Com. v. Mercado, M. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S18013-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    MALIK MERCADO
    No. 1444 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 18, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0023918-2015
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SOLANO, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.                               FILED April 25, 2017
    On August 1, 2015, Appellee Malik Mercado was stopped at a sobriety
    checkpoint on East Allegheny Avenue in the 25th Police District in
    Philadelphia. The police officers operating the checkpoint arrested him and
    charged him with driving while under the influence of marijuana (“DUI”). The
    Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas affirmed the Philadelphia Municipal
    Court’s conclusion that the DUI checkpoint was unconstitutional and
    suppressed the evidence gathered from the stop. The sole issue in this
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S18013-17
    Commonwealth appeal1 is whether the police chose the location of the DUI
    checkpoint in compliance with the Tarbert/Blouse2 guidelines and the body
    of law contained in this Court’s application of those guidelines. After careful
    review, we affirm.
    The Commonwealth contends that the Court of Common Pleas erred in
    its application of the Tarbert/Blouse guidelines.
    When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, this
    Court may consider only the evidence from the defendant’s
    witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that,
    when read in the context of the record as a whole, remains
    uncontradicted. In our review, we are not bound by the
    suppression court’s conclusions of law, and we must determine if
    the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. We
    defer to the suppression court’s findings of fact because, as the
    finder of fact, it is the suppression court’s prerogative to pass on
    the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to
    their testimony.
    Commonwealth v. Myers, 
    118 A.3d 1122
    , 1125 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (citation omitted).
    The Tarbert/Blouse guidelines were promulgated to allow the
    government to pursue its legitimate interest in preventing the “carnage”
    caused by DUI, Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 304 (citation omitted), while
    protecting “the individual from arbitrary invasions at the unfettered
    ____________________________________________
    1
    The Commonwealth certified in its notice of appeal that the suppression
    order would terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution of Mercado,
    thereby perfecting our jurisdiction under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
    2
    Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 
    535 A.2d 1035
     (Pa. 1987) and
    Commonwealth v. Blouse, 
    611 A.2d 1177
     (Pa. 1992).
    -2-
    J-S18013-17
    discretion of the officers in the field,” Blouse, 611 A.2d at 1178 (citation
    omitted). The guidelines set forth five general requirements that the
    Commonwealth must establish substantial compliance with in order to
    ensure the constitutionality of a DUI checkpoint. See Commonwealth v.
    Garibray, 
    106 A.3d 136
    , 140 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc). Here, only one
    part of the fourth requirement, that the choice of location for the checkpoint
    be based on experience as to where intoxicated drivers are likely to be
    driving, is at issue.
    The essential facts of this case are undisputed          and may be
    summarized as follows. The 25th Police District of Philadelphia suffered the
    highest number of DUI arrests in the city during the years 2013 and 2014.
    See N.T., Suppression hearing, 1/7/16, at 24, 29-32. The district covers
    approximately 2.3 square miles. See id., at 30. The data used by the police
    in this case was not broken down further to specific locations or streets
    within the district. See id.
    Reacting reasonably to this data, the police sought to curb DUI in this
    district by establishing a DUI checkpoint. See id., at 29. Complicating
    matters was the fact that a checkpoint requires a large operation, involving
    “18 police officers, two police cruisers and one large processing center. It’s
    about the size of a firetruck.” Id., at 25. As a result, the police were also
    reasonably concerned with safety considerations, ruling out smaller, more
    residential side streets. See id.
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    J-S18013-17
    The Court of Common Pleas concluded that under Commonwealth v.
    Blee, 
    695 A.2d 802
     (Pa. Super. 1997), and Garibray, the police had not
    provided sufficient evidence to prove that “the DUI checkpoint in question
    substantially complied with the Tarbert/Blouse location requirement
    because” the evidence was not specific to the location of the DUI checkpoint.
    See Trial Court Opinion, 7/6/16, at 6. It therefore affirmed the Municipal
    Court’s order that found the stop unconstitutional.
    On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the Court of Common Pleas
    misapplied     Blee    and    Garibray.3       The   Commonwealth   believes   that
    Commonwealth v. Fioretti, 
    538 A.2d 570
     (Pa. Super. 1988), is controlling.
    After reviewing these cases, we agree with the Court of Common Pleas that
    there is significant unresolved tension between the holdings of Blee and
    Fioretti.
    In Fioretti, a panel of this Court was presented with circumstances
    similar to the present case. The appellant was one of several defendants
    who had been arrested at a DUI checkpoint in Williamsport. The location for
    the checkpoint had been chosen after determining that the thirteenth (of
    fifteen) police district in Williamsport had been the location of a high number
    ____________________________________________
    3
    The Commonwealth also argues that the stop was voluntary. While there
    was testimony to support this position, our review of the record reveals that
    the Commonwealth never presented this argument to the Court of Common
    Pleas or the Municipal Court. It is therefore waived for purposes of appeal.
    See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
    -4-
    J-S18013-17
    of DUI arrests over a recent six-month period. See Fioretti, 538 A.2d at
    576. However, the specific location within the thirteenth district had been
    chosen “for its safety features[.]” Id., at 576-577.
    The suppression court held that the checkpoint did not comply with the
    Tarbert guidelines. The Fioretti panel disagreed, noting that “the location
    of the roadblock was chosen based on a statistical analysis of which district
    had the highest number of [DUI] arrests or accidents[.]” Id., at 549. It
    therefore reversed the suppression order and remanded for further
    proceedings.
    Similarly, the Blee panel reviewed the placement of a DUI checkpoint
    in Luzerne County. It summarized the relevant evidence as follows:
    Deputy Chief William Barrett of the Wilkes-Barre Police
    Department testified that he was responsible for determining the
    site of the checkpoint. He decided to locate the checkpoint on
    Route 11 approximately one-quarter mile south of Main Street,
    near the shopping center in Edwardsville. In making this
    decision, Deputy Chief Barrett considered motorist safety, traffic
    volume, availability of lighting and whether motorists would have
    ample opportunity to avoid the checkpoint if they so desired. He
    also testified that he reviewed studies from the Pennsylvania
    Department of Transportation (PennDOT) regarding DUI arrests
    and DUI-related accidents in Luzerne County during the years
    1989 through 1994. These studies were introduced into evidence
    and made a part of the record. On cross-examination, [he]
    admitted that the studies were not specific to DUI-related
    accidents and arrest at the particular location of the sobriety
    checkpoint, that is, Route 11 in Edwardsville. Rather, the studies
    provided general information indicating the number of DUI-
    related accidents and arrests in Luzerne County, the
    municipalities located in Luzerne County and the roads bordering
    Luzerne County. Specifically, the studies indicated that, among
    the roads in Luzerne County, Route 11 had the second highest
    incidence of alcohol-related accidents, and that, among the
    -5-
    J-S18013-17
    municipalities in Luzerne County, Edwardsville had one of the
    highest incidence of alcohol-related accidents.5
    5
    Deputy Chief Barrett testified that from 1989 through
    1994 there were 185 alcohol related accidents on Route 11
    in Luzerne County, which is approximately thirty-eight miles
    in length. He also testified that there were forty-one alcohol
    related accidents in the Borough of Edwardsville, which
    contains numerous roads.
    
    695 A.2d at 804
     (citations omitted).
    In       contrast   to   Fioretti,   the   Blee   panel   concluded    that   the
    Commonwealth had failed to establish compliance with the Tarbert/Blouse
    guidelines.
    While Deputy Chief Barrett testified concerning the number of
    alcohol-related accidents on Route 11 in Luzerne County and the
    number of alcohol-related accidents in Edwardsville, Luzerne
    County, he never testified as to the number of alcohol-related
    accidents and/or arrests on Route 11 in Edwardsville, the specific
    location of the sobriety checkpoint. … At the very least, the
    Commonwealth was required to present information sufficient to
    specify the number of DUI-related arrests and/or accidents on
    Route 11 in Edwardsville, the specific location of the sobriety
    checkpoint.
    
    Id., at 805-806
    .
    We are thus left with one precedent, Fioretti, that held that the
    localization requirement was satisfied by data covering one of fifteen police
    districts in Williamsport, and another, Blee, that held that the localization
    requirement was not satisfied by data covering a small borough outside of
    Wilkes-Barre. The Commonwealth attempts to distinguish                      Blee from
    Fioretti by formulating a rule whereby police districts are sufficiently
    localized, while an entire municipality is not.
    -6-
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    However, the Commonwealth’s distinction does not hold up under
    review of the status or size of Edwardsville Borough when compared to the
    25th police district in Philadelphia. First, it is clear from Blee that
    Edwardsville Borough was only a portion of a larger whole covered by the
    Wilkes-Barre Police Department. Thus, Edwardsville Borough is more like the
    police district at issue in Fioretti than the Commonwealth’s argument
    admits.
    This becomes even more obvious in light of the size of the
    administrative units at issue. Edwardsville Borough covers approximately 1.2
    square      miles.   See    About    Edwardsville          Borough,   available         at
    http://www.edwardsvilleborough.com/, retrieved 3/21/17. While there is no
    indication of the size of the 13th police district in Fioretti, the Williamsport
    Police    Department    covers   approximately     9   square    miles   total.        See
    Williamsport           Bureau        of          Police,         available              at
    http://williamsportpd.org/Pages/Home.aspx,          retrieved     3/22/17.        It    is
    therefore unlikely that the 13th district at issue in Fioretti was significantly
    larger than the 1.2 square miles contained in Edwardsville Borough. By way
    of comparison, the 25th police district at issue in the present case covers
    approximately 2.3 square miles. See N.T., Suppression Hearing, 1/7/16, at
    30.
    We therefore agree with the Court of Common Pleas that Blee is not
    easily distinguishable. We therefore turn to this Court’s most recent
    -7-
    J-S18013-17
    application of the Tarbert/Blouse guidelines. In a decision published after
    the parties submitted their principal briefs in this case, a panel of this Court
    reviewed a suppression order that required the Commonwealth to present
    evidence of arrests or accidents “at the exact spot of the checkpoint.”
    Commonwealth v. Menichino, 
    2017 WL 281930
    , at *4, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa.
    Super. 2017).
    The Menichino panel rejected this argument, holding that “under
    current law, the specific location of the checkpoint is the area where the
    checkpoint is located, not the exact block/location of the checkpoint.” 
    Id.
    Thus, in the case before it, evidence that 44 out of a total of 94 DUI arrests
    on State Route 18 occurred within the city of Hermitage was sufficient to
    satisfy the localization requirement of Tarbert/Blouse. See 
    id.
    Here, the Court of Common Pleas noted that the Commonwealth’s
    evidence only addressed a 2.3 square mile area. It therefore reasoned that
    “it does not logically follow that any route selected within a police district
    with a relatively high number of DUI-related incidents will be a route that is
    likely to be travelled by intoxicated drivers[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 7/6/16, at
    6   (quotation    marks    omitted).   We     agree   that,   under   the   specific
    circumstances of this case, the Commonwealth failed to establish that
    Allegheny Avenue in the 25th Police District was a route likely to be travelled
    by intoxicated drivers. 2.3 square miles within the City of Philadelphia is not
    sufficiently   localized   to   constitute   substantial   compliance   with    the
    -8-
    J-S18013-17
    Tarbert/Blouse guidelines. While certainly not the only method to obtain
    compliance, evidence of DUI arrests on Allegheny Avenue within the 25th
    district would have been sufficient. But the Court of Common Pleas did not
    err in concluding that the evidence presented here was insufficient.
    Accordingly, we affirm the suppression order.
    Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/25/2017
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Mercado, M. No. 1444 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 4/25/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/25/2017