Com. v. Moore, J. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S23029-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    JERONE ANDRE MOORE                         :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1651 MDA 2021
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 22, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-40-CR-0003215-2015
    BEFORE:      STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                  FILED: MARCH 10, 2023
    Jerone Andre Moore appeals the order denying his Post Conviction Relief
    Act (“PCRA”) petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. This case returns to
    us following our denial of counsel’s initial petition to withdraw. We directed
    counsel to file either a compliant Turner/Finley brief and petition to
    withdraw, or an advocate’s brief.1 Counsel has filed a petition to withdraw as
    counsel, along with a Turner/Finley brief. We affirm the order dismissing
    Moore’s PCRA petition and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
    A jury convicted Moore of attempted murder and kidnapping.2 Relevant
    to this appeal, at trial, counsel objected to the Commonwealth’s questioning
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1Commonwealth     v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
    Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
    2   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901 and 2901(a)(3), respectively.
    J-S23029-22
    of the officer who confiscated Moore’s phone. N.T., Trial, 2/21/17, at 484.
    Defense counsel objected that a text message to Moore’s girlfriend was not
    admissible as an admission of a party opponent. The message was sent from
    Moore’s phone one day after the kidnapping. The message read, “A lot of shit
    went down bae n its bad I need to leave [sic].” Id. at 488. Defense counsel
    objected that Moore could have been “talking about something else.” Id. at
    485. The court overruled the objection. Id. Counsel made a second objection,
    immediately before the Commonwealth admitted the contents of the text
    message. Id. at 487. Counsel argued that the Commonwealth had not proved
    that the outgoing message was from Moore. Id. The court overruled the
    objection and the Commonwealth admitted the message into evidence.
    After conviction and sentencing, Jackson appealed to this Court,
    challenging, among other issues, the authentication of the text message. See
    Commonwealth v. Moore, No. 820 MDA 2017, 
    2018 WL 3800774
    , at *2
    (Pa.Super. filed August 10, 2018) (unpublished memorandum). We rejected
    this claim as waived due to Moore’s failure to include it in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    statement. See 
    id.
     We affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our Supreme
    Court denied allowance of appeal. See id.; Commonwealth v. Moore, 
    203 A.3d 983
     (Table) (Pa. filed March 11, 2019).
    Moore then filed the instant, timely PCRA petition. The court appointed
    counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition. The amended petition
    contended that prior counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the
    -2-
    J-S23029-22
    challenge to the authentication of the text message. The PCRA court, which
    also presided over Moore’s trial, held an evidentiary hearing on April 12, 2021.
    At the hearing, Moore testified that he did not have a conversation with
    counsel regarding the admission of the text message but that he understood
    that counsel would raise the issue on appeal. N.T., PCRA Hearing, 4/12/21, at
    8. Moore’s trial counsel, David Lampman, Esquire, testified that he believed
    he raised the issue of the text on appeal. Id. at 11. He testified that he “made
    an objection during trial to the admission of that text message. I put it in my
    complaint statement on the first page, and I fully briefed the issue in the
    appeal.” Id. at 13. The court denied the petition and this timely appeal
    followed.
    We first address whether counsel has satisfied the procedural
    requirements of a petition to withdraw. A Turner/Finley brief must: (1) detail
    the nature and extent of counsel’s review; (2) list each issue the petitioner
    wished to have reviewed; and (3) explain why the petitioner’s issues were
    meritless. See Commonwealth v. Doty, 
    48 A.3d 451
    , 454 (Pa.Super. 2012)
    (citation omitted). “Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the
    ‘no-merit’ letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to withdraw; and (3) a
    statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or by new
    counsel.” Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 
    931 A.2d 717
    , 721 (Pa.Super. 2007).
    If counsel has substantially complied with these requirements,3 we conduct
    ____________________________________________
    3See Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 
    836 A.2d 940
    , 947 (Pa.Super. 2003)
    (holding that substantial compliance with Turner/Finley criteria is sufficient).
    -3-
    J-S23029-22
    our own independent review to determine if the issues raised are in fact
    meritless. If they are, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. 
    Id.
    Here, counsel has substantially complied with the requirements of
    Turner/Finley. Counsel’s brief details the nature and extent of his review,
    lists the issue that Moore wishes to have reviewed, and explains counsel’s
    conclusion that Moore’s issue is meritless. Counsel attached a letter addressed
    to Moore, which indicates that he provided Moore with a copy of the
    Turner/Finley brief and motion to withdraw. The letter also informs Moore
    of his right to proceed pro se or with new counsel. We now address the merits
    of Moore’s issue.
    Counsel’s brief identifies one issue: “Whether the trial counsel was
    ineffective in failing to raise the issue of whether the trial court abused its
    discretion in allowing evidence of a text message from [Moore’s] phone into
    the record.” Turner/Finley Br. at 1.
    When reviewing the denial of relief under the PCRA, our review is limited
    to determining “whether the PCRA court’s ruling is supported by the record
    and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Presley, 
    193 A.3d 436
    , 442
    (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
    Counsel is presumed effective, and the petitioner has the burden of
    proving otherwise. Thus, the petitioner must plead and prove: (1) the
    underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for
    counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice
    because of counsel’s error such that there is a reasonable probability that the
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    J-S23029-22
    result of the proceeding would have been different absent such error. See
    Commonwealth v. Fears, 
    86 A.3d 795
    , 804 (Pa. 2014). “A failure to satisfy
    any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim of
    ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 
    963 A.2d 409
    , 419 (Pa. 2009).
    To authenticate an item of evidence, the proponent must produce
    evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent
    claims it is. Pa.R.E. 901(a). “[A]uthentication of electronic communications,
    like documents, requires more than mere confirmation that the number or
    address belonged to a particular person. Circumstantial evidence, which tends
    to corroborate the identity of the sender, is required.” Commonwealth v.
    Koch, 
    39 A.3d 996
    , 1005 (Pa.Super. 2011).
    Here, Moore maintains that trial counsel, who was also appellate
    counsel, was ineffective for failing to include on appeal a challenge to the
    authentication of the text message. This claim of ineffectiveness fails because
    the underlying authentication issue lacks arguable merit.
    The   PCRA   court   concluded   that   the   Commonwealth        provided
    circumstantial evidence supporting the authentication and admittance of the
    text message:
    In the instant case, the text message was properly
    authenticated and admitted into evidence after the
    Commonwealth proffered a quantum and quality of evidence
    sufficient to meet the “relatively low burden of proof” to
    establish that the text message was what it purported to be,
    namely, a reference by [Moore] to the previous day’s attack
    on the victim. Specifically, the Commonwealth’s evidence
    established that the phone from which the text message was
    -5-
    J-S23029-22
    sent belonged to [Moore], and was in [Moore’s] possession
    before being turned over by him to the police. Additionally,
    there was no allegation or evidence presented that someone
    else had access to the phone. Further, the message, sent
    the day after the attack on the victim, references “[a] lot of
    shit [that] went down,” indicates the sender’s belief that “its
    bad,” and expresses the senders “need to leave.” Taken
    together, this evidence was sufficient to support the Court’s
    conclusion that the text message had been properly
    authenticated.
    PCRA Court Opinion, filed 2/16/22, at 6-7.
    We    discern   no   error.   The   Commonwealth      presented    sufficient
    circumstantial evidence to support a finding that Moore sent the text message
    to his girlfriend. As a result, the ineffectiveness claim predicated on the failure
    to preserve on appeal a challenge to authentication is meritless. We therefore
    affirm the order denying PCRA relief and grant the application to withdraw.
    Order affirmed. Application to withdraw granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/10/2023
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1651 MDA 2021

Judges: McLaughlin, J.

Filed Date: 3/10/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024