extinguishing a
    burning newspaper in his cell, did not regularly take the
    psychoactive drug prescribed for him, and had a twisted
    coathanger in his cell. In spite of his testimony, the Court found
    involuntary commitment improper, citing no evidence of
    attempted suicide or self-mutilation; no evidence that the
    newspaper fire was deliberately set; no evidence that the failure
    to take medication threatened the inmate’s life or well-being;
    and no evidence that the twisted coathanger was used to
    threaten or injure anyone. On this record, the Court found that
    the Commonwealth had not shown “such inability of [the inmate]
    to attend to his needs as to threaten death, serious bodily injury,
    or serious physical debilitation.”
    In re 
    T.T., 875 A.2d at 1127
    (citing 
    Gibson, 439 A.2d at 107
    ) (internal
    citations omitted; brackets in original).
    -4-
    J-S12002-17
    Here, Appellant argues that, as was the case in Gibson, the prison
    officials failed to present evidence to show that he was a clear and present
    danger to himself or others. We recognize that there was no evidence
    presented to indicate that Appellant committed an overt act in furtherance of
    a threat to commit suicide or self-mutilation. Additionally, no evidence was
    offered that Appellant committed an overt act in furtherance of a threat to
    harm others. Therefore, the only basis for involuntary treatment was if the
    prison proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Appellant was unable
    to care for himself and that there was a reasonable probability of his death,
    serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation within thirty days unless
    commitment was ordered. See 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(i). See also In re
    Hancock, 
    719 A.2d 1053
    , 1056-57 (Pa. Super. 1998) (requiring clear and
    convincing evidence as the standard of proof for involuntary treatment).
    Instantly, the trial court found that
    [e]vidence was presented that Appellant will not satisfy his own
    needs for medical care. Appellant suffers from unspecified
    psychosis, suicidal ideation, and has a paranoid set of beliefs
    reaching delusional proportions. As explained above, Dr. Burke
    testified that Appellant’s condition is likely to continue without
    treatment. Appellant testified that he is stressed out from
    receiving bad news regarding his court case, and that he needs
    to work on his coping skills. Despite this acknowledgement,
    Appellant refuses to take his prescribed medication or fully
    participate in therapy. Such refusal supports Dr. Burke’s
    testimony that Appellant is unable to provide for his own basic
    needs. Specifically, Dr. Burke testified that Appellant is
    prescribed Narvane, to address his paranoia and delusions, and
    Cogentin. Dr. Burke testified that Appellant had also exhibited
    minimal, when any, cooperation in therapy. He explained at
    times Appellant will not respond, will only use one word answers,
    -5-
    J-S12002-17
    or wave therapy completely at times. Dr. Burke testified that
    without such care and support there is a reasonable probability
    Appellant’s behavior would lead to death, disability, or serious
    physical debilitation. Dr. Burke is aware of Appellant’s ongoing
    mental health diagnosis and history, suicidal ideation, threats
    [of] harm to others, and refusal to seek and accept medical care
    to address his issues. As such, the requirements of 7301(b)(2)(i)
    have also been met.
    Trial Court Opinion, 10/12/16, at 3-4.
    Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the
    prison presented clear and convincing evidence that there was “a reasonable
    probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation
    would ensue within 30 days unless adequate treatment were afforded under
    the act.” 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(i). Unlike the evidence presented in Gibson,
    there was evidence presented here that the failure to take his medication
    and participate in therapy threated Appellant’s life. Dr. Burke opined that
    Appellant’s credible threats of suicide could not be curtailed without
    Appellant’s participation in therapy and/or medication. Further, because the
    uncontroverted evidence established that Appellant’s suicidal ideations had
    only emerged a week prior to the prison seeking involuntary treatment, we
    find that the trial court’s conclusion that “death, serious bodily injury or
    serious physical debilitation would ensure within 30 days” is sound. Thus,
    presented with these facts, we find that the trial court did not err in
    determining that the statutory requirements for involuntary commitment had
    been met.
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    J-S12002-17
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/8/2017
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: In the Interest of: D.W. No. 1544 MDA 2016

Filed Date: 3/8/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/8/2017