Com. v. Vanskiver, T. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S01018-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    TERRY NEIL VANSKIVER                       :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1313 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 25, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-59-CR-0000118-2017
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                           FILED FEBRUARY 04, 2019
    Terry Neil Vanskiver (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed after he pled guilty to rape of a child, aggravated indecent assault,
    and endangering the welfare of a child.1 After careful review, we affirm.
    The charges in this case arise from Appellant’s rape and sexual abuse
    of his then-girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter. A criminal complaint against
    Appellant was filed on February 17, 2017.          On March 16, 2018, Appellant
    appeared before the trial court and pled guilty to the above crimes. That same
    day, the trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation.
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3125(a)(7), and 4304(a)(1).
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S01018-19
    On June 25, 2018, Appellant was sentenced to 20 to 40 years of
    incarceration for rape of a child.2            Appellant filed a timely post-sentence
    motion, which the trial court denied.            Appellant filed this timely appeal on
    August 9, 2018.        Both the trial court and Appellant have complied with
    Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
    Appellant presents one issue for our review:
    DID THE SENTENCING COURT ERR IN SENTENCING THE
    [APPELLANT] TO THE STATUTORY LIMIT FOR THE OFFENSE OF
    RAPE OF A CHILD, EVEN THOUGH THE STATUTORY LIMIT FOR
    THAT OFFENSE IS ALWAYS ENCOMPASSED WITHIN THE
    STANDARD SENTENCING GUIDELINE RANGE, WHEN THE
    [APPELLANT] (1) HAD A MINIMAL PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD, (2)
    WAS OF GOOD BEHAVIOR DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE CASE,
    (3) DID NOT EXHIBIT UNUSUAL CRUELTY OR SADISTIC
    BEHAVIOR IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME, AND (4) WAS
    NOT FOUND BY THE PENNSYLVANIA SEXUAL OFFENDERS
    ASSESSMENT BOARD (SOAB) TO BE A SEXUALLY VIOLENT
    PREDATOR IN PART BECAUSE THE FACTORS ANALYZED BY SOAB
    SUGGESTED A LOW LIKELIHOOD OF RE-OFFENDING?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence, averring that:
    [t]he sentence herein at the statutory limit of [] twenty (20) to
    forty (40) years for [Appellant] with a minimal prior record, who
    was of good behavior during the pendency of the case, who was
    noted by SOAB to have exhibited no unusual cruelty or sadistic
    behavior during the commission of the crime, and who was
    determined not [to] be a Sexually Violent Predator in part because
    of a low likelihood of reoffending, is manifestly unreasonable and
    should not be allowed to stand.
    ____________________________________________
    2 For the purposes of sentencing, the remaining two counts merged with
    Appellant’s rape of a child conviction.
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    J-S01018-19
    Appellant’s Brief at 10.
    “The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence
    is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.”
    Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 
    91 A.3d 1247
    , 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014),
    appeal denied, 
    104 A.3d 1
    (Pa. 2014). “An appellant must satisfy a four-
    part test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary
    aspects of a sentence.”    
    Id. We conduct
    this four-part test to determine
    whether:
    (1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the
    time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2) the
    appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth
    a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of
    appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises
    a substantial question for our review.
    Commonwealth v. Baker, 
    72 A.3d 652
    , 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
    omitted), appeal denied, 
    86 A.3d 231
    (Pa. 2014). “A defendant presents a
    substantial question when he sets forth a plausible argument that the
    sentence violates a provision of the sentencing code or is contrary to the
    fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Dodge,
    
    77 A.3d 1263
    , 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted), appeal denied,
    
    91 A.3d 161
    (Pa. 2014).
    Appellant has complied with the first three prongs of this test by raising
    his discretionary sentencing claims in a timely post-sentence motion, filing a
    timely notice of appeal, and including in his brief a Rule 2119(f) concise
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    statement.   See Appellant’s Brief at 8-9.     Therefore, we examine whether
    Appellant presents a substantial question for review.
    Appellant argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence
    where it failed to consider Appellant’s criminal history, good behavior during
    the pendency of his case, and the findings of the Pennsylvania Sexual
    Offenders Assessment Board. Appellant’s Brief at 10. This argument presents
    a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Swope, 
    123 A.3d 333
    , 340
    (Pa. Super. 2015) (“This Court has also held that an excessive sentence claim-
    -in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating
    factors--raises a substantial question.”) (citations omitted). We thus review
    Appellant’s sentencing claim mindful of the following:
    Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
    sentencing judge. The standard employed when reviewing the
    discretionary aspects of sentencing is very narrow. We may
    reverse only if the sentencing court abused its discretion or
    committed an error of law. A sentence will not be disturbed on
    appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an
    abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
    Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
    that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised
    its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
    arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. We must accord
    the sentencing court’s decision great weight because it was in the
    best position to review the defendant’s character, defiance or
    indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime.
    Commonwealth v. Cook, 
    941 A.2d 7
    , 11-12 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations
    omitted).
    The relevant portion of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) states:
    -4-
    J-S01018-19
    In selecting from the alternatives set forth in subsection (a), the
    court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed
    should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection
    of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact
    on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
    rehabilitative needs of the defendant. . . . In every case in which
    the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor . . . the
    court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court
    at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons
    for the sentence imposed.
    
    Id. This Court
    has also held, “[w]hen a sentencing court has reviewed a
    pre[-]sentence investigation report, we presume that the court properly
    considered and weighed all relevant factors in fashioning the defendant’s
    sentence.” 
    Baker, 72 A.3d at 663
    (citing Commonwealth v. Fowler, 
    893 A.2d 758
    , 767 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Additionally:
    [i]n imposing sentence, the trial court is required to consider the
    particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the
    defendant. The trial court should refer to the defendant’s prior
    criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for
    rehabilitation. However, where the sentencing judge had the
    benefit of a presentence investigation report, it will be presumed
    that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding
    the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along
    with mitigating statutory factors.
    
    Fowler, 893 A.2d at 767-68
    (citing Commonwealth v. Boyer, 
    856 A.2d 149
    ,
    154 (Pa. Super. 2004)) (some citations omitted).
    At the June 25, 2018 hearing, the trial court acknowledged that it was
    in receipt of, and considered, the pre-sentence investigation report completed
    in anticipation of Appellant’s sentencing.   N.T., 6/25/18, at 1, 19.     Before
    imposing Appellant’s sentence, the trial court commented:
    -5-
    J-S01018-19
    [I]t is my responsibility and my duty to fashion and impose
    sentences; and [Defense Counsel] has advanced, I think, the best
    and most logical arguments that one might advance on behalf of
    your circumstance. And as he notes, it is the responsibility of us,
    as professionals, to reflect upon the individual cases and to be
    governed by reason, by the law, and not necessarily by passion -
    certainly not by passion or some sense of vengeance. There are
    a couple of things that I would say to you at the outset. Obviously,
    this is - this is behavior which is not acceptable; it’s a crime - and
    it is a very, very serious crime. And it is, I think, as life goes on
    and time advances, we appreciate more and more just what a
    serious crime this is. The impact - the lingering impact or trauma
    and the consequences that will be borne by this young lady
    throughout the course of her life.
    This - there are - well, as [Defense Counsel] noted, there
    are certainly some circumstances regarding your ability to
    function, and an argument to be made that you have some, some
    recognition of the harm that you caused and recognized, and
    didn’t go out of your way to inflict pain. We do have to
    understand, and the Court has to take into consideration, that this
    is an - this was an eight-year-old child. This is an eight-year-old
    child, whether she was either, nine, ten, twelve, she was a child,
    a young child, who was entrusted to you by, by a parent who was
    faced with a terrible crisis involving her other child. And this
    young lady, the victim, obviously, had some sort of relationship
    with you, viewed you favorably; I presume knew you, trusted you.
    Her mother trusted you, obviously, or the conditions that led to
    this would have never occurred or arisen. And that trust, the trust
    that this young lady has, and apparently everyone around her, is
    now shattered, and the effort to put that back together will be
    arduous for her and for all of those around her.
    And while it is my responsibility to take into account
    information regarding your likelihood to recidivate and to
    contemplate, and reflect on your criminal history, which is taken
    into the guidelines, you nonetheless do have it.       And it is my
    responsibility to also hold you accountable. And as [Defense
    Counsel] referenced, and I said earlier, these are all individual
    cases. They are individual, unique, and specific. They are fact
    driven. And frankly, this is a - this is a circumstance where I
    believe the accountability requires and is such that a sentence
    should be imposed that’s going to incarcerate you in the State
    Correctional System for a very significant period of time. And I’m
    -6-
    J-S01018-19
    going to stay in the standard range, but the reality is, this will not
    be at the bottom end of the standard range, but rather will be at
    the upper end. The standard range is the presumptive range, and
    in your case, and in the circumstances that you bring to the table,
    and that this case brings to the table, in fact, the maximum
    sentence allowed by law, is within the standard range, and that is
    what I believe is appropriate in this case.
    
    Id. at 16-18.
    In its opinion, the trial court further explained:
    In [Appellant’s] case he pled guilty to one count of [r]ape of
    a [c]hild, along with other charges that merged for sentencing
    purpose[s] under a negotiated plea. The charge stemmed from
    [Appellant’s] rape, and additional sexual abuse, of his then
    paramour’s eight year old daughter. The abuse began after the
    victim’s brother was diagnosed with cancer. The victim’s mother
    had to travel to Geisinger Medical Center in Danville for extended
    periods of time so her brother could receive the cancer treatment
    he needed. During mother’s absence, [Appellant] was entrusted
    with the care of the victim. Instead of caring for her he sexually
    abused and raped her.
    Prior to imposing sentence, the court, on the record, went
    over the sentencing guidelines with [Appellant] as prepared by the
    Tioga County Probation Department as part of its [p]re-[s]entence
    [i]nvestigation. [Appellant] had a prior record score of a two (2)
    for sentencing purposes and the charge of [r]ape of a [c]hild has
    an offense gravity score of fourteen (14). This resulted in
    standard range guidelines of ninety-six (96) months to two
    hundred forty (240) months. The mitigated range is eight[y]-four
    (84) months and there is no aggravated range as the statutory
    maximum sentence is encapsulated in the standard range.
    Neither the Defense nor the Commonwealth objected to these
    calculations.
    After the court went over the sentencing guidelines, the
    Commonwealth called the victim’s mother to the stand. She
    testified how the victim changed after the abuse. The victim went
    from an outgoing and loving child to one who is scared, untrusting,
    and depressed. The Assistant District Attorney also read a letter
    from the victim where she describes the abuse, specifically two
    occurrences where the [Appellant] raped her. The letter also
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    stated the [Appellant] threatened the victim that if she told
    anyone he would come back and kill her. The Commonwealth also
    submitted a letter from the victim’s counselor.
    The Defense argued for a sentence at the lower level of the
    sentencing guidelines range. In making this argument, [Defense
    Counsel] noted factors in [Appellant’s] favor. These factors
    included [Appellant’s] good behavior while released on bail in this
    case, the fact his prior record score is solely the result of a juvenile
    adjudication, [Appellant’s] low risk of recidivism (as determined
    through the SOAB evaluation), [Appellant] taking responsibility
    for his crimes by pleading guilty, along with other reasons.
    [Appellant] also gave a brief statement saying he loved the victim
    and her brother, cared for them when the victim’s brother was
    sick, and parented the children when their mother worked or was
    unavailable.
    In handing down it[s] sentence[,] the court obviously
    considered the sentencing guidelines as it went over them on the
    record and noted the sentence was within the standard range of
    the guidelines. The court also considered [Defense Counsel’s]
    arguments that [Appellant] deserved a sentence in the lower
    range of the guidelines. The court then noted, however, the victim
    was eight years old at the time of the rape and abuse, the victim’s
    mother entrusted [Appellant] with caring for the victim during a
    time of family crisis, and the victim herself had a close relationship
    and trusted [Appellant]. The court took all of these factors into
    consideration in arriving at the sentence imposed on [Appellant].
    The court looked at the individual circumstances of [Appellant]
    and the facts of the specific case in handing down its sentence and
    did not merely reflexively sentence [Appellant] to the statutory
    maximum sentence. In addition, the sentence imposed by the
    court is “consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity
    of the events as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim
    and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the
    [Appellant].” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9721(b). As such, the sentence
    should be upheld.
    Trial Court Opinion, 9/17/18, at unnumbered 3-5 (citations to notes of
    testimony omitted).
    -8-
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    Based on our review of the record, particularly the notes of testimony
    from the sentencing hearing, we conclude that the trial court properly
    considered all relevant factors when imposing Appellant’s sentence.          In
    addition to reviewing Appellant’s pre-sentence investigation report, the trial
    court considered all potential mitigating factors raised by Appellant. See N.T.,
    6/25/18, at 16 (“[Defense Counsel] has advanced, I think, the best and most
    logical arguments that one might advance on behalf of your circumstance.”).
    Ultimately, and in its discretion, the trial court determined that Appellant’s
    crimes necessitated a period of 20 to 40 years of incarceration. Accordingly,
    we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
    For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s sole issue is without merit, and
    we affirm the judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 02/04/2019
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1313 MDA 2018

Filed Date: 2/4/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024