Com. v. Gumminger, E. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S90034-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ERIK GUMMINGER
    Appellant              No. 2763 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the PCRA Order August 24, 2015
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000835-2010
    BEFORE: OTT, J., SOLANO, J. AND JENKINS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.:                      FILED DECEMBER 08, 2016
    Erik Gumminger (“Appellant”) appeals from the August 24, 2015 order
    of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition
    filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1     After careful
    review, we affirm.
    On June 22, 2011, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to
    receiving stolen property2 and criminal conspiracy3 in the instant matter at
    Docket No. CP-51-CR-0000835-2010 (“the theft case”).         Pursuant to the
    terms of the agreement, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two to five
    ____________________________________________
    1
    42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
    2
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3925.
    3
    18 Pa.C.S. § 903.
    J-S90034-16
    years’ incarceration. At the same June 22, 2011 proceeding, the trial court
    sentenced Appellant to a concurrent term of two to five years’ incarceration
    on an unrelated drug case at Docket No. CP-51-CR-0007842-2010 (“the
    drug case”).
    On June 18, 2012, Appellant filed a single pro se PCRA petition in both
    the drug case and the theft case. Appellant claimed in this petition that his
    plea agreement was improper because it failed to properly account for credit
    due Appellant for time served, although he did not specify to which sentence
    the credit should apply. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who amended
    the PCRA petition and claimed Appellant was entitled to a new trial based on
    after-discovered evidence related to an ongoing investigation of the police
    officers involved in the drug case.4
    Because    Appellant’s    PCRA     allegations   concerned   his   convictions
    stemming from the drug case alone, the Commonwealth moved to dismiss
    the PCRA petition with respect to the theft case. The PCRA court issued a
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss, to which Appellant responded
    on July 2, 2015. The PCRA court dismissed the petition without a hearing on
    August 24, 2015.5 On September 11, 2015, Appellant filed a timely notice
    ____________________________________________
    4
    The federal government later charged the police officers with robbery,
    falsification of records, RICO violations, and related crimes. The officers
    were later found not guilty of these charges in federal court.
    5
    Also on August 24, 2015, the Commonwealth nolle prossed the drug case.
    -2-
    J-S90034-16
    of appeal. Both Appellant and the Commonwealth complied with Pa.R.A.P.
    1925.
    Appellant raises the following questions for our review:
    I. Whether the court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA petition
    without an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in the
    amended       PCRA    petition   regarding    trial   counsel’s
    ineffectiveness[?]
    II. Whether the court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA
    petition alleging Appellant’s guilty plea was not entered
    knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily[?]
    Appellant’s Brief, p. 9.
    In reviewing an order denying PCRA relief, our well-settled standard of
    review is “to determine whether the determination of the PCRA court is
    supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA
    court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
    findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 
    74 A.3d 185
    ,
    191-192 (Pa.Super.2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
    Initially, to be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must
    plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is “currently
    serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime[.]” 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i). A petitioner who has completed his sentence is no
    longer eligible for post-conviction relief. Commonwealth v. Soto, 
    983 A.2d 212
    , 213 (Pa.Super.2009); see also Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    80 A.3d 754
    , 765 (Pa.2013) (“due process does not require the legislature to
    continue to provide collateral review when the offender is no longer serving
    -3-
    J-S90034-16
    a sentence.”). This is so even if the petitioner filed his PCRA petition during
    the pendency of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    977 A.2d 1174
    , 1176 (Pa.Super.2009) (“As soon as his sentence is completed, the
    petitioner becomes ineligible for relief, regardless of whether he was serving
    his sentence when he filed the petition.”).
    Here, the trial court sentenced Appellant in the theft case to two to
    five years’ incarceration on June 22, 2011.    Appellant’s sentence ended in
    June 2016.    As a result, Appellant is no longer eligible for PCRA relief,
    despite the fact he was serving his sentence when he filed his petition. See
    
    Soto, supra
    ; 
    Williams, supra
    .       Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s
    order dismissing Appellant’s petition.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/8/2016
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2763 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 12/8/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/8/2016