Com. v. Thoman, S. ( 2019 )

J-A24019-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SHANNON LAMAR THOMAN :
:
Appellant : No. 994 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0003498-2014
BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: JANUARY 28, 2019
A jury convicted Shannon Lamar Thoman of seven counts of sexual
abuse of children - child pornography.1 He now appeals the judgment of
sentence entered on February 3, 2016. Thoman raises a Batson2 claim;
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; and maintains that the testimony
from the assigned detective on the case was inadmissible because it was
misleading and overwhelmed the jury. We affirm on the basis of the trial court
opinion.
The trial court aptly summarized the relevant procedural history and
facts of this case. See Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), filed December 28, 2017,
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d).
2 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
J-A24019-18
at 5-10. Therefore, we do not restate them and instead briefly note that
photographs of nude minors were found on hard drives belonging to Thoman.
The trial court rejected all of Thoman’s claims. First, it reviewed his
Batson claim and concluded “we do not believe that trial counsel made a
record that addressed the inquiries that must be made for a Batson challenge.
Again, such a failure precludes appellate review of any Batson challenges.”
Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).
Next, it reviewed his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and
concluded that they were all meritless. It explained that the evidence was
sufficient to satisfy the convictions for child pornography despite Thoman’s
arguments that the Commonwealth did not prove that the depictions were for
sexual stimulation or gratification; that he knowingly possessed the
depictions; and that the minors in the photographs were under the age of 18.
The trial court opined that the photographs “depict[ed] lewd exhibition of the
genitals or nudity that was produced for sexual stimulation” and the “jurors
could reasonably conclude that the photos in question met the definition of a
[‘]prohibited sexual act[’]” within the statute. Id. at 17. It also explained that
because a “timely objection was [not] raised regarding” the issue of the age
of the minors in the photographs, Thoman waived appellate review of the
issue. Id. at 20. Regarding the argument of his knowing possession of the
photographs, the court stated that Thoman’s argument is a challenge to the
weight and not the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 27. However, it
nonetheless concluded that because “[its] sense of justice was not shocked,
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J-A24019-18
the jury’s verdict should remain undisturbed.” Id. at 28. Thoman also
challenged the testimony of the investigating detective, claiming that his
testimony was misleading and confused the jury. The trial court also rejected
this argument, stating “the jury was well aware as to how many photos
[Thoman] was alleged to possess,” and “because the jury only needed to
determine if [Thoman] possessed the images he was charged with
possessing,” the testimony did not mislead the jury. Id. at 30, 31.
Additionally, even if the jury was confused by the testimony, the court
concluded the photographs “recovered from the loose hard drive, Dell laptop,
and Gateway laptop w[ere] overwhelming.” Id. at 31. We agree and also note
that Thoman waived this issue by failing to develop this argument in his brief.
See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 147 A.3d 7, 15 (Pa.Super. 2016) (“Where
an appellant offers no citation to pertinent case law or other authority in
support of an argument, the claim is waived”).
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are
“required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner
giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Neysmith, 192 A.3d 184, 189
(Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Our standard of review is de novo and
our scope of review is plenary. Id.After a thorough review of the certified record, the parties’ briefs, and
the relevant law, we affirm on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of the
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J-A24019-18
Honorable Michael E. Bortner, which we adopt and incorporate herein. See
TCO at 11-32.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 01/28/2019
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Circulated 01/02/2019 12:08 PM
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YOIRK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
· CRIMINAL DIVISirON
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COMMONWEALTH ''"'"'''
v.
SHANNON LAMAR THOMAN,
C) Defendant/Appellant
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COUNSEL OF RECORD:
Thomas L. Kearney, III, Esquire Barbara Jo Entwistle, Esquire
District Attorney of York County Counsel for Defendant
OPINION IN SUPPORT OF ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1925(a) OF THE
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The Court received a Notice of Appeal, docketed on June 23, 2017, thatShannonL.
Thoman, by and through his counsel, appeals to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania this
Court's order of June 1, 2017. The Court has reviewed the record. The Court now issues
this opinion in support of our June 1, 2017 order.
I. Procedural History
The Appellant's trial by jury began on November 2, 2015 and, at the conclusion of
that trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on seven counts of possession of child
pornography.' Sentencing was held on February 3, 2016. On Count 2, the Appellant was
sentenced to eleven-and-a-half to twenty-three months in York CountyPrison. The Appellant
received one year of probation on each of the other six counts, numbered as Counts 3, 4, 5, 6,
1 17 Pa.C.S.A. 6312(d)
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7, and·9. Each of the probationary counts ran consecutive to one another and to the sentence
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of confinement on Count 2.
On November 21, 2016,the Appellant filed apro se Post-Conviction Relief Act
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i--"'·· (hereinafter: PCRA) petition. Subsequently, the Appellant obtained the legal representation
of Barbara Jo Entwistle, Esquire, who, on January 19, 2017, filed the Appellant's Motion for
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Stay of Sexual Therapy and Counseling Conditions of Sentencing Relating to Sex Offender
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Status. A hearing was set for this motion on February 21, 2017 at which this Court suspended
the usage of polygraph testing in the Appellant's sentence to avoid his making any
inculpatory statements whilst challenging his conviction. By an order of February 14, 2017, a
PCRA hearing was set for April 5, 2017. On March 21, 2017, a Motion to Amend PCRA
Petition was filed. Permission to amend was granted on April 5, 2017. The amended P<:;RA
was filed that same day. Prior to a true PCRA hearing occurring, the Commonwealth filed
their Commonwealth's Response to PCRA Petition, which sought the granting of that portion
of the. Appellant's PCRA that requested the reinstatement of hi� appeal rights nunc pro tune.
We signed the Commonwealth's proposed order on June 1, 2017, which reinstated the
Appellant's post-sentence and appeal rights. Thereafter, on June 9, 2017, the Appellant
caused to be docketed his Post-Sentence Motions. Prior to our review of those motions, on
June23, 2017, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of our June 1, 2017 order. On July 7,
2017, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 1925(b), the
Appellant was directed to file a statement of matters complained of on appeal. That same
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{':.) day, we also denied the Appellant's post-sentence motions based upon our belief that the
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filing of the notice of appeal denuded this Court of jurisdiction to decide those motions. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1701 (a). On July 17, 2017, the Appellant filed his Motion for Order Reinstating
Defendant's Post-Sentence Motions based upon the averment that counsel had inadvertently
appealed. Unfortunately, we do not believe we possess the power to enter orders in a case
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that has been a�pealed where the Superior Court has not remanded or relinquished
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jurisdiction, nor has the Appellant withdrawn his appeal. See again, Pa.RAP. 1701(a).
Thereafter, the Appellant timely complied with our Rule I 925(b) request and submitted his
Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on July 28, 2017.
The Appellant appeals for the following reasons:
L First, the Appellant complains that, as a result of the Commonwealth exercising all of
its peremptory challenges to strike men, which resulted in the impaneling ofan all-
female jury, the Appellant was denied trial by a jury of his peers.
2. Secondly, the evidence adduced by the Commonwealth 'was insufficient to
demonstrate, as required, " ... a child under the age of 18 engaging in a prohibited
sexual act or in the simulation of such act," because none of the photographs depicted
actual or simulated sexual activity.
3. Thirdly, the Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that the
persons depicted in each ofthe photos related to the charges upon which guilt was
found were under the age of 18 as required by 18 Pa.C.S:A. § l 632(e ).
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4. Fourth, the Appellant avers that the photos undergirding each of the individual
··-..I charges did not depict sexual acts and the evidence was insufficient to show that the
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photos were possessed for purposes of sexual stimulation or gratification of the
possessor.
5. Fifth, the Appellant states that there was insufficient evidence presented to prove that
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co. the App_ellant "knowingly" possessed the photos in question where the evidence
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demonstrated that the photos had been deleted and no evidence was produced that the
Appellant had viewed them.
6. Sixth, the Appellant believes that the evidence was insufficient to show thatthe
Appellant "knowingly" possessed Exhibits #5, #6, #7, and #8 where those photos had
been downloaded in 2009 and 2010 before the Appellant gained any access to the
computer in question in the last quarter of 2012 and all of the photographs had been
deleted.
7. Seventh, the Appellant alleges that Detective Baker introduced misleading, irrelevant,
and confusing computer terminology that resulted in a verdict based upon insufficient
and irrelevant evidence ..
8. Eighth and finally, the Appellant submits that there was insufficient evidence to show
that the Appellant "knowingly'' possessed Exhibit #12.
We would note that it.is our belief that the Appellant did not fully develop the record on all
of these claims of error; however, any judgement about waiver will be made by the Superior
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Court. Wewill endeavor to address each matter complained of.
-...) II.
At trial, Detective John Bumstead testified that he began investigating the Appellant
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based upon information received from Detective Mark Baker .. (Notes of Testimony, 11/2/151
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at 73.) Based upon this information, a search warrant was garnered and served at the
Appellant's ad�ress of4 7 North Main Street, Second Floor Rear Apartment, Mount Wolf
Borough, PA. Id., at 74. The Appellant was informed that the investigators were searching
for child pornography and the Appellant was given his Miranda Warnings. Id., at 75.
Thereafter, the Appellant sated that he is addicted to pornography, which he likened to being
alcoholic, and then he declined to make any further statements. Id., at 76. The Appellant was
transported to a police station and, advised that the Miranda Warnings were still in effect,
stated thathe did not wish to speak sans counsel. Id., at 77. On cross-examination, Detective
Bumstead indicated that he had not personally examined any of the items seized from the
Appellant's residence and hadvinstead, turned over the evidence gathered to Detective.Baker,
Id., at 78.
Detective Baker took the stand and testified that he is an investigator for Northern
York County Police Department, part of the York County Cyber Crime Task Force, part of
the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force, and a task force officerwith the F.B.L Id.,
at 81. Detective Baker is certified to perform computer forensic examinations. Id., at 82. The
detective
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is not, however,
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trained to identify what is or is not child pornography. Id., at $3.
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(:) Rather, he has experience with child pornography based Upon combatingit since 2008. Id.
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Detective Baker stated that he has never been qualified as an expert in identifying child
pornography. Id. Withoutobjection, Detective Baker was qualified as an expert in computer
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..�.. forensic analysis. Id., at 84 .
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The genesis of this case was Detective Baker monitoring a file-sharing application
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known as "Bifl�orrent." Id., at 85. Asked by the prosecution to explain the nature of
BitTorrent, Detective Baker testified as follows:
Basically-it basically boils down to what actually is a torrent. A
BitTorrent is a bunch of files. It can actually [be] one file or 40,000 files. They
are in one container.
It usually they are of the same thing. [sic] It's a way for people to
share data without cramping up bandwidth for single users. It used to be,
when Lwas a kid, you would actually make a connection to somebody else's
computer, download the file directly from them. If you are downloading
multiple files from that person, you �e taking away their internet connection
by taking away their bandwidth.
The way that BitTorrent is set up, the files-the torrent is actually
broken up into multiple pieces. So when I go online, and say I would like to
get this torrent, whatever it is, a movie or a group of images or whatever, my
torrent find will go out and say, who has this torrent. An"d out of the 6
computers that may have it, I' 11 pull pieces from all 6 computers. That way
we'll be able to take everybody's bandwidth all at the same.time and I'll be
able to get the complete torrent package.
Id., at 85"86. The detective then explained that a unique "information hash" identifies each
torrent and that investigators have developed a list of known child porn hashes. Id., at 86.
The software used by child pornography investigators is set up to only draw information
from one target computer, which, inevitably, results in the file-sharing software on the target
computer recognizing that it alone is supplying information and then terminating the
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a: connection. Id., at 87.
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Pertinent to this case, one image of interest was downloaded out of 1700 files
associated with a particular information hash before the connection was-severed. I&, at 88.
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Detective Baker believed that image to have depicted child pornography. Id., at92. The IP
r:..D address was identifiedas York.Haven, which is in York County. Id., at 93. A warrant was
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(0 obtained and se�ed on Comcast who identified the Appellant and his physical address as the
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subscriber associated with that IP address. Id The detective then described how he received
evidence including a loose hard drive and two other hard drives that he removed from
computers. Id., at 96. Those hard drives were each attached to a forensic write blocker, which
bridges the suspect's hard drive the detective's computer. Id. The write blocker blocks any
attempts by the detective's computer to edit the seized hard drive. Id., at 96;.97. Exact copies
were then made of the hard drives, which prevented any risk of the original hard drives being
altered, Id., at 97.
On the loose hard drive, Detective Baker found four images that he believed showed
child pornography. (N.T., 11/2/15, at 97.) Also on this drive was found an application to
view torrents. Id., at 97°'."98. The-detective then identified four images of suspected child
pornography from the loose hard drive. Id., at 98. These images had been deleted and only
existed as data that the computer was authorized to overwrite. Id., at 100. No dates could be
obtained for the images on the loose. hard drive. Id., at 100-01. On cross-examination,
Detective Baker explained that the dates of three of the four images indicated 2010 as the
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C; date of the originals and. digitalization and 2011 as the date on which the photos were taken.
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Id., at 135-36. These dates correspond to the camera used to produce the photos and the
detective testified that he would need to examine the actual camera used to reconcile any
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discrepancies regarding dates on which the photos were created. Id., at 135. The loose hard
drive also contained a file shredding piece of software that is designed to overwrite the data
of a file such that the overwritten file cannot be recovered. Id., at 101-.02. Detective Baker
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opined that the presence of this software demonstrated that the Appellant possessed a mid-
level degree of sophistication for concealing child pornography. Id., at 102. The images from
the loose hard drive were then published to the jury. Id., at 102-03. Detective Baker opined
that the loose hard drive images depicted child pornography. Id. Following a sidebar, the jury
was instructed that it was. for them.to decide if the images showed child pornography. Id., at
105. Over the objections of defense counsel, Detective Baker testified regarding some of the
names of torrents discovered on the loose hard drive, which included terms like "preteen."
Id., at 105-07. These descriptive titles would have been available to the Appellant prior to
any downloadingby him. Id., at 108. The Windows Vista Business operating system of the
loose hard drive is registered to "Jody," the computer's name is "Nicholas 3,'' and there was
an unidentified user for the McAfee account. Id., at 116-17. One of the installations occurred
on September 20, 2008; however, it is not clear whether that installation refers to the
Windows operating system or theMcAfee account. Id., at 117.
A Dell laptop that was analyzed contained a torrent sharing application and a
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different type of shredding application that functioned like the one described previously. Id.,
'•,,l at 108-09. Three images were recovered from the Dell laptop. Id., at 109. Detective Baker
characterized these images as being child pornography and described the images before those
images were published to the jury.2 Id., at 110-.12. Some ofthe torrents found on the loose
hard drive and the Dell laptop included "LS" as a descriptor, which, from his training and
experience, Det�ctive Baker knows to be often associated with the name of a former child
pornography magazine. Id, at 114-15._The operating system on the Dell laptop was
registered to "Shannon" when it was installed on November 5, 2013, Id., at 116.
One image was recovered from the Gateway laptop, which was published to the jury.
Id., at 117-18; Additionally, a sharing program known as "Limewire" was found on the
Gateway laptop. Id., at 118-19. Detective Baker described how Limeware has a globally
unique identifier for each time it is installed that he referred to as a '�GUIB." Id., at 119. The
Gateway laptop had a GUIB. Id. When checked against the International Crimes Against
Children website, the GUIB for the Gateway laptop shov....ed it h'ad been sharing child
pornography. Id., at 120. In fact, the GUIB indicated that the Gateway laptop had travelled
all over the United States and Canada to places that are well removed from one another. Id.,
at 139-41. The Gateway's operating system was Windows XP Service Pack 3, which was not
registered. to any particular person during setup on July 25, 2009. Jd., at 121. This indicated .
2 It is not clear from the transcript that the images were circulated to the jury; however, this Court has no reason
to doubt that they were based upon the lack of any objections from either of the parties regarding the photos
being supplied, or not, to the jury.
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to Detective Baker that whoever set up the Gatewayhad declined to supply any personally
identifying information when setting up the Gateway laptop. Id.
On cross-examination, Detective Baker agreed with the defense that any type of file
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can be shared on BitTorrent. (N.T., 11/2/15, at 127.) Additionally, BitTorrent and shredder
applications have legal uses. Id., at 128. The detective admitted that he could not identify
who any of the subjects of the 8 pictures in question are, nor was he aware of their ages. Id.,
at 149-50.
When it came time for the defense to present evidence, they called Jody Nichols who
is the Appellant's sister. ld., at 14. Ms. Nichols stated that the Appellant worked for her at
Nichols' Insurance from January to September of 2013. (N.T., 11/4/15,. at 15.)3 The loose
hard drive, which was named "Nicholas 3," was bought for the insurancecompany to giveto
sales associates and was used from 2008 to September or October of201 l. Id., at 15-16.
Having asked his sister for a computerto use, Ms. Nichols gave the Appellant a computer
that had contained the loose hard drive during the last quarter of 2012-prior to the
Appellant's employment at Nichols' Insurance. Id., at 16-17. The computer that Jody Nichols
had lent to the Appellant was returned to her without the hard drive. Id., at 18.
3 We would note that the two days of court proceedings were bifurcated by a court holiday. This seems to have
resulted in the transcript of the second day beginning anew. In order to avoid confusion, we provide this
explanation and refer to the second day of the trial transcript by its date of l l/4/15.
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III. Matters Complained of on Appeal
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A. Trial of Appellant's Peers
The Appellant's first matter complained of is that, as a result of the Commonwealth
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exercising all ofits peremptory challenges to strike men, which resulted in the impaneling of
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(0 an all-female jury, the Appellant was denied trial by a jury of his peers. We believe this
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(J) complaint is likely premature.
en
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court of the United States of America,
reaffirming and expanding upon their prior decision in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202(1965), held that the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment disallows prosecutors
from striking potential jurors based upon the erroneous notion that black jurors could not be
impartial in a case presented against a black defendant." 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). In Batson,
The Court went.on to state:
[A] defendant may establish e primafacie case of purposeful discrimination in
selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's
exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. To establish such a
case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group ... and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to
remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the ·
defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute,
that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits
."those to discriminate who are of amind to discriminate." ... Finally, the
defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances
raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the
veniremen from the petitjury on accountof their race. This combination of
4 Westlaw provides an extremely helpful primer on the subject of Batson challenges that has guided our
understanding of the matter and which can be found at: 1 OA West's Pa. Prac., Driving Under the Influence §
27:6 (2016 ed.)
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factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire,
raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.
Id., at 96 (internal citations omitted). The case law has developed such that defendants of any
race may assert Batson challenges to the exclusion of.a race or gender from their jury. See
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Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) and J.E.B. v.. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S.127
c: (I 994); respectively. See also, 'Commcnwealthv. Roney, 79 AJd 595, 618·19 (Pa. 2013)
''·,.J (citing .I.EB., supra).
The relevant circumstances a court must consider include any patterns in striking a
race of'jurors and the prosecutor's questions and comments while conducting the voir dire
process. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 649 A,2d 435, 443 (Pa, 1994). Interestingly, "[t]he
striking of a number ofindividuals belonging to some cognizable minority group, however,
is not dispositive that a violation of Batson has occurred." Commonwealth v. Rico, 711 A.2d
990, 993 (Pa. 1998) (citing Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 555 A.2d 846, 850 (Pa. 1989)).
In order to lay the groundwork for a successful Batson challenge appeal that.is
premised upon a primafacie case of racial discrimination having occurred during voir dire,
defense counsel must make a record of the following:
J. the race or gender of all the venirepersons in the jury pools;
2 .. the race or gender of all venirepersons remaining after challenges for cause;
3. the race or gender of those removed by the prosecutor.and
4. the race or gender ofthe.jurors who served and the gender of jurors
acceptable by the Commonwealth who were stricken by the defense.
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Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Spence, 627 A.2d 1176, 1182-83 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v.
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Jones, 668 A.2d 49 l, 518 (Pa. 1995)). Any failure of defense counsel to make such a
complete record precludes appellate review of Batson challenges. Commonwealth v.
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Thompson, 106 A.3d 742, 752 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (citations omitted). "After such a record
is established, the trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances to determine
D whether challen.ges were used to exclude venirepersons on account ofrace or gender." Rico,
supra, at 993. "If the court finds in the affirmative, the prosecutor is to offer neutral reasons
for each ofits strikes." Id.; Batson, 476 U.S., at 97 (citations omitted).
Unfortunately for the Appellant, we do not believe that trial counsel made a.record
thataddressed the inquiries that must be made for a Batson challenge. Again, such a failure
precludes appellate review of any Batson challenges. This is not to say that the matter Will
forever evade review; but, rather, that it is untimely submitted on a direct appeal. For this
reason, we humbly seek affirmance as to this matter complained of on appeal.
In Comnionwealth v. Sepulveda, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the
defendant could not demonstrate, in a Post-Conviction Relief Act setting, purposeful
discrimination based upon statistical evidence. 55 A.3d 1108, 1132,.33 (Pa. 2012) (citations
omitted). We would note, however, that, in Sepulveda, the Commonwealth had not exercised
all of its peremptory strikes, the Commonwealth had acceptedjurors ofboth genders, and
nothing in the transcript demonstrated gender-based bias or animus. Id
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c::, B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A number of the Appellant's matters complained of relate to the supposed
insufficiency of evidence. 5 Therefore, we provide a brief synopsis of relevant law to avoid
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needless repetition later. In Commonwealth v. Fabian, the Superior Court succinctly laid out
their standard ofreviewfor sufficiency of the evidence challenges as follows:
1.1) The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether
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viewing all the evidence admitted at.trial in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above
test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-
finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts
regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence
actually received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact while
passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part or none ofthe evidence.
60 A.3d 146, 150-51 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)(Com,noriwealthv. .Jones, 886 A.2d 689,
704 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)). With the aforementioned law in mind, we turn to those matters
complained of regarding the sufficiency of evidence,
5 We believe.that the Appellant could have challenged the-sufficiency of the evidence to prove Possession of
Child Pornography in orie consolidated matter as all of the charges are identical=-save for the image in
question-and the Appellant is realistically challenging the sufficiency ofthe evidence presented to show
Possession of Child Pornography. Nonetheless; we will attempt to hew as closely as possible to the Appellant's
presentation so as to avoid missing an issue raised. ·
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�j 1. Underage Prohibited Sexual Acts or Simulation Thereof
··�! The Appellant's first and fourth matters complained of are so intertwined as to be all
but inseparable. Therefore, for conservation of judicial resources, we dispense with them
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simultaneously. In his second matter complained of on appeal, the Appellant avers that the
.D evidence adduced by the Commonwealth was insufficient to demonstrate, as required," ... a
child under the �ge of 18 engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such
act," because none of the photographs depicted actual or simulated sexual activity. For his
fourth matter complained of on appeal, the Appellant avers that.the photos undergirding each
of the individual charges did not depict sexual acts and the evidence was insufficient.to show
that the photos were possessed for purposes of sexual stimulation or gratification of the
possessor. For the reasons cited infra, we disagree with both contentions.
Ab initio, we describe the photos in question. ·Exhibit number 5 was described by
Detective Baker as follows:
.: . .
It's an image of two prepubescent females and one prepubescent male
standing naked, and it appears to be in a bathhouse. One of the females is
holding a tennis ball. It looks like it's overseas, if! would have to guess.
(Notes of Testimony, 11/2/15, at 99.}Exhibit nurnberewas described as follows: "This is an
image of two prepubescent females laying [sic] on a beach, both are completely naked and
laying on their stomachs in the sand as the water comes over them." Id. Exhibit number 7
was described as follows: "This is two prepubescent females, it looks like they are standing
in a shower, one might be a male, I can't tell by the way it's blurred out" Id., at 99-100.
15
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..;.
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2) Exhibit number 8 was described as follows: "This is of another two prepubescent females,
they are both kneeling on, it looks like a couch, facing a wall, and they are both completely
r.:.:, naked[.]"Jd., at 100. Exhibit number 9 was described as follows: "It appears to be a
J1
prepubescent female kneeling on a bed. She's completely naked facing way from the
camera." Id., at 110. Exhibit number 10 is described as follows: "This is ofa prepubescent
female on a professional set, she's completely naked, and she's holding a flower above her
head." Id., at 110--ll. And, Exhibit number 12 was described as follows: "This is an image of
a prepubescent female laying {sic] naked, it appears to be on a desk, I believe there is an
adult male that is having intercourse with this female." Id., at 118.
All ofthe charges of which the Appellant was convicted were for Possession of Child
Pornography. Possession of Child Pornography is defined in relevant part of 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
6312(d) as follows:
Any person who intentionally views or knowingly possesses qr controls any
book, magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape, computer
depiction or other material depicting a child under the age of 18 years
engagingin a prohibited sexual act orin the simulation of such act commits an
offense.
Based upon his first complaint, the Appellant does not believe the photos depict actual or
simulated sexual activity. And, the definition for "prohibited sexual act" forms the basis of
the Appellant's fourth matter complained of. One cannot be easily addressed without
touching upon the other. So, we look to the definition of'vprohibtted sexual act," as defined
at 18 Pa.C.S.A § 6312(g) and find that _it includes the following:
16
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C) Sexual intercourse as defined in section 3101 (relating to definitions),
�-.,..- masturbation, sadism, mascichism, bestiality, fellatio, cunnilingus, lewd
�·-)
exhibition of the genitals or nudity ifsuch nudity is depictedfor the purpose of
sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who might view such
depiction.
If]
.....,. (emphasis added). All of the photos, as described above, depict lewd exhibition of the
genitals or nudity that was produced for sexual stimulation. To quote Mr. Justice Douglas in
(?.)
his dissenting opinion in Miller v. California, regarding what qualifies as hardcore
pornography, "'I could never succeed in (defining it) intelligibly,' but 'I know it when I see
it.'" 413 U.S. 15, 39 {quoting Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. State
of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)). We believe the jurors could reasonably conclude that the
photos in question met the definition of a prohibited sexual act.
Delving further into the operative definition, in Commonwealth v. Savich, the
Superior Court found thatl 8 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312 is not void for vagueness or arbitrary as
applied to the videotaping of children. 716 A.2d 1251, 1255-57 (Pa, Super. Ct. 1998)
(citations omitted). Though another section of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312 is at issue in Savich, it
relies upon the same definitions as § 6312(d). And, "[tjheterm 'for purposes of sexual
stimulation or gratification of the viewer' permits the fact-finder to distinguish between
depictions such as those in the present case from nude depictions taken for legitimate
scientific, medical or educational activities, which are specifically exempt under§ 6312(f)."
Id., at 1256 (citing Washingtonv. Bohannon, 814 P.2d 694 (1991)). Most instructive for this
case is Commonwealth v. Davidson. 938 A.2d 198 (Pa. 2007). Davidson, likeSavich
17
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f .•__)
addresses issues of potential vagueness in the definition of"prohibited sexual act" and rejects
>..J
them. Id., at 213. The Appellant, though not specifically raisingthis issue, is wallowing in it.
Put simply, the Appellant's first and fourth complaints suggest that there is simply no way of
Vl
1-� ascertaining whether the pictures were "depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or
gratification." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(g). In Davidson, The Court, in discussing the related§
,:2)
63 l2(a)6, states .the following:
The "nudity" qualifier does not create a subjective standard requiring people
to guess atits meaning. The content, focus and setting ofthe images create an
objective standard which allows a personof common intelligence to know
what images are prohibited under the statute. ·
Davidson, 'supra, at 213 (emphasis added), The Davidson Court went on to state:
The trial court found that "[ a]t least [ ] 28 of the thousands of pornographic
images stored within [a]ppellant['s] [] computer depicted children engaged in
vaginal intercourse, analintercourse, oral sex, performing sex acts, or in
various stages ofundress or in sexually and [sic] in sexually provocative
poses. This fact clearly satisfies the 'prohibited sexual act' definition
contained in [Section 6312(a)J ." Utilizing the statutory definition of
"prohibited sexual act," the court properly focuses on th� content ofthe
images in making its determination.
Id., at 213-14 (citation omitted) ( emphasis added). Moreover, "common sense and human
experience dictate that an 'individual of ordinary intelligence, not a mind reader or a genius,
can identify whether a photograph of a nude child depicts 'nudity' for the purpose of sexual
stimulation or gratification." Id., at 214. The fact-finding.jury; armed with their common
sense, was 'eminently able to decide if the photos in question depicted nudity for the purpose
6 The definition cited at 18 Pa;C.S.A. § 6312{a) was renumbered as 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 63 l2(g) in 2009.
18
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of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who tnight view them. And, our
··,J estimation of the photos comports with how the jury must have viewed the photos
considering their finding of guilt. We believe that the images challenged by the Appellant
were possessed for purposes of sexual stimulation or gratification of the Appellant. We
therefore dutifully request affirmance as to this matter complained of on appeal.
..f::·,
(:) �.Age ofSubjects in Pictures
For his third matter complained of, the Appellant argues that the evidence was
insufficient to show that the persons depicted in each of the photos related to the charges
upon which guilt was found were under the age of 18 as required by 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1632(e).
For the following reasons, we disagree.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d) states that, for a person to be guilty of Possession of Child
Pornography, the subject must be, "a child under theage of 18 years." In Commonwealth v.
Koehler, the Superior Court states that, '"the proof necessary to satisfy the element of age in ,·
a dissemination or possession of child pornography case is not limited to expert. opinion
testimony.'" 914 A.2d 427, 438 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v, Robertson-
Dewar, 829'A.2d 1207, 1212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)). The Koehler court goes on to state that,
"[s]ection 6312 does not mandate experttestimony on age, as it permits a case-by-case
process whereby the trier of fact may be able to decide the elementofage based on the
outward physical appearance of an alleged minor.'" Id. (quoting Robertson-Dewar, supra, at
1213). "However, where the alleged minor is post-puberty but appears quite young, expert
19
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testimony may well be necessary to assist the trier of fact as to age." Id. Like the defendant in
·• ••J
Koehler, it does not appear that a timely objection was raised regarding this issue, which will
likely prevent appellate review; Id. (citing Pa.R.A.P. 302). We recognize that appeliate
.n
counsel was not trial counsel and that this issue may recur as a collateral matter challenging
.D trial counsel's effectiveness; however, we will nonetheless address the issue as we do not
:::,
f,:;..
believe that the�e would have been grounds to object vis-a-vis the age of the subjects of.the
.n
photos,
From our review of the photos, all of the subjects appear to be prepubescent. Per
Koehler, supra, it was for the jury to determine, sans expert testimony, whether the subjects
of the photos in question were under.the age of 18. This Court has absolutely ho question as·
to whether or not the subjects of the photos are prepubescent. To this Court, they very clearly
are. We leave any conclusion to the contrary to be made by our judicial betters. For the
foregoing reasons; we pray for affirmance as to this 'matter complained of on appeal.
3. Knowing Possession
The Appellant's fifth, sixth, and eighth matters complained of ate so interrelated as to
be best addressed together. All three of these matters complained of relate to whether or not
the Appellant knowingly possessed the photos at issue in this case. In his fifth matter
complained of, the Appellant states thatthere was insufficient evidence presented to prove
that the Appellant "knowingly" possessed the photos in question where the evidence
demonstrated that the photos had been deleted and no evidence was produced that the
20
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Appellant had viewed them. For his sixth matter complained of, the Appellantbelieves that
932 A.2d 172, 174
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1021-1022 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2011 ). We have also reviewed cases in which circumstantial evidence indicated that the
defendant was the one who viewed the photos. Commonwealth v. Colon-Plaza, 136 A.3d
521, 526-27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (''Not only was [the defendant] the internet subscriber,
profile user of the HP laptop, and one of just two residents living at the address, he also
admitted to h�ving access to the laptop, knowing its password, arid, significantly, using its
Ares file-sharing program in the past"); Commonwealth v. Koehler, 914 A.2d 427, 427 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2006)("[I]t is clear that sufficient evidence existed to support thejury's
determination. The Commonwealth established, inter alia, that the computer bore a screen
name, systems properties name, and a software registration name all referring in some
respect to Appellant's proper name. Furthermore, the Commonwealth established that 12 of
the 14 video clips in question were downloaded onto his computer in the early morning
21
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1,•.J
before Appellant's work hours began, and the other two videos were downloaded at nearly
··.,..J
midnight, after Appellant's work hours. The totality of the circumstances presented at trial
thus permitted the jury to infer the Appellant's ownership, use, and ability to access the
materials at issue such that it was he, and no one else in his aunt's home, who possessed the
child pornography at issue.") The case sub Judice clearly fits within the second species of
J··
c:) such cases.
�---l
The facts showing that the Appellant knowingly possessed the photos in question are
as follows. Comcast identified the Appellant as the registered account holder associated with
the IP address. The physical address associated with that account appears from the evidence
to have been the Appellant's residence. The Appellant's sister stated that the Appellantwas
given the loose hard drive to use, which contained Exhibits numbered 5 through 8. The
operating system of the Dell laptop, which contained Exhibits numbered9 and 10, was
registeredin the Appellant's name of "Shannon." The loose hard drive, the Dell laptop, and
the-Gateway laptop all had some form of file-sharing epplication of the sort whose activity
Detective Baker's investigation monitored. Both the loose hard drive and the Dell laptop
contained shredder applications, which does not seem coincidental where the Appellant
possessed both devices and those devices contained child pornography. Detective Baker
testified that, in his experience, shredding applications are typically found in child
pornography cases where the offender exhibits at least a mid-level 'degree of sophistication.
This explains the deletion of files that were recovered by Detective Baker. While not
22
········· ·-···-····· ·----"---·---------------------------
)
definitive on its own, the Appellantpossessed at least two computers that made use of
.J shredding applications where child pornography had been deleted. Again, following a search
of his residence, the Appellant was found to be in possession of three devices containing
·1
child pornography where at least one of the devices was clearly registered in the Appellant's
::, name. When he was served with the search warrant and told that the officers were looking for
::,
) child pornography, the Appellant made what might be considered a statement against own
o
interest or, perhaps, an excited utterance when he responded that he was addicted to
pornography. The Appellant knew the investigators were present at his property looking for
child pornography; yet, the defense would surely have us believe, he responded by
proclaiming his addiction to the related, but legal, item of adult pornography. It seems more·
likely that the Appellant's admission was referring to child pornography. Finally, the only
computer that the Appellant did not own belonged to his sister's insurance company.
Interestingly, the Appellant returned that computer without the hard drive; which evidences
knowledge on his part that it contained information that he did �ot wish to divulge.
The totality of the circumstances of this case militates in favor of finding that the
Appellant did knowingly possess child pornography for which he was convicted. We are not
in a position to say that this is an ironclad circumstantial case; however, by the very nature of
these sorts of crimes, a sophisticated trafficker in child pornography might evade prosecution
by dint of savvy actions such as the use of shredding applications. Obviously, all criminal
actions might elude prosecution through careful planning; yet, we believe that there is an
23
·-· ·-------······-···--···-·--- -------·'-·-·-·-----··- ·······-·-----
enhanced risk in cases of this nature as a result of the ethereal nature of computer-based
evidence. In our estimation, there is enough circumstantial evidence to tie the Appellant to all
of the images for which he was convicted and infer that he viewed those images. Viewing the
1
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict-winning Commonwealth, we believe that
.J there was sufficient evidence presented by the Commonwealth of the Appellant's intentional
or knowing pos�ession of the offensive images. Trusting that if we have erred then our
learned superiors will set us right, we reverentially seek affirrnance as to these matters
complained of on appeal.
i, Knowledge of Contents on Loose Hard Drive
In addition to the foregoing on the subject ofknowing possession, we.must address
the contention in his sixth matter complained of that the Appellant did not have access to the
loose hard drive at the time when the illicit images were downloaded. We would first note
that the Appellant has not directed us to where in the transcript or admitted evidence it is
evident that the images on the loos� hard drive were downloaded prior to the Appellant's
possession of the loose hard drive. The Appellant's Concise Statement of Matters
Complained of on Appeal avers that there is evidence showing that Exhibits #51 #6, #7, and
#8 were downloaded in 2009 and 2010. See unnumbered page 2. We cannot locate this
evidence. Our review of the transcript reveals that trial counsel elicited from Detective Baker
that the only dates associated with these exhibits related to the camera and the time at which
the photos were created in 2010 or 2011 and not when they were· downloaded onto the loose
24
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hard drive. Assuming this is the evidence to which the Appellant refers-then we are left to
'
ponder why it matters when the images were created. The Appellant is not alleged to have
created the images; but, rather, the Appellant is alleged to have possessed already existing
photos, which necessarily musthave been created at some date prior to his accessing them.
Moreover, we reiterate the suspicious action of the Appellant in removing the hard drive
from the computer before returning it to the insurance company as evidence of knowledge.
ii. Solitary Gateway Image and Location Inconsistency
In his eighth matter complained of on appeal, the Appellant highlights the fact that
the Gateway computer contained.just one illicit photo that had been deleted and the fact that
the Gateway had shared child pornography from physical locations across the United States
and from international locales.7 Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, at
unnumbered page 4. The Appellant believes that this defeats any notion that he knowingly
possessed the illicit image on the Gateway. We disagree.
The fact that there was but one image located on the Gateway and it had been deleted
speaks to the Appellant's modus operandi. All of the evidence considered in toto depicts an
offender who viewed child pornography and then sought to obliterate the evidence of such
acts. Viewed inisolation, the evidence from the Gateway computer would not be half so
strong as it is in conjunction with evidence garnered from the other two hard drives seized at
7 The Appellant's concise statement refers to the Gateway downloading images from across the United States
and internationally; however, the trial testimony indicated that the Gateway had shared from these locations.
(N.T., 11/2/15, at120and 139-41.) ·
25
···-······-······· ·········---·----- -------------------------
.,.,
the same time. The loose hard drive and the Pell laptop contained shredding applications
·--�J
whose purpose is to permanently delete material from a computer.No great cache of child
pornography was found on either the loose hard drive or the Dell laptop, which speaks to
what Detective Baker described as the Appellant' s mid-level grade of sophistication in
viewing child pornography. The Appellant is a person who is savvy at covering his tracks,
No wonder the� that only a solitary image was found on the Gateway or thefact that it was
deleted. It is the Appellant's concerted efforts to conceal his wrongdoing that end up
demonstrating a pattern of concealment that strengthens the inference that he intentionally or
knowingly possessed the images in question.
When we consider the Appellant's argument that there was a dearth of evidence to
demonstrate he was ever in any of the locations from which the GUIB indicated that the
Gateway laptop had shared child pornography, we are struck by the fact that it was not the
Commonwealth that elicited this information. It was the defense who questioned Detective
Baker regarding the varied locations associated with the Gatew�y and the sharing of child
pornography: (N.T., 11/2/15, at 139-41.) Insofar as sufficiency of the evidence goes, we
remember that " ... the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility ofinnocence," Commonwealth v. Fabian, 60 A.3d 146, 150-51
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (citations omitted). As with any defendant, the Appellanthad no burden
at trial, but his trial counsel did assert to the jury that the Commonwealth had rtot proven that
the Appellant was ever present in the far-flung locations that the Gateway laptop had
26
· ····· ··· ··· ···--·-------·-·----------------------------- . -·······---------··· ···----·-----···
-:::;
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t'.)
(I) apparently been to. (N.T., 11/4/15, at 37.) The jury was obviously unswayed by this
reasoning.
To whatever, extent this is actually a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we
1.fl
recite therelevant law. Allegations that a verdict is againstthe weight of the evidence are
I,£). decided based upon the discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Chine, 40 A.3d 1239,
1243 (Pa. Super, Ct. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1101 (Pa. Super.
,,.)
Ct. 2005)). The trier of fact, "is free to believe all, part, or none ofthe evidence.and to
determine the credibility ofthe witnesses." Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, 33 A.3d 602, 609
(Pa. 201 l). Moreover, the trial court should not disturb ajury's verdict unless the verdict is
"so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice." Id. Further, "unless the
evidence is so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon pure
conjecture, these types of claims are not cognizable on appellate review." Commonwealth v.
Gibbs, 981 'A.2d 274; 282 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 863 A.2d
1185, 1191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)). .Appe.lfate review will not o�errule a . trial court's
determination as to weight of the evidence unless "the facts and inferences of record disclose
a palpable abuse of discretion." · Id. To this end, "the trial court's denial of a motion for a
new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings." Id.As �e state in ·aimost every appeal vis-a-vis a weight ofthe evidence challenge,' it is
true that ther� are certainly pieces of evidence which arguably undermine the
Commonwealth's case; however, the testis not whether there is any evidence that goes
27.
·······---······· . --------------------
co
c: against the Commonwealth's assertions. Rather, this Court is to examine whether the verdict
was "so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice." Ramtahal, supra. As our
sense of justice was not shocked, we believe thejury's verdict should remain undisturbed.
I.)"]
4. Verdict Based on Insufficient and Irrelevant Evidence
co For his seventh matter complained of, the Appellant alleges that Detective Baker
0)
introducedmisleading, irrelevant, and confusing computer terminology that resulted in a
verdict based upon insufficient and irrelevant evidence.The Appellant makes two specific
allegations in this vain, whose separation we maintain for clarity,
i. Implication of Detective Baker's Probable Cause
The Appellant believes that the jury was inappropriately influenced by Detective
Baker's testimony regarding what drew his attention to the Appellant and the improper
suggestion that there were many more child pornographic photos in the Appellant's
possession than what was ultimately produced for the jury. The Appellant is referring to a
point in the trial during which Detective Baker described, at the, beginning of the
investigation, being able to download one image associated with an information hash before
the connection was choked off. (N.T., 11/2/15, at 88.) The detective testified that there were
approximately 1700 total files and that 860 were of interest to the Internet Crimes Against
Children Task Force. Id. And, "[ o]finterest means that they are either partially naked
pictures or completely naked child pornography images." Id.
The evidence in question was initially proffered regarding a dissemination charge,
28
1
...
(N.T.,·l 1/2/15, at 88-92), which this Court dismissed for lack of evidence, (N.T., 11/4/15, at
. ,)
7). Nonetheless, the evidence was still relevant to those charges that proceeded to the jury .
Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible to establish the identity of the person charged with a
n crime. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2); See also Commonwealth v. Dillon, 863 A.2d 597, 601 (Pa. Super.
. .
Ct. 2004) (citing Pa.R.E, 404(b)). The question of how the detective became interested in the
Appellant and i?entified the Appellant required the recounting of Detective Baker's detection
of illicit images emanating from what was determined to be the Appellant's address. And,
"our courts have long recognized the special significance ofevidence which provides jurors
with the res gestae, or complete history, of a crime." Dillon, supra (citing Commonwealth v.
Paddy, 800 A.2d 294, 308 (Pa. 2002)). As was stated by the Superior Court in Smith v.
Morrison,
[t]he law "does not require a court to sanitize a trial to eliminate all unpleasant
facts from the jury's consideration where those facts are relevant.to the issues
· at hand and form part of the history and natural development of the. events and
offenses for which the defendant is charged."
47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Page, 965 A.2d 12121. . '
1220 (P�. Super. 2009) ( citation omitted)). A recognized hash was being shared from the
Appellant's computer. That hash was known to contain a certain number of files that were of
interest to investigators _and led to the investigation of the Appellant. Detective Baker
conveyed this in his testimony. We believe that a jury was cognizant of the fact that the
Appellant was not found to possess 860 images of fully or partially nudechildren, This was
evident from the total of seven images that were described andpresented to thejury and the
29
1,/)
t-._)
testimony that these constituted all that was located on the computers seized from the
Appellant The jury had a right to know how and why the detective became interested in the
Appellant. We therefore hope for affirmance as to this matter complained of on appeal.
ii. Misleading Expert Testimony
In addition to his complaint that Detective Baker misled the jury regarding the
J;,.
h-'-� number of chil� pornographic images, the Appellantcomplains that the detective confused
the jury by misrepresenting what a BitT orrent is. The Appellant alleges that a BitTorrent is a
keyword that links to files rather than containing the files itself. Arguendo the Appellant is
right, how does this.materially change anything? Withoutthis Courtrelying upon our futile
internet searches that seem to support both contentions to varying degrees and which we have
not been able to check with experts, the jury was well aware as to how many photos the
Appellant was alleged to possess. Detective Baker described seven photos that were found on
devices recovered from the Appellant's address, which the jury saw.
Even if it was error to admit Detective Baker's testimony regarding what exactly a
BitTorrent is, we would offer that it was harmless error. In Commonwealth v. Allshouse, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated the following:
[T]he doctrine of harmless error is a technique of appellate review designed to
advance judicial, economy by obviating the necessity for a retrial where the
appellate court is convinced that a trial error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Its purpose is premised on the well-settled proposition that
"[a] defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one."
36A.3d 163� 183 (Pa. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth.v. Thornton, 431 A.2d 248, 251 (Pa.
30
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)
1981)). And, "[hjarmless error is present when the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so
.•J overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error is so insignificant by comparison that it
is dear beyonda reasonable doubt that the error could not have contributed to the verdict."
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 712 A.2d 746, 749 (Pa. 1998) (citing Commonwealthv. Ragan,
645 A.2d 811, 820 (Pa. 1994)). Three devices were seized from the Appellant that all
contained child pornography. The usage ofa file-sharing application helped to locate and
.r.,
identify the Appellant. The presence of the file-sharing applications also helped to show that
the Appellant's possession of the child pornography was intentional or knowing. The precise
manner in which BitTorrents work could not have contributed to the verdict because the jury
only needed to determine if the Appellant possessed the images he was charged with
possessing. The evidence recovered from the loose hard drive, Dell laptop, and Gateway
laptop was overwhelming. Therefore, we respectfully request affirmance as to this matter
complained of on appeal.
31
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h.)
('p
t·,,_)
CD IV. Conclusion
Based upon the reasons stated above, this Court respectfully urges affirmance of our
June l, 2017 order.
IJl
1-,
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_.-;:;:._.,
J:,.
BY THE COURT,
DATED: Decemb�r �
2017
�t:A:d�
MICHAElLE. BoiliNER, JUDGE
32