Com. v. Singh, B. ( 2017 )

J-S14007-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
v. :
:
BALDEV SINGH :
:
Appellant : No. 1431 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 21, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0003902-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 27, 2017
Appellant, Baldev Singh, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial
convictions of two counts each of robbery and simple assault, and one count
each of sexual assault, intimidation of witnesses or victims, terroristic
threats, and stalking.1 We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant
facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to
restate them.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 3701(a)(1)(iv), 2701(a)(1), 2701(a)(3),
3124.1, 4952(a)(3), 2706(a)(1), and 2709.1(a)(3), respectively.
_____________________________
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S14007-17
BY PERMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF DR. SHAMITA
DASGUPTA INSOFAR AS HER TESTIMONY EXCEEDED THE
SCOPE OF HER QUALIFICATION AS AN EXPERT IN
“SEXUAL ABUSE VICTIM BEHAVIOR AND RESPONSE TO
TRAUMA” UNDER 42 PA.C.S.[A]. § 5920 AND INCLUDED
HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS REGARDING
PERPETRATOR BEHAVIOR?
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY AS TO THE PERMISSIBLE LIMITS OF DR. [SHAMITA]
DASGUPTA’S EXPERT TESTIMONY PURSUANT TO 42
PA.C.S.[A]. § 5920?
(Appellant’s Brief at 10).
Our standard of review in cases involving the admission of expert
testimony is as follows:
Generally speaking, the admission of expert testimony is a
matter left largely to the discretion of the trial court, and
its rulings thereon will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion. An expert’s testimony is admissible when it is
based on facts of record and will not cause confusion or
prejudice.
Commonwealth v. Watson, 945 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, our standard of review of a court’s decision to include or
omit jury instructions “is one of deference—an appellate court will reverse a
court’s decision only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of
law.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1022 (Pa.Super. 2011),
aff’d, 621 Pa. 401, 78 A.3d 1044 (2013) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Galvin, 603 Pa. 625, 651, 985 A.2d 783, 799 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S.
1051, 130 S.Ct. 2345, 176 L.Ed.2d 565 (2010)). “The trial court has broad
-2-
J-S14007-17
discretion in formulating jury instructions, as long as the law is presented to
the jury in a clear, adequate, and accurate manner.” Commonwealth v.
Lukowich, 875 A.2d 1169, 1174 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 584 Pa.
706, 885 A.2d 41 (2005).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Patrick T.
Barrett, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court
opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions
presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed October 28, 2016, at 10-17)
(finding: (1) Appellant objected to Commonwealth’s proposed testimony
pursuant to Section 5920 because Appellant believed testimony would not
provide guidance to jury on particular charges against Appellant; court
overruled defense objection, and Commonwealth presented expert testimony
of Dr. Dasgupta, who specializes in domestic violence and sexual abuse in
Indian culture; Dr. Dasgupta provided general testimony on disclosure of
sexual abuse, which included explanation of how importance of marriage in
Indian culture could delay disclosure of marital sexual abuse; Dr. Dasgupta
specifically opined there is no typical response to sexual abuse in Indian
culture; this testimony was within confines of Section 5920 because Dr.
Dasgupta merely offered general opinion about disclosure of sexual abuse
and did not offer any opinion on credibility of Victim in this case;
additionally, Dr. Dasgupta’s testimony was helpful to jury because it
-3-
J-S14007-17
explained dynamics of sexual abuse in Indian culture; under these
circumstances, Appellant’s challenge to scope of Dr. Dasgupta’s testimony
fails; moreover, Appellant waived his challenge to Dr. Dasgupta’s testimony
because he failed to object at appropriate time at trial or provide specific
examples of how Dr. Dasgupta’s testimony exceeded the scope of Section
5920; thus, Appellant’s challenge to Dr. Dasguta’s testimony warrants no
relief; (2) Appellant did not ask court to instruct jury on permissible limits of
expert testimony under Section 5920; Appellant also failed to object when
court gave jury instruction on expert witness testimony; further, court
issued jury instruction on effect of delayed reporting on assessment of
Victim’s credibility; Appellant requested no further jury instruction on this
issue; thus, Appellant waived his challenge to court’s jury instruction).
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/27/2017
-4-