Com. v. Strine, W. ( 2023 )

J-S39026-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM FRANK STRINE :
:
Appellant : No. 492 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 12, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0002304-2020
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 09, 2023
William Frank Strine (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence of 72 hours to 6 months’ incarceration, imposed after he was
convicted of one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”).1 Appellant
alleges the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We affirm.
We reproduce the Commonwealth’s factual summary of the incident
which led to Appellant’s conviction:
On January 6, 2020, Officer Steven Knickel was out on patrol in
Northern York County. Officer Knickel noticed a vehicle heading
north[,] swerving across the lanes, going onto the shoulder of the
roadway multiple times[,] and failing to use any signals for lane
changes. The vehicle then sped up to what the officer estimated
to be 92 miles per hour, in a 55 mile per hour zone.
Officer Knickel subsequently pulled the vehicle over; upon
approach, the officer had to instruct the driver to place the vehicle
in park. It was determined that [Appellant] was the driver and
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1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2).
J-S39026-22
sole occupant. [Appellant] was jittery, talkative, and “all over the
place;” he also exhibited some paranoia. When asked if he was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, [Appellant] acknowledged
that he had prescriptions for Suboxone and Adderall. [Appellant]
advised he had taken his Suboxone earlier in the day and then
indicated he actually had another prescription, mumbling
“something about Oxycodone.”
[Appellant] was then asked to exit the vehicle. His movements
were very uncoordinated, and he appeared unsure of his footing.
The officer had [Appellant] perform standard field sobriety tests
on the side of the road, which was flat and level; there were no
adverse weather conditions at the time and traffic was light.
During the Modified Romberg test, [Appellant] exhibited a sway
side to side or forward to backwards and estimated 30 seconds at
20 seconds. [Appellant] next attempted the walk and turn test;
he had an extremely difficult time just getting into starting
position, with Officer Knickel describing his efforts as looking “like
an individual walking a tight rope.” [Appellant] was unable to stay
in the instructional position, leaving it multiple times and using his
hands for balance. The test was stopped almost as soon as
[Appellant] began it to ensure no one would get hurt due to the
severe issue he was having trying to complete the test.
[Appellant] next attempted the one-leg stand test. During the
test, he used his arms, had extreme difficulty getting into position,
put his foot down, hopped, and failed to follow directions by
putting his hands in front of himself rather than down at his sides.
Following [Appellant’s] failure to successfully complete the
standardized field sobriety tests, Officer Knickel contacted the
Harrisburg barracks for an on-duty Drug Recognition Expert
(DRE). [Appellant] indicated he was willing to meet with the DRE
and do some additional tests, so the officer transported him to the
Harrisburg barracks, arriving about 4 a.m., roughly an hour after
the initial stop. The DRE performed “most of those same tests
again in a controlled-level environment in a room at the
Harrisburg station[,]” as well as an additional “finger-to-nose”
test. At the conclusion of the testing, Officer Knickel believed
[Appellant] to be impaired. When asked, [Appellant] agreed to
submit to a blood test, which was completed at 5:34 a.m.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 6-8 (citations to record omitted).
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The Commonwealth further summarized the procedural history of this
matter as follows:
On February 10, 2020, [Appellant] was charged by the
Pennsylvania State Police with [DUI] and attendant traffic
summaries for [the] incident that occurred on January 6, 2020.
The charges were held for court following a preliminary hearing
on June 15, 2020. [Appellant] was then formally charged by
Information on July 9, 2020, with two counts of DUI, both graded
as ungraded misdemeanors, and four traffic summary offenses.
A non-jury trial was held on … July 29, 2021. Following testimony,
[Appellant] was convicted of one count of [DUI,] as well as the
four traffic violations. He was then sentenced on the DUI to 72
hours to [6] months in York County Prison, payment of court costs
and a $1,000 fine, and completion of DUI conditions; he was
ordered to pay a fine and court costs on each summary offense.
On October 22, 2021, [Appellant] filed a post-sentence motion;
the sole claim raised was that his verdict was against the weight
of the evidence. The [trial] court then denied [his] motion on
February 22, 2022.
Id. at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
On March 24, 2022, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, followed
by a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on the
same day, in which it incorporated its February 24, 2022 opinion in support of
its order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion. On appeal, Appellant
presents the following, sole issue for our review: “Whether the trial court
abused its discretion when it held the verdict was not against the weight of
the evidence where the greater weight of the evidence showed [Appellant]
was not impaired by Adderall consumption and the trial court’s decision was
manifestly unreasonable[?]” Appellant’s Brief at 4.
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We review a weight of the evidence claim according to the following
standard:
A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an
appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial court’s discretion;
it does not answer for itself whether the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. It is well settled that the [fact-finder] is
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine
the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial based on a weight
of the evidence claim is only warranted where the … verdict is so
contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of justice. In
determining whether this standard has been met, appellate review
is limited to whether the trial judge’s discretion was properly
exercised, and relief will only be granted where the facts and
inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 795-96 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation and brackets omitted).
Instantly, Appellant claims his DUI conviction was against the weight of
the evidence, which he maintains “demonstrated [his] driving was due to his
belief he was being followed” — not impairment by Adderall consumption —
and that “[h]is performance on the field sobriety tests was due to
environmental factors, his anxiety, and his footwear.” Appellant’s Brief at 15-
16. Appellant explains that “his weaving and increased speed were attempts
to verify [his] belief” that someone was following him. Id. at 21. He states
that the evidence establishes he was, in fact, being followed at the time he
was pulled over — albeit by the police — and that it was his belief that he was
being followed — not his Adderall consumption — that caused him to violate
numerous traffic laws. Id. at 22. Additionally, Appellant asserts that the field
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sobriety tests were not developed to determine Adderall impairment. Id. at
16.
In support of his argument, Appellant points to the testimony of Dr.
Guzzardi, an expert in medical toxicology. Dr. Guzzardi indicated that
Appellant has a chronic paranoid personality and that his “unusual thought
processes … are independent of the use of amphetamine[,] which is prescribed
for [Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (‘ADHD’)].” Id. at 18 (citation
omitted). Dr. Guzzardi also asserted that the field sobriety tests administered
on Appellant were not validated to test for impairment due to an
amphetamine. Id. at 23 (citing Appellant’s Exhibit 1 at 11-12 (Dr. Guzzardi’s
Expert Report concluding that neither the walk and turn test or the one-leg
stand test are able to measure impairment by drugs)). He concluded, “there
is no evidence that indicates … [Appellant’s] use of amphetamines caused any
impairments that could be significant enough to affect his ability to safely drive
a motor vehicle.” Id. at 19.
The trial court did not find Dr. Guzzardi credible, however, and stated
that his contention regarding the lack of evidence to establish Appellant’s
impairment by Adderall consumption was “wholly without merit and belied by
the other evidence of record.” Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 2/24/22, at 8, 10.
The court also opined that it did not find Appellant’s excuses for his erratic
driving and his poor performance on the field sobriety tests to be credible. Id.
at 2 (dismissing Appellant’s excuses that he was feeling anxious because he
believed someone was following him, that he was changing lanes to confirm
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this belief, and that environmental conditions affected his ability to perform
the sobriety tests).
In support of its denial of Appellant’s post-sentence motion, the trial
court explained:
[Appellant] was convicted of DUI under Subsection 3802(d)(2),
which provides, in pertinent part:
(d) Controlled substances. – An individual may not drive,
operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of
a vehicle under any of the following circumstances: …
(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the
individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual
physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2). Pursuant to this statute, whether or not
the amphetamine in [Appellant’s] system was the result of
prescription medication he was taking, and whether or not
[Appellant] was taking the prescribed dosage for that medication,
has no bearing on his conviction.
Id. at 4-5.
At trial, Ayako Chan-Hosokawa, a forensic toxicologist at NMS Labs,
testified for the Commonwealth. Id. at 2.
Ms. Chan-Hosokawa testified that she prepared a toxicology
report … regarding [Appellant’s] blood sample. The parties
stipulated to the chain of custody of [Appellant’s] blood, to the
authenticity of the report, and to the testing on the blood sample.
In regard to [Appellant’s] blood sample, Ms. Chan-Hosokawa
testified [that] … [s]he found amphetamine at a concentration of
230 plus or minus 50 nanograms per milliliter in [Appellant’s]
blood[.]
Id. at 3 (citations to record omitted). She further stated:
100 nanograms per milliliter is the most common observation in
the blood when somebody gets prescription amphetamines[.] …
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While she has seen someone prescribed enough amphetamine to
get the level [Appellant] had in his blood, if someone [was] not
prescribed that much or if somebody [was] overusing that
medication, some of the symptoms of impairment would be
agitation, fast speech, even maybe hallucinogenic type of
behavior. Moreover, Ms. Chan-Hosokawa testified that simply
because a particular drug that can cause impairment is being
prescribed and used at a therapeutic level does not lead to the
conclusion that therefore no impairment can occur as a result of
the use of that drug at that level.
Id. at 5 (some paragraph breaks omitted).
Ms. Chan-Hosokawa explained:
Amphetamine is a stimulant[.] Some signs of impairment that
you would see with someone under the influence of amphetamine
are agitation, hallucination, fast speech, and maybe poor
balance[.] … After listening to the testimony and watching the
DVD that was played in [c]ourt[,] which showed [Appellant’s] field
sobriety tests, she testified that [Appellant’s] actions were
consistent with impairment as a result of amphetamine use,
including: [Appellant’s] speeding; [Appellant’s] weaving;
[Appellant’s] switching lanes without signaling; [Appellant’s] poor
balance; [Appellant’s] agitated speech; and [Appellant’s]
hallucinogenic behavior like having someone following him.
Id. at 3 (citations to record and paragraph breaks omitted). The trial court
found Ms. Chan-Hosokawa’s testimony to be credible. Id.
The trial court also found Trooper Knickel’s testimony regarding
Appellant’s behavior on the date of the incident credible and in direct contrast
to Dr. Guzzardi’s assertion that there is no evidence indicating Appellant’s use
of amphetamines caused any impairments that would be significant enough
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to affect his ability to safely drive a motor vehicle. Id. at 8.2 Specifically, the
trial court relied on the following testimony:
[Trooper Knickel] saw [Appellant’s] vehicle jut to the side and then
come back over; he observed the vehicle swerving all over the
roadway; he saw the vehicle go across both lanes of traffic and
then cut back across both lanes of traffic onto the shoulder, and
then back onto the roadway; [Appellant’s] vehicle accelerated up
to 92 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone; there were a
few times where the vehicle left its lane, came back into its lane,
and went onto the shoulder of the roadway; and at no point did
[Appellant] signal for a lane change when doing so.
Id. (paragraph breaks, bullet points, unnecessary capitalization, and citation
to record omitted).
Trooper Knickel further observed:
[Appellant] was very jittery, all over the place, very talkative, and
hard to follow; [he] exhibited some paranoia; when [Appellant]
got out of the car, he was very uncoordinated, unsure of his
footing, and his movements in general were very uncoordinated;
and when [he] stopped his vehicle, he did not place the vehicle in
park and had to be told to do so.
Id. at 9 (paragraph breaks, bullet points, unnecessary capitalization, and
citation to record omitted).
Regarding the field sobriety tests Appellant was asked to perform,
Trooper Knickel testified:
The road where [Appellant] was asked to perform these tests was
a very flat, paved road[.] It was not raining and there were no
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2 See also id. (noting that Trooper Knickel has been with the State Police for
four and a half years; has been trained in regard to impaired drivers and
Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement (“ARIDE”); is certified in
administering standard field sobriety tests; and has been involved in
approximately 300-400 DUI investigations).
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other adverse weather conditions that night[.] During the
Modified Romberg test[, Appellant] swayed a little from side to
side or forward to backwards … [and his] estimation of 30 seconds
was actually around 20 seconds. During the walk and turn test[,
Appellant] could not maintain the instructional phase and left that
position a couple of times[. He] used his hands for balance[,] and
Trooper Nickel [sic] had to stop the test when [Appellant] started
to begin it because he was having such a difficult time and the
Trooper did not want him to get hurt. In regard to the one-leg
stand test[, Appellant] was using his arms and having an
extremely difficult time[. Appellant] put his foot down[] and was
hopping, trying not to fall over[. He] did not perform the test as
instructed[. Appellant’s] hands were in front of him instead of at
his sides[.] At the conclusion of these tests, Trooper Knickel told
[Appellant] that he believed him to be impaired.
Id. at 9-10 (paragraph breaks, bullet points, unnecessary capitalization, and
citation to record omitted).
Finally, regarding Dr. Guzzardi’s claim that field sobriety tests have not
been validated to test for impairment by drugs, the trial court noted that Dr.
Guzzardi is an expert in the field of medical toxicology, not forensic toxicology.
Id. at 5-6. It further stated that even if Dr. Guzzardi’s contention is true, field
sobriety tests continue to be used in DUI cases as evidence of impairment.
Moreover, “it is common knowledge that field sobriety tests are used to assess
an individual’s motor skills and divided attention necessary for driving a motor
vehicle.” Id. at 6. See also Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231,
1240 (Pa. 2011) (concluding that an experienced police officer’s observation
of the appellee’s “behavior, demeanor, unsteadiness, and inability to perform
field sobriety tests, all of which led him to request laboratory tests for the
detection of controlled substances in [the a]ppellee’s blood[,]” was sufficient
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evidence to establish that the appellee was under the influence of a drug or
combination of drugs to a degree that impaired her ability to safely drive).
It is undisputed that Appellant had amphetamine in his system in the
amount specified by Ms. Chan-Hosokawa. TCO at 6. Based on this fact, along
with the testimony of Trooper Knickel and Ms. Chan-Hosokawa, and what
could be seen on the motor video recording, the trial court concluded that the
Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was driving
impaired as a result of those amphetamines. Id.Assessing all the evidence according to the governing principles cited
above, we simply cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
when it found that the verdict did not shock its conscience and denied
Appellant’s motion for a new trial. Consequently, Appellant’s weight challenge
fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/09/2023
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