In the Interest of: T.D.C., a Minor ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: T.D.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: S.W. A/K/A C.M.W., FATHER
No. 1596 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000314-2016
CP-51-DP-0002301-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: T.C.Q.C., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: S.W. A/K/A C.M.W., FATHER
No. 1598 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000315-2016
CP-51-DP-0002302-2014
BEFORE: OTT, J., SOLANO, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2016
S.W. A/K/A C.M.W. (“Father”) appeals from the orders entered April
26, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family
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Court Division,1 that involuntarily terminated his parental rights to his
daughter, T.D.C., born in February of 2013, and his son, T.C.Q.C., born in
August of 2014 (collectively “Children”).2 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the testimony presented at the termination
hearing, as follows:
On April 26, 2016, this Court held a Goal Change/Termination
Hearing and heard testimony on DHS’s [Department of Human
Services] Petition to Terminate both Mother and Father’s Rights
as to their two (2) Children, and Change the Permanency Goal to
Adoption. Both Mother and Father appeared and were
represented by their respective attorneys.
The first witness for the Department of Human Services (DHS),
Tyrone Jessie, CUA [Community Umbrella Agency] Case
Manager, testified that CUA became involved in February 25,
2015. He testified that single case plan meetings were held and
that the parents did not attend those meetings.
Mr. Jessie testified the Children came into care in November
2014, because of neglect going on with the family. The Children
were living with Mother, although Mother and Father were
together but living in separate homes.
He testified Father’s objectives were to maintain a drug-free
status, to submit to three (3) random drug screens prior to
Court, to continue going to Nu-Stop and continue to show clean
screens. For his mental health, Father’s objective was to
schedule a BHS assessment and follow through with all
recommendations, and finally, to maintain regular contact with
the Children.
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1
By order of June 17, 2016, this Court consolidated the above-captioned
appeals sua sponte.
2
Mother’s parental rights to T.D.C. and T.C.Q.C. were also involuntarily
terminated by the trial court. Mother has filed an appeal at 1630 EDA 2016.
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Mr. Jessie stated Father was referred to the CEU [Clinical
Evaluation Unit] for a screen and assessment. Father did not
comply however has complied since November 2015. He is
receiving drug screens, completed a psychiatric evaluation on
1/11/2016, and was placed on Seroquel, Depakote, Dioxin and
Xanax. He was also referred to anger management on
3/17/2016, and also referred to parenting classes. Father did
test positive for marijuana on a screen on 10/7/2014.
Mr. Jessie opined the Children are in a safe environment now,
and does not believe irreparable harm would come to the
Children if Father’s parental rights are terminated. He reasoned
that Father has only attempted compliance since November
2015, and prior to that had not attempted to resolve the issues
effecting his neglect of the Children.
He stated the Children are currently placed with the foster
mother, A.B., and have been there since November 2014. They
are safe and their needs are being met. They are attached to the
foster mother.
On cross-examination, Mr. Jessie stated that on 6/18/2015 the
compliance level of Mother and Father for their objectives of the
plan were minimal and at the next Court date of 9/15/2015,
there was a rating of non-compliance for both parents. The only
report received by the Agency from CEU was 10/7/2014 and
confirms the parents have not gone to CEU since that date.
Regarding BHS, Mr. Jessie testified the parents have not
complied with that objective either.
Further on cross-examination, Mr. Jessie acknowledged that he
was aware Father was incarcerated from May 2015 to September
2015, and knew Father could not comply with objectives during
this period. He stated Father had signed releases for Nu-Stop
and was getting drug screens there. He further testified he
observed Father during a visit with the Children and opined that
Father arrived on time and acted appropriately with the Children.
On re-direct examination, Mr. Jessie stated Father did not
comply with the BHS goals of attending biweekly visits after
November 2015, did not comply with attending CEU after
November 2015, did not comply with CUA’s single case plan
goals, and Father’s only compliance was with Nu-Stop.
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The next witness was Portia Bailey, Visitation Coach at Turning
Points for Children, who testified she has been the visitation
coach since March of 2015. She testified that based on Mother
and Father’s sporadic visits with the Children, visits were
changed from weekly for two hours to one hour weekly, then
when the parents continued to miss visits, they were changed to
a one hour visit biweekly. Based on her notes, the parents
attended overall half the scheduled visits. She observed that
when the parents first missed their scheduled visits, the Children
were sad and disappointed, however, as missed appointments
became more frequent, the Children did not seem affected, and
would be fine going back to their foster home. The Children call
the foster mother “Mom”, and case mother reacts to that by
correcting them. She doesn’t want the kids to call her Mom and
tells them she is the Mother.
On cross-examination, Ms. Bailey testified the Children are
bonded with the foster mother, and look to her to have their
needs met. Foster mother takes the Children to their medical
appointments, and is well-informed about T.D.C.’s asthmatic
condition, administering treatments when necessary. She
testified that out of 17 or 18 scheduled visits that she covered,
the parents kept only 8 or 9 of them. Finally, she stated that
during the visits Father and Children did interact well.
Father testified next, and stated he signed releases and attended
Nu-Stop. He attended group and individual therapy sessions. He
also attends anger management once a week at Nu-Stop on
Thursdays. He further testified he goes to GPHA and his
therapist is attempting to locate a parenting class for him. He
admitted he missed visits with the Children, but stated he was
working.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/27/2016, at 11–14 (record citations omitted).
On April 26, 2016, the trial court found by clear and convincing
evidence that Father’s parental rights should be terminated as to T.D.C. and
T.C.Q.C., pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and
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2511(b). Furthermore, the trial court changed the goal to adoption. This
appeal by Father followed.
Father presents five issues for our review:
1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental
rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)?
2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental
rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)?
3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental
rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)?
4. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental
rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)?
5. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental
rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
Father’s Brief at 5.
Our standard of review is well established:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
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Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. The burden rests upon the petitioner
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for
seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d
273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section
2511(a), along with a consideration of section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W.,
843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In the instant case, the trial
court terminated Father’s parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2),
(a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). We will focus on Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b), which
provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds: …
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed
from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
…
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
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beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
We first address whether the trial court erred by terminating Father’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §
2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) The
child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or
more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003).
“Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8)[] does not require an
evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that
led to placement of her children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,
511 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Here, the trial court reasoned:
The Record demonstrates Father’s ongoing inability to provide
care or control for the Children or perform any parental duties
and also his failure to remedy the conditions that brought the
Children into care. Father was incarcerated during a period when
the Children were in placement,[3] however, the evidence shows
he failed to comply with the plan objectives once he was
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3
Father was incarcerated from May, 2015, to September, 2015. See N.T.,
4/26/2016, at 21.
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released, as shown by the documents and testimony provided to
this Court.
After hearing the credible testimony of the CUA Case Manager,
and the Visitation Coach from Turning Points for Children, the
Court found by clear and convincing evidence, that their
observations and conclusions regarding Father’s non-compliance
with the FSP [Family Service Plan] objectives, and lack of ability
and or refusal to fulfill his parental responsibilities were
persuasive.
****
As discussed above, the Trial Court found that Father failed to
comply with plan objectives and showed an incapacity to parent.
He attended therapy at Nu-Stop after November 2015, after
being released from incarceration and attended approximately
half of the scheduled visitations. The Court was not persuaded
that Father could or would resolve these issues in the near
future.
This Court finds credible the testimony from the agency workers
that the Children would not suffer irreparable harm if father’s
rights were terminated and that termination of Father’s parental
rights would be in the best interest of the Children.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/27/2016, at 16–17, 18.
With regard to the requirements of Section 2511(a)(8) that “[t]he
child has been removed from the care of the parent,” we agree with the trial
court that “[C]hildren were effectively in the care of both parents when they
were removed, the parents, at times, having lived together. Although they
claim that they were living across the street from one another, its effective
proximity supports the finding that the Children were in the care of both
parents.” N.T., 4/26/2016, at 63. Specifically, the record showed that at
the time Children were removed, Father and Mother “were together, but not
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living in the same home.” Id. at 9. Mother testified that when their younger
child, T.C.Q.C. was born, she and Father “lived right across the street,” and
Father was “there all the time.” Id. at 55. Furthermore, the record shows
that Children have been removed for a period of “12 months or more from
the date of removal.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).
In addition, “the conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist,” id., because Father has been noncompliant with
his reunification plan. Mr. Tyrone Jessie, CUA Case Manger Supervisor for
Turning Points for Children, testified Father’s objectives were:
To maintain a drug-free status, [F]ather to submit three random
drug screens prior to court, to continue going to Nu-Stop and
continue to show clean screens.
For his mental health, [F]ather will – will schedule a BHS
assessment and follow through – all recommendations. Those
were his – and as well maintain – along with mom – to maintain
regular contact with the children.
N.T., 4/26/2016, at 10. In addition, he testified Father was referred to the
CEU for a screen and assessment. Id. at 11.
Mr. Jessie specified that Father was compliant based on going to Nu-
Stop, but he was not complying with all the court orders. Id. at 23. Mr.
Jessie testified Father was not initially compliant, but since November, 2015,
Father had attended Nu-Stop where he had drug screens, completed a
psychiatric evaluation on January 11, 2016, was referred for anger
management on March 17, 2016, and parenting classes, as well. Id. at 12.
However, he stated Father did not go up to CEU after November 2015, and
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did not go to BHS after November 2015. Id. at 23. In addition, he stated
Father was not compliant with CUA’s single case plan goals. Id.
Furthermore, Ms. Portia Bailey, Visitation Coach for CUA, testified that
she had been in charge of the visitation for Father and Mother for the past
year, that initially, they had visits on a weekly basis for two hours, but the
visits became sporadic and were changed to one hour weekly, and then
changed to bi-weekly because parents started to miss more and more visits.
Id. at 24–25.
Finally, the record confirms that “termination of parental rights would
best serve the needs and welfare of the child.”4 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).
This Court has stated that “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a
parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
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4
With regard to Section 2511(a)(8) and 2511(b), it is important to note that
Section 2511(a)(8) explicitly requires an evaluation of the
“needs and welfare of the child” prior to proceeding to Section
2511(b), which focuses on the “developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child.” Thus, the analysis
under Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs of the child in
addition to the behavior of the parent. … Accordingly, while both
Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate
the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve
the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing
the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed by Section
2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must address
Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).
In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008-09 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(citations omitted).
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responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a
child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress
and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., supra, 901 A.2d at
513. Here, the record shows that T.D.C. – age three – has an asthma
condition that requires careful attention, that T.C.Q.C. – age one and one-
half – was removed from parents’ care three months after birth, and that
Children are bonded with their pre-adoptive foster parent and their needs
are being met. See N.T., 4/26/2016, at 15–16, 17, 31–32, 38. At this point
in their young lives Father’s limited compliance with his objectives leaves
Children in a prolonged state of limbo. Furthermore, Children’s need for
permanency must be weighed against concerns about Father’s ability to
meet Children’s “needs and welfare” when the circumstances that led to
Children’s removal from parents’ care was neglect evidenced by T.D.C.’s
near-fatal asthma attack. See Id. at 8, 18–19.
Father contends DHS (petitioner) failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that his parental rights should be terminated pursuant
to Section 2511(a)(8), since he “has appropriate housing, was involved in
Nu-Stop since November 2015 and visited the children to the best of his
ability.” Father’s Brief at 17. This argument, however, is irrelevant.
“Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to
evaluate a parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions
that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of Agency
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services.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
omitted). This Court has explained:
We recognize that the application of Section (a)(8) may seem
harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward
resolving the problems that had led to removal of her children.
... However, by allowing for termination when the conditions that
led to removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the
statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in
abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity
necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot
and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for
permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and
hope for the future. Indeed, we work under statutory and case
law that contemplates only a short period of time, to wit
eighteen (18) months, in which to complete the process of
either reunification or adoption for a child who has been placed
in foster care.
In re Adoption of R.J.S., supra, 901 A.2d at 513 (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
Here, at the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court
stated on the record:
Well, taking the evidence as a whole, and taking the exhibits
that came in as part of the evidence in this petition to terminate,
a few things stand out, and that is that the parents somehow try
to blame the system because the system didn’t reunite them
with their children, when the parents had, and have, the
obligation to do all they can to be reunited with their children.
And instead of making efforts to reunite themselves with the
Children, they make excuses because the system didn’t do
enough for them. And when asked about documentation to
substantiate their claims, the documents are not presented.
The reason they don’t have records is because it was somebody
else’s job to get the records and present the records on behalf of
them. And in the issues where there’s a conflict between the
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testimony, the Court finds the credibility to be with the witnesses
for the Commonwealth, the Department of Human Services, and
against the parents.
Therefore, taking the evidence into consideration, the Court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence — this is with respect to
both children — that the parents failed to remedy the issues that
brought the children into Court, brought the children into DHS,
and are not in a position to remedy, nor will they be in a position
to remedy the issues that brought the children into care in the
near future.
Considering that, under [Sections] 2511(a) (1), (2), (5) and (8),
(8) because the children have been in care for one year, and (5)
because the children were effectively in the care of both parents
when they were removed, the parents, at times, having lived
together.
Although they claim that they were living across the street from
one another, its effective proximity supports the finding that the
Children were in the care of both parents.
N.T., 4/26/2016, at 62–63.
Based upon our careful review of the record, the trial court’s opinion,
the briefs on appeal, and the relevant law, we conclude that the trial court’s
findings are supported by competent and sufficient evidence, and that it
properly concluded grounds for involuntary termination of Father’s parental
rights exist pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8).
We next consider whether the trial court erred by terminating Father’s
parental rights under Section 2511(b). We have discussed our analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b) as follows:
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has
explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding
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analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act.
Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond,
if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as
part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or
her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-
interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be
considered by the court when determining what is in the best
interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have with
the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the
trial court should consider the importance of continuity of
relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond
can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Our Supreme Court has stated, “Common sense dictates that courts
considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a
pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”
In re T.S.M, supra, 71 A.2d at 268 (citation omitted). The Court directed
that, in weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b),
“courts must keep the ticking clock of Childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269.
The T.S.M. Court observed that “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of
years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development
quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically
maladjusted children.” Id.
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Here, the trial court opined on the record:
Also under [Section] 2511(b), it is in the best interest of the
children that the parents’ rights be terminated, and the goals be
moved to adoption, and any harm that would be caused would
be remedied.
There would be no irreparable harm, based upon the clear and
convincing evidence on those issues. So, the parents’ rights are
terminated – both children – and the goal is moved to adoption
for both children.
N.T., 4/26/2016, at 63–64. The only argument presented by Father to
contest the trial court’s Section 2511(b) determination is the bald assertion
that “[t]he evidence presented by Petitioner did not rise to the level of clear
and convincing evidence as required by the applicable case law.” Father’s
Brief at 19. We disagree.
Mr. Jessie testified Children are currently in a safe environment. N.T.,
4/26/2016, at 14. He testified he did not believe any irreparable harm
would be done to Children if Father’s rights were terminated. Id. Mr. Jessie
explained Father had only been compliant since November 2015, and he
noted “the length of the case and the basis that the case came in.” Id. He
stated Children have been with their foster mother, A.B., since November,
2014, and they were safe with their needs being met. Id. at 15. Mr. Jessie
testified that T.D.C. has a loving relationship with A.B., and T.D.C. is
attached to her. Id. He further stated T.C.Q.C. has a very good relationship
with A.B., and is very attached to her. Id. at 16. Mr. Jessie testified he
observed one visit where T.C.Q.C. was very weepy when he left A.B., but
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was able to calm down for the rest of the visit with Father and Mother, and
the visit went very well that day.5 Id. He further testified that T.C.Q.C. has
been with A.B. for most of his life. Id. at 17. He stated that DHS had
become involved with this family in 2013 because there were neglect issues,
that when T.C.Q.C. was born, he tested positive for marijuana and
benzodiazepines and had to remain hospitalized, and services were put into
the home in September of 2014. Id. at 18. He testified that, from his
understanding, Father and Mother were living together at that time. Id. He
stated on September 25, 2014, T.D.C. almost died from an asthma attack,
and was “lifeless” when she was rushed to the hospital. Id. at 18–19. He
testified DHS then obtained an order of protective custody on September 29,
2014. Id. at 19. He stated Father and Mother have not gone to CEU since
October 7, 2014, and throughout the life of the case Father and Mother had
not gone to BHS. Id. at 20.
Ms. Portia Bailey testified that she was the visitation coach for Father
and Mother’s visits since March, 2015, that the initial visits were on a weekly
basis for two hours, but became sporadic and decreased to one hour weekly,
and then biweekly, in June, 2015. Id. at 24–25. She explained the cause
for the change was that Father and Mother attended half of the visits. She
testified Children were happy to see Father and Mother and the snacks, toys
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5
Mr. Jessie did not indicate the date of the visit.
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and clothes they brought Children; when Father and Mother did not visit,
Children seemed to be sad. Id. at 25–26. She further stated, “as time went
on, it didn’t really seem to affect them” when Children came to the office
and there wasn’t a visit, and they were fine with just going back home with
the foster parent. Id. at 26. She testified that the visits went from Children
having a hard time transitioning and going back to the foster parent to
Children looking forward to seeing the foster parent and happy to see the
foster parent, A.B. Id. at 28. She stated Children call A.B. “mom.” Id.
She also stated she was aware Father was incarcerated from May 2015 to
November 2015. Id. at 30.
She testified Children are bonded to the pre-adoptive foster parent,
A.B., they look to her for their needs, they are ages three and one and one-
half, and A.B. takes appropriate action for T.D.C.’s asthma. Id. at 31–32.
She stated T.C.Q.C. cries when he leaves his pre-adoptive parent, and when
he is picked up by her after a visit, he is excited. Id. Ms. Bailey testified
that of the 17 or 18 visits she covered from March, 2015, Father and Mother
only made eight or nine. Id. at 35. She testified Father interacted very well
with Children during visits. Id. at 35–36.
Finally, Mr. Jessie testified that the children are more bonded with A.B.
than with Father and Mother because they have been with her for the last 16
months, and the reason Children have been in care is Father and Mother’s
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failure to follow through with all court recommendations or court orders that
have been set for them. Id. at 38.
The trial court found under Section 2511(b), it was “in the best
interest of [Children] that the parents’ rights be terminated, and the goals
be moved to adoption, and any harm that would be caused would be
remedied[, and t]here would be no irreparable harm, based upon the clear
and convincing evidence on those issues.” Id. at 63–64. While Father
testified he “provide[s] for my kids and do the best I can, and … I’ve always
got something for them … that’s my world,”6 competent, sufficient evidence
of record supports the trial court’s decision that termination of Father’s
parental rights best serves Children’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), supra.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination that DHS proved
grounds for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights to T.D.C.
and T.C.Q.C. pursuant to §§ 2511(a)(8) and (b).
Orders affirmed.
____________________________________________
6
N.T., 4/26/2016, at 58–59.
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J-S90001-16
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/2/2016
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