Com v. Gilmore, M. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S95030-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    MARVIN GILMORE
    Appellant                 No. 1115 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order March 18, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0705281-2000
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., MOULTON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:                            FILED APRIL 21, 2017
    Marvin Gilmore appeals from the March 18, 2016 order entered by the
    Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing as untimely his
    petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42
    Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    On December 13, 2002, Gilmore pled guilty to charges of carrying a
    firearm without a license, resisting arrest, and two counts of attempted
    murder.1      On April 21, 2003, the trial court resentenced Gilmore to an
    aggregate term of 30 to 69 years’ incarceration.2 Gilmore thereafter filed a
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106, 5104, and 2502, respectively.
    2
    The trial court originally sentenced Gilmore to an aggregate term of
    36 to 89 years’ incarceration on March 27, 2013. Gilmore filed a motion to
    modify sentence, which the court granted, acknowledging a sentencing error
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    J-S95030-16
    motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied on May 7,
    2003. On July 15, 2003, Gilmore filed a pro se PCRA petition. Gilmore was
    appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition alleging that trial counsel
    was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal.    On March 17, 2004, the
    PCRA court denied the petition. Gilmore appealed, and this Court affirmed
    the PCRA court’s decision on November 9, 2004.
    On April 13, 2005, Gilmore filed a second PCRA petition. On February
    14, 2006, the PCRA court sent notice of its intent to dismiss Gilmore’s
    petition pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907.           On
    February 24, 2006, Gilmore filed an objection to the trial court’s Rule 907
    notice. On March 15, 2006, the PCRA court dismissed Gilmore’s petition as
    untimely.     Gilmore appealed, and on November 16, 2006, this Court
    affirmed. On October 25, 2007, Gilmore filed his third PCRA petition. The
    PCRA court sent Gilmore a Rule 907 notice, and on June 17, 2008, it
    dismissed Gilmore’s third petition as untimely.        Gilmore appealed, and on
    October 14, 2009, this Court affirmed.
    On August 12, 2010, Gilmore filed the instant PCRA petition, his
    fourth.3 On December 19, 2012, and June 11, 2015, Gilmore amended the
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    and reducing one of Gilmore’s sentences for attempted murder from 16 to
    40 years’ incarceration to 10 to 20 years’ incarceration.
    3
    We note that the period of time from the filing of Gilmore’s fourth
    PCRA petition to its disposition by the PCRA court includes multiple
    substitutions of counsel on Gilmore’s behalf.
    -2-
    J-S95030-16
    petition. The trial court thereafter sent a Rule 907 notice, and on March 18,
    2016, it dismissed Gilmore’s petition as untimely. On April 6, 2016, Gilmore
    filed a timely notice of appeal.
    Gilmore raises the following issue on appeal: “Did the PCRA Court err
    and violate [Gilmore’s] Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the
    U.S[.] and Pennsylvania Constitutions by finding that his PCRA petition was
    untimely?” Gilmore’s Br. at 4.
    Our standard of review from the denial of PCRA relief “is limited to
    examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the
    evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v.
    Ousley, 
    21 A.3d 1238
    , 1242 (Pa.Super. 2011).
    It is well settled that “the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a
    jurisdictional requisite.”   Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    111 A.3d 171
    , 175
    (Pa.Super.), app. denied, 
    125 A.3d 1197
     (Pa. 2015).         A PCRA petition,
    “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of
    the date the judgment becomes final.”        42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).       A
    judgment is final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
    review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking [] review.” 42 Pa.C.S.
    § 9545(b)(3).
    -3-
    J-S95030-16
    Gilmore’s judgment of sentence became final on June 6, 2003.4        He
    had one year from that date, that is, until June 6, 2004, to file a timely PCRA
    petition. Therefore, his current petition filed on August 12, 2010, is facially
    untimely.
    Courts may consider a PCRA petition filed more than one year after a
    judgment of sentence became final only if the petitioner alleges and proves
    one of the following three statutory exceptions:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
    of interference by government officials with the
    presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or
    laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
    the United States;
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
    unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
    ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
    recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
    the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
    provided in this section and has been held by that court to
    apply retroactively.
    ____________________________________________
    4
    “If post-sentencing motions are timely filed, . . . the judgment of
    sentence does not become final for purposes of appeal until the trial court
    disposes of the motion, or the motion is denied by operation of law.”
    Commonwealth v. Rojas, 
    874 A.2d 638
    , 642 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Borrero, 
    692 A.2d 158
    , 159 (Pa.Super. 1997)).
    Because the trial court denied Gilmore’s post-sentence motion on May 7,
    2003, and Gilmore did not file a direct appeal, his judgment of sentence
    became final 30 days later. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (“[T]he notice of appeal
    required by Rule 902 . . . shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the
    order from which the appeal is taken.”).
    -4-
    J-S95030-16
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii); see Brown, 
    111 A.3d at 175
    . In addition,
    when invoking an exception to the PCRA time bar, the petition must “be filed
    within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.
    § 9545(b)(2).
    Gilmore argues that his PCRA petition is timely pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.
    § 9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii). We will first address whether Gilmore satisfies the
    time-bar exception in section 9545(b)(1)(ii), which is known as the “new
    facts” exception. Under this exception, a petitioner may overcome the PCRA
    time bar if he or she alleges and proves: “(1) the facts upon which the claim
    was predicted were unknown and (2) they could not have been ascertained
    by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 
    146 A.3d 221
    ,
    227 (Pa. 2016); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).        “Due diligence ‘does not
    require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the
    party has put forth reasonable effort’ to obtain the information upon which a
    claim is based.”    Cox, 146 A.3d at 230 (quoting Commonwealth v.
    Edmiston, 
    65 A.3d 339
    , 348 (Pa. 2013). Furthermore, our Supreme Court
    has “unequivocally explained that ‘the exception set forth in subsection
    (b)(1)(ii) does not require any merits analysis of the underlying claim.’” Id.
    at 227 (quoting Commonwealth v. Abu Jamal, 
    941 A.2d 1263
    , 1268 (Pa.
    2008)).
    Gilmore avers that his PCRA petition is timely because he filed it within
    60 days of discovering a new fact, that is, “that critical notes of testimony
    from his plea proceedings [which] had been transcribed by the Court
    -5-
    J-S95030-16
    Reporter Service [were] later destroyed, despite the fact that [Gilmore] had
    attempted multiple times through multiple sources to obtain them before
    their destruction.” Gilmore’s Br. at 8. He claims that he first learned of the
    alleged destruction of the notes of testimony on August 3, 2010, when he
    received an affidavit from his mother, dated June 9, 2010, which stated that
    in March 2010, she had learned from the court reporter service that the
    notes of testimony could not be located.
    We conclude that Gilmore has failed to establish that the “new facts”
    exception applies.       Regardless of whether the notes of testimony were
    missing or “destroyed,”5 Gilmore knew in 2008 that the notes were
    unavailable, as evidenced by the letter Gilmore allegedly received from the
    court reporter service, see R.R. at 8.6          Because Gilmore did not file the
    instant PCRA petition until 2010, the petition was not filed within 60 days of
    the date his claim could have been presented as required by section
    9545(b)(2).
    ____________________________________________
    5
    Although Gilmore contends the notes of testimony were “destroyed,”
    he provides no proof that this occurred. Rather, the affidavit from his
    mother avers only that the court reporter service could not find the records.
    6
    We note that the letter from the court reporter service, as included in
    the reproduced record, is undated; however, the version attached to
    Gilmore’s original and amended PCRA petitions includes a handwritten
    notation of “Sept 17, 2008 [sic].”
    -6-
    J-S95030-16
    Next, we address whether Gilmore satisfies the time-bar exception of
    section 9545(b)(1)(i), known as the “governmental interference” exception.
    Gilmore argues that the government interfered by ignoring his repeated
    requests for the notes of testimony “until it was too late and the notes had
    been destroyed.” Gilmore’s Br. at 19. “Although a Brady7 violation may fall
    within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead
    and prove that the failure to previously raise [the claim] was the result of
    interference by government officials, and that the information could not have
    been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth
    v. Hawkins, 
    953 A.2d 1248
    , 1253 (Pa. 2006).
    We    conclude     that   Gilmore       has   not   proven   any   governmental
    interference.     Although he repeatedly uses the words “destroyed” and
    “destruction,” the only evidence Gilmore provides to support his allegation
    that the notes of testimony were destroyed is his mother’s affidavit, which
    does not support this claim. Moreover, to the extent Gilmore argues that his
    requests for the notes of testimony were ignored, Gilmore was aware in
    2008 that the notes of testimony were unavailable, and the instant PCRA
    ____________________________________________
    7
    Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963). “[T]o establish a Brady
    violation, a defendant must demonstrate that: (1) the evidence was
    suppressed by the Commonwealth, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the
    evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material,
    in that its omission resulted in prejudice to the defendant.”
    Commonwealth v. Haskins, 
    60 A.3d 538
    , 545 (Pa.Super. 2012).
    -7-
    J-S95030-16
    petition was not filed until 2010. Further, Gilmore does not explain how the
    alleged destruction of the notes of testimony interfered with his ability to
    bring a claim challenging the propriety of his guilty plea colloquy, as Gilmore
    was present8 at the guilty plea colloquy and would know whether he had
    been       informed   of   the   possibility   that   he   could   receive   consecutive
    sentences.9 Finally, Gilmore does not adequately explain how his ability to
    make claims related to the unavailability of the notes of testimony was
    affected by the alleged interference, and more critically, does not explain
    why that information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise
    of due diligence.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court’s dismissal of Gilmore’s
    fourth PCRA petition is supported by the record and free of legal error.
    Order affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    8
    Gilmore’s brief contends only that he was not present at the April 21,
    2003 resentencing hearing.
    9
    Gilmore’s underlying claim challenges the propriety of his guilty plea,
    that is, that he made the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntary.
    Gilmore contends that he was not informed prior to pleading of the
    possibility of receiving consecutive sentences, and that he believed that he
    would receive concurrent sentences.
    -8-
    J-S95030-16
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/21/2017
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com v. Gilmore, M. No. 1115 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 4/21/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024