Com. v. Harding, J. ( 2017 )

J-S84044-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
JAMES HARDING
Appellant No. 3214 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 22, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division
at No(s):
CP-39-CR-0000914-2014
CP-39-CR-0004806-2013
CP-39-CR-0005211-2013
BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MARCH 24, 2017
Appellant, James Harding, appeals pro se from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas following
revocation of his parole. We vacate the court’s order and remand for further
proceedings.
The facts of this case are unnecessary for our disposition, and the
relevant procedural history is as follows. On March 17, 2014, Appellant pled
guilty to three counts of driving under the influence at three separate
dockets. That same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a negotiated
thirty days’ to six months’ imprisonment for each offense, all to run
consecutively. Appellant subsequently committed new offenses, and on
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S84044-16
March 10, 2015, the court conducted a Gagnon II1 hearing at which it
revoked Appellant’s parole, sentenced him to serve the remaining balance of
his original sentence, and granted him immediate reparole.
Thereafter, Appellant again violated his parole when he committed
forgery. The trial court sentenced him to eleven-and-one-half to twenty-
three months’ imprisonment on this new offense. On September 22, 2015,
the court once again conducted a Gagnon II hearing, during which the
following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: [Appellant], you don’t have a lawyer here for
your Gagnon hearing. Do you wish to be represented?
[APPELLANT]: No. I want―I wish to get this over and
done with.
N.T. Gagnon II Hr’g, 9/22/15, at 2. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court revoked Appellant’s parole, sentenced him to serve the remaining
balance on his previous sentence, and granted him immediate work release.2
Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on October 9, 2015. The
court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
As a prefatory matter, we consider whether Appellant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
1
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
2
The following day, the court modified its order to have Appellant’s
revocation sentence run consecutive to his new sentence for forgery.
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“When a waiver of the right to counsel is sought at the . . . appellate
stages, an on-the-record determination should be made that the waiver is a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary one.” Commonwealth v. Robinson,
970 A.2d 455, 457 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (citations and quotation
marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81, 82
(Pa. 1998) (requiring on-the-record determination of whether waiver of
counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary).
Nevertheless, “there is no absolute right under either the Sixth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment [of the United States
Constitution] to be afforded counsel at a parole or probation revocation
hearing.” Jester v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 595 A.2d
748, 751 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (citing Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790).3 Thus, in
parole revocation hearings, the court is not required to conduct an extensive
on-the-record colloquy to ensure that a defendant has effectuated a valid
waiver of counsel. Jester, 595 A.2d at 751. However, “reasonable steps
must be taken to ensure that a parolee has an ample opportunity to retain
counsel of his or her choice or secure the services of the public defender.”
Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, in the interest of fairness, our Supreme
Court has also recognized the right to counsel “in an appeal from a parole
revocation order[.]” Id. (citing Bronson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of
3
Commonwealth Court decisions are not binding on this Court; however,
they may be considered persuasive authority. See Commonwealth v.
Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 395 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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Probation and Parole, 421 A.2d 1021, 1026 (Pa. 1980)); see also
Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(B)(1).
Instantly, a review of the record reveals no waiver of counsel for
Appellant’s September 22, 2015 revocation hearing. The only indication that
Appellant wanted to proceed pro se was his negative response to the court’s
question as to whether he wished to be represented at the Gagnon II
hearing. See N.T. Gagnon II Hr’g at 2 (“I wish to get this over and done
with.”). Thus, the record does not show that the court took reasonable
steps to ensure Appellant had an opportunity to retain counsel, let alone that
Appellant executed a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel.
See Robinson, 970 A.2d at 457; Jester, 595 A.2d at 751. Although the
court was not required to conduct an extensive waiver colloquy given the
nature of parole revocation proceedings, the brief exchange between the
court and Appellant was insufficient to constitute an adequate waiver of
counsel. See Jester, 595 A.2d at 751. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s
judgment of sentence and remand this matter for the trial court to conduct a
Grazier hearing to determine whether Appellant has knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel before revoking such parole as
allowed by law. See Grazier, 713 A.2d at 82; Pa.R.Crim.P. 709(B)(1).
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/24/2017
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