Com. v. Juarez-Panjota, J. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JESUS ANGEL JUAREZ-PANJOTA, :
:
Appellant. : No. 407 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, February 9, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001444-2017.
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 07, 2018
Jesus Angel Juarez-Panjota appeals a judgment of sentence of one year
probation, following a non-jury conviction on three drug-possession offenses.1
He challenges the constitutionality of the Commonwealth’s physical evidence,
which a Pennsylvania State Policeman seized during a traffic stop. For the
reasons below, we affirm.
The parties agree on the facts, which Trooper Frank Gawel recounted at
the suppression hearing. The dashboard camera on his cruiser also recorded
the traffic stop and collaborated his recollection.
On a February afternoon in 2017, Juarez-Panjota, high on marijuana,
drove his sedan, a Chevrolet Malibu, upon a state highway. Extraordinarily
large, rear tires protruded beyond the Malibu’s body and fenders.
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1 35 P.S. §780-113(A)(16).
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Trooper Gawel was sitting in his cruiser on the roadside, when Juarez-
Panjota drove by him. Believing that the Malibu’s oversized tires violated
Pennsylvania’s Vehicle Code, the trooper pulled out and followed the car for
about five minutes. From behind the Malibu, Trooper Gawel could tell that its
“fender did not cover the wheels and tires.” N.T., 8/28/17, at 5-7. He initiated
a traffic stop.
Upon approaching the car, Trooper Gawel smelled freshly burnt
marijuana, arrested Juarez-Panjota, and searched the vehicle. That search
uncovered various drugs stashed throughout the Malibu.
Juarez-Panjota filed a motion to suppress those drugs, on the grounds
that the trooper did not have probable cause to stop him for a Vehicle Code
violation. At the suppression hearing, Trooper Gawel testified that the
Malibu’s protruding tires violated “the Vehicle Code [at section] 4107(b)(2),
which then refers to the PA Code 67, Inspection, Regulations and violations .
. . under Section 175 [b].” Id. at 7.
After defense counsel challenged the trooper’s lack of familiarity with
the Vehicle Code on cross-examination, the Commonwealth rehabilitated him
by highlighting that Trooper Gawel relied upon “a short guide . . . a condensed
form of the vehicle code.” Id. at 12. As he flipped through this book on the
stand, the trooper then cited “two other sections here under tires and wheels,
which would be 175.65, which also then falls under 177.5 under the fender
section.” Id. The prosecutor then asked:
You could have gone with either one?
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A: As far as I am aware, both apply to the situation. I
chose fender.
Id.
Agreeing with the trooper that Juarez-Panjota’s car displayed signs of a
Vehicle Code violation, the suppression judge denied the motion to suppress.
She said, “I am satisfied that . . . a traffic stop must be supported either by
probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a criminal violation . . . .” Id. at
20. The judge further opined that:
[t]here is a violation of the Vehicle Code regarding tire width
and protrusion, as I read not only the Vehicle Code section
relied on, but the underlying regulations on which that
Vehicle Code section is based. Therefore, I am satisfied that
the stop was legal, in that it was based on a reasonable
suspicion that that violation had occurred.
Id. at 21.
The court later convicted Juarez-Panjota on various possession counts
and sentenced him to one year of probation. This appeal followed.
Juarez-Panjota presents three issues for appeal. First, he says that the
suppression court applied an unconstitutional standard of review – namely,
reasonable suspicion. See Juarez-Panjota’s Brief at 3. Second, he asks
whether “a mistake of law can provide the objectively reasonable grounds for
probable cause?” Id. Third, if the trooper honestly misinterpreted the Vehicle
Code, Juarez-Panjota points out that the state constitution – unlike its federal
counterpart – does not allow for a good-faith exception to the warrant
requirement. See id.
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These issues form a three-pronged theory, and Juarez-Panjota must win
each of them in order to succeed on appeal. Essentially, he argues that:
1. a protruding-tires violation requires courts to apply the probable
cause standard;
2. Trooper Gawel had no probable cause, because a protruding-tires
violation does not exist for sedans; and
3. Trooper Gawel’s bona fide misinterpretation of the law does not
excuse his failure to procure a warrant under Article I, § 8 of the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Because Juarez-Panjota’s second point rests upon an incorrect reading of the
Vehicle Code and disposes of this appeal, we will address only that issue.
At the heart of his second appellate issue, Juarez-Panjota claims that
there is no violation for driving a sedan with tires that extend beyond its
fender. He believes that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation’s
(“PennDoT”) regulation prohibiting overly-wide tires only applies to heavy
trucks and buses. The court of common pleas and the Commonwealth both
disagree with Juarez-Panjota’s reading of the regulations. We do, too.
Interpreting the Vehicle Code and PennDoT’s regulations in pursuance
thereof presents a pure question of law. Thus, “our scope of review is plenary,
and the standard is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Cooper, 27 A.3d 994, 998
(Pa. 2011). See also Ramalingam v. Keller Williams Realty Group, Inc.,
121 A.3d 1034, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2015) (indicating that this Court reviews
“code provisions” de novo).
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Trooper Gawel stopped Juarez-Panjota’s Malibu, because he saw that its
rear tires extended outside the fenders. PennDoT has forbidden sedans from
passing inspection if a tire’s “tread extends beyond the outer edge of the wheel
housing inclusive of fender flares.” 67 Pa.Code § 175.80(e)(1)(ix). The
“tread” is “[t]hat portion of the tire that comes into contact with the road.”
67 Pa.Code § 102 (definition of “Tread”).
Moreover, PennDoT requires that a sedan’s “[t]ires and wheels shall be
in safe operating condition as described in § 175.80.” 67 Pa.Code § 175.65.
Thus, PennDoT, in its expertise as the regulating agency of vehicles in this
Commonwealth, has determined that protruding-tires render a car unsafe for
driving. Hence, Juarez-Panjota’s Malibu was an unsafe car, equipped with
tires in violation of PennDoT regulations.
The General Assembly, in turn, has outlawed the driving of any vehicle
that violates PennDoT’s regulations on the Commonwealth’s roadways. “It is
unlawful for any person to . . . [o]perate . . . on any highway in this
Commonwealth any vehicle . . . which is not equipped as required under this
part or under department regulations . . . .” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2)
(relating to unlawful activates on the highways). If Juarez-Panjota’s tires were
wider than his fenders, he committed a violation under Section 4107(b)(2).
Thus, we fully agree with the learned Court of Common Pleas Judge
Margaret C. Miller, who correctly held:
Regardless of whether Trooper Gawel included an inaccurate
citation in [the] criminal complaint, or misspoke while
testifying, the fact remains that the vehicle stop at issue was
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neither based upon mistake of fact nor law. [Juarez-
Panjota] was stopped for operating a vehicle with illegal and
unsafe equipment, because the vehicle’s tires extended
beyond the vehicle’s fender.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/8/16, at 16.
At the suppression stage, we are concerned with the facts as Trooper
Gawel (and his dashboard camera) related them, not whether he cited the
exact sections of the Vehicle Code and PennDoT regulations in the criminal
complaint or on the stand. Here, the trooper credibly described the tires, their
size, and their protrusion beyond the fenders.
Having established that sedans tires have a size-limit under the law, we
now consider whether Trooper Gawel had grounds to stop Juarez-Panjota’s
vehicle for his oversized tires. In doing so, our scope of review is limited to
only the suppression-hearing evidence2 of the prevailing party (here, the
Commonwealth) and the uncontradicted evidence of the losing party. See
Commonwealth v. Ranson, 103 A.3d 73, 76 (Pa. Super. 2014). However,
because Trooper Gawel failed to obtain a search warrant prior to stopping and
searching Juarez-Panjota’s vehicle, the suppression court’s ruling that the
trooper possessed “reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be
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2 Throughout his brief, Juarez-Panjota makes multiple references to the non-
jury and sentencing hearing transcript. See, e.g., Juarez-Panjota’s Brief at
6, 24. These references are irrelevant. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has made clear that, when considering claims of a suppression court’s errors,
our scope of review is “limited to the factual findings and legal conclusions of
the suppression court.” In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013). See also
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 166 A.3d 1249, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal
denied, 180 A.3d 1207 (Pa. 2018).
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reviewed de novo on appeal.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996). See also Commonwealth v. Davis, 188 A.3d 454, 458 (Pa. Super.
2018).
Under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . .” Likewise, Article I, §
8 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania dictates that:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person
or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as
may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
“As a general rule, a search conducted without a warrant is presumed
to be unreasonable unless it can be justified under a recognized exception to
the search warrant requirement.” Commonwealth v. Agnew, 600 A.2d
1265, 1271 (Pa. Super. 1991). One exception to the warrant requirement is
the vehicle exception, because, in most cases, a vehicle can drive away,
provided the Commonwealth can demonstrate that the stopping/searching
officer had the required level of suspicion to justify the stop and/or search.
See Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (plurality opinion).3
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3 In Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (plurality opinion),
four Justices agreed, albeit on differing grounds, that Pennsylvania should
adopt the federal standard for vehicle searches. Thus, only probable cause is
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Law enforcement must, depending upon “the nature of the violation” in
question, possess either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initiate a
traffic stop. Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa. Super.
2015).
To prove reasonable suspicion, the Commonwealth need only show that
an officer made “specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable
inferences derived from those observations, led him reasonably to conclude,
in light of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that the person
he stopped was involved in that activity.” Commonwealth v. Anthony, 1
A.3d 914, 919 (Pa. Super. 2010).
On the other hand, an officer possess probable cause:
when the facts and circumstances within the police officer’s
knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.
Probable cause justifying a warrantless arrest is determined
by the totality of the circumstances.
It is the facts and circumstances within the personal
knowledge of the police officer that frames the
determination of the existence of probable cause.
Id. at 996–97 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, the suspicion
required for reasonable suspicion is only that the person detained be involved
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now required to search a vehicle, rather than probable cause and an additional
exigent circumstance.
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in criminal activity, whereas probable cause requires reasonable belief that a
person committed or is committing a crime.
We need not decide the constitutional question of which standard applies
to the violation at bar, because Trooper Gawel had probable cause. There is
no dispute that the protruding tires of Juarez-Panjota’s vehicle were clearly
visible to Trooper Gawel at the time he made this traffic stop. Thus, it was
reasonable for the trooper to believe that the driver of the Malibu was
committing a protruding-tires violation of the Vehicle Code as he drove down
the highway. In fact, defense counsel, after watching the video of the traffic
stop at the suppression hearing, acknowledged seeing the “tires sticking out.”
N.T., 8/28/18, at 18. If the tires’ treads had not protruded beyond the
Malibu’s fenders, then the trooper and defense counsel would not have seen
them “sticking out” beyond the sides of the car. Id.Upon de novo review, we conclude that Trooper Gawel had ample
probable cause to believe Juarez-Panjota’s tires violated 67 Pa.Code §
175.80(e)(1)(ix) and, by extension, 67 Pa.Code § 175.65 and 75 Pa. C.S.A. §
4107. Hence, we have no need to decide whether the higher or lower standard
of constitutional scrutiny applies to 67 Pa.Code § 175.80(e)(1)(ix), because
Trooper Gawel articulated sufficient facts to clear the higher hurdle of probable
cause.
Moreover, whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion existed at
the time a police officer stops someone or conducts a search “is predominately
an objective inquiry.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 736 (2011)
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(quotations and citations omitted). The Supreme Court of the United has
made clear that, in most cases, courts must:
ask whether “the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify
[the challenged] action.” Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.
128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). If so, that
action was reasonable “whatever the subjective intent”
motivating the relevant officials. Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).
This approach recognizes that the Fourth Amendment
regulates conduct rather than thoughts, Bond v. United
States, 529 U.S. 334, 338, n. 2, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 146
L.Ed.2d 365 (2000); and it promotes evenhanded, uniform
enforcement of the law, Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S.
146, 153–154, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004).
Id. at 731.
Thus, it does not matter which PennDoT regulations Trooper Gawel
subjectively believed Juarez-Panjota had violated when he pulled the Malibu
over, when he filled out the criminal complaint, or when he testified at the
suppression hearing. In a random traffic stop such as this one, all that matters
are the facts, as the common pleas judge found them to be, and whether
those facts, objectively speaking, add up to probable cause or reasonable
suspicion. A trooper’s subjective mistake of law is irrelevant.
Thus, Juarez-Panjota’s second claim of error is without merit, because
his tires presented visual evidence, objectively speaking, to warrant a person
of reasonable caution to believe that their tread extended “beyond the outer
edge of the wheel housing inclusive of fender flares.” 67 Pa.Code §
175.80(e)(1)(ix). We arrive at the same conclusion as the suppression court
– this traffic stop was constitutional.
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Because Juarez-Panjota’s success in this Court depended on the success
of all three of his appellate issues and his second has failed him, we need not
address his first and third issues.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/07/2018
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