Granville, A., II v. Granville, H. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ALBERT GRANVILLE, II IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
HOLLY K. GRANVILLE
Appellant No. 10 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered December 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Civil Division at No(s): 2013-FC-41196
BEFORE: MOULTON, J., SOLANO, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2017
Holly K. Granville (“Wife”) appeals from the December 2, 2016 order
entered in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas overruling her
exceptions to the master’s recommendations and decreeing her divorced
from Albert Granville, II (“Husband”). We affirm.
The parties married in 1996 and separated in 2012. On August 27,
2013, Husband filed a complaint in divorce. On November 25, 2015, the
parties participated in a hearing in front of Master David J. Ratchford, Esq.
On January 29, 2016, the Master filed recommendations and findings in
divorce (“Master’s Recommendations”). On February 19, 2016, Wife filed
exceptions to the Master’s Recommendations, which the trial court overruled
in an opinion and order dated October 20, 2016. Wife timely filed a notice of
appeal.
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Wife raises the following issues on appeal:
A. Where the overall equitable distribution award failed to
accomplish the stated intention of the divorce master in
that it was overwhelmingly in favor of Husband, must
the award be revised?
B. Where Husband failed to file his inventory, income
statement, expense statement, and pre-trial statement,
was the divorce master required to bar [Husband]’s
testimony and evidence when fashioning the award?
C. Did the divorce master commit errors of law and fact in
the allocution of assets and debts such that the
equitable distribution award was inequitable to Wife?
D. Did the trial court’s failure to issue an order of
distribution for Husband’s military retirement in
accordance with US Army guidelines constitute an
abuse of discretion?
E. Did the award of alimony fail to adhere to the facts, fail
to provide Wife with sufficient time for rehabilitation,
and include an improper penalty if Wife were to
challenge the award?
F. Did the divorce master’s overall distribution and
statements concerning the relative contributions and
educational attainments of the parties show a bias
against Wife?
Wife’s Br. at 4-5 (full capitalization and suggested answers omitted).
Wife’s first four issues challenge the equitable distribution award. “Our
scope of review in equitable distribution matters is limited. Awards of
alimony, counsel fees, and property distribution are within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an error of law
or abuse of discretion.” Smith v. Smith, 749 A.2d 921, 924 (Pa.Super.
2000) (quoting Berrington v. Berrington, 598 A.2d 31, 34 (Pa.Super.
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1991)). The appellant must establish an abuse of discretion by clear and
convincing evidence. Morgante v. Morgante, 119 A.3d 382, 386
(Pa.Super. 2015).
“In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts
must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We measure the
circumstances of the case against the objective of effectuating economic
justice between the parties and achieving a just determination of their
property rights.”1 Id. (quoting Biese v. Biese, 979 A.2d 892, 895
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1
The relevant factors in an equitable distribution determination are:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) Any prior marriage of either party.
(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of
income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities
and needs of each of the parties.
(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training
or increased earning power of the other party.
(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of
capital assets and income.
(6) The sources of income of both parties, including, but
not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other
benefits.
(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the
acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation of
the marital property, including the contribution of a party
as homemaker.
(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(Pa.Super. 2009)). “[A] master’s report and recommendation, although only
advisory, is to be given the fullest consideration, particularly on the question
of credibility of witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to
observe and assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.” Moran v.
Moran, 839 A.2d 1091, 1095 (Pa.Super. 2003).
We address Wife’s first and third issues together. Wife claims that the
equitable distribution award did not reflect the Master’s intention to award
her with more assets than Husband. She claims the Master disproportionally
allocated assets in Husband’s favor. Wife further contends that Husband
impermissibly benefitted from: $10,000 that Husband withdrew from an
Annuity Accumulation Fund Rider (“AAFR”); the Master’s finding that Wife
was responsible for the Jeep payments and boat storage fees; and the
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during
the marriage.
(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time
the division of property is to become effective.
(10.1) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications
associated with each asset to be divided, distributed or
assigned, which ramifications need not be immediate and
certain.
(10.2) The expense of sale, transfer or liquidation
associated with a particular asset, which expense need not
be immediate and certain.
(11) Whether the party will be serving as the custodian of
any dependent minor children.
23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a).
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profits from the sale of a 2001 Yamaha Bear Tracker all-terrain vehicle
(“2001 Yamaha Bear Tracker ATV”).
The Master found that the marital estate consisted of the following
assets:
1. USAA ROTH IRA titled to [Husband], in the amount of
$26,972.77[.]
2. [AAFR] titled to [Husband]. (The value of this item is
in controversy however. The parties have stipulated
that it is either [$1,413.00 o]r $11,123.00)[.]
3. USAA R[OTH] IRA titled to [Wife] in the amount of
$3,716.14.
4. One 1976 Catalina 22 in the name of [Husband]
having a value of $2,820.00[.]
5. One 2009 Jeep Wrangler in the name of [Husband],
having a value of $14,725.00.
6. One 2006 Yamaha XT 225 in the name of [Husband]
having a value of $1,370.
7. One 2006 Dodge Caravan in the name of [Husband]
valued at $3,000.
8. 2001 Yamaha Bear Tracker [ATV] which was titled in
the name of [Husband] and for which [he] received
$500.00 upon transfer.
9. One liability in the name of [Husband] for storage fees
due and owing at the time of separation in the amount
of $2,155.00 [and the post separation payments on
the outstanding loan payments on the Jeep Wrangler
at time of separation totaling $4,000.]
10. One checking account titled to [Husband] in the
amount of $5,360.34[.]
11. One savings account titled to [Husband] in the amount
of $1,006.06[.]
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12. One checking account titled to [Wife] in the amount of
$105.42[.]
13. One savings account titled to [Wife] in the amount of
$25.
14. Upon sale of the marital dwelling the net proceeds
were distributed in the following manner; $29,717.00
to Husband . . . and $18,216.62 to Wife . . . . This
arrangement was temporarily agreed to in order to
facilitate settlement on the house closing, both parties
having reserved their rights to litigate the distribution
at a later time.
Master’s Recommendations, 1/29/16, at 1-3, 12 (“Master’s Rec.”). The
Master recommended the distribution of assets as follows:
1. It is assumed that the military retirement of Husband
accessible to the parties upon Husband’s termination of
military service in April 2016 will be distributed
according to the applicable administrative rules of the
retirement. Accordingly, it is further assumed that Wife
shall receive the equivalent of fifty percent (50%) of the
marital component of that retirement as determined by
the applicable coverture fraction. The remainder of this
recommended equitable distribution is predicated upon
this assumption.
2. The USAA ROTH IRA titled to [Husband], which is
distinct from his military retirement, in the stipulated
value amount of $26,972.77 to be divided and
distributed in equal shares between Husband and Wife.
3. Wife to be awarded the following assets having the
following stipulated values[:]
a. The USAA R[OTH] IRA titled in her name and
valued in the amount of $3,716.14.
b. [O]ne 2006 Dodge Caravan valued at
$3,000.00[.]
c. [T]he checking account titled in the name of
[Wife] in the amount of $105.42[.]
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d. [T]he savings account titled in the name of [Wife]
in the amount of $25.00[.]
4. The following assets are awarded to Husband in
equitable distribution[:]
a. [AAFR] valued at $1,413.
b. 1976 Catalina 22 having a value of $2[,]820.
c. 2009 Jeep Wrangler having a value of $14,728.
d. 2006 Yamaha XT having a value of $1,370.
e. [C]hecking account titled to Husband in the
amount of $5,320.00[.]
f. [S]avings account titled to Husband in the amount
of $1,006.00[.]
g. Husband is credited with the payment of the boat
storage liability in the amount of $2,155.00 and the
post separation payments on the outstanding loan
payments on the Jeep Wrangler at the time of
separation totaling $4,000.
[5.] In light of the foregoing, and the stipulated fact that
Husband received a greater share of the net proceeds of
the marital home, an additional payment from Husband
to Wife in the amount of $15,000.00 is appropriate.
Id. at 11-12 (emphasis omitted).
Regarding Wife’s claim that Husband impermissibly benefitted from the
$10,000 withdrawn from the AAFR, the trial court found that “evidence was
presented to demonstrate that the $10,000 . . . was for the use of travel
arrangements for the parties’ children, which was agreed upon by the
parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 2/17/17, at 2 (“1925(a) Op.”). The
trial court further stated that while “Wife was unable to recall how the
expenses were to be paid[,] she did recall agreeing to have the children
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travel, and we defer to the Master’s determination of . . . credibility . . . and
the evidence presented in making the determination of whether knowledge
and/or approval for the withdrawal existed.” Id.2 We conclude the trial
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2
The Master found that “approximately $10,000 of funds from the
[AAFR] was used to satisfy expenses with regard to bringing the children
over to Germany and their living expenses during the stay. Wife agreed to
this.” Master’s Rec. at 5. During the Master’s hearing, Wife testified as
follows:
[HUSBAND’S COUNSEL]: Ms. Granville, the only thing we
didn’t talk about was, there was an [AAFR] in your
husband’s name as owner and your name as the insured;
and it’s my understanding that it had, as of the date of
separation, $11,113 and a penny in it. And then shortly
thereafter, $10,000 was withdrawn.
Were you aware of that?
[WIFE]: On which -- what was that?
[HUSBAND’S COUNSEL]: It was an [AAFR] that had
$11,113 in it.
[WIFE]: Um-hum.
[HUSBAND’S COUNSEL]: And shortly after the date of
separation, [$]10,000 was withdrawn from that.
Were you aware of that?
[WIFE]: I don’t know. We had a couple different things.
I’m not sure what that one might have been. Who -- who
withdrew it?
[HUSBAND’S COUNSEL]: [Husband] withdrew it. And if I
were to tell you that he paid for passports and air fair [sic]
for the children to go over to Germany and visit with him
and then to visit several cities in Germany, do you have
any reason to disagree that that’s where the money was
spent?
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence shows the
$10,000 was for the children’s travel expenditures.
Wife next claims that she should not be responsible for the boat
storage fees and the loan payments on the Jeep. The trial court deferred to
the Master’s discretion in determining the “credit of debts, including whether
a single party had possession of the boat and Jeep Wrangler during the
period of separation based on the credibility of the witnesses.” Opinion and
Order, 10/20/16, at 9 (unpaginated) (“Oct. 20 Op.”). During the Master’s
hearing, Husband testified that while he was in Germany, the Army would
not ship the boat, so he stored it. N.T., 11/25/15, at 44. He further
testified that he paid $2,155 in storage fees. Id. at 45-46. Further,
Husband testified that he also made the Jeep loan payments. Id. at 109-11.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
[WIFE]: Maybe some of it. I did pay for the passports; I
did arrange for them to get their passports updated and do
that. Maybe -- he was in charge of our finances, so if he
did withdraw that money then maybe he did do that. And
I do know our children did go to Germany.
He did deduct, though, from whatever he was giving me
at that time -- we didn’t have child support, so he was,
you know, we just had a verbal agreement that he would
send me some money to take care of the kids. He told me
he was gonna start deducting from that money because he
would be paying for all their plane tickets; and then I
agreed to that as well. So I’m not exactly sure that he
took that money out, what he used it for, I’m not clear on
that.
N.T., 11/25/15, at 151-53.
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The Master had the opportunity to assess Husband’s behavior and demeanor
and found his testimony with regard to the boat storage fees and the Jeep
loan payments credible. We agree with the trial court’s determination to
defer to the Master.
Finally, regarding Wife’s claim that the Master failed to include in his
recommendation the proceeds from the sale of the 2001 Yamaha Bear
Tracker ATV, we conclude any such error is harmless. The parties stipulated
that Husband sold the property, for which he received $500. Id. at 8. While
it appears that the Master overlooked the distribution of this amount, it does
not materially affect the overall equitable distribution scheme. See
Morgante, 119 A.3d at 386; Smith v. Smith, 653 A.2d 1259, 1268
(Pa.Super. 1995).
When viewing the equitable distribution scheme as a whole we find no
abuse of discretion. The Master took into consideration the relevant factors,
the parties’ testimony, and all the evidence it had available, and made its
recommended distribution. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in adopting the Master’s equitable distribution recommendations.
In Wife’s second issue, she challenges the Master’s failure to preclude
Husband’s testimony. Wife claims Husband’s testimony should have been
barred under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1920.33 because he failed
to timely file the documents required by that Rule, including a pre-trial
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statement, inventory, and income and expense statement. The version of
Rule 1920.33 in effect at the time of the Master’s hearing stated:
(a) Within ninety days after service of a pleading or
petition containing a claim for determination and
distribution of property under Section 3502 of the
Divorce Code, each party shall file an inventory
specifically describing all property owned or
possessed at the time the action was commenced.
...
(d)(1) A party who fails to comply with a requirement of
subdivision (b) of this rule shall, except upon good
cause shown, be barred from offering any testimony
or introducing any evidence in support of or in
opposition to claims for the matters not covered
therein.
(2) A party shall, except upon good cause shown, be
barred from offering any testimony or introducing
any evidence that is inconsistent with or which goes
beyond the fair scope of the information set forth in
the pre-trial statement.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.33(a), (d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).3
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3
Wife cites the version of this rule in place at the time of the parties’
separation and the Master’s hearing. While this rule has been revised since,
we apply the earlier version as it was the rule in place at all relevant times.
The current version of Rule 1920.33, effective October 1, 2016, states:
(a) If a pleading or petition raises a claim for equitable
division of marital property under Section 3502 of
the Divorce Code, the parties shall file and serve on
the other party an inventory, which shall include the
information in subdivisions (1) through (3) . . . .
Within 20 days of service of the moving party’s
inventory, the non-moving party shall file an
inventory.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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At the outset of the hearing, the Master acknowledged receipt of
Husband’s inventory. N.T., 11/25/15, at 6-7. Wife did not object. Later in
the hearing, Wife objected to the admission of Husband’s amended pretrial
statement. The following exchange occurred:
[WIFE’S COUNSEL]: I maintain the same objections that I
had maintained before. The only additional objection would
be to the additional pretrial statement. I believe it doesn’t
comply with the rules as to being timely submitted, so I
raise an objection as to the amended, if you will, pretrial
statement.
THE MASTER: What particular aspects of the pretrial
statement do you have objections to?
[WIFE’S COUNSEL]: I believe it changes some of the
calculations. I mean, I wouldn’t change the stuff we
stipulated to, of course.
THE MASTER: I guess I’m confused then.
[HUSBAND’S COUNSEL]: Well, my only comment to that
is that we agreed on the phone to change the numbers
that we stipulated to, and I think we also agreed that the
other numbers that were placed in there, given the nature
of the fact that we changed -- or agreed upon, I should
say, the date of separation, were not agreed to; so I don’t
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(Footnote Continued)
...
(d)(1) A party who fails to comply with a requirement of
subdivision (b) may be barred from offering
testimony or introducing evidence in support of or in
opposition to claims for the matters omitted.
(2) A party may be barred from offering testimony or
introducing evidence that is inconsistent with or
goes beyond the fair scope of the information set
forth in the pre-trial statement.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.33(a), (d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
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understand your objection to the timeliness of it. We
talked about that and agreed to do it.
[WIFE’S COUNSEL]: If the only change between the first
one was the numbers that we stipulated to, I would not
have an objection.
[HUSBAND’S COUNSEL]: Well, and the only necessity for
me to have included the other three numbers under
liabilities was the fact that we finally agreed on the date of
separation, so I had to include those as liabilities as at the
time that would not have been in existence if we went with
August of 2013; so again, I think one necessitated the
other. That’s just my response.
THE MASTER: I will accept the filing as made with the
stipulations that you noted in the beginning of the
testimony, and then we can proceed with defense.
Id. at 123-24.
The trial court found:
[T]he parties disagree as to the timeliness of production of
such documentation. The evidence suggests that Husband
provided a copy of his amended statement and inventory
to Wife and the Master as soon as practical, considering
the parties were unable to stipulate to the date of
separation until just days before the hearing and the
record reflects that the parties had discussed Husband
amending his earlier pre-trial statement as a result of the
stipulated date of separation.
1925(a) Op. at 3. We agree. Further, in its October 20, 2016 order, the
trial court explained that “counsel for the parties were not able to stipulate
as to the date of separation to be used at the hearing until just days before
the hearing[,] which required amending the inventory to reflect debts going
back to the official date of separation.” Oct. 20 Op. at 8-9 (quotation
omitted). We discern no abuse of discretion.
Wife’s fourth issue is that the Master erred by not determining the
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coverture fraction and that the Master’s division of Husband’s military
retirement benefits did not meet the requirements of Army regulations.
The trial court addressed this issue in its 1925(a) opinion:
Regarding the distribution of Husband’s pension, we
believe the language of the Master’s Recommendations is
sufficient to exact an equal distribution. Although the
Master assumed distribution will occur in accordance with
the applicable administrative rules to grant Wife half of the
marital component of Husband’s pension, the Master
makes clear that the parties will each receive half of
Husband’s pension and that the overall distribution
incorporates dividing the marital portion of the pension
equally between the parties.
1925(a) Op. at 3. We agree. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in adopting the Master’s recommendation as to division
of the Husband’s retirement pension.
Wife’s fifth issue challenges the alimony award. “Our standard of
review regarding . . . [an] award of alimony is whether the trial court abused
its discretion.” Moran, 839 A.2d at 1097. An award of alimony should
reflect the “reasonable needs in accordance with the lifestyle and standard of
living established by the parties during the marriage, as well as the payor’s
ability to pay.’”4 Id. (quoting Twilla v. Twilla, 664 A.2d 1020, 1022
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4
Section 3701(b) of the Divorce Code sets forth the relevant factors in
an alimony determination:
In determining whether alimony is necessary and in
determining the nature, amount, duration and manner of
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant
factors, including:
(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the
parties.
(2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional
conditions of the parties.
(3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but
not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other
benefits.
(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.
(5) The duration of the marriage.
(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training
or increased earning power of the other party.
(7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses or
financial obligations of a party will be affected by reason of
serving as the custodian of a minor child.
(8) The standard of living of the parties established during
the marriage.
(9) The relative education of the parties and the time
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable the party seeking alimony to find appropriate
employment.
(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.
(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.
(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.
(13) The relative needs of the parties.
(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during
the marriage. The marital misconduct of either of the
parties from the date of final separation shall not be
considered by the court in its determinations relative to
alimony, except that the court shall consider the abuse of
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(Pa.Super. 1995)). Further, “[a]limony following a divorce is a secondary
remedy and is available only where economic justice and the reasonable
needs of the parties cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution
award and development of an appropriate employable skill.” Id. (quoting
Twilla, 664 A.2d at 1022) (emphasis in original). “[T]he purpose of alimony
is not to reward one party and to punish the other, but rather to ensure that
the reasonable needs of the person who is unable to support himself or
herself through appropriate employment, are met.” Id. at 1096 (quoting
Twilla, 664 A.2d at 1022).
Wife claims that: (1) the award of $500 per month for a period of 24
months was insufficient; (2) the award included an improper penalty if she
were to challenge the alimony award; (3) the Master “downplayed the
conspicuous disparity between Husband’s income of $5,692.87 and Wife’s
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
one party by the other party. As used in this paragraph,
“abuse” shall have the meaning given to it under section
6102 (relating to definitions).
(15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications of the
alimony award.
(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient
property, including, but not limited to, property distributed
under Chapter 35 (relating to property rights), to provide
for the party’s reasonable needs.
(17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of
self-support through appropriate employment.
23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b).
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income [of] $1,765.91 stating that the difference is not large,” Wife’s Br. at
36; (4) Husband’s expert’s testimony should not have been admitted; and
(5) because Wife is in school and it will take 4 years of part-time study for
her to complete her bachelor’s in education, the alimony award should be for
a period of 4 years rather than 24 months.
The trial court upheld the Master’s findings and stated:
The Master has properly considered relevant factors,
including the likely incomes of the parties and their similar
education levels, in determining the necessity, duration,
and amount of alimony. In addition, we have considered
the Pennsylvania Support Guidelines, which we believe are
substantially in line with the award of alimony. Any slight
deviation from the Pennsylvania Support Guidelines [is]
justified based on the overall circumstances of the parties
in this case. In addition, for the reasons set forth in the
October [20, 2016] Order,[5] we also believe that the
award of alimony recommended by the Master is for a
sufficient time frame for Wife to become self-sufficient,
considering Wife has a work history and was pursuing
educational opportunities. Although Wife disagrees with
our interpretation, we do not consider the language “[i]n
the event of exceptions being raised by [Wife], . . .
Husband’s payments to Wife during pendency of
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5
In its October 20, 2016 order, the trial court found:
the Master ordered an appropriate period of time and
amount of money to be paid in alimony. The amount of
$500 per month to be paid over 24 months provides
reasonable support for [Wife] to meet her needs.
Considering that [Wife] has been employed in the
workforce and is pursuing a Bachelor’s Degree, we believe
that 24 months is sufficient.
Oct. 20 Op. at 9.
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exceptions or appeals should be credited toward the total
amount owed by him pursuant to this recommendation or
the court’s final resolution” from the Master’s
Recommendations to be punishing Wife. Rather, we
consider this language to protect Husband from paying any
additional sums during the pendency of exceptions,
thereby allowing Wife to unfairly receive additional sums
and encouraging Wife to file exceptions that may not be
warranted.
1925(a) Op. at 3-4. We agree.
Moreover, we reject Wife’s claim that the Master “downplayed” the
parties’ income disparity. In discussing the section 3701(b) factors, the
Master acknowledged that Husband had a higher income than Wife and that
the difference in earnings would likely continue into the near future. The
Master determined that the factor regarding the parties’ incomes weighed in
Wife’s favor. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in upholding
the Master’s Recommendations concerning the award of alimony.
Finally, Wife’s argument that the Master should not have considered
the testimony of William Walker, Husband’s expert, fails. Wife claims that
the Master “presumably” relied on Husband’s expert in stating that
Husband’s income would be lowered after retirement. Wife’s Br. at 36. The
Master stated, however, that while the expert’s testimony was credible and
“enlightening insofar as the issue of [Husband]’s vocational capabilities and
future income potential are concerned[,] . . . the most weight is assigned to
the testimony of the parties themselves.” Master’s Rec. at 4. We conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in “deferring to the Master as
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to how much weight should be assigned to [the expert’s] testimony.” Oct.
20 Op. at 8.
In Wife’s last issue, she claims the Master exhibited bias against her.
However, Wife has waived this claim for failing to include it in her
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) statement.6 See
Middleton v. Middleton, 812 A.2d 1241, 1245 (Pa.Super. 2002) (“Any
issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998)). Even if Wife had
preserved this claim, however, we would find it meritless. As the trial court
stated:
At multiple points, in evaluating the factors that the Master
considered in coming to his decision, he stated “[t]his
factor weighs in favor of [W]ife.” The Master provided
weight to [Wife]’s role as caretaker of the home and the
children when he stated in Factor 7 that “[b]oth parties
contributed to the marriage financially and otherwise.”
The Master went on to say that “[W]ife . . . contributed
through her earnings, but also as a homemaker and child
care provider for the parties’ minor children[.”] This
demonstrates that the Master considered [Wife]’s
contributions to the marriage and weighed that in his
consideration of distribution of the assets.
Oct. 20 Op. at 7-8 (internal citations omitted). While Wife may not agree
with the Master’s recommendations, this alone does not indicate, nor do we
find any indication of, bias or ill-will.
____________________________________________
6
Wife’s Rule 1925(b) statement incorporates by reference her
exceptions to the Master’s Recommendations. However, in her exceptions,
Wife did not assert that the Master demonstrated bias against her.
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J-A15005-17
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/18/2017
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