Com. v. Pedraza, C. ( 2018 )

J-S06024-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
CHRISTINE PEDRAZA :
: No. 1876 EDA 2017
Appellant
Appeal from the PCRA Order May 11, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-1104041-1999
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2018
Christine Pedraza appeals pro se from the post-conviction court’s May
11, 2017 order dismissing, as untimely, her second petition filed pursuant to
the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as
follows. On October 14, 1999, Pedraza shot and killed Jennifer Monti in the
city of Philadelphia. A jury convicted Pedraza of first-degree murder,
aggravated assault, carrying a firearm without a license, and possessing an
instrument of crime in July 2000. On October 5, 2000, the trial court sentenced
Pedraza to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for first-degree murder,
plus an aggregate consecutive term of six to 12 years’ incarceration for the
remaining convictions.
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We affirmed Pedraza’s judgment of sentence on May 9, 2002 and our
Supreme Court denied further review. See Commonwealth v. Pedraza, 804
A.2d 59 (Pa.Super. 2002) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 815
A.2d 632 (Pa. 2002). On November 29, 2003, Pedraza filed a timely first PCRA
petition. After counsel was appointed, the trial court dismissed Pedraza’s
petition on January 9, 2006. This Court affirmed on December 13, 2007, and
our Supreme Court denied further review. See Commonwealth v. Pedraza,
945 A.2d 767 (Pa.Super. 2007) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied,
952 A.2d 676 (Pa. 2008).
Pedraza filed the instant pro se PCRA petition on August 17, 2012,
followed by an amended petition on March 3, 2016. The PCRA court dismissed
Pedraza’s petition as untimely on May 11, 2017. Pedraza filed a timely pro se
notice of appeal. It does not appear that the PCRA court ordered her to file a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
Pedraza raises the following issues for our review:
A. Did [Pedraza] timely file a PCRA [petition] and thus it should
not have been dismissed as untimely without an evidentiary
hearing on the merits?
B. Did Court of Common Pleas [err] in determining that Graham
v. Florida, Montgomery v. Louisiana, and People v.
House, did not apply to [Pedraza]?
C. Does Graham v. Florida and People v. House apply to
[Pedraza] whose culpability is questionable when age, history
of sexual abuse, history of long term drug abuse, extreme
duress, and diminished capacity are considered according to
recent neuroscience in above-mentioned cases and additional
cases under review?
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Pedraza’s Brief at 2.
Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is limited to
determining “whether the decision of the PCRA court is supported by the
evidence of record and is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Melendez-
Negron, 123 A.3d 1087, 1090 (Pa.Super. 2015). However, as a prefatory
matter, we must address the timeliness of Pedraza’s PCRA petition. “The
timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional.” Commonwealth v.
Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 92 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Pursuant to
the PCRA, any petition for post-conviction relief, including a second or
subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of
sentence becomes final, unless one of the following exceptions set forth in 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies:
(b) Time for filing petition.—
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition
alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with
the presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after
the time period provided in this section and has been
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held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke one of these
exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
In this case, Pedraza’s judgment of sentence became final in 2003, after
this Court affirmed her judgment of sentence, our Supreme Court denied
review, and the period to petition the United States Supreme Court
subsequently expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Supreme Ct. R.
13. Therefore, Pedraza’s instant petition, initially filed in 2012, is patently
untimely. Thus, we cannot address the merits of Pedraza’s issues unless she
meets one of the above-stated exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar.
Pedraza attempts to overcome the time bar by asserting the newly-
recognized constitutional-right exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(iii).
Pedraza relies on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), in which the
United States Supreme Court held that a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional when
imposed on defendants who were under the age of 18 at the time of their
crimes. Specifically, the Miller court reasoned that “children have a ‘lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ leading to
recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.” Id. at 471 (quoting
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). Significantly, in
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Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718, 732 (2016), the Supreme Court
held that Miller applied retroactively to cases on state collateral review.1
However, Pedraza acknowledges that she was 19 at the time of the
crime. See Pedraza’s Brief at 6. Nevertheless, she contends that the rationale
underlying the Miller/Montgomery line of cases should apply to her due to
her “youthfulness” at the time of the crime in combination with an “affective
disorder and a history of drug abuse, sexual and physical abuse.” Id. at 20.
She argues that various studies have shown that a person’s propensity for
impulse control, risk assessment, and moral reasoning is not fully developed
until an individual’s “mid 20’s.” Id. at 14.
However, this Court has previously rejected this precise claim in
Furgess, supra, and Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (Pa.Super.
2013). In Furgess, our Court held:
The Miller decision applies to only those defendants who were
under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes.
***
[Furgess] argues that he nevertheless may invoke Miller because
he was a “technical juvenile,” and he relies on neuroscientific
theories regarding immature brain development to support his
claim that he is eligible for relief. But, rather than presenting an
argument that is within the scope of the Miller decision, this
argument by [Furgess] seeks an extension of Miller to persons
convicted of murder who were older at the time of their crimes
than the class of defendants subject to the Miller holding.
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1 Pedraza properly filed her amended PCRA petition on March 3, 2016, less
than 60 days after Montgomery was issued on January 25, 2016. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
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We rejected reliance on this same argument for purposes of
Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) in Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d
759 (Pa.Super. 2013). The defendants in Cintora were 19 and 21
years old at the times of their crimes, but they argued that Miller
should apply to them and others whose brains were not fully
developed at the time of their crimes. We stated that a contention
that a newly-recognized constitutional right should be extended
to others does not render a petition seeking such an expansion of
the right timely pursuant to section 9545(b)(1)(iii).
We also pointed out in Cintora that the right recognized in Miller
had not been held to apply retroactively at the time of that
decision and that its non-retroactivity would have been an
alternative basis for denial of relief. Because the U.S. Supreme
Court in Montgomery has since held that Miller does apply
retroactively, this second reason stated in the Cintora opinion is
no longer good law. However, nothing in Montgomery
undermines Cintora's holding that petitioners who were [under
the age of 18] at the time they committed murder are not within
the ambit of the Miller decision and therefore may not rely on
that decision to bring themselves within the time-bar exception in
Section 9545(b)(1)(iii). Accordingly, Cintora remains controlling
on this issue, and [Furgess’] assertion of the time-bar exception
at Section 9545(B)(1)(iii) must be rejected.
Furgess, 149 A.3d at 94 (citations, original brackets, and most quotations
omitted; emphasis in original).
Therefore, pursuant to Furgess and Cintora, Pedraza has failed to
plead and prove an exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar. Accordingly,
the PCRA court properly dismissed Pedraza’s instant PCRA petition as untimely
and we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Pedraza relief.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/13/18
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