Com. v. Simpson, M. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICHAEL SIMPSON
Appellant No. 3749 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order dated December 4, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-1106411-2005
BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 30, 2016
Appellant Michael Simpson pro se appeals from the December 4, 2015
order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (“PCRA court”),
which dismissed as untimely Appellant’s request for collateral relief under
the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history underlying this case are undisputed.1
Briefly, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted—for his role in the
robbery and shooting of Kareem Frazier and Roy Williams—of two counts of
aggravated assault, two counts of criminal conspiracy, attempted murder,
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
We need not recite the full facts giving rise to this appeal as they are not
relevant for purposes of disposition.
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carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on public streets or
public property in Philadelphia, and possessing an instrument of crime. On
September 7, 2007, Appellant was sentenced in absentia to an aggregate
term of 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment. Appellant timely appealed to this
Court. On August 28, 2008, a panel of this Court dismissed Appellant’s
appeal because Appellant was and had remained a fugitive since the jury
returned its verdicts. See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 961 A.2d 1283(Pa. Super. 2008). Appellant did not petition for allowance of appeal. As a
result, Appellant’s sentence became final on September 27, 2008. In
September 2009, Appellant was arrested and returned to custody.2
On April 14, 2014, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, alleging
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of the
Commonwealth’s plea offer. In support of his petition, Appellant attached a
document titled “Major Trials Unit Case Identification,” which shows a
purported plea offer of 8 to 20 years’ imprisonment. Appellant alleged that
he first learned of the plea offer on April 8, 2014, i.e., about one week prior
to the filing of the instant petition, when he reviewed his case file. Following
issuance of a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice, the PCRA court dismissed as untimely
Appellant’s PCRA petition on December 4, 2015. Appellant timely appealed
to this Court. The PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
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2
Appellant subsequently was unsuccessful in his pro se efforts to obtain
nunc pro tunc reinstatement of his appellate rights.
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statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant complied. In
response, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
On appeal,3 Appellant argues only that the PCRA court erred in
dismissing his petition “where Appellant filed his petition within 60 days of
learning that the Commonwealth provided a plea offer prior to trial.”
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the court erred in
dismissing as untimely Appellant’s PCRA petition. The PCRA contains the
following restrictions governing the timeliness of any PCRA petition.
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with
the presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have
been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after
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3
“In PCRA proceedings, an appellate court’s scope of review is limited by the
PCRA’s parameters; since most PCRA appeals involve mixed questions of
fact and law, the standard of review is whether the PCRA court’s findings are
supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Pitts,
981 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).
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the time period provided in this section and has been
held by that court to apply retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1)
shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have
been presented.
(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in
the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b) (emphasis added). Section 9545’s timeliness
provisions are jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa.
2014). Additionally, we have emphasized repeatedly that “the PCRA confers
no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the
PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the
Act.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003)
(citations omitted).
Here, as stated earlier, the record reflects Appellant’s judgment of
sentence became final on September 27, 2008. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Because Appellant had one year from
September 27, 2008 to file his PCRA petition, the current filing is facially
untimely given it was filed on April 14, 2014.
The one-year time limitation, however, can be overcome if a petitioner
alleges and proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section
9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA. Here, Appellant concedes that the instant
PCRA petition is untimely. He, however, alleges that he is entitled to relief
under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) because he learned of the pre-trial plea offer
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for the first time on April 8, 2014 and filed the instant PRCA petition within
60 days. As the PCRA court and the Commonwealth note, however,
Appellant fails to plead and prove that the plea offer “could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence” prior to April 8, 2008. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Specifically, considering Appellant was
sentenced in 2007, Appellant does not explain why he failed to review his
case file prior to April 8, 2014. Thus, because Appellant does not meet the
due diligence requirement under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), we conclude that
the PCRA court did not err in dismissing as untimely his PCRA petition.
Simply put, the PCRA court did not have jurisdiction to entertain it.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/30/2016
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