Com. v. Reagan, E. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S57036-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :            PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                          :
    :
    EUGENE REAGAN,                            :
    :
    Appellant              :           No. 647 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 4, 2016
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County,
    Criminal Division, No(s): CP-23-CR-0005918-2015
    BEFORE: PANELLA, SOLANO and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                      FILED OCTOBER 18, 2017
    Eugene Reagan (“Reagan”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed following his conviction of two counts of recklessly endangering
    another person, and one count each of attempted murder, aggravated
    assault, and firearms not to be carried without a license.1     Additionally,
    Reagan’s counsel, James Brose, Esquire (“Attorney Brose”), has filed a
    Motion to Withdraw as Appellate Counsel, as well as a brief pursuant to
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744 (1967) (hereinafter the “Anders
    Brief”). We grant Attorney Brose’s Motion to Withdraw, and affirm Reagan’s
    judgment of sentence.
    In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant factual and
    procedural history, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial
    Court Opinion, 4/6/17, at 1-13.
    1
    See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2705, 901(a), 2501(a), 2702(a)(1), 6106(a)(1).
    J-S57036-17
    On July 22, 2016, a jury convicted Reagan of the above-referenced
    crimes.      On October 4, 2016, the trial court sentenced Reagan to an
    aggregate prison term of 15 to 30 years. Reagan filed a pro se Motion to
    reconsider sentence. The trial court thereafter appointed Attorney Brose as
    Reagan’s counsel.     On February 7, 2017, the trial court denied Regan’s
    Motion to reconsider sentence. Reagan filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and a
    court-ordered Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
    However, in lieu of filing a brief on Reagan’s behalf, Attorney Brose filed an
    Anders brief.
    “When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the
    merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to
    withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Garang, 
    9 A.3d 237
    , 240 (Pa. Super. 2010)
    (citation omitted). Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is
    frivolous and wishes to withdraw from representation, he must do the
    following:
    (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after
    making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
    determined the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief
    referring to any issues that might arguably support the appeal,
    but which does not resemble a no-merit letter; and (3) furnish a
    copy of the brief to the defendant and advise him of his right to
    retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points
    he deems worthy of this Court’s attention.
    Commonwealth v. Edwards, 
    906 A.2d 1225
    , 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006)
    (citation omitted).   In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
     (Pa.
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    J-S57036-17
    2009), our Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of Anders,
    i.e., the contents of an Anders brief, and required that the brief
    (1)   provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
    with citations to the record;
    (2)   refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
    arguably supports the appeal;
    (3)   set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
    and
    (4)   state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
    frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
    record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
    have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.       “Once counsel has satisfied the [Anders]
    requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the
    trial court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment as to whether
    the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.”     Edwards, 
    906 A.2d at 1228
    (citation omitted).
    Here, Attorney Brose has complied with each of the requirements of
    Anders.     Attorney Brose indicates that he conscientiously examined the
    record and determined that an appeal would be frivolous. Further, Attorney
    Brose’s Anders brief comports with the requirements set forth in Santiago.
    Finally, the record includes a copy of the letter that Attorney Brose sent to
    Reagan, advising him of his right to proceed pro se or retain alternate
    counsel and file additional claims, and stating Attorney Brose’s intention to
    seek permission to withdraw. Thus, Attorney Brose has complied with the
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    J-S57036-17
    procedural requirements for withdrawing from representation. Accordingly,
    we will conduct an independent review to determine whether Reagan’s
    appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.
    The first issue raised in the Anders brief is whether the trial court
    erred by granting the Commonwealth’s Motion in limine to limit testimony
    regarding prior incidents between Reagan and his ex-wife, Margaret Giles
    (“Giles”). Anders Brief at 3. Attorney Brose points to the trial court’s ruling
    that Reagan could not testify about incidents with Giles that had occurred
    more than one year prior.         Id. at 4.   Attorney Brose contends that
    challenging the court’s ruling would be useless because Reagan did not claim
    self-defense; the incidents with Giles were not criminal events; and the
    victim, Gary Hudson (“Hudson”), was not deceased.        Id.   Attorney Brose
    also points to Reagan’s claim that the gun went off “accidentally,” and
    argues that such claim rendered any prior disputes between him and Giles
    irrelevant. Id. at 5. Finally, Attorney Brose asserts that, even if the trial
    court erred in limiting the testimony, such error was harmless, as the
    evidence of Reagan’s guilt was overwhelming. Id.
    In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this issue, set forth the
    relevant law, and determined that the issue lacked merit. See Trial Court
    Opinion, 4/6/17, at 19-20; see also id. at 21 (wherein the trial court
    determined that even if its ruling was in error, such error was harmless, as
    the evidence of Reagan’s guilt was overwhelming). We agree with the trial
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    J-S57036-17
    court’s determination, and affirm on this basis as to the first issue raised in
    the Anders brief. See id.
    The second issue raised in the Anders brief is whether the trial court
    erred by denying Reagan’s Motion in limine to preclude Timothy Bates
    (“Bates”) from providing testimony that differed from his statement to
    police.   Anders Brief at 5.        According to Attorney Brose, “the only
    discrepancy in the [trial] testimony of [] Bates versus his prior statement
    was that he saw [Reagan] approach the car where the shooting occurred
    after he had walked back to his truck. Id. at 6. Attorney Brose points out
    that Bates consistently stated that he saw Reagan approach the car and
    shoot into it. Id. Finally, Attorney Brose asserts that the defense had the
    opportunity to cross-examine Bates about the discrepancy, and the jury had
    the ability to assess his credibility. Id.
    In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this issue, set forth the
    relevant law, and determined that the issue lacked merit. See Trial Court
    Opinion, 4/6/17, at 20; see also id. at 21 (wherein the trial court
    determined that even if its ruling was in error, such error was harmless, as
    the evidence of Reagan’s guilt was overwhelming). We agree with the trial
    court’s determination, and affirm on this basis as to the second issue raised
    in the Anders brief. See id.
    The third issue raised in the Anders brief is whether the trial court
    erred in making its rulings regarding Reagan’s expired license to carry a
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    firearm. Anders Brief at 6-7. According to Attorney Brose, the trial court
    initially precluded testimony regarding the expired license, but ultimately
    permitted Reagan to testify about the license, and allowed the license to be
    admitted as a defense exhibit. Id. at 7.
    In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this issue, set forth the
    relevant law, and determined that the issue lacked merit. See Trial Court
    Opinion, 4/6/17, at 20-21; see also id. at 21 (wherein the trial court
    determined that even if its ruling was in error, such error was harmless, as
    the evidence of Reagan’s guilt was overwhelming). We agree with the trial
    court’s determination, and affirm on this basis as to the third issue raised in
    the Anders brief. See id.
    The fourth issue raised in the Anders brief is whether the trial court
    erred when it instructed the jury as to “flight as consciousness of guilt.”
    Anders Brief at 7. Attorney Brose claims that there is no dispute that, after
    the shooting, Reagan got in his truck and drove away from the crime scene.
    Id. Attorney Brose further claims that the trial court’s instruction was taken
    directly from the model jury instructions on flight as consciousness of guilt.
    Id.
    In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this issue, set forth the
    relevant law, and determined that the issue lacked merit. See Trial Court
    Opinion, 4/6/17, at 21-24.    We agree with the trial court’s determination,
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    J-S57036-17
    and affirm on this basis as to the fourth issue raised in the Anders brief.
    See id.
    The final issue raised in the Anders brief is whether the evidence was
    sufficient to support Reagan’s convictions. Anders Brief at 8. According to
    Attorney Brose, consistent credible testimony from several witnesses, and
    video evidence from the bar, placed Reagan at the scene of the shooting.
    Id. Attorney Brose indicates that Reagan admitted that he approached the
    car, but claimed that the gun had gone off “accidentally.”       Id.   Attorney
    Brose asserts that “the only issue for the jury was whether [] Reagan had
    the intent to fire that gun and injure or kill [] Hudson.” Id. Attorney Brose
    contends that the Commonwealth presented the uncontradicted testimony of
    Detective Louis Gandizio, who testified that the gun in question would not
    have accidentally fired by banging it on a car window, and would only have
    discharged by someone pulling the trigger. Id. at 8 (citing N.T., 7/21/16, at
    286-87). Attorney Brose argues that this evidence, when viewed in the light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, was sufficient to
    support the verdict. Id. at 9.
    In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this issue, set forth the
    relevant law, and determined that the issue lacked merit. See Trial Court
    Opinion, 4/6/17, at 14-19.       We agree with the trial court’s determination,
    and affirm on this basis as to the fourth issue raised in the Anders brief.
    See id.
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    J-S57036-17
    Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude that all of
    the issues raised in the Anders brief are, in fact, wholly frivolous. Having
    found no other non-frivolous issues during our review, we grant Attorney
    Brose’s Motion to Withdraw, and affirm Reagan’s judgment of sentence.
    Motion to Withdraw granted; judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/18/2017
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    Circulated 10/03/2017 09:10 AM
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 647 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 10/18/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024