Y.V.K. v. V.S.K ( 2017 )


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  • J-S48042-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    Y.V.K.,                                           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    V.S.K.,
    Appellee                   No. 540 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order Entered March 6, 2017
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
    Domestic Relations at No.: 384 S 2016
    PACSES No. 946115925
    BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:                         FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2017
    Appellant, Y.V.K. (Mother), appeals pro se from the trial court’s child
    and spousal support order, which adopted the recommendation of the
    support master and set forth the child and spousal support owed by V.S.K.
    (Father).1     Specifically, Mother challenges the court’s determination of
    Father’s net income. We affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    Although Mother challenges the court’s order for child and spousal support,
    spousal support orders are interlocutory and not appealable when entered
    during the pendency of divorce claims. See Leister v. Leister, 
    684 A.2d 192
    , 193 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en banc); see also Capuano v. Capuano, 
    823 A.2d 995
    , 998 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“[During the pendency of a divorce
    action,] the portion of a trial court order attributable to child support is final
    and immediately appealable; however, the portion of an order allocated to
    spousal support is interlocutory.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the trial
    court’s March 6, 2017 order is appealable only as it relates to child support.
    J-S48042-17
    We take the factual and procedural history in this matter from the trial
    court’s April 19, 2017 opinion, and our independent review of the certified
    record. Mother and Father were married in March 2006, and are the parents
    of two children, M.V.K., born in December 2006, and J.V.K., born in June
    2008.     Mother is the primary custodian of the children.             The parties
    separated on April 29, 2016.          On May 12, 2016, Mother filed a complaint
    seeking both child and spousal support.            The court appointed a support
    master, who conducted a hearing de novo on August 26, 2016.
    At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Mother’s monthly gross
    income was $3,068.28. (See N.T. Hearing, 8/26/16, at 5). Mother testified
    that she is the primary custodian of the children; however, they spend three
    nights out of every two weeks with Father. (See 
    id. at 6-7).
    She explained
    that she hired her mother (Maternal Grandmother) to watch the children
    before and after school at a rate of $500.00 per week while she worked.2
    (See 
    id. at 11,
    15).
    Father testified that he works for The CSI Companies, Inc. (CSI), as a
    consultant and makes ninety dollars an hour and works forty hours per
    week; he does not receive overtime.            (See 
    id. at 35).
      Father introduced
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Mother commutes from Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, to Harrisburg,
    Pennsylvania where she works from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday
    through Friday. (See N.T. Hearing, at 15-16). The children get on the bus
    to go to school at 8:00 a.m. and get off the bus after school at 4:05 p.m.
    (See 
    id. at 26-27).
    Maternal Grandmother is paid to watch the children
    from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (See id.).
    -2-
    J-S48042-17
    both his pay stub and travel reimbursement. (See id.). He explained that
    CSI reimburses his out-of-pocket expenses that he pays to travel to the
    client’s site. (See id.). Additionally, CSI pays him a set per diem rate of
    fifty-six dollars per day for meals while he is traveling. (See 
    id. at 35-36).
    Father also testified that, prior to the parties’ separation, they had planned
    on using a before and after school childcare program offered at the
    children’s school, which cost $670.00 per month. (See 
    id. at 40).
    On    September       15,   2016,       the   master   issued   a   report   and
    recommendations with respect to Mother’s complaint for support.                     The
    master calculated that Father’s gross annual income, taking into account
    both his salary and per diem pay, is $198,200.00.                      (See Master’s
    Recommendation, 9/15/16, at 4-5).                The master then determined that
    support for the children could be maximized if each parent claims one child
    as a dependent. Based upon that deduction, the master calculated Mother’s
    net monthly income as $2,322.57 and Father’s net monthly income as
    $11,899.42, resulting in a combined monthly income of $14,221.99 and a
    basic support of $2,457.00. (See 
    id. (citing Pa.R.C.P.
    1910.16-3)). After
    adjusting for health insurance and childcare,3 the master concluded that
    Father’s monthly child support obligation is $2,881.57. (See 
    id. at 7).
    ____________________________________________
    3
    The Master concluded that $670.00 per month, the cost of the before and
    after school program, was a more reasonable childcare amount than the
    $500.00 per week paid to Maternal Grandmother.             (See Master’s
    Recommendation, at 6-7).
    -3-
    J-S48042-17
    On October 4, 2016, Mother, pro se, filed exceptions challenging
    several findings of the support master.4 On March 6, 2017, the trial court
    entered an order overruling the exceptions and adopting the master’s
    recommendations in their entirety. (See Trial Court Opinion, 3/06/17, at 1).
    Mother timely appealed.          On March 31, 2017, Pursuant to the trial court’s
    order, Mother filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal. 5         See
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court entered an opinion on April 19, 2017, in
    which it relies, in part, on its March 6, 2017 opinion adopting the master’s
    recommendations. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
    Mother raises one question on appeal: “Whether the court may award
    child support absent full disclosure of a high net worth obligor[?]” (Mother’s
    Brief, at 5).6, 7
    ____________________________________________
    4
    As noted by the trial court, Mother’s exceptions do not contain a summary
    or list of specific exceptions. (See Trial Ct. Op., 3/06/17, at 1).
    5
    Mother’s statement consists of nineteen allegations of error. (See Concise
    Statement of Errors, 3/31/17, at 1-4; Trial Ct. Op., 4/19/17, at 1-2).
    6
    Mother’s brief contains argument concerning the court’s order with regard
    to the justness of the amount of child support and spousal support,
    dependency exemptions for income taxes, and the court’s calculation of
    daycare expenses. (See 
    id. at 9-11).
    However, because these issues are
    neither “stated in the statement of questions involved [nor] fairly suggested
    thereby[,]” we do not consider them. Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).
    7
    In his brief, Father claims that although “the [trial] court did not err in
    calculating his income based off the information provided at the de novo
    hearing,” this Court should remand to the trial court for it to calculate his
    income based on Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(2), which considers involuntary
    reductions of income. (Father’s Brief, at 4; see 
    id. at 4-6).
    Father did not
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -4-
    J-S48042-17
    In her issue, Mother contends that the court erred in finding “that the
    introduction of a copy of [Father’s] most recent paystub and previous two
    months of bank statements along with his testimony that he received per
    diem and reimbursement for travel is sufficient under the law to calculate
    child . . . support.” (Id. at 12) (emphasis omitted). We disagree.
    Our standard of review in child support cases is well-settled:
    Appellate review of support matters is governed by an
    abuse of discretion standard. When evaluating a support order,
    this Court may only reverse the trial court’s determination where
    the order cannot be sustained on any valid ground. An abuse of
    discretion is [n]ot merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching
    a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the
    judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
    partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of
    record. The principal goal in child support matters is to serve
    the best interests of the children through the provision of
    reasonable expenses.
    J.P.D. v. W.E.D., 
    114 A.3d 887
    , 889 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 
    130 A.3d 1290
    (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted).          An abuse of discretion “will be
    found where there is insufficient evidence to sustain the award or where the
    law is overridden or misapplied.” Lampa v. Lampa, 
    537 A.2d 350
    , 352 (Pa.
    Super. 1988) (citation omitted).
    Here, Mother claimed that the trial court erred because it did not
    consider income received from Father’s business entities.          (See Mother’s
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    raise this issue before the trial court either at the de novo hearing or by
    filing exceptions to the master’s recommendation. Furthermore, Father has
    not supported his argument with any legal authority. Therefore, we decline
    to address Father’s concern here.
    -5-
    J-S48042-17
    Brief, at 7). However, our review of the record discloses that during the de
    novo hearing, Father expressly denied receiving any income from the LLC
    that he has created in his name, and Mother did not provide any evidence of
    this income. (See N.T. Hearing, at 62, 69). The trial court could not include
    income that was not before it.
    Furthermore,    with   respect   to    Father’s   salary   and   per   diem
    reimbursements, the trial court explained:
    At the hearing, Father introduced evidence of [two pay stubs,
    one for regular earnings, and one for reimbursements,] and two
    months of bank statements.         Father is a salaried worker,
    meaning his income does not vary from paycheck to paycheck.
    Consequently, a single paycheck, combined with two months of
    bank statements, is sufficient to determine Father’s income.
    Regarding Father’s receipt of a per diem and reimbursement for
    business expenses, the [s]upport [m]aster correctly did not
    include travel expenses as part of Father’s income but did
    include the per diem amount. Father’s per diem is received to
    help pay for meals and is not a direct reimbursement, and
    therefore constitutes income. Father’s travel expenses are not
    income.     Father is required to travel and his employer
    reimburses those travel expenses. As these amounts constitute
    expenses for which Father pays and is directly reimbursed, they
    do not constitute income. As a result, the [c]ourt did not err in
    finding that there was sufficient evidence to determine Father’s
    income.
    (Trial Ct. Op., 4/19/17, at 2; see N.T. Hearing, 35-36, 58-59, Defendant’s
    Exhibits No. 2, 3).
    We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the court’s
    calculation of Father’s income, where the court based its calculation on
    uncontroverted evidence of Father’s salary and per diem reimbursement as
    -6-
    J-S48042-17
    represented in his pay stubs. See J.P.D., supra at 889; Lampa, supra at
    352. Mother’s issue does not merit relief.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/19/2017
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 540 MDA 2017

Filed Date: 9/19/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024