Com. v. Goble, K., Sr. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
KEVIN GOBLE, SR.
Appellant No. 153 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 22, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0003767-2009
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and RANSOM, J.
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED DECEMBER 21, 2016
Appellant, Kevin Goble, Sr., appeals from the December 22, 2015
order denying his petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. In addition, appellate counsel, Matthew P. Kelly,
Esq., has filed an application seeking to withdraw representation, pursuant
to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). After careful
review, we grant counsel’s application to withdraw and affirm the order of
the PCRA court.
On September 16, 2010, a jury convicted Appellant of rape of a child,
involuntary deviate intercourse with a child, aggravated indecent assault of a
child, and three counts of indecent assault of a person less than thirteen
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years of age as a result of the ongoing sexual abuse of his stepdaughter. 1
On March 4, 2011, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence
of 204 to 408 months of incarceration. Appellant timely filed post-sentence
motions arguing that the court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence which failed to adequately consider mitigating
circumstances. The court denied Appellant’s motion.
Appellant timely appealed, but his appeal was dismissed for failure to
file a brief. Appellant’s direct appeal rights were reinstated pursuant to a
PCRA petition. On May 28, 2014, this Court denied Appellant’s direct appeal.
See Commonwealth v. Goble, 104 A.3d 61 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(unpublished memorandum).
Appellant pro se filed a petition seeking PCRA relief. Counsel was
appointed. Following an evidentiary hearing, on December 22, 2015, the
PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition. PCRA counsel was granted leave to
withdraw representation.
Appellant timely appealed to this Court and, after appellate counsel
was appointed, filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors. The trial court
did not issue a responsive opinion but adopted its December 22, 2015
memorandum opinion denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.
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1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(c), 3123(b), 3125(b), and 3126(a)(7), respectively.
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On August 11, 2016, appellate counsel filed in this court a
Turner/Finley brief2 and an application to withdraw as counsel. The brief
sets forth the following issues Appellant seeks to raise on appeal:
I. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present
evidence that the victim was pressured to testify.
II. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to argue
[Appellant’s] innocence to the jury.
III. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to prove to
the jury that Genevieve Goble had a bias or motive to testify
against [Appellant].
IV. Whether the Commonwealth violated [Appellant’s] right to a
speedy trial pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
V. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the
Commonwealth’s opening statement that she intended to prove
[Appellant] was guilty.
VI. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in coercing [Appellant]
to waive his spousal privilege against his wife testifying.
Turner/Finley Brief at 1. Counsel forwarded a copy of his brief and motion
to Appellant and advised him of his right to proceed pro se. In his pro se
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2
We would note that counsel submitted his Turner/Finley brief pursuant to
the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Although
a no merit letter is the appropriate filing, as an Anders brief provides
greater protection to the defendant, we may accept an Anders brief in lieu
of a Turner/Finley letter. See Commonwealth v. Fusselman, 866 A.2d
1109, 111 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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response, Appellant argues that the allegations of no merit are false and not
supported by the record.3 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1-6.
We review an order denying a petition under the PCRA to determine
whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the evidence of
record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169,
1170 (Pa. 2007). We afford the court’s findings deference unless there is no
support for them in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Brown, 48
A.3d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Anderson,
995 A.2d 1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
Before considering the merits of Appellant’s arguments, we must
review PCRA counsel’s request to withdraw from representation. When
requesting to withdraw, PCRA counsel must submit:
1) A “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel detailing the nature and
extent of his review;
2) The “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel listing each issue the
petitioner wished to have reviewed;
3) The PCRA counsel’s explanation, in the letter, of why the
issues were meritless.
See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1 (Pa. 2009) (quoting
Finley, supra, at 215). “Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a
copy of the ‘no-merit’ letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel's petition to
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3
Appellant also raises, in each of his issues, a number of layered claims of
the ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel, which we will address separately.
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withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro
se or by new counsel.” Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 511 (Pa.
Super. 2016).
[W]here counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that do
satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court—trial
court or this Court—must then conduct its own review of the
merits of the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the
claims are without merit, the court will permit counsel to
withdraw and deny relief. By contrast, if the claims appear to
have merit, the court will deny counsel's request and grant
relief, or at least instruct counsel to file an advocate's brief.
Id. at 510-11 (citation omitted).
Instantly, we conclude that Mr. Kelly has complied with the
requirements of Turner/Finley. Specifically, Mr. Kelly’s brief details the
nature and extent of his review, addresses the issues Appellant raised in his
PCRA and Rule 1925(b) statement, and determines that the issues lack
merit. Mr. Kelly provides a discussion of Appellant’s claims and explains why
those issues are meritless. Additionally, Mr. Kelly served Appellant with a
copy of his petition to withdraw and brief and advised Appellant of his right
to proceed pro se or with privately retained counsel. Accordingly, we will
conduct an independent review of Appellant’s claim.
All of Appellant’s claims raise issues of ineffective assistance of
counsel. We presume counsel is effective. Commonwealth v.
Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007). To overcome this presumption
and establish the ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) the underlying legal issue
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has arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s actions lacked an objective reasonable
basis; and (3) actual prejudice befell the petitioner from counsel’s act or
omission.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 533 (Pa. 2009)
(citations omitted). “A petitioner establishes prejudice when he
demonstrates that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Id. A claim will be denied if the petitioner fails to meet any one of
these requirements. Commonwealth v. Springer, 961 A.2d 1262, 1267
(Pa. Super. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Natividad, 938 A.2d 310, 322
(Pa. 2007)); Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super.
2008).
First, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
present evidence that the victim was pressured to testify. See
Turner/Finley Brief at 1; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1. 4 Appellant argues
that Luzerne County Children and Youth Services (CYS) pressured the victim
and “tainted” her testimony and references, in support, a letter written by
the victim in which she stated that she hated her caseworker and wanted to
return home to her family.5 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1-4.
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4
We will address Appellant’s claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness at the
conclusion of this opinion.
5
A copy of this letter was not included in the certified record.
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The competency of a child to testify is a threshold legal issue the trial
court must decide, and an appellate court will not disturb that determination
absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Washington, 722 A.2d
643, 646 (Pa. 1998). Every witness is presumed competent; a party who
challenges the competency of a minor witness must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the witness lacks the minimal capacity 1) to
communicate, 2) to observe an event and accurately recall that observation,
and 3) to understand the necessity to speak the truth. See Pa.R.E. 601(a);
Commonwealth v. Pena, 31 A.3d 704, 707 (Pa. Super. 2011). “Taint” is
the implantation of false memories or distortion of actual memories through
improper and suggestive interview techniques. Pena, 31 A.3d at 707. It
implicates the second prong of the competency test, namely, the mental
capacity to observe the occurrence itself. Id. The party challenging a
witness must come forward with evidence before there is a competency
hearing, and bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
that the witness’s memory has been tainted on the specific question.
Commonwealth v. Judd, 897 A.2d 1224, 1229 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Appellant relies solely upon the letter to prove taint. The record
reflects that counsel did in fact request a taint hearing based on this letter,
which the trial court denied, holding that the letter did not rise to the level of
taint. See Notes of Testimony (N. T.), Trial, 9/15/10 to 9/16/10, at 10-19.
However, Appellant was permitted to cross-examine the victim extensively
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regarding the letter. Id. at 71-75. Counsel then litigated this issue on
direct appeal. A panel of this Court adopted the trial court’s analysis of this
issue. See Goble, 104 A.3d 61 at *4-5. No nexus existed between the
case worker wanting the victim to testify and the victim’s ambivalence about
her situation, and no techniques were used during the interview of the child
that would rise to the level of taint. See Goble, 104 A.3d 61 at *4-5.
Accordingly, Appellant’s claim lacks arguable merit. See Johnson, 966 A.2d
at 533.
In his second issue, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to argue his innocence to the jury. Turner/Finley Brief at 6;
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2. Specifically, Appellant argues that counsel was
ineffective in failing to present “evidence of [his] actual innocence” and the
victim’s “history of making false alegations [sic] of sexual abuse against
others in the past.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2.
As a first note, counsel did argue Appellant’s innocence during both his
opening statement and closing argument.6 See N. T. Trial, at 29-50.
Further, counsel extensively cross-examined the victim, the victim’s mother,
and the sexual assault nurse who examined the victim. Id. at 64-71, 90-93,
125-137. Appellant chose to testify in his own defense, admitting that he
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6
Although PCRA counsel references counsel’s closing argument in his brief,
it does not appear from the certified record that closing arguments were
transcribed. Turner/Finley Brief at 6.
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was aware the victim was nine years old at the time of the assaults. Id. at
200-01. Further, Appellant admitted to ejaculating while the victim
performed oral sex on him. Id. at 210. Appellant claimed that he was the
victim of the assault, rather than the child. Id. The jury, sitting as a fact-
finder, clearly disbelieved Appellant’s testimony. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Hankerson, 118 A.3d 415, 420 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(noting that the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence, and determine the credibility of witnesses). Thus, the claim lacks
arguable merit. See Johnson, 966 A.2d at 533.
Additionally, Appellant claims that counsel was ineffective for his
failure to present evidence concerning the victim’s disclosure of a past
sexual assault. Appellant litigated the court’s grant of the Commonwealth’s
motion in limine to preclude testimony on direct appeal, and this Court
affirmed.
The Rape Shield Law governs the admissibility of evidence regarding a
victim’s past sexual conduct; the law bars evidence of the victim’s past
sexual conduct, opinion evidence thereto, and reputation evidence thereto,
except evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the defendant
where consent is at issue. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3104. Our Court has previously
held that assaultive sexual activity is covered by the Rape Shield Law,
particularly where prior sexual conduct is irrelevant to a subsequent assault.
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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 566 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa. Super. 1989),
aff'd, 638 A.2d 940 (Pa. 1994).
An examination of the record shows that trial counsel argued that any
past assaults were relevant to the extent the victim made claims that were
unfounded. See N. T. Trial, at 4. The Commonwealth responded that the
allegations had not been reported or pursued and there was no finding of
any kind. Id. at 4-5. The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion,
precluding mention of any assaults, but allowed for reconsideration if the
victim opened the door. Id. at 6. No additional assaults were mentioned
during testimony.
On direct appeal, Appellant challenged the court’s ruling. This Court
affirmed on the basis of the trial court’s analysis, which noted that the
evidence was inadmissible under the Rape Shield Law, as the unreported,
uninvestigated incident of sexual assault did not concern Appellant nor the
issue of consent. See Goble, 104 A.3d 61 at *4. Moreover, Appellant
mischaracterizes the victim’s claims as constituting a “history of false
allegations” that would require further investigation. At no time was
argument or evidence introduced that would indicate the allegations were
false. This claim lacks arguable merit. See Johnson, 966 A.2d at 533.
In his third issue, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to prove to the jury that Genevieve Goble had a bias or motive to
testify against him. Turner/Finley Brief at 7; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3.
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Specifically, Appellant argued that Ms. Goble had testified for the
Commonwealth pursuant to a “deal” in which she would regain custody of
her children. Id.
It is a general rule that the accused has the right to cross-examine
Commonwealth witnesses for bias. See Commonwealth v. Cox, 728 A.2d
923 (Pa. 1999). In the instant case, trial counsel cross-examined Ms. Goble
regarding the fact that her children were in foster care. See N. T. Trial,
131-34. Specifically, counsel inquired whether Ms. Goble agreed to testify in
an effort to regain custody of her children. Id. at 134. However, Ms. Goble
rejected this suggestion because she did not think she would ever be
allowed to have her three children return to the home. Id. at 135. Thus,
the claim is not of arguable merit, as the record reflects that the jury was
apprised of Ms. Goble’s potential bias.
Appellant also argued in his PCRA petition, and again in his reply to
Mr. Kelly’s Turner/Finley brief, that counsel was ineffective for failure to
pursue an additional issue regarding Ms. Goble’s testimony. Appellant’s
Brief at 3. Specifically, during a recess at trial, counsel suggested that CYS
intended to remove Ms. Goble’s remaining child from her custody. See N. T.
Trial at 171-74. According to counsel, CYS threatened removal in response
to Ms. Goble’s trial testimony. Id. Counsel argued that this was proof that
CYS had pressured Ms. Goble to testify. Id. at 175.
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The trial court excluded any further testimony regarding this matter,
as Ms. Goble had already testified, and because the statements were
speculative and hearsay.7 At sidebar, Ms. Goble further clarified that the
caseworker had not made any promises to her regarding her testimony and
that she had not been threatened. Id. at 177. The trial court noted that if
Appellant had any additional information to present regarding the issue as
the trial continued, he would be given the opportunity. Id. at 175-76.
Appellant did not, nor does he now, provide any additional information that
could or should have been raised. Counsel could not be ineffective for failing
to further pursue a meritless claim. See Commonwealth v. Parker, 469
A.2d 582, 584 (Pa. 1983).
In his fourth issue, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth violated
his right to a speedy trial pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 and that counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss. Turner/Finley Brief at 8;
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4.
The record reflects that the criminal complaint against Appellant was
filed October 5, 2009. Thus, the mechanical run date would have been
October 5, 2010. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(2)(a) (“Trial in a court case in
which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence
within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.”) Appellant’s
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7
Counsel suggested that CYS had called Ms. Goble’s current paramour, who
in turn called Ms. Goble. See N. T. Trial at 171-74.
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trial commenced September 15, 2010. As the trial commenced within the
365-day period prescribed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Appellant’s claim lacks
merit. See Johnson, 966 A.2d at 533.
In his fifth issue, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to object to the Commonwealth’s opening statement, where the
assistant district attorney stated that she intended to prove Appellant was
guilty.
With regard to a prosecutor’s opening statement,
Generally, a prosecutor's arguments to the jury are not a basis
for the granting of a new trial unless the unavoidable effect of
such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their
minds fixed bias and hostility towards the accused which would
prevent them from properly weighing the evidence and
rendering a true verdict.
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 1222 (Pa. 2006). A prosecutor
must be free to present her arguments with logical force and vigor, and
advocacy is permitted so long as there is a reasonable basis in the record for
the prosecutor’s remarks. See Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111,
1146 (Pa. 2011). Comments based on the evidence or reasonable
inferences therefrom are not objectionable, nor are comments amounting to
oratorical flair. Id.The record reflects that the Commonwealth stated that the evidence
would prove Appellant guilty. See N. T. Trial at 39. The prosecutor did not
state that Appellant was guilty. The prosecutor then went on to outline the
evidence that the Commonwealth planned to present, all of which was, in
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fact, presented over the course of the trial. Consequently, the opening
statement was based upon the evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom and was not objectionable. Thus, this claim lacks arguable merit.
See Johnson, 966 A.2d at 533.
Finally, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective in coercing him to
waive his spousal privilege against his wife testifying. In his pro se PCRA
petition, Appellant averred that counsel informed him that Appellant needed
to waive his spousal privilege so that Ms. Goble could be questioned
regarding her decision to testify for the Commonwealth. See Appellant’s
PCRA Petition at 10. Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective because
this decision assisted the Commonwealth and not Appellant’s case. Id.
At the PCRA evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that originally
his strategy had been to have Ms. Goble testify on behalf of Appellant and
that spousal privilege should thus be waived. See N. T., 11/19/15, at 5-12.
Counsel was surprised when, at trial, Ms. Goble testified on behalf of the
Commonwealth instead. Id. at 8.
This claim lacks arguable merit, as spousal privilege does not apply in
any criminal proceeding against either spouse for:
bodily injury or violence attempted, done or threatened upon the
other, or upon the minor children of said husband and wife, or
the minor children of either of them, or any minor child in their
care or custody, or in the care or custody of either of them.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5913. Thus, because the instant matter was a criminal
proceeding against Appellant committed upon the minor daughter of his
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wife, in their custody, the waiver was a nullity. This claim lacks arguable
merit. See Johnson, 966 A.2d at 533.
Finally, Appellant raised a number of layered claims of ineffectiveness,
alleging that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failure to pursue or investigate
certain of Appellant’s claims. Additionally Appellant argues, in his response
to Mr. Kelly’s Turner/Finley brief, that Mr. Kelly himself was ineffective.
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1-6. However, claims of PCRA counsel
ineffectiveness cannot be raised for the first time after a notice of appeal has
been taken from the underlying PCRA matter. Commonwealth v. Ford, 44
A.3d 1190, 1201 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); see also Pitts, 981 A.2d at 880
n.4.
Accordingly, we discern no error in the PCRA court’s decision to
dismiss Appellant’s petition following an evidentiary hearing. Appellant’s
claims are without merit, and he is entitled to no relief. Moreover, counsel
has complied with the requirements of Turner/Finley, and his petition to
withdraw is granted.
Application to withdraw granted; order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/21/2016
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