Com. v. Norris, C. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CALVIN LAMAR NORRIS
Appellant No. 1604 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence imposed September 29, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County
Criminal Division at Nos: CP-43-CR-0001475-2016;
CP-43-CR-0001476-2017
BEFORE: STABILE, DUBOW, and NICHOLS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 11, 2018
Appellant, Calvin Lamar Norris, appeals from the September 29, 2017
judgment of sentence imposing life in prison without parole for first degree
murder and a consecutive by 8½ to 20 years of incarceration for aggravated
assault. We affirm.
Appellant’s convictions arose from two shootings that occurred around
11:30 p.m. on August 14, 2016.1 Victim Kimberly Odem testified that she
bought crack cocaine from Appellant earlier on the day of the crimes. The
crack turned out to be fake, and Odem and her boyfriend, deceased victim
Percy Godfrey, had an altercation with Appellant on the same evening, a few
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1 Unless another source is cited, we have relied on the facts recited in the
trial court’s March 15, 2018 opinion.
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hours prior to the shootings. Surveillance video from 10:30 on the evening
of the shootings depicted Appellant entering a convenience store appearing as
though he had been in an altercation.
Just before she was shot on the northeast corner of New Castle Street
in Sharon, Pennsylvania, Odem heard someone call her name. She turned to
look, and Appellant opened fire, hitting Odem in the jaw, left hand, and
shoulder. Police recovered three nine-millimeter casings near the site of the
Odem shooting. Odem had known Appellant for approximately ten years, and
she consistently identified him as the shooter. Odem was hospitalized for two
months and, as of the time of trial, needed several additional surgeries.
No eyewitness observed the fatal altercation between Appellant and
Godfrey, but it took place very shortly after the shooting of Odem. Neighbors
reported hearing two or three shots, a pause, and then an additional series of
shots fired. Police found Godfrey’s corpse roughly 150 feet from the site of
the Odem shooting. Godfrey suffered bullet wounds in the leg and in the
abdomen. Both bullets entered Godfrey’s body from behind. The fatal shot
entered Godfrey’s left mid-back and exited the right front of his lower chest.
The bullets were not fired from point blank range. Police recovered eight spent
nine-millimeter casings approximately 62 feet from Godfrey’s body. Appellant
suffered a stab wound in the abdomen, and police found a knife in Godfrey’s
hand with Appellant’s blood on it. The convenience store surveillance footage
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from earlier in the evening did not depict Appellant bleeding from the
abdomen.
Shortly after the shootings, Appellant knocked on the door of his aunt,
Regina Norris, who lived very near the crime scene. There, he asked his
cousin, Alvin Hancock, Jr., to drive him to a hospital in Youngstown, Ohio,
rather than Sharon Regional Hospital. Appellant claimed he had been stabbed
after having oral sex with another man’s girlfriend. Appellant and Hancock
arrived at St. Elizabeth Hospital in Youngstown shortly after midnight on
August 15, 2016. Surveillance video depicted Appellant walking across a
parking lot from Hancock’s car to the hospital entrance with no obvious
impairment.
Corporal Randolph Guy of the Pennsylvania State Police interviewed
Appellant in the hospital at 7:20 a.m. on the morning of August 15, 2016 after
having interviewed family members of the shooting victims. Corporal Guy
wore plain clothes and did not give Appellant Miranda2 warnings. The
interview lasted five to ten minutes. Appellant claimed he was stabbed a few
blocks from the hospital.
Police retrieved a nine-millimeter Luger handgun from underneath some
other items on Norris’ front porch. DNA testing revealed that Appellant’s DNA
was on the gun. Crime lab analysis established that the 11 nine-millimeter
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2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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casings recovered from the scenes of the Odem and Godfrey shootings were
fired from the Luger handgun.
Appellant filed pretrial motions seeking to suppress his statements to
police at the hospital and the results of a gunshot residue test performed at
the hospital, and seeking to admit evidence of Godfrey’s prior convictions.
The trial court denied suppression, permitted Appellant to introduce Godfrey’s
2013 terroristic threats conviction, and refused to permit introduction of
Godfrey’s 1989 involuntary manslaughter conviction. On July 18, 2017, a jury
found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned offenses. The trial court imposed
sentence on September 29, 2017, and this timely appeal followed.
Appellant raises seven assertions of error:
I. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that
[Appellant] was not under custodial interrogation at the time
he was questioned and made statements against his interest
to Corporal Guy at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital when, at the time,
he was under a police hold and a suspect in the shootings
of Godfrey and Odem.
II. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that
[Appellant] was not under custodial interrogation and that
his consent was voluntary when the Youngstown Police
conducted a [Gun Shot Residue (“GSR”)] test on
[Appellant’s] hands at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital when, at the
time, he was under a police hold, a suspect in the shootings
of Godfrey and Odem and under the effects of medication
following surgery.
III. Whether the trial court erred when it denied [Appellant’s]
request to introduce [Pa.R.E.] 404(b)(2)(B) character
evidence of Godfrey in the form of a 1989 conviction of
involuntary manslaughter in Ohio when self-defense was
properly alleged.
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IV. Whether [Appellant] negated a conviction of first-degree
murder when he presented the expert testimony of Dr. Karl
Williams who opined that at the time of the shootings
[Appellant] lost his sensibilities due to alcohol intoxication.
V. Whether there was sufficient evidence that [Appellant]
acted in self-defense from Godfrey and whether the
Commonwealth failed to prove [Appellant] was not acting in
self-defense when [Appellant] was stabbed by Godfrey at
the time of the shooting.
VI. Whether the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to
prove [Appellant] formed the specific intent to commit
murder of the first degree of Godfrey and whether
[Appellant’s] voluntary intoxication and/or act of self-
defense negated any intention to kill.
VII. Whether the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to
prove [Appellant] formed the intent to commit aggravated
assault on Odem when evidence was presented that showed
[Appellant] acting in self-defense toward Godfrey.
Appellant’s Brief at 15-17 (Numeration ours).
Appellant’s first two arguments challenge the trial court’s denial of his
motion to suppress evidence. We conduct our review as follows:
[O]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the factual findings are supported by the record and
whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.
We are bound by the suppression court’s factual findings so long
as they are supported by the record; our standard of review on
questions of law is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant is
appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may consider
only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the
evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted. Our scope
of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression
hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial.
Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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First, Appellant argues the trial court erred in admitting the statements
he made to Corporal Guy because Corporal Guy subjected him to a custodial
interrogation without Miranda warnings.
A police encounter becomes an arrest when, under the
totality of the circumstances, the detention becomes so coercive
that it is the functional equivalent of an arrest. The numerous
factors used to determine whether a detention has evolved into
an arrest include the cause for the detention, the detention’s
length, the detention’s location, whether the suspect was
transported against his or her will, whether physical restraints
were used, whether the police used or threatened force, and the
character of the investigative methods used to confirm or dispel
the suspicions of the police. Custodial interrogation has been
defined as questioning initiated by the police after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her
freedom of action in any significant way. Further, an
interrogation” occurs when the police should know that their
words or actions are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.
Commonwealth v. Clinton, 905 A.2d 1026, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2006)(internal
citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).
Corporal Guy was aware that Appellant was suspected in the shootings
of Odem and Godfrey, having visited the crime scene, spoken with other
officers, and interviewed victims’ family members. Supplemental Findings of
Fact, 6/7/17, at p. 12. Wearing plain clothes, he asked Appellant to explain
how he was stabbed. Partial Findings of Fact, 4/12/17, at ¶ 25. Appellant
told Guy that he believed he was stabbed somewhere near St. Elizabeth
Hospital in Youngstown while walking to his cousin’s house. Id. at ¶ 22.
Appellant could not identify the cousin or the person who stabbed him. Id.
Corporal Guy was unaware that Appellant had an outstanding arrest warrant
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in Farrell, Pennsylvania, and that he did not believe he had authority to arrest
Appellant at the hospital in Ohio. Id. at ¶ 21. Nonetheless, Corporal Guy
would have made efforts to have Appellant detained had Appellant tried to
leave the hospital. Id. Appellant was not restrained or under guard, and the
interview lasted five to ten minutes. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 26. Appellant notes that
he was recovering from a major surgery (a bowel resection), heavily
medicated, and unable to leave the hospital for that reason.
In Commonwealth v. Fento, 526 A.2d 784 (Pa. Super. 1987), appeal
denied, 535 A.2d 875 (Pa. 1988), the defendant was in a hospital emergency
room, confined to a bed, and receiving treatment after a single-car driving
accident. Id. at 785. The defendant confirmed that he was driving the vehicle
and that he drank several beers prior to driving. Id. at 786. The police
trooper noted the smell of alcohol on the defendant’s breath, bloodshot eyes,
and slurred speech. Id. The interview was part of routine accident
investigation. Id. at 787. The police officer did not suspect the defendant of
a crime until he noticed his eyes and the smell of alcohol. Id. The officer
sought and received permission from hospital personnel to interview the
defendant, the interview lasted five minutes, and Appellant was not under any
guard. Id. The Fento Court noted that the defendant became the focus of
an investigation when the officer noted the defendant’s obvious drunkenness,
but found no other evidence of a custodial interrogation. Id. The Fento Court
distinguished Commonwealth v. Fisher, 352 A.2d 26 (Pa. 1976), in which
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the defendant had been under guard for 48 hours before finally incriminating
himself during his third interview. Id.
In Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 629 A.2d 142 (Pa. Super. 1993),
on the other hand, police had investigated the scene of an accident and
suspected the defendant of drunk driving prior to arriving at the hospital to
interview him. The officer smelled alcohol on the defendant’s breath and
observed his staggering gait at the scene prior to placing the defendant on an
ambulance. Id. at 143. The officer specifically asked the defendant whether
he had been drinking. Id. He arrested the defendant at the conclusion of the
interview. Id. We concluded that the officer subjected the defendant to a
custodial interrogation:
While the initial questions were general, we agree that the
clear intent was to obtain incriminating admissions while appellee
was not freely capable of leaving and was fearful of not
cooperating. The statement was made after prompting and
followed questions designed to obtain incriminating statements.
No formal declaration of arrest is required in order for an individual
to conclude that he is in custody.
Id. at 145.
In view of the totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude the trial
court erred in finding no custodial interrogation. Instantly, Corporal Guy,
having been to the crime scene and spoken to several other officers, was
aware that Appellant was a suspect in the shootings of Odem and Godfrey.
Nonetheless, the interview was brief, it took place in a hospital to which
Appellant travelled of his own free will, and Corporal Guy did not prompt
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Appellant to discuss the shootings. Rather, he simply asked Appellant about
his injury. Police were not guarding or restraining Appellant in any way, and
Corporal Guy made no show of force. Corporal Guy did not arrest Appellant,
but would have made efforts to detain Appellant had Appellant attempted to
leave. As in Fento, most of the circumstances weigh against a finding of
custodial interrogation.
Furthermore, we observe that Appellant’s statement to Corporal Guy
was incriminating only insofar as it was an obvious falsehood, potentially
indicative of consciousness of guilt. Given the nature of Appellant’s statement,
and the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, we would conclude that any error
in admitting it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “The doctrine of
harmless error is a technique of appellate review designed to advance judicial
economy by obviating the necessity for a retrial where the appellate court is
convinced that a trial error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Commonwealth v. Thornton, 431 A.2d 238, 251 (Pa. 1981). “Its purpose
is premised on the well-settled proposition that ‘[a] defendant is entitled to a
fair trial but not a perfect one.’” Id. (quoting Lutwak v. United States, 344
U.S. 604 (1953)).
Harmless error exists where: (1) the error did not prejudice
the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; (2) the
erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other
untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the
erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and
uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the
prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison
that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.
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Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 571 Pa. 45, 52–53, 811 A.2d 556, 561
(2002). Instantly, given Odem’s eyewitness testimony, and the ballistics and
DNA evidence, including Appellant’s DNA on the murder weapon and
Appellant’s blood on Godfrey’s knife, and Godfrey’s false account to his cousin
who drove him to St. Elizabeth’s hospital, Appellant’s statement to Corporal
Guy was insignificant in comparison to the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.
Next, Appellant argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the
GSR test taken at St. Elizabeth. The record reveals that Appellant consented,
but he claims his consent was invalid because he gave it while he was
recovering from a major surgery and still under the effects of sedation and
painkillers. We need not address this issue on the merits because Appellant
does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he was the
shooter. Indeed, his theory at trial and his arguments on appeal are that he
was defending himself against Godfrey’s knife assault and that he was too
intoxicated to form the specific intent to kill. Moreover, Appellant’s DNA was
on the gun recovered from Norris’s front porch, where Norris observed
Appellant shortly after the shootings. Assuming without deciding that
Appellant’s consent to the GSR test was invalid, the admission of the results
into evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to admit
Godfrey’s 1989 involuntary manslaughter conviction into evidence. Godfrey
received a sentence of 10 to 25 years for the Ohio conviction. Appellant
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remained on supervision in Ohio until 2014. Appellant claims the conviction
was relevant to bolster his self-defense theory and admissible under
Commonwealth v. Amos, 284 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1971). That Court held that
where a defendant alleges self-defense, he may use his
deceased victim’s criminal record either (1) to corroborate his
alleged knowledge of the victim’s quarrelsome and violent
character to show that the defendant reasonably believed that his
life was in danger; or (2) to prove the allegedly violent
propensities of the victim to show that the victim was in fact the
aggressor.
Id. at 751. The prior crime must be “of the same nature,” and “not too distant
in time.” Id. at 752. “The decision in each case as to similar nature and
remoteness […] rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Id. In
Commonwealth v. Beck, 402 A.2d 1371, 1373 (Pa. 1979), overruled in
part by Commonwealth v. Christine, 125 A.3d 394 (Pa. 2015)3 our
Supreme Court held that the defendant need not have knowledge of the
defendant’s prior conviction to meet the second prong of the Amos test, i.e.,
that the victim had violent propensities and was the aggressor.
Instantly, the trial court held Godfrey’s 1989 conviction inadmissible
because Appellant failed to establish his knowledge of it and because it was
too remote in time. As to the former, the trial court erred. Pursuant to Beck,
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3 The Supreme Court overruled Beck to the extent that it stood for the
proposition that all prior assault convictions are sufficiently similar and thus
admissible to demonstrate the victim’s propensity for violence. Christine,
125 A.3d at 400 n.9. Courts must determine whether the facts of the prior
act are sufficiently similar on a case-by-case basis. Id.
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Appellant did not need to establish his knowledge of the 1989 conviction in
order to establish that Godfrey had violent propensities and was the
aggressor. As to the latter, we conclude the trial court acted within its
permissible discretion in excluding the 1989 conviction as too remote in time.
The trial court cited Commonwealth v. Quarles, 456 A.2d 188, 192 (Pa.
Super. 1983) in which this Court noted that no Pennsylvania decision had ever
admitted a victim’s prior conviction that was more than three years old. The
Quarles Court held the trial court properly excluded evidence of an undefined
22-year-old conviction. Id. at 192-93. This Court in Commonwealth v.
Gilliard, 446 A.2d 951, 956 (Pa. Super. 1982), held the trial court properly
excluded evidence of a murder victim’s convictions of aggravated assault,
attempted rape, burglary, and impersonating a police officer because those
convictions predated the crime at issue by more than twenty years. We
conclude that Appellant’s assertion of error lacks merit.
In his fourth argument, Appellant claims the testimony of his expert
witness, Dr. Karl Williams, of Appellant’s intoxication was sufficient to negate
Appellant’s specific intent to kill Godfrey. Section 308 of the Crimes Code
provides that a defendant’s voluntary intoxication is not a defense except
where it is relevant to reduce a murder conviction to a lower degree. 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 308. To succeed on a voluntary intoxication defense, the
defendant must prove that he was “overwhelmed to the point of losing his
faculties and sensibilities.” Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 571 A.2d 1035,
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1041 (Pa. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990). This determination is
for the jury. Id.
Dr. Williams testified that Appellant weighed 160 pounds and that his
blood alcohol content (“BAC”) was .228 percent when his blood was drawn at
12:41 a.m. at St. Elizabeth Hospital, more than one hour after the shootings.
Appellant’s BAC would have been around .256 at the time of the shootings.
Dr. Williams concluded that Appellant was significantly impaired in all of his
capabilities as of that time, and that any person with a BAC above .2 is grossly
impaired. He would have expected Appellant to have slurred speech and be
unable to walk across a parking lot without swaying. He also testified that
some people develop a tolerance to alcohol and appear to not to be as
impaired as they really are.
Nonetheless, the jury also heard evidence of Appellant’s interaction with
his cousin, Alvin Hancock, Jr., shortly after the shootings. Appellant appeared
glossy eyed and drunk to Hancock. Nonetheless, Appellant had the presence
of mind to concoct a false story, telling Hancock he was stabbed because he
failed to pay for oral sex from another man’s girlfriend. Subject to an
outstanding warrant in Farrell, Pennsylvania, Appellant asked to be taken to
an out-of-state hospital. Appellant got into Hancock’s car under his own
power, and he chose to walk across a parking lot at St. Elizabeth Hospital
under his own power rather than have Hancock drop him off at the entrance.
The jury observed surveillance video showing Appellant walking across the
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parking lot without visibly swaying. When they arrived at St. Elizabeth,
Appellant told Hancock he was okay. Officer Steven Gibson of the Youngstown
Police Department interviewed Appellant shortly after his arrival at St.
Elizabeth and Appellant once again gave a false account and denied knowing
where or by whom he was stabbed.
The evidence of record supports a finding that Appellant’s sensibilities
were not so overwhelmed that he was unable to form the specific intent to
kill. Appellant had the presence of mind to request a specific hospital and to
give false accounts of his stabbing. Further, there is no evidence that
Appellant was slurring his speech or staggering, as Dr. Williams testified that
he should have been. The jury was free to credit the evidence demonstrating
Appellant’s presence of mind and control of his physical faculties, and reject
Dr. Williams’ testimony. Appellant’s voluntary intoxication argument fails.
Next, Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to disprove that
Appellant acted in self-defense. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides in
relevant part:
(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the person.--
The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when
the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the
purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by
such other person on the present occasion.
(b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.—
[…]
(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this
section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary
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to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury,
kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or
threat; nor is it justifiable if:
(i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or
serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force against
himself in the same encounter; or
(ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of
using such force with complete safety by retreating, except
the actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place
of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in
his place of work by another person whose place of work the
actor knows it to be.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a), (b)(2).
Where the defendant properly raises a self-defense claim, the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act in self-defense. Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa.
Super. 2014).
The Commonwealth sustains this burden if it establishes at
least one of the following: 1) the accused did not reasonably
believe that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury; or
2) the accused provoked or continued the use of force; or 3) the
accused had a duty to retreat and the retreat was possible with
complete safety.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Hammond, 953 A.2d 544, 559 (Pa. Super.
2008), appeal denied, 964 A.2d 894 (Pa. 2009)).4
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4 The following governs our review of the sufficiency of the evidence:
The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
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In support of his argument, Appellant notes that he was stabbed, that
Godfrey was found with a knife in his hand, and that Appellant’s blood was on
that knife. Id. We agree with Appellant that the evidence clearly indicates
that Godfrey stabbed him. Furthermore, we are willing to assume, for
purposes of this issue only, that Godfrey was the initial aggressor. Even so,
Appellant cannot obtain relief.
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the
fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Furthermore,
when reviewing a sufficiency claim, our Court is required to give
the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence.
However, the inferences must flow from facts and
circumstances proven in the record, and must be of such volume
and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence and
satisfy the jury of an accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on conjecture and
speculation and a verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail
even under the limited scrutiny of appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 275-76 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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As explained above, witnesses heard two volleys of shots, with a pause
in between. The first volley included two or three shots, and the second volley
included more. Police recovered three nine-millimeter casings near where
Odem was shot, and eight more closer to the location of Godfrey’s body.
Godfrey’s body was found roughly 150 feet from the site of Odem’s shooting,
and more than 60 feet from the location where Appellant fired the eight
additional shots. The two bullets that hit Godfrey entered his body from
behind.
Thus, reviewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, it appears that Appellant pursued Godfrey
from the site of the Odem shooting and fired at him eight times. The fact that
two bullets hit Godfrey from behind—and from outside of point blank range—
establishes that Appellant was not in any immediate danger from Godfrey’s
knife, and that Godfrey was fleeing from Appellant’s gunfire. We therefore
conclude that the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant continued the use of force after force was no longer necessary for
self-defense, and that Appellant could have retreated with complete safety.
Appellant’s self-defense argument fails.
Next, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of
his first degree murder conviction, arguing that his voluntary intoxication
and/or self-defense arguments negated his specific intent to kill. This
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argument is simply a brief restatement of two arguments we have already
rejected. Appellant therefore cannot obtain relief.
In his seventh and final argument, Appellant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence in support of his aggravated assault5 of Odem. He claims that
he shot Odem in the course of defending himself from Godfrey’s knife assault.
As noted above, Odem testified that she heard a voice call her name, turned
to look, and Appellant opened fire on her. The jury was entitled to credit
Odem’s eyewitness testimony, and her testimony by itself is more than
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant did not shoot
Odem in self-defense. There is no evidence that Godfrey stabbed Appellant
before he shot Odem. Appellant’s argument fails.
Because we have found all of Appellant’s arguments lacking in merit, we
affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Dubow and Judge Nichols concur in the result.
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5 Aggravated assault occurs where the defendant “attempts to cause serious
bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme difference to human life.”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/11/2018
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