In the Interest of: Y.K.W., a Minor ( 2017 )

J -S23031-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: Y.K.W., a Minor IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: K.I.H., Mother No. 3207 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order dated September 16, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Family Court Division, No(s): CP-51-AP-0000786-2015;
CP-51-DP-0001907-2013
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.D.W., a Minor IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: K.I.H., Mother No. 3208 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order dated September 16, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Family Court Division, No(s): CP-51-AP-0000785-2015;
CP-51-DP-0001908-2013
IN THE INTEREST OF: I.T.W., a Minor IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: K.I.H., Mother No. 3209 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order dated September 16, 2016
inthe Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Family Court Division, No(s): CP-51-AP-0000784-2015;
CP-51-DP-0001909-2013
BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO and MUSMANNO, JJ.
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MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MAY 05, 2017
K.H. ("Mother") appeals from the Orders granting the Petitions, filed
by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS"), involuntarily
terminating Mother's parental rights to her children, Y.K.W., K.D.W. and
I.T.W. (collectively, "Children"), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2),
(5), (8) and (b).1 Mother's counsel, Gary Server, Esquire ("Counsel"), has
filed a Motion to Withdraw from his representation of Mother, and a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).2 We grant
Counsel's Motion to Withdraw and affirm the Orders of the trial court.
We adopt the trial court's comprehensive summary of the facts and
procedural history for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion,
12/6/16, at 1-5.
On September 16, 2016, the trial court entered its Orders terminating
Mother's parental rights to Children, and changing Children's placement
goals to adoption. Mother filed timely Notices of Appeal, accompanied by a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statements of matters complained of on appeal.
1 This Court consolidated Mother's appeals for disposition. We additionally
note that Children's father has filed separate appeals of the orders
terminating his parental rights to Children, and changing their placement
goals to adoption, at Nos. 3340, 3341 & 3342 EDA 2016.
2 This Court has extended the Anders principles to cases involving the
termination of parental rights. In the Interest of .7.1.L., 150 A.3d 475,
479 (Pa. Super. 2016).
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Subsequently, Counsel filed with this Court a Motion to Withdraw from
his representation of Mother, and an Anders brief.
When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the
merits of the underlying issues until we address counsel's request to
withdraw. .7.1.L., 150 A.3d at 479. To be permitted to withdraw, counsel
must (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a
conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined that the
appeal would be frivolous; (2) furnish a copy of the brief to the client; and
(3) advise the client that he or she has the right to retain private counsel or
raise additional arguments that the client deems worthy of the court's
attention. In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004).
In his Motion to Withdraw, Counsel states that he "has made a
thorough and conscientious examination of the record[,]" and "believes that
this appeal[,] in its present procedural posture[,] is wholly frivolous and
without support in the law or facts." Motion to Withdraw, 1/22/17, at 1111 4,
5. Counsel represents that he has notified Mother in writing of his
conclusion that the appeal has no merit, that "[C]ounsel is moving to
withdraw[,]" and that Mother "has the right to represent herself and to
participate in the appeal or to hire private counsel." Id. at ¶ 3. Counsel
states that he has notified Mother of the withdrawal request, supplied her
with copies of the Motion to Withdraw and the Anders brief, and sent
Mother a letter explaining her right to proceed pro se or with new, privately-
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retained counsel to raise any additional points or arguments that Mother
believes have merit. See id. at ¶ 3; Letter, 1/22/17. Consequently, we
conclude that Counsel has met the procedural requirements of Anders.
We must next determine whether counsel's Anders brief meets the
requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago.
In Santiago, our Supreme Court stated that the Anders brief must
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Further, "[a]fter establishing that the
antecedent requirements have been met, this Court must then make an
independent evaluation of the record to determine whether the appeal is, in
fact, wholly frivolous." Commonwealth v. Palm, 903 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Townsend, 693 A.2d 980, 982
(Pa. Super. 1997)).
In the Anders brief, Counsel has provided a summary of the facts and
procedural history of the case, referred to evidence of record that might
arguably support the issues raised on appeal, provided citations to relevant
case law, stated his conclusion that the appeal is wholly frivolous, and
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provided his reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Accordingly,
counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago.3
Mother has not filed a pro se brief or a counseled brief with new,
privately -retained counsel. We, therefore, review the following issues raised
in the Anders brief:
[1.] WHETHER UNDER THE JUVENILE ACT, 42 PA.C.S.A.
SECTION 6351, AND 55 PA. CODE SECTION 3130.74, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT [("ASFA")], 42 U.S.C.[A.]
SECTION 671 ET SEQ., REASONABLE EFFORTS WERE MADE TO
REUNITE [] MOTHER WITH [] CHILDREN[,] AND WHETHER THE
GOAL CHANGES TO ADOPTION WERE THE DISPOSITIONS BEST
SUITED TO THE SAFETY, PROTECTION AND PHYSICAL, MENTAL
AND MORAL WELFARE OF [] CHILDREN[?]
[2.] WHETHER IT WAS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE THAT MOTHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS SHOULD BE
TERMINATED UNDER SECTIONS 2511(a) & (b)[?]
Anders Brief at 6.
In the Anders brief, Mother claims that the Department of Human
Services ("DHS") and its contracted agencies failed to make reasonable
efforts to reunite her with Children. Id. at 17. Mother asserts that DHS
failed to give her necessary paperwork and the Family Service Plan ("FSP").
Id. Mother also contends that the social workers told her what to do,
without providing her objectives in writing. Id. Mother claims that she
3 We note that Counsel failed to include the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise
Statement in the Anders brief. Cf. Pa.R.A.P. 2111(d) (there shall be
appended to the brief of the appellant a copy of the statement of errors
complained of on appeal ...."). As Counsel's omission does not affect our
review, we will address the claims raised in the Anders brief.
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failed to comply with the objectives through no fault of her own. Id. For
these reasons, Mother argues that DHS did not make reasonable efforts to
reunite her with Children, thereby violating the Juvenile Act and the ASFA.
Id.
Our Supreme Court has set forth the following standards in reviewing
the termination of parental rights:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. ... [O]ur standard of review
requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. In re R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190
(2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or
abused its discretion. Id. As has been often stated, an abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion. Id. Instead, a
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill -will. Id.In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012) (some internal
citations omitted).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, as we have explained, "[t]he standard of clear and convincing
evidence is defined as testimony that is so 'clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
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without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.' Id. (quoting
In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant law and its reasons
for terminating Mother's parental rights to Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2) and (b). See Trial Court Opinion, 12/6/16, at 5-7, 8-10. The
trial court's findings are supported in the record; its legal conclusions are
sound; and we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. See id. We
therefore affirm on the basis of the trial court's Opinion, with regard to the
termination of Mother's parental rights to Children. See id.; see also In re
D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 675 (Pa. 2014) (stating that, "while reasonable
efforts should be considered and indeed, in the appropriate case, a trial
court could insist upon their provision, we hold that nothing in the language
or the purpose of Section 6351(f)(9) [of the Juvenile Act] forbids the
granting of a petition to terminate parental rights, under Section 2511, as a
consequence of the agency's failure to provide reasonable efforts to a
parent.").
In her second claim, Mother argues that it was not proven, by clear
and convincing evidence, that her parental rights should be terminated.
Anders Brief at 19. Mother asserts that a change of goal is "not the
disposition best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and
moral welfare of [C]hildren." Id. In support, Mother claims to have a
strong bond with [C]hildren[,] which was demonstrated by the attention she
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lavished on them during the visits she kept[,] and by the affection they
showed her during her visits." Id. Mother asserts that Children were asking
to come home, and that she has stable housing. Id."When we review a trial court's order to change the placement goal for
a dependent child to adoption, our standard is abuse of discretion." In re
N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa. Super. 2006). "[T]he best interests of the
child and not the interests of the parent must guide the trial court, and the
burden is on the child welfare agency involved to prove that a change in goal
would be in the child's best interest." In re R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 573 (Pa.
2011) (citations omitted). The safety, permanency, and well-being of the
child must take precedence over all other considerations. In the Matter of
S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Having already determined that it is in Children's best interests to
terminate Mother's parental rights, we also agree that it is in Children's best
interests to change their permanency goals to adoption. Accordingly, we
affirm the termination of Mother's parental rights as to Children, and the
change of Children's permanency goals to adoption.
Our independent review discloses no further non -frivolous issues that
could be raised by Mother.4 Accordingly, we grant Counsel's Motion to
Withdraw, and affirm the Orders of the trial court.
4Our review discloses that the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8). On appeal, Mother
challenges only the trial court's termination pursuant to subsection (a)(2).
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Motion to Withdraw granted. Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
J seph D. Seletyn,
Prothonotary
Date: 5/5/2017
As we affirm the trial court's termination pursuant to subsection (a)(2), we
need not address potential challenges to termination pursuant to subsections
(a)(1), (5) or (8). See In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1240 (Pa. Super.
2004) (stating that this Court need only agree with the trial court's decision
as to any one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), in order to affirm a
termination of parental rights).
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Circulated 04/21/2017 11:53 AM
1:-i TH£ COCRT Of COM.WON PLEAS
FOR THE C0l.1'TY OF PHILADELPHIA
t·A.\IIL v COURT DIVISION
ln the lniercst Cir YJ\.\\'. CP-51-[)P-0001901-20 J J
CP· < 1-,\P-00011186-"015
111 the Interest \'.lf KJ> W CP· 5J.l)p.00111908-"ll I 3
CP-, I -AP li00U785-~015
In the Tnti.'r(,·.:.t or 11 \\. CP-S 1-DP-000l909-,013
CP-51 •. \P-0Cl0078J-Z!l 1 S
..\l'l'l:.\L OF: \.:.I H., \lo1he1
01'1:S:IOJ'>
Fernandes. J.:
'\ppeJian1 K.C.H. ("\h,Hhe(·) appeals trcm th ..· order entered ml September 16, :!(H6. granting the
petition likd h> the Philadclphi» Dcpartmcru C'd Human Sen 1:.:1!!> ("OH~··). to involuntarily
terminate Molht'r·, p;m.:mJl right" h1 Y.1\.. \V. i"Ctnld l"). K.D.W. r·Ch1ld 2'") and U .W. ("(JU!d
,··, c(hil<.11 pun,uanl to Rule 192:'lb).
Factual and Procedu ra l Us\<:kgrnund:
1 he family H) this case became to OHS vn fcl,ma{) :::S,
i.Ol)\\.TI 2.on. when l)HS received a
G~'n~r.:tl Protecuve Se(\ ices report w1: Mother lud JU'>I given hirth. was using drugs and had not
been ancnding prcrunnl care OHS visited Mother in her home. and \.h1th~r accepted Jn-H(lJUC
Protecu ve St!(\ recs. I hcsc HS then
developed 3 r a.ind~· Service PJ:.m [ .. 1,SP'"1 \\ nh objcctiv cs for Mother. Between ~OJJ and 2()15,
~ki1hs JiJ not complete her objectives On November .i. ~OJ 5 OHS tiled peutior» to terminate
~J(lihe( s pari..·ntJI righl:-.
The goal chance an,l rerrninaticn trial was held on September 16. ~O )<>. I he foster care agency
supervisor testified that durin:;? the time shi..· ,.,:,,~ involved wlth 1h~ cu-c, from June ~015 to June
~016. Mother hJ.J. r. 9.'16'!(). p~!\ lL t,(111.JcJ \\ ith lb: Children. t''-i T t;,· 16' 16. pg. 38). The DJ IS intake
worker testified that he h.u.l been i11\ ...-ih ed ,,1th tlu:-. case smcc l(1 l2. when Mcrbcrv parental rig.his
to another child were mvoluntanly terminated. l he Children 111 tins case were originally
supervised by DHS. and .:iJl1.)\\',,:J to remain wtth Mother. (v.T. 9.'16'16, rg:-.. 6K. 71>. During the
-upcrvrs.on period. Mother slopped complying with drug screen- at the Clink.al Fvaluation l 'nit
("Cl 1 :·1 and the qu:1111.y vf her home degraded until 11 \\;!:,. no krngcr fit fo1 habiration by the
Children. At this point. th.: Children were adjudicated dcpen.lent. hut remained U\ ;\·!other's home.
(~. I \J1l6,• I(), p~). 7:! 7-H
4 ;\lothtr then lcstcd p.)s1ti\e fi)r I. 9:J 6iJ 6. pg. ::.::: >. Mother sometimes expressed J. ~trong. desire to fini~h parenting
classes, but other time» clatl;- refused 1£'1 con-plete mem. I\. I 9.'16.'J 6. w. &; ) vlorher completed
1
the PCF. \\ hrch recommended inJh idual ihcrapv ror Mother (1'. l . "FJ(,.:t <>. pg. $4). Mother has
no employment or income. h:l"i never :1>.:.ikJ herself for a 1ncnt.t1 il.:ahh a,-..c,::mt"nt and i-, not
..·n~agcJ m tht:rai)~. t N.T. I;') 6: J 6. pf> SSL Morber never completed random drug screer» at CELI.
('I T ~'1 fu 16. rg. ~61. Mother"' ordered to C(l'. but she refused 10 go. tJ\. T. 9'16!16. pg. 89).
Mc·1hcr' 5, i:,ig were origin:llly :-.Jpt:..,.iscJ b~ the I,. inship fo~lt'r parent. l hi::. foster parent claimed
Mother w;,~ not attending visi«. but \lutlk'c claimed she had ancndcd. Visits were changed 10
monthly :u th1.' ag1.;nc~. lhe Children were ti:Hel wben Motbcr mi~:,.cJ vishs. (1'.T ·91) \fother ha, a l11t:1H.H}. but not a parental. rclarionship wnh the Children, ('\; 1. Children'» therapy. (NT o, 16:16. pg 9J). The' Uuldren':,.
rclanonshrp with 'vlnthcr made them up ...1.·1 when she missed ,i,i1:-., and made them act out
inapprf•pnatel~ attcr 'vlother attended "i~it-.. 1"\! l. 9"J6iJ6. pg>. 9]·94) Mocher has never been
more thnn mimrnally compliant \\ ith her cbiccrivc s. (N.T Qll 6.· 16. pg. 951. I he Children would
not suffer any irreparable h.1nn if Mother'« parcraal rights were tcrminnted. , ;\. J. 9.,16/1 (). pgs.
l (J2. J 03 i The Children arc happy ,.,.ith their foster parent. and are bencr behaved than al dO) prior
time in the lite of the case It is in their 0``1 intcrcs; to be adopted by the to-tcr parem •f\·.r.
CJ:J/1')6. PS· 104). Mother missed the Children'< medical appointmeots and v.a:; inconsistent ill
\ isiung the Chi ldren. For a period of time. f\foLher ;;;imrl; Jid nm \ hil at all (~. l. 1.)/j (>.' l (). pgs.
J05·106) Mother has not completed mental health treatment (N.T Q:J6:'J6, pg. lffh Mother
has not c ompleted parenting d,1,,.i:,, or involv cd herself in the Children' s 1hcra:pJ. (N.T Wl 6,, 16.
p~ IO~). TI)(' current DH!:i social worker testified 1har sine ...· ,he was :1-,.,tgneJ the case. luur months
before the trial. she met m person with Motlier and di:-.cu-i,i.ed Mothers objectives Mother
admnted thl:Jt she had J1..1nc nothin~ t() ~(n·•,pl('te her ob}tcthc:s. (~. T. 9:16.1 l ti. pgs. 113-115, 121)
,\fother', ClUhta.ng.rnm. anJ n."llh~d w :sign rclcas~:- 1-:et.:au:,,< '1lc \... ishendanlt (,.r. 9, I ()·'16, pgs. U6-D-:)
}.folil~r auendcd court hc..t.nug:-. where her obiccnves w...'re diecu ...scd ~fotht'r te,1i1ieJ th~1 she
refused t,, go 1n (Tl «lrb the ::is~i~:11:d Dll'.'> «orker. but would have been pcrfectlv willing 10 gt1
1f another ''-QIJ..er had been assigned Mother never completed o court-ordered assessment. O\.T.
\ long she had attended cg when she stopped att\'nJin~. 1):. T. 9 '16'1 fi. pg.
1-11)) M,'HhC'r iesritled that •;h;· agn:cc:J wuh nu.ch of ()I [S' :- case ~he: starts but docs ran complete
(lbJ c~L·tt,c:-.. 1 N. T ->'16.. t 6. pg : -1:? J. Mother k"tilicd that she never completed parcnung classes
bccauv c she -pent her umc pm!nHng her other children. who have also be-en removed from her
care \'\.T. 9, 16:16, p,g 143}. M,nht:r testified lhat she never anendcd anger managcm c·ot. and
mivscd her individual th crap) ln.'CO\I~ she wa-, . ("';\ T. Q·16· l6. pgs )46-IJQ) 'vlotber te~ut'i«l that she completed an mpaticnt
Jrug und alcohol treatment program on September 7 :Ol6, ten davs before th\.' trial Tub program
recommended that vtother continue to engage in an 1)~tpalic:n1 program. which was schednled 10
l:oe:gin on Scptcrnbcr ~9. ~P 16. l~.T. 9. \6/H\ pg:-. 1~8.)53). Mother testified that sbe would work
with DH$ and accomplish bee objcctivcv if 011$ removed her currently -nssigned worker. (~.I.
1;·16·16. pg~. I`` 156>. fvllov.mg argument. the tfh1l court terminated ~fotht'r·., parental rights
under :CJ Pa.C.S.A. ~c· (>). (8) an I .'il!ri.
Discussion:
Mother avers the following errors on appeal:
1. Whether under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 6351, and 55 Pa.Code Section
3130.74, in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act,
42 U.S.C. Section 671 et seq., reasonable efforts were made to reunite Mother with [the
Children) and whether the goal change to adoption was the disposition best suited to the
safety, protections and physical, mental and moral welfare of [the Children]
2. Whether it was proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother's parental rights
should be terminated under Sections 2511(a)(2) and 2511 (b)
Mother alleges that DHS did not provide reasonable efforts to reunify her with the Children. The
court may terminate parental rights even if the state agency does not provide reasonable efforts to
a parent. In re D. C. D., I 05 A.3d 662 (Pa. 2014) ("the remedy for an agency's failure to provide
services is not to punish an innocent child, by delaying permanency through denying termination,
but instead to conclude on the record that the agency has failed to make reasonable efforts, which
imposes a financial penalty on the agency of thousands if not tens of thousands of dollars under
federal law.")
The remedy for a lack of reasonable efforts at the termination stage is not a new trial, but a financial
penalty to DHS. However, OHS has indeed made reasonable efforts in this case. Mother's visits
were originally supervised by the prior foster parent, but when Mother alleged that the foster parent
was lying by claiming Mother never attended visits, DHS changed visitation to occur at the agency,
so Mother's attendance could be accurately tracked. (N.T. 9/16/16, pgs. 19, 24-25, 89-91). DHS
referred Mother to ARC for services, and re-referred her three times when she was unsuccessfully
discharged. (N.T. 9/16/16, pg. 82). The prior DHS worker attempted to personally escort Mother
to CEU for drug screens and assessment, but Mother refused. (N.T. 9/16/16, pgs. 137-138, 159-
160). The current OHS worker personally met with Mother to review her objectives, both before
and during the scheduled FSP meeting. (N.T. 9/16/16, pgs. 113-115, 121). Throughout the life of
this case, DHS has made reasonable efforts to refer Mother for services and provide her visits with
her Children. The trial court found reasonable efforts on behalf of DHS. Mother's appeal of a
lack of reasonable efforts lacks merit both factually and based on the case law of this
Commonwealth.
Page 5 of 10
Mother also alleges that the court erred in changing the Children's permanency goal from
reunification to adoption. In a change of goal proceeding, the child's best interest must be the
focus of the trial court's determination. The child's safety and health are paramount considerations.
In re A.H, 763 A.2d 873 (Pa. Super. 2000). Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act recognizes family
preservation as one of its primary purposes. In the Interest O{R.P. a Minor. 957 A.2d 1205 (Pa.
Super. 2008). As a result, welfare agencies must make efforts to reunify the biological parents
with their child. Nonetheless, if those efforts fail, the agency must redirect its efforts toward
placing the child in an adoptive home. Agencies are not required to provide services indefinitely
when a parent is unwilling or unable to apply the instructions received. In re R. T, 778 A.2d 670(Pa. Super. 200 I). The trial court should consider the best interest of the child as it exists presently,
rather than the facts at the time of the original petition.
The Children in this case were originally supervised by DHS, and allowed to remain with Mother.
(N.T. 9/16/16, pgs. 68, 71). Mother then stopped complying with drug screens, and the Children
were adjudicated dependent, but remained with Mother. (N.T. 9/16/16, pgs. 72-74). The Children
were only removed after the conditions of Mother's home degraded and the Children missed
medical appointments. (N.T. 9116116, pg. 75). Mother's FSP objectives after the Children were
removed were to take a PCE, attend CEU for dual diagnosis assessment and attend ARC for
parenting classes. (N.T. 9/16/16, pgs. 80-81). Mother never completed parenting classes, and
often told DHS that she had no desire or inclination to complete them. (N.T. 9/16/16, pgs. 82-83).
Mother testified that she never completed parenting because she was too busy parenting the
Children's siblings, who have also been removed from Mother's care. (N.T. 9/16/16, pg. 143).
Mother completed the PCE, which recommended individual therapy for Mother. (N.T. 9/16/16,
pg. 84). Mother has never availed herself for a mental health assessment and is not engaged in
therapy. (N.T. 9/16/16, pg. 85). Mother claimed she had been enrolled in therapy, but had stopped
going. She did not know how long she had attended or when she stopped attending. (N.T. 9/ 16/16,
pg. 140). Mother refused random drug screens at CEU, in violation of court orders. (N.T. 9/16/16,
pgs. 86, 89). Mother completed an inpatient drug and alcohol treatment program on September 7,
2016, ten days before the trial. This program was to be followed by an outpatient program, which
was scheduled to begin on September 29, 2016, two weeks after the trial. Despite drugs being an
issue for the entire life of the case, Mother only began to engage in treatment at the last minute,
Page 6 of 10
and ha., dcmousuared a pattern ~:-'tw1 t:ni,h1nt; prograne- she has :-.1ancJ (l\:r Q.'16·'16, pg:-. 1~8-
1 S"l. t Mother tcsu ficd tha: -:,he: would h:~, r been cugcr l(' complete her objecuv cs ii cmly ,;h~· were
a-.~1'4nCd a dilfrr.•m DH~ worke-. (\. T. l)'J 6:'J 6. 11115 13 7-138, 15 'i-156. J 59-160). Morber" i;.
' '
•. 1::,it::. were oritin.,lly supi'r, i5C:li l:iy I he k m.-:-lii I' lester parent Thi, foster parent claimed 'vlother
'.\JS not ;ttkm.hng n'5H-:-. hut Mother claimed :,.he h;1J attended. Vi,it!. \\CJ't! changed IP month}} m
li'H' ai._,nc:. 1> I. l:).')6')<,, pgs. 89-91 >. After this change. rv(other did not attend visns for several
months \lc1h.. -:- refo~c.-xi 1,1 o'fcr :1n:- reason ..... hv she stopped an ending vi-it-, 1 ~ T. 't- 16''16. pgs.
IP.:--!06. L'i6-U71 The C'hildn·n·-. rckuionslup ,, th .v1othi:r made chem Uf!S\'I when she mi-ced
\tsi1::.. und made them ..1,;,·t cut mappropriatcly .1firr \lctht!r aueuded \'1:-.11~. (l'·:.T 9l)61 l6. pi;$. ':>3-
9~) The Children .u e lnthcrap:-. but vlothcr has not involved herselfm rhe Ch1!Jri::n's therapy
I j\. T •FJ (i.·: r, ~)g~. ~7. 3 ~. 108). ~lotb:·r has never been more than rninirnalf; ..:vm~"!ia11l ,\ uh her
FSP .md court orders, bas fo.t~ht with DHS J.nJ refused services. a.nJ failed to make an~ '-igoilic:.m1
pmgr~.:.., to 1)1~,c~ hcr-...d I 111 a posnion \Jo f,'lrCni the Ctnldrcn. Motber has a friendly. hut not a
parental. rel:uin~-.hb wuh the Ch1lJr1tC:,.. l(,. p~,. J•J. 2-1-2:=.:. vlothcr has not parented the Children 01 ull SHl'CC
June :015. c'1.T «;. Jfr'l6. "~· 1Xt I hi.' ( bildrcu arc currently in a pre-adoptive home, ('..T.
<>tl ().I(;. r; 31 t [he Childn:-r. fed ··righ1 at home .. ;-md ha\ c become very comfortable there The
Children Ol"I\\ h•1\k l\1 lhtt foster parent far all their needs. (NT '):)ti, 16. pg. 33). lhc foster parent
has a wonderful. lP\'ing hl.,nd \\1lh al! the Children. (\ T. q·10:16. pg. }J) The Children are
currcmlv the happicct thl'~ have ever been. and arc beuet behaved than at any prior time in the tife
ofihe case. 11\ T 9'16:t6. rg 1...i. 10..t). ·1 he Ch1IJr~n $<.:C tht' foster parent JS their mom. and i1 H
in t~w1r rt'sl interest 11, OC adopted. (N. T. q, If. In, pgs }-l,, H)~. l t '-). J 201. Because these facts
were ck;irh. and comincmcl\
... , cxtablishcd h·, the credible rcsumonc. of DflS'o; \\ilnr-., rhc trial
court 's clunge of permanency goal from rcunificnttnn 10 udopnon was prupC'r.
The rrfrll co,irt k• mmatctht"r· s rar:11h1I ri~h1-:- undi:r f,,·;.1r ~\'~ti,,,,.,. or ~3 P3.(.S.A. ~25 l l la).
Moth1.:r t'>nl~ nppe1Js th.: tcrmimckm uud..:-r one t."f 1he~\' ~cction:-.. so sh\' hao; \\:11\ ed S!!ctinm;
2511 la)( l t. (AJ()) aJ\d (a. \18 > ,,n :1pp,~:il ~(~ :1flir-n a 1c:r:n111;111011, th~ apJXab co,1rl n~<:J only ~flinn
1he trial tiJurt', Ji!ti!inun.i.u..->n tind"-"! one .;,.c,:1i..:>:'I In,.., JI-:, 74" A.2d 1~50. 1~55 (Pa. ':)uf>i:L
~OOOt A, 1,, <.;~Ji()n~ ~51 hal(J 1. ~:1)D) am.J (3)(81. the lriJI c:otlr1 a.15-o did n839 A.2d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2003). The
trial court must examine the status of the bond to determine whether its termination "would destroy
an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship". In re Adoption of T.B.B. 835 A.2d 387, 397
(Pa. Super. 2003). In assessing the parental bond, the trial court is permitted to rely upon the
observations and evaluations of social workers. In re K.Z.S .. 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa. Super.
2008). In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is
reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis depends on the
circumstances of the particular case. In re K.Z.S. at 762-763. However under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§2511(b), the rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors
such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care, if found to be beyond
the control of the parent.
Mother's visits were originally supervised by the kinship foster parent, but after a dispute with the
foster parent, visits were changed to monthly at the agency. For several months after this change,
Mother did not attend any visits. (N.T. 9/16/16, pgs. 105-106, 136-137). The Children were upset
when Mother missed visits, but also act out inappropriately when she attends visits. (N.T. 9/16/16,
pgs. 89-91, 93-94). Mother has a friendly, but not a parental, relationship with the Children. (N.T.
9116116, pg. 92). Her interactions with the Children were very basic. (N.T. 9/16/16, pgs. 19, 24-
25). She is not involved in the Children's therapy or schooling. (N.T. 9/16/16, pg. 32, 93, 108).
Mother has missed the Children's medical appointments, and is inconsistent in her visitation.
(N.T. 9/16/16, pgs. 105-106). Mother has not parented the Children at all since June 2015. She is
not bonded with the Children. (N. T. 9/ 16/16, pg. 38). The Children would not suffer any
irreparable harm if Mother's parental rights were terminated. (N.T. 9/16/16, pgs. 102-103). The
Children are currently in a pre-adoptive home. (N.T. 9/16/16, pg. 31 ). The Children feel "right at
home" and have become very comfortable there. The Children now look to the foster parent for
all their needs. (N.T. 9/16/16, pg. 33). The foster parent has a wonderful, loving bond with all the
Page 9 of 10
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