Com. v. Roberts, W. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S01026-23
    2023 PA SUPER 36
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                             :
    :
    WILLIAM ALBERT ROBERTS                     :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 301 WDA 2022
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 7, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-26-CR-0001543-2021
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
    OPINON BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                                FILED: MARCH 6, 2023
    Willam Albert Roberts appeals from the judgment of sentence imposing
    five to ten years’ incarceration after a jury convicted him of two counts of
    failing to comply with the registration requirements of the Sex Offender
    Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.51-
    9799.75.1 Because a SORNA registrant violates by knowing that he failed to
    report, regardless of his subjective view of the duration of the underlying
    reporting obligation, we affirm.
    On January 25, 2006, Roberts became a sexual-offender registrant due
    to a conviction in a previous proceeding. See N.T., 3/7/2022, at 15-16. The
    trial court classified him as a Tier III Offender under the existent registration
    statute. See id. at 16. Thus, Roberts became obligated to report annually to
    the Pennsylvania State Police for “the remainder of his lifetime.”           Id.
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(1),(2).
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    According to the SORNA records that the State Police maintain in a statewide
    database, Roberts failed to appear for his annual reporting obligation in 2020
    and also failed to report a change in his residence. See id. at 20, 33.
    The Commonwealth charged him with two counts of failing to comply
    with SORNA.    A jury convicted him, and the trial court sentenced him as
    described above. This timely appeal followed.
    Roberts raises two issues:
    1.    Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient
    evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
    [Roberts] is a lifetime registrant?
    2.    Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient
    evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
    [Roberts] “knowingly” failed to register?
    Roberts’ Brief at 7. We address each issue in turn.
    The two claims challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict
    Roberts of failure to comply with the SORNA-registration requirements. Thus,
    our scope and standard of review are the same for both issues.            When
    reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we face “a question of law.”
    Commonwealth v. Chambers, 
    188 A.3d 400
    , 409 (Pa. 2018). Accordingly,
    our standard of review is “de novo.” 
    Id.
     We view the “evidence in the light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, and we draw all
    reasonable inferences therefrom in the Commonwealth’s favor.”              
    Id.
    “Through this lens, we must ascertain whether the Commonwealth proved all
    of the elements of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id.
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    “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element
    of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
    evidence.” Commonwealth v. Gause, 
    164 A.3d 532
    , 541 (Pa. Super. 2017)
    (en banc). Moreover, “we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
    judgment for the factfinder.” 
    Id. at 540
    . “Any doubts regarding a defendant’s
    guilt may be resolved by the factfinder, unless the evidence is so weak and
    inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact may be drawn from
    the combined circumstances.” 
    Id.
     Critically, the jury, when ruling on “the
    credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
    believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” 
    Id. at 541
    .
    As for the substantive law, SORNA assigns registration requirements of
    varying durations to convicted sexual offenders. The statute ties the length
    of an offender’s registration period to the severity and number of underlying
    crimes for which the offender has been convicted.      See Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.55
    (imposing ten-year-registration and lifetime-registration requirements for
    various offenders).
    During a registration period, “offenders . . . shall . . . register with the
    Pennsylvania State Police upon release from incarceration, upon parole from
    a State or county correctional facility, or upon the commencement of a
    sentence of intermediate punishment or probation.”              42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    9799.56(a)(1)(ii). They “shall provide the Pennsylvania State Police with all
    current or intended residences, all information concerning current or intended
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    employment, and all information concerning current or intended enrollment
    as a student.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.56(a)(1)(iii).
    Furthermore, sexual offenders:
    shall inform the Pennsylvania State Police within three
    business days of:
    (i) A change of residence or establishment of an
    additional residence or residences.
    *     *     *
    (ii) A change of employer or employment location for
    a period of time that will exceed 14 days or for an
    aggregate period of time that will exceed 30 days
    during a calendar year, or termination of
    employment.
    (iii) A change of institution or location at which the
    person is enrolled as a student, or termination of
    enrollment.
    (iv) Becoming employed or enrolled as a student if the
    person has not previously provided that
    information to the Pennsylvania State Police.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.56(a)(2).
    The registration obligations are ongoing. Throughout the duration of a
    sexual offender’s registration period, the “offender shall appear within 10 days
    before each annual anniversary date of the offender’s initial registration . . .
    at an approved registration site to complete a verification form and to be
    photographed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.60(b). Thus, offenders must reappear,
    in person, to re-register annually.
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    A registrant who “knowingly fails to register with the Pennsylvania State
    Police as required under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.56 . . . [or to] verify [their]
    residence or be photographed as required under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.60”
    commits the crime of failure to comply with SORNA-registration requirements.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(1),(2) (subsection numeration omitted). Here, the
    jury convicted Roberts of both types of failure to comply with SORNA, failure
    to report a change of address and failure to verify his address annually.
    1.     Proof of Lifetime Registration
    Roberts claims there was insufficient evidence to prove he was a lifetime
    registrant under SORNA. He asserts his SORNA-registration requirement was
    only ten years in duration. In other words, he contends the Commonwealth
    failed to prove that he was a SORNA registrant when he failed to report his
    change of address and when he failed to verify his address in 2020.2
    Roberts argues, “It is of significance that Trooper Janosko, without any
    firsthand knowledge        of   [Roberts’] case, mostly   testified as to   [the
    Pennsylvania State Police] overall procedure without testifying as to the
    specifics of this matter.” Id. at 14. Roberts believes that the trooper’s lack
    of personal knowledge renders his testimony in the Commonwealth’s case-in-
    chief legally insufficient. He is incorrect.
    ____________________________________________
    2Roberts does not attempt to excuse his failure to re-register based upon the
    COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, it would seem that no such excuse is available,
    as a matter of law. “The occurrence of a natural disaster . . . shall not relieve
    an individual of the duty to register or any other duty imposed by this
    subchapter.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.55(c).
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    Trooper Janosko’s lack of firsthand knowledge has no bearing on the
    legal sufficiency of his testimony. A witness’s personal knowledge – or lack
    thereof – goes to the weight of the evidence that a jury may choose to afford
    his testimony, not to the legal sufficiency of that testimony to convict. See,
    e.g., Commonwealth v. Bowen, 
    55 A.3d 1254
    , 1262 (Pa.Super. 2012)
    (explaining that a claim witness was unreliable goes to the weight, not the
    sufficiency of the evidence). It was the right of the jury to decide Trooper
    Janosko’s credibility and reliability, even in light of his lack of personal
    knowledge of this case.
    Trooper Janosko testified that, based upon a prior conviction, Roberts
    was a Tier III Offender under a prior registration statute. The trooper further
    explained that Roberts’ registration obligation arose, as an operation of law,
    and that it continued under the current enactment of SORNA. Specifically,
    Roberts’ conviction required him to register and report annually to the State
    Police for “the remainder of his lifetime.” N.T., 3/7/2022, at 16. The trooper
    inferred this fact from the record of Roberts’ past conviction, coupled with the
    operable registration statute at the time of that conviction.      The operable
    statute eventually did away with tier offenders and became of list of 10-year
    offense and lifetime offenses.     See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.55(b).        Trooper
    Janosko testified that Roberts’ prior conviction required him to register for life
    under the former and the current registration statutes.
    Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the testimony
    of Trooper Janosko proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Roberts was a
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    lifetime registrant under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.55(b). He flatly told the jury
    that Roberts was a lifetime registrant, and the jury believed him. As a result,
    Roberts’ first appellate issue is meritless.
    2.    Knowing Failure to Comply
    In his second issue, Roberts claims there was insufficient proof of his
    mens rea under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(1),(2). Roberts, who testified in his
    own defense, argues that his “mindset was very clearly established at trial.”
    Robert’s Brief at 15. He bases this assertion upon his testimony regarding his
    subjective “understanding that he would have to register for ten years
    following the Westmoreland County qualifying conviction.” Id.
    Thus, Roberts’ second argument does not focus on the insufficiency of
    the Commonwealth’s evidence. Rather, he relitigates his own testimony and
    the self-serving assertions of fact.   He would have us credit his testimony
    regarding what transpired in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland
    County and during his interactions with the State Police in the years
    thereafter. This is not the role of an appellate court. As stated above, the
    jury was “free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” Gause, 
    164 A.3d at 541
    .
    Instead, the issue before us is what, if anything, the Commonwealth
    failed to prove in its case-in-chief regarding Roberts’ mens rea. Turning to
    that question, we find the statute does not require proof that Roberts knew of
    his lifelong-registration requirement. Instead, the crime occurred when (1)
    he “knowingly” failed “to register with the Pennsylvania State Police”, i.e.,
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    within three days of changing his address, and (2) when he “knowingly” failed
    “to verify [his] residence or be photographed” on his anniversary date. 18
    Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(1),(2).
    The legislature has defined “knowingly” as follows:
    A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element
    of an offense when:
    (i)    if the element involves the nature of his conduct
    or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that
    his conduct is of that nature or that such
    circumstances exist; and
    (ii)   if the element involves a result of his conduct,
    he is aware that it is practically certain that his
    conduct will cause such a result.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(2). Here, the material element involves the result of a
    registrant’s conduct. Accordingly, we apply subsection (ii).
    To violate 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(1),(2), a registrant must “knowingly
    fail to register” or “knowingly fail to verify.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(1),(2).
    Therefore, a registrant must be aware that it is practically certain he will fail
    to report and to verify with the State Police if he fails to do so. The mens rea
    is simply that the actus reus of failure be committed knowingly.
    In most cases, such a failure will be knowing, because a rational actor
    knows when he fails to do something. The only exceptions would be in cases
    where a registrant has dementia, is in a coma, or suffers from a similar mental
    incapacity.
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    A registrant’s reason for failing to report or to verify is irrelevant to the
    mens rea analysis, where, as here, the registrant knew he failed to report or
    to verify. Even if Roberts believed his registration requirement expired after
    ten years, he still knew that he failed to report his change of address when he
    did not re-register in 2020. He also knew that he failed to verify his address
    and appear to be photographed by his anniversary date in 2020. Therefore,
    Roberts knowingly failed to comply with SONRA and violated 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
    4915.2(a)(1),(2).
    Simply put, there is no notice requirement in SORNA.            The statute
    expressly negates and disclaims such a requirement. “Neither failure on the
    part of the Pennsylvania State Police to send nor failure of a sexually violent
    predator or [sexual] offender to receive notice            [of the registration
    requirement] or information under subsection (a.1), (b.1) or (b.3) shall relieve
    that predator or offender from the [registration/re-registration] requirements
    of this subchapter.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.60(f).
    Essentially, the General Assembly, when enacting SORNA, codified the
    ancient maxim that “ignorance of the law is no excuse.” Commonwealth v.
    Kratsas, 
    764 A.2d 20
    , 30 (Pa. 2001). Roberts may not excuse noncompliance
    with SORNA based on alleged ignorance of his lifetime-registration obligation.
    His second and last appellate issue warrants no relief.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/6/2023
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 301 WDA 2022

Judges: Kunselman, J.

Filed Date: 3/6/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/6/2023