Com. v. Woodall, T. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
THEODORE WOODALL
Appellant No. 1566 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order April 25, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1208311-2003
BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 29, 2017
Appellant, Theodore Woodall, appeals from the order entered on April
25, 2016, which dismissed his first petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We vacate the
order of the PCRA court, vacate the judgment of sentence, and remand for
resentencing.
In 2004, a jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of aggravated
assault and one count each of carrying a firearm on the public streets of
Philadelphia and possessing instruments of crime; the convictions arose out
of Appellant shooting one Philadelphia police officer in the neck and shooting
at another Philadelphia police officer.
On November 22, 2004, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve an
aggregate term of 21 to 42 years in prison for his convictions. Further, as
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the Commonwealth concedes, during “the November 22, 2004[] sentencing
hearing, [the trial court] indicated that the mandatory minimum sentence of
five years for offenses committed with firearms, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712,
applied to [Appellant’s] aggravated assault convictions.” Commonwealth’s
Brief at 2; see also N.T. Sentencing, 11/22/04, at 3.
Following the nunc pro tunc reinstatement of Appellant’s direct appeal
rights, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on July 2, 2014
and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal
on November 13, 2014. Commonwealth v. Woodall, 105 A.3d 781 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum) at 1-24, appeal denied, 104 A.3d
4 (Pa. 2014).
On February 12, 2015, Appellant filed the current, timely PCRA
petition. The petition constitutes Appellant’s first petition for post-conviction
collateral relief under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d
1283 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[w]hen a PCRA petitioner’s direct appeal rights are
reinstated nunc pro tunc in his first PCRA petition, a subsequent PCRA
petition will be considered a first PCRA petition for timeliness purposes”).
The PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant and counsel
filed an amended PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf. Within the amended
petition, Appellant claimed that his sentence is illegal, as he was sentenced
under a mandatory minimum sentencing statute that was rendered
unconstitutional by Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct.
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2151 (2013). See Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, 9/17/15, at 2;
Appellant’s Brief in Support of Amended PCRA Petition, 9/17/15, at 1.
On April 25, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition and
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Appellant raises one
claim on appeal:
Did the [PCRA] court err in failing to grant PCRA relief
where [] Appellant had been sentenced pursuant to a
mandatory minimum sentence law that has been declared
unconstitutional?
Appellant’s Brief at 7 (some internal capitalization omitted).
Appellant claims that he is entitled to relief, as he was sentenced
under a mandatory minimum sentencing statute that was rendered
unconstitutional by Alleyne. The Commonwealth concedes that Appellant’s
sentence is, in fact, illegal and that Appellant is entitled to relief in this case.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 5. We agree with Appellant and the
Commonwealth. We thus vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and
remand for resentencing.
We observe our well-established standard of review: “In reviewing the
denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s determination is
supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Fears,
86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Alleyne challenges implicate the legality of a sentence. A
challenge to the legality of a sentence may be entertained
as long as the reviewing court has jurisdiction. An illegal
sentence must be vacated. Issues relating to the legality of
a sentence are questions of law. Our standard of review
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over such questions is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary.
Commonwealth v. Ali, 112 A.3d 1210, 1225 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal
citations, quotations, and corrections omitted).
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the United States
Supreme Court held: “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489. Further, in Alleyne, the United States
Supreme Court expanded “Apprendi’s basic jury-determination rule to
mandatory minimum sentences.” Alleyne, ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at
2167 (Breyer, J., concurring). Specifically, the Alleyne court held that,
where an “aggravating fact” increases a mandatory minimum sentence, “the
fact is an element of a distinct and aggravated crime. [The fact] must,
therefore, be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2162-2163.
As this Court has held, Alleyne rendered the mandatory minimum
sentencing statute of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712 wholly unconstitutional.
Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801, 812 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Further, in Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 131 A.3d 54 (Pa. Super. 2015), this
Court held that an Alleyne claim is a non-waivable challenge to the legality
of a sentence that may be raised for the first time on direct appeal or in a
timely-filed PCRA petition. Ruiz, 131 A.3d at 60; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542
(“persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief”).
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We also observed in Ruiz that Alleyne may be applied retroactively to
cases pending on collateral review so long as the petitioner’s judgment of
sentence was not final when Alleyne was decided. Ruiz, 131 A.3d at
59-60. In the case at bar, while Appellant was originally sentenced on
November 22, 2004, Appellant’s judgment of sentence did not become final
until February 11, 2015. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (“A judgment
becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States . . . , or at the expiration
of time for seeking the review”); see also U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. Since
Alleyne was decided on June 17, 2013, Appellant is entitled to the benefit of
Alleyne and the instant case does not implicate an impermissible retroactive
application of that case.
Based on our review of the procedural background of this case and the
relevant case law discussed above, we conclude that Appellant is entitled to
resentencing without consideration of the mandatory minimum sentencing
provision of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712. Therefore, since the PCRA court erred in
dismissing Appellant’s petition raising an Alleyne challenge, we vacate the
order denying Appellant PCRA relief, vacate Appellant’s judgment of
sentence, and remand for resentencing.
Order vacated. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for
resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/29/2017
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