Com. v. Morris, A. ( 2023 )

J-S45039-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ACKEEM MORRIS :
:
Appellant : No. 498 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 16, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0011393-2016
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 1, 2023
Ackeem Morris (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after a jury found him guilty of attempted murder, aggravated
assault, criminal conspiracy to commit attempted murder, conspiracy to
commit aggravated assault, firearms not to be carried without a license,
carrying a firearm without a license on the public streets of Philadelphia,
possession of an instrument of a crime, simple assault, and recklessly
endangering another person.1 We affirm in part and vacate in part.
The trial court summarized the factual history underlying this appeal as
follows:
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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a) and 2502, 2702(a)(1), 903(a), 6106(a)(1),
6108, 907(a), 2701(a)(1), 2705. Immediately after the jury’s verdicts,
Appellant pled guilty to persons not to possess firearms. Id. § 6105(a)(1).
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This case stems from Appellant’s shooting of Brandon Davis
(“Mr. Davis” [or “the victim”]) on September 17, 2016. Mr.
Davis’s multiple gunshot[] wounds were nearly fatal and included
a lacerated liver and kidney, kidney failure, a collapsed lung,
respiratory failure, sepsis, internal bleeding, acute post-
hemorrhagic anemia, and bone fractures. On that date, officers
investigating a shooting were advised that the victim had been
transported to Temple University Hospital in a private vehicle. Mr.
Davis was uncooperative and refused to give an interview about
the shooting.
Detectives obtained video footage from the scene of the
shooting which [occurred] outside a corner store. The videos
show Mr. Davis, a male later [] identified as Talil Williams [(Mr.
Williams)], and Appellant, who [wa]s wearing “a black Khimar [(,
i.e., a traditional Muslim outerwear garment)], sunglasses, yellow
socks with blue stripes on them, black sneakers ... [and] carrying
a tan or goldish satchel or purse over his shoulder.”
The videos show that Appellant enters a store, exits and
shoots Mr. Davis multiple times from a proximity of about five
feet. After the shooting, Appellant flees northbound on Carlisle
Street from York Street. Appellant’s directions of travel led the
detectives to a nearby apartment complex at 2411 North 11th
Street, where they obtained additional videos from the building’s
surveillance cameras. These videos show a man wearing the
same Muslim garments, distinctive socks and satchel as the
shooter, along with Mr. Williams, enter and exit the building
together just before the shooting. Within minutes after the
shooting, the two men are again on videotape entering the
elevator together, and although Appellant had removed his
traditional Muslim garments that covered his face and body, he
still wore black sneakers and [the] same distinctive “yellowish
socks with blue markings on them.” The video shows Appellant
re-enacting to Mr. Williams how he shot Mr. Davis.
After extensive investigation, Detectives located Mr.
Williams, who gave a statement identifying Appellant as the other
person wearing Muslim garb involved in the shooting.
Detectives recovered the satchel the shooter was carrying
at the scene, along with the distinctive socks and black shorts.
DNA samples extracted from the black shorts matched the DNA
obtained from Appellant. Gunshot residue was found in the
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purse/satchel recovered from the apartment.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 3-4 (citations to record omitted; some
capitalization modified).
The trial court also detailed the procedural history:
On December 18, 2017, this court sentenced Appellant to
consecutive terms of ten (10) to twenty (20) years’ incarceration
for his convictions of attempted murder and conspiracy [to commit
attempted murder]. This court imposed no further sentences for
Appellant’s remaining convictions.
On December 18, 2017, Appellant filed post-sentence
motions, which this court denied on that same day. On January
10, 2018, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court
(255 EDA 2018), and on April 9, 2019, Appellant filed a
“Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal” consisting of forty-
eight (48) numbered paragraphs. On June 22, 2020, the Superior
Court affirmed the convictions[;] however[,] the court vacated the
sentence imposed and remanded for re-sentencing to correct an
error made by the trial court whereby it sentenced Appellant for
committing two (2) inchoate crimes in error. [See generally
Commonwealth v. Morris, 237 A.3d 1072 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(unpublished memorandum).]
On April 16, 2021, the trial court conducted a re-sentencing
hearing and while changing the structure of the sentence, [the
court] nonetheless again sentenced Appellant for two (2) inchoate
crimes,[2] in error[, which we explain further below. Appellant’s
c]ounsel thereafter filed an untimely post-sentence motion to
correct the sentence; said motion was denied. However, the trial
court appointed new counsel to represent Appellant and he filed a
notice of appeal to the Superior Court on May 26, 2021 (1141 EDA
____________________________________________
2 With respect to attempted murder, the court resentenced Appellant to 15 –
30 years in prison. The court imposed a concurrent sentence of 10 – 20
years for conspiracy to commit attempted murder. Finally, for persons not to
possess firearms, the court imposed a sentence of 5 – 10 years in prison, to
run consecutive to the sentence for attempted murder. Thus, Appellant
received an aggregate sentence of 20 – 40 years in prison (i.e., the
same aggregate sentence he received in 2017).
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2021), despite the fact that the late post-sentence motion would
render the appeal untimely.
Therefore, [Appellant’s] counsel filed a praecipe to
discontinue the untimely appeal (1141 EDA 2021) and filed a
timely [] petition on September 1, 2020[, pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546].
… [Appellant thereafter withdrew his PCRA petition,] and the trial
court granted reinstatement of Appellant’s right to file his post-
sentence motion and a direct appeal, nunc pro tunc.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 1-2 (footnote added; some capitalization
modified).
On January 25, 2022, Appellant filed a nunc pro tunc post-sentence
motion, seeking, inter alia, reduction of the purportedly excessive sentence
imposed at resentencing. Appellant claimed the trial court abused its
discretion in “increasing” the sentence originally imposed for Appellant’s
conviction of attempted murder. See Post-Sentence Motion, 1/25/22, at ¶¶
13-14 (“At the [April 16,] 2021 [re]sentencing hearing, the court incorporated
its reasoning and bases from the [December 18,] 2017 sentencing hearing.
Despite incorporating the same bases from 2017, the court raised
[Appellant’s] sentence on the charge of attempted murder by 50% despite the
absence of any new facts warranting an increased sentence.”). The trial court
denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on January 28, 2022. This timely
appeal followed. The trial court and Appellant have complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
Appellant presents two issues for review:
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1. Is the sentence imposed illegal where [A]ppellant was
convicted of — and sentenced on — both conspiracy to commit
attempted murder, and attempted murder in violation of 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 906?
2. Is the sentence imposed unduly harsh and excessive under the
circumstances of this case?
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (issues reordered).
Appellant first claims the trial court imposed an illegal sentence because
he “was convicted of – and sentenced on – both conspiracy to commit
attempted murder, and attempted murder ….” Id. at 21. We agree.
“The determination as to whether a trial court imposed an illegal
sentence is a question of law; an appellate court’s standard of review in cases
dealing with questions of law is plenary.” Commonwealth v. White, 268
A.3d 499, 500 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). Our scope of review is
de novo. Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 697 (Pa. Super.
2021).
The Commonwealth agrees that Appellant’s illegal “sentence for
conspiracy should be vacated[.]” Commonwealth Brief at 7 (bold omitted).
The Commonwealth points out this Court’s holding, in Appellant’s direct
appeal, that the original sentencing court improperly “imposed a sentence on
both of [Appellant’s] attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder
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convictions — two inchoate crimes.” Morris, 237 A.3d 1072 (unpublished
memorandum at 11);3 see also Commonwealth Brief at 7 (same).
The trial court concedes it illegally sentenced Appellant with respect to
his conspiracy conviction:
The trial court held a re-sentencing hearing on Aril 16, 2021,
as per direction of the Superior Court (Commonwealth v.
Morris, 255 EDA 2018 Opinion filed June 22, 2020) to correct a
previous error in sentencing, whereby the trial court imposed a
sentence on two inchoate crimes in violation of Commonwealth
v. Maguire, 452 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Super. 1982). In so doing, the
trial court again erred in the imposition of sentence by failing to
recognize that a sentence on the 2nd inchoate crime would still be
illegal even if it ran concurrently, and not consecutively. While
[Appellant’s] aggregate sentence of 20-40 years did not
change, the structure of the sentence was illegal. Therefore,
this court recommends the sentence for conspiracy to commit
attempted murder be vacated, and the remaining sentence be
affirmed. It was for this reason that the PCRA petition was
withdrawn, and Appellant’s appellate rights were reinstated nunc
pro tunc.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 6 (emphasis added; citations altered). We
agree. Because the sentence imposed for Appellant’s conviction of conspiracy
to commit attempted murder is unlawful, we vacate that sentence.
We next address Appellant’s second issue, in which he challenges the
discretionary aspects of his sentence imposed at resentencing. Appellant
____________________________________________
3The panel in Morris cited as support Commonwealth v. Maguire, 452 A.2d
1047, 1050 (Pa. Super. 1982) (recognizing a trial court may not sentence a
defendant on two inchoate crime convictions), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906 (“A
person may not be convicted of more than one of the inchoate crimes of
criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or criminal conspiracy for conduct
designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same crime.”).
Morris, 237 A.3d 1072 (unpublished memorandum at 10-11).
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emphasizes that when the trial court originally sentenced him in 2017, it
imposed on the attempted murder conviction a sentence of 10 – 20 years in
prison, whereas at resentencing, the court sentenced Appellant to 15 – 30
years for attempted murder. See Appellant’s Brief at 26-27, 28. According
to Appellant:
The imposition of the significantly increased sentence on the
attempted murder charge with no accompanying explanation of
what warranted the 50 percent increase is excessive under the
circumstances. The fact that the only new facts and information
adduced at the re-sentencing hearing warranted a mitigation in
the sentence, rather than an increase, results in imposition of a
sentence on this charge which violates the “fundamental norms
which underlie the sentencing process.” The [resentencing court
also failed] to adequately account for the additional mitigating
factors presented at the re-sentencing hearing….
Id. at 30 (italics in original; break omitted); see also id. at 29 (detailing
mitigating factors, including Appellant’s difficult childhood and purported
mental health conditions).
There is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a
sentence. Summers, 245 A.3d at 691. Rather, where, as here, the appellant
preserved his sentencing challenge in a timely post-sentence motion, he must
(1) include in the appellate brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) concise statement of the
reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal of; and (2) show that there is a
substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code. Summers, 245 A.3d at 691.
Instantly, Appellant’s brief includes a Rule 2119(f) statement, and his
claims present a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Knox, 165
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A.3d 925, 929-30 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“A claim that the trial court focused
exclusively on the seriousness of the crime while ignoring other, mitigating
circumstances, such as [the defendant’s] mental health history and difficult
childhood, raises a substantial question.”); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167
A.3d 110, 123 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc) (a claim of judicial vindictiveness
in resentencing following a remand presents a substantial question); see also
Appellant’s Brief at 23. Accordingly, we review the merits of Appellant’s claim.
We are mindful of our standard of review: “Sentencing is a matter
vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will
not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Barnes,
167 A.3d at 122 n.9 (citation omitted).
In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an
error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by
reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or
misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly
unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation
omitted).
The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly
deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing
court is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a
particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual
circumstances before it.
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
omitted).
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The Sentencing Code directs a trial court to follow the general principle
that “the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with
the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the
impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative
needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). “A sentencing
court has broad discretion in choosing the range of permissible confinements
that best suits a particular defendant and the circumstances surrounding his
crime.” Commonwealth v. Celestin, 825 A.2d 670, 676 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(citation omitted). The court “need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its
reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statute in
question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s
consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender.”
Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
omitted).
The trial court must also consider the sentencing guidelines. See
Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008). Here, it
is undisputed that the sentences imposed for each charge fall within the
standard range of the sentencing guidelines. See Appellant’s Brief at 32 n.19;
Commonwealth Brief at 6. Therefore, we may only vacate Appellant’s
sentence if “the case involves circumstances where the application of the
guidelines would be clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2); see
also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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The trial court opined it did not abuse its sentencing discretion, and
reasoned:
[T]o the extent that Appellant argues that the increase in
his sentence for attempted murder to 15-30 years is excessive
and an abuse of this court’s discretion, Appellant’s argument has
no merit. The aggregate sentence remains the same: 15-30
years for attempted murder and [a consecutive sentence of] 5-10
years for [persons not to possess firearms].
***
Appellant complains that when he was re-sentenced, the
court failed to consider numerous factors, including Appellant’s
difficult childhood, mental health diagnosis, and various ways in
which he has changed during his period of incarceration. As noted
by this court, however, the lengthy discussion of the factors
weighed by the court at Appellant’s prior sentencing hearing was
referenced and made a part of the re-sentencing hearing. The
court was extremely detailed when weighing the factors at
[Appellant’s] first sentencing. In that regard, the court recognized
Appellant’s difficult circumstances:
THE COURT: Having reviewed the presentence [report
(PSI)] information that I have regarding [Appellant], and
all his family has already told the [c]ourt, certainly
[Appellant] had a very, very difficult childhood with his
mother being incarcerated and his father, who was very
forth[right] with the Court in coming here today, also
spending time in and out of jail. [Appellant] did not have
his parents to rely upon, but he did have his
grandmother, Ms. Harris, who raised him and obviously
still care[s] about him. She worked to support him.
Because of her efforts, there was a somewhat stable
household for [Appellant] to grow up in and his needs
were met by his grandmother …[.] Unfortunately,
[Appellant] started having behavior issues very, very
early in grade school and has a juvenile history that
reflects that…. There are … six commitments, I believe
as a juvenile []. Over and over and over[, Appellant]
being discharged from placement, being put back into
placement. … Unfortunately, this went on all throughout
school. Nothing [Appellant did] as a juvenile indicat[es]
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violent behavior, but certainly [Appellant’s] juvenile
[history] … mak[es] it clear [Appellant] was not
particularly amendable towards the guidance that was
being offered to him through the [c]ourt and through all
of his placements.
(N.T., 12/8/17, pgs 16, 17).
The court went on to note [that at Appellant’s original
sentencing,] Appellant received his high school diploma but that
he had yet to obtain a legitimate source of employment. In that
regard, Appellant admitted to supporting his own children by
selling drugs on Lehigh Avenue[,] where he was earning good
money. At age 17[,] Appellant was adjudicated for statutory
sexual assault and he was committed as a juvenile until he turned
18 years old. Then, he amassed 6 arrests, 3 convictions, 3
commitments, 2 violation of probations, [and] 2 sentence
revocations. All of that occurred between the ages of 18-21, when
[Appellant] was arrested for shooting the [victim] in this case.
Thus, the record confirms that prior to imposing its
sentence, this court closely considered Appellant’s [PSI], his
lengthy criminal history in the City of Philadelphia, his repeated
failure to rehabilitate, his abhorrent conduct in this case, his
history of substance abuse and mental health issues, his
education, his lack of employment history, and his family and
personal circumstances. (N.T., 12/8/17, at pgs. 16-24).
Regarding Appellant’s depraved shooting of Mr. Davis,
this court [stated at the original sentencing hearing]:
So[, Appellant’s counsel] has argued mitigation for
you based on your childhood and upbringing and did so
very well, but I will note that having sat through the trial
and watched [the surveillance] video over and over
again, … I have to agree with the prosecution that it
shows somebody who was intent on the execution of Mr.
Davis….
Put together, what it all shows is someone who
disguised themselves [sic] from head, almost to toe, in
Muslim garb, walk[ed] down to that co[r]ner store, go in,
go out, draw your gun, and almost in point-blank range,
try to kill [Mr.] Davis and you nearly succeeded. It’s only
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for the grace of God that Mr. Davis is alive and that you
did not face a homicide trial and a homicide conviction.
In my mind ... what [Appellant] did shows the same
type of culpability, the same type of intent to kill, the
same cold-blooded premeditated plan to shoot and kill
Mr. Davis. … [A]dding to the disturbing nature of what
we saw [on the video] was [Appellant] acti[ng] out in the
elevator [immediately after the shooting]. Clearly[,
Appellant was] not in the least bit disturbed by what [he]
had just done, showing almost an animated reenactment
to Mr. Williams….
I have to say … that there are [] few times that I
have had on this bench for now 13 years that I’ve seen
such intentionally, brutal behavior.
(Id. at pgs. 20-21).
Before shooting Mr. Davis, Appellant had already
amassed a considerable criminal record that included twelve
arrests, several adjudications or convictions, and multiple
probation violations. Notwithstanding the many opportunities
provided to him, Appellant made no effort toward rehabilitation.
(Id. at pgs. 16-20).
Returning to [Appellant’s] re-sentencing hearing, the
court clearly stated that all of the aforesaid information would not
be reiterated but would be incorporated into the record.
THE COURT: All right. I will say, of course, that I
remember the details of this case very, very clearly. And
I believe I stated on the record at sentencing all of the
reasons and all of the considerations that I have weighed
in issuing the sentence that I did. I’m not going to go
into a full recitation of those reasons again since they are
already of record. I will just incorporate that record into
today’s record. However, suffice it to say, that this was
a cold[-]blooded attempt … to commit murder. And I did
find that [Appellant’s] actions [after the shooting]
seemed to indicate that he was somewhat cavalier about
his intent immediately afterwards as we saw on the video
that was taken when [Appellant] was in the elevator of
the building as well as in the courtroom.
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(N.T., 4/16/21, pgs 7, 8.)
Counsel for Appellant argued [at resentencing] that the
sentence should be lowered to a total 10-20 years because
Appellant is still young and that a lesser sentence would enable
him to participate in rehabilitation programs in state custody.
Appellant exercised his right to allocution and detailed the ways
in which he believes he has tried to better himself while
incarcerated. Notably, however, Appellant did not express any
remorse for his actions in connection with the [victim], nor did he
express any concern for the [victim] and his family. The court
was not compelled to comment nor question Appellant’s assertions
in this regard.
***
Considering Appellant’s vicious and remorseless
conduct in this case, together with his overall penchant for
crime and disregard of its effect on his community, this
court’s aggregate sentence of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration
is thoroughly justified.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 6-7, 8-11 (emphasis added; some
capitalization, citations and punctuation modified).
Our review discloses record and legal support for the court’s reasoning.
This Court rejected a similar claim in Barnes, supra:
We have held that preserving the integrity of a prior sentencing
scheme is a legitimate sentencing concern. See
[Commonwealth v.] Walker, 568 A.2d [201,] 205 [(Pa. Super.
1989)] (“Upon resentencing, a court has a valid interest in
preserving the integrity of a prior sentencing scheme.”) (citation
omitted). Indeed, a trial court properly may resentence a
defendant to the same aggregate sentence to preserve its
original sentencing scheme. See Commonwealth v. Bartrug,
732 A.2d 1287[, 1289] (Pa. Super. 1999) (noting a resentence of
7½ to 15 years for burglary was lawful after not receiving a
sentence for burglary and having been given previously the same
sentence for theft by unlawful taking)…. “[I]n most
circumstances, a judge can duplicate the effect of the original
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sentencing plan by adjusting the sentences on various counts so
that the aggregate punishment remains the same.” Walker, 568
A.2d at 206. However, “[i]f a judge could have imposed the same
aggregate sentence he handed down at the original sentencing
hearing, and … instead imposes a harsher aggregate sentence,
the presumption of vindictiveness could not be rebutted by
invoking the need to preserve the original sentencing plan.” Id.
In Commonwealth v. McHale, 924 A.2d 664, 667 (Pa. Super.
2007), overruled in part on other grounds as stated in
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15 (Pa. Super. 2007),
we upheld the trial court’s resentencing of the defendant when his
conviction on the most serious charges, two counts of aggravated
assault, previously had been reversed based on insufficient
evidence. McHale, 924 A.2d at 673-74. After remand, to
maintain the same total aggregate sentence as originally imposed,
the trial court increased the overall sentence on the surviving
counts. Id. at 667. Noting that the aggregate sentence remained
unchanged, we upheld the new sentence. Id. at 674. In so doing,
we noted:
[O]ur conclusion is not altered by the fact that remand
and resentencing were prompted by reversal of two of
[the defendant’s] convictions…. Whether remand is the
result of reversal of one or more convictions or vacation
of an illegal sentence, we conclude that the trial court has
the same discretion and responsibilities in resentencing.
Id. at 673-74.
… [C]onsistent with [] Walker, and McHale, the trial court’s
resentencing [appellant] did not rise to vindictiveness because the
trial court here sought to preserve the integrity of the original
sentencing scheme by imposing the same aggregate sentence.
Barnes, 167 A.3d at 124-25 (emphasis in original; some citations modified).
Finally, where, as here, a sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI, “it
will be presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information
regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along
with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Conklin, 275 A.3d
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1087, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). “[W]here the court has been
so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v.
Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009); see also Commonwealth
v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 767 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“The sentencing judge can
satisfy the requirement that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on the
record by indicating that he or she has been informed by the pre-sentencing
report; thus properly considering and weighing all relevant factors.” (citation
omitted)).
In sum, we discern no abuse of the resentencing court’s discretion.
Contrary to Appellant’s claim, his standard-guideline-range sentences were
neither excessive nor unreasonable. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926
A.2d 957, 964 (Pa. 2007) (stating that “rejection of a sentencing court’s
imposition of sentence on unreasonableness grounds [should] occur
infrequently, whether the sentence is above or below the guideline ranges.”);
Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (stating “where a sentence is within the standard
range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate
under the Sentencing Code.”).
Based on the foregoing, we vacate Appellant’s unlawful sentence
imposed for conspiracy to commit murder. Because the trial court ordered
the conspiracy sentence to run concurrent to the sentence imposed for
attempted murder, our disposition does not affect the overall sentencing
scheme. See Commonwealth v. Henderson, 938 A.2d 1063, 1067 (Pa.
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Super. 2007) (stating that “since appellant’s sentences were concurrent, the
trial court’s overall sentencing scheme has not been compromised, and it
[wa]s not necessary to remand for re-sentencing” after this Court held the
sentence imposed on one count to be unlawful); cf. Commonwealth v.
Tanner, 61 A.3d 1043, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding vacatur of a
consecutive sentence in the context of a larger sentencing scheme
necessitates vacatur of the entire sentence). We affirm Appellant’s judgment
of sentence in all other respects.
Judgment of sentence vacated in part and affirmed in part. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/01/2023
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