Com. v. Bates, M. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S65007-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :
    MARC S. BATES A/K/A MARC S.              :
    BATTES                                   :
    :   No. 1707 MDA 2017
    Appellant             :
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 26, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-38-CR-0001906-2014
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                        FILED DECEMBER 24, 2018
    Marc S. Bates, also known as Marc S. Battes, appeals from the judgment
    of sentence entered August 26, 2017, in the Lebanon County Court of
    Common Pleas. We affirm.
    This Court previously summarized the facts of the case and initial
    procedural history as follows:
    On October 14, 2014, the Commonwealth charged
    [Appellant] with delivery of cocaine and criminal use of a
    communications facility. At trial, the Commonwealth presented
    evidence that Sergeant Brett Hopkins of the Lebanon County Drug
    Task Force utilized a confidential informant (“CI”) to introduce him
    to a cocaine dealer known only as “Mighty Mike.” N.T., Trial,
    6/10/15, at 4–8. The CI contacted Mighty Mike and arranged for
    a cocaine transaction. See 
    id., at 9.
    Shortly before 10 p.m., a white car, later determined to be
    [Appellant’s], pulled up on the street in front of Sergeant Hopkins
    and the CI. See 
    id., at 9;
    33–34. Sergeant Hopkins testified that
    he saw, but could not identify, a Hispanic female driving the
    J-S65007-18
    vehicle. See 
    id., at 26.
    A black male exited the vehicle and
    approached the CI. See 
    id., at 9.
    Sergeant Hopkins handed the
    CI $100 of “prerecorded drug task force funds,” and the CI
    immediately handed the money to the black male. 
    Id. In exchange,
    the man handed the CI a white envelope containing
    crack cocaine and then quickly departed. See 
    id., at 10.
    The transaction lasted no more than a minute. See 
    id., at 26.
    During that time, Sergeant Hopkins stood within inches of the
    black male. See 
    id., at 17.
    He stated that he got a clear look at
    the man’s face. See 
    id., at 28.
    Sergeant Hopkins positively
    identified [Appellant] as the man who handed the envelope to the
    CI. See 
    id., at 8.
    [Appellant] pursued a mistaken identity defense at trial. In
    furtherance of this strategy, he sought pre-trial disclosure of the
    identity of the CI.        The trial court denied this request.
    Furthermore, [Appellant] sought to present the testimony of his
    girlfriend, Ali Marinkov. [Appellant] proffered that Marinkov would
    testify that during the time in question, she would take
    [Appellant’s] car with people other than [Appellant] to engage in
    narcotics transactions.      The trial court barred Marinkov’s
    testimony on the grounds that she was an undisclosed alibi
    witness. Finally, [Appellant] sought to introduce a picture of
    himself and his brother in an attempt to bolster his argument that
    Sergeant Hopkins had mistakenly identified him. The trial court
    denied admission of the photograph on the ground that
    [Appellant] could not present the testimony of the person who had
    taken the photograph.
    The trial court entered a directed verdict on the criminal use
    of a communications facil[i]ty charge, and the jury convicted
    [Appellant] on the delivery of cocaine charge. [Appellant] filed a
    post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied.
    Commonwealth v. Bates, 
    161 A.3d 376
    , 291 MDA 2016 (Pa. Super. filed
    February 13, 2017) (unpublished memorandum at *1).
    In the prior appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s determination that the
    evidence at trial was sufficient to establish Appellant’s identity as the
    perpetrator, that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, and
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    that the trial court did not err in denying admission of the photograph of
    Appellant’s brother because the photograph was not relevant to any issue at
    trial, thereby affirming the judgment of sentence in part. However, we also
    concluded that we were unable to address Appellant’s claim that the trial court
    erred in denying the pretrial disclosure of the CI’s identity, and we remanded
    to the trial court for a hearing.              Bates, 291 MDA 2016 (unpublished
    memorandum at *4). In addition, we determined that the trial court erred in
    denying Appellant the opportunity to present the testimony of his girlfriend
    because it impacted Appellant’s mistaken-identity defense. Thus, we vacated
    that ruling and remanded “for both sides to be given an opportunity to provide
    proffers or evidence addressing the issue of relevance.” 
    Id. Upon remand,
    on September 25, 2017, the trial court held a hearing at
    which Sergeant Hopkins was the sole witness. Following the hearing, the trial
    court ruled from the bench, and subsequently filed an order on September 26,
    2017, confirming its denial of disclosure of the CI’s identity. The trial court
    concluded that “the disclosure of the identification of the [CI] in this case could
    and would present danger to that [CI] . . . .” Order, 9/26/17, at 2. Also in
    that order, the trial court observed that Appellant waived the issue regarding
    the presentation of Appellant’s girlfriend as a witness.1 
    Id. Appellant filed
    a
    ____________________________________________
    1  Appellant confirmed at the remand hearing that he was withdrawing the
    issue concerning his request to have his girlfriend testify. N.T., 9/25/17, at
    13–14.
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    timely notice of appeal; Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
    1925.
    Appellant raises the following single issue for review:       “Did the Trial
    Court err by denying Appellant’s oral pretrial motion for disclosure of the
    identity of the Confidential Informant?” Appellant’s Brief at 4. In making this
    argument, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth failed to establish that
    at the time of trial, “there existed a reasonably specific type of danger that
    would result from the disclosure of the CI’s identity.” Appellant’s Brief at 11.
    Appellant does not support any bald allegation in his brief with citation to the
    notes of testimony.2 
    Id. at 11–12.
    See Commonwealth v. Rompilla, 
    983 A.2d 1207
    (Pa. 2009) (an appellant’s failure to support bald assertions with
    sufficient citation can impede meaningful judicial review).
    “Our standard of review of claims that a trial court erred in its disposition
    of a request for disclosure of an informant’s identity is confined to abuse of
    discretion.” Commonwealth v. Jordan, 
    125 A.3d 55
    , 62 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (en banc).     Jordan delineated the applicable Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    precedent     outlining    the    test   employed   to   determine    whether    the
    Commonwealth must reveal the identity of a confidential informant, as
    ____________________________________________
    2 We note that the Commonwealth, as well, has failed to support its references
    to Sergeant Hopkins’s testimony with citations to the notes of testimony.
    Commonwealth’s Brief at 11.
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    contained in Commonwealth v. Bing, 
    713 A.2d 56
    (Pa. 1998).3                The
    Commonwealth retains a qualified privilege to withhold the identity of a
    confidential source.      Commonwealth v. Watson, 
    69 A.3d 605
    , 607 (Pa.
    Super. 2013). In order to overcome the Commonwealth’s privilege and obtain
    disclosure of a CI’s identity during pretrial discovery, the defendant must
    establish that the informant’s identity is material to the preparation of a
    defense and that the request is reasonable.       
    Jordan, 125 A.3d at 63
    ;
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(2)(i). The trial court may not exercise its discretion to
    determine whether disclosure is required until the defendant makes the
    threshold showing of materiality and reasonableness. 
    Jordan, 125 A.3d at 63
    . If a defendant is able to establish the threshold showing of materiality
    and reasonableness, the court must:
    balance the public interest in the police’s ability to obtain
    information[,] against the defendant’s right to prepare his
    defense. In this connection, we consider the crime, the potential
    defense, and the significance of the confidential informant’s
    testimony. The scales tip in favor of disclosure if the
    Commonwealth will be relying on police testimony based
    on a single observation. If other proof corroborates a police
    officer’s testimony, disclosure is not mandated. Furthermore, the
    safety of the confidential informant can be a controlling
    factor in determining whether to reveal a source’s identity.
    ____________________________________________
    3  While Appellant cites to Commonwealth v. Marsh, 
    997 A.2d 318
    (Pa.
    2010), for the applicable test, the Jordan Court noted that Marsh was a
    plurality decision with respect to the balancing factors to be applied in this
    context. 
    Jordan, 125 A.3d at 62
    n.3.
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    Id. (emphases added).
    We previously concluded that Appellant “established
    that the identity of the CI was material to his mistaken identity defense.”
    Bates, 291 MDA 2016 (unpublished memorandum at *4). We also previously
    concluded that “absent evidence of a ‘reasonably specific type of danger’ to
    the CI, disclosure of the [CI’s] identity was warranted.” 
    Id. Thus, the
    only
    question before the court upon remand regarding this issue concerned
    whether the safety of the CI compelled nondisclosure of his identity.
    As 
    noted supra
    , Sergeant Hopkins was the sole witness at the
    September 25, 2017 hearing upon remand. Sergeant Hopkins testified that
    in early 2015, prior to trial, he and Detective Mong4 met with the CI. N.T.,
    9/25/17, at 5.     The CI relayed to police that he had been “harassed by a
    girlfriend of a [d]efendant[] that [he] had been involved in a drug buy [with]
    and the person was already incarcerated.” 
    Id. at 6.
    In another instance, the
    CI, who had recently had hip surgery, had been assaulted in retaliation for his
    cooperation before the trial. 
    Id. at 6,
    9. The CI believed his name “was out
    there and [he was] being targeted because of cooperation with law
    enforcement.” 
    Id. at 6.
    Sergeant Hopkins, a thirty-year member of the Drug
    Task Force who worked with informants on a weekly basis, testified that he
    was concerned, based on his knowledge of the CI’s involvement in this case,
    ____________________________________________
    4   Detective Mong’s given name is not identified in the record.
    -6-
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    that the CI “would be subject to further harassment or assault if his or her
    identity were disclosed in this case.” 
    Id. at 7.
    Based on this evidence, the trial court found:
    by evidence clearly that the disclosure of the identification of the
    [CI] in this case could and would present danger to that [CI] if it
    was disclosed and therefore it’s an exception to the Payne[5] case
    consistent with Commonwealth v. Marsh, 
    997 A.2d 318
    . For that
    reason, the [c]ourt would deny the Pre-Trial Motion had it been
    heard at the appropriate time and also rules in this manner upon
    remand by the Superior Court.
    Order, 9/26/17, at 2.
    Thus, the trial court weighed the competing interests and concluded that
    the scales tip against disclosure of the CI’s identity. Here, as in Bing, the
    Commonwealth demonstrated, through Sergeant Hopkins’s testimony, that
    revealing the identity of the [CI] could place his physical safety in jeopardy.
    “It is this showing of a reasonably specific type of danger which justifies
    keeping an informant’s identity confidential.” 
    Bing, 713 A.2d at 60
    (citing
    Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    518 A.2d 1187
    (Pa. 1986).6                   This was a
    ____________________________________________
    5 Commonwealth v. Payne, 
    656 A.2d 77
    (Pa. 1994), wherein our Supreme
    Court held that the combination of the single view of the appellant by one
    police officer and the time lapse between the sale and the arrest mandated
    that the identity of the informant should have been revealed. Payne did not
    involve testimony concerning the CI’s safety.
    6  Appellant’s bald assertion in his brief, cited without any substantiation, that
    the CI’s identity was disclosed in some unidentified trial does not require a
    different result. Appellant’s Brief at 11. See N.T., 9/25/17, at 8–9 (CI’s
    identity was disclosed in a trial subsequent to Appellant’s trial and CI was
    assaulted thereby requiring hospitalization).
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    determination left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we discern no
    abuse of that discretion.    Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of
    sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/24/2018
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1707 MDA 2017

Filed Date: 12/24/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/24/2018